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ARTICLES

THE IMAGE OF THE WEREWOLF IN MEDIEVAL LITERATURE

PETER BYSTRICKÝ

BYSTRICKÝ, Peter. The image of the werewolf in medieval literature. *Historický časopis*, 2015, 63, 5, pp. 787-812, Bratislava.

The subject of the study is the transformation of humans into wolves in medieval chivalric romances, rhymed tales (lais), educational works, Norse sagas, Russian literature and Serbian folk songs. The medieval idea of a werewolf was anatomically an ordinary wolf, but it retained human memory, mind, habits and upbringing. People, almost always men, became wolves either voluntarily with help from magic, wolf skin or enchanted objects such as rings, or involuntarily when somebody cursed or betrayed them. In medieval chivalrous literature, the traitor was always a woman, either a malicious wife or jealous step-mother. One of the conditions for a werewolf's return to human form was clothes, a motif already found in the antiquity. Werewolves with cyclical transformations hid their clothes, because without them they would remain wolves until the end of their lives. The details of transformation into wolves in the Primary Chronicle, Russian heroic poems (byliny) or Serbian folklore are not known, but the circumstances indicate that this ability was attributed to wizards and heroes.

Werewolf. Wolf. Middle Ages. Literature. Transformation. Lycanthropy.

Although our ideas of werewolves were formed only in the Middle Ages, belief in the possibility of changing into a wolf or other form, or the wish to do so reaches far back into the past.¹ The oldest text mentioning the transformation of a human into a wolf is

1 The phenomenon of the werewolf can be researched from various points of view – history, mythology, ethnology, folklore, occultism, the history of literature, art history and cinematography. From the rich literature on the theme see, for example: LEUBUSCHER, Rudolf. *Über die Werwölfe und Tierverwandlungen im Mittelalter*. Berlin : Druck und Verlag von G. Reimer, 1850; HERTZ, Wilhelm. *Der Werwolf: Beitrag zur Sagengeschichte*. Stuttgart : Verlag von A. Kröner, 1862; SMITH, Kirby Flower. An historical Study of the Werwolf in Literature. In *PMLA*, 1894, Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 1-42. ISSN 0030-8129; STEWART, Caroline Taylor. The origin of the werewolf superstition. In *The University of Missouri studies. Social science series*, 1909, Vol. 2, No. 3, p. 253-284 (p. 1-37); BARING-GOULD, Sabine. *The Book of Werewolves*. London : Smith, Elder & Co., 1865; SUMMERS, Montague. *The Werewolf in Lore and Legend*. New York : Dover Publications, 2003 [reprint 1933]. ISBN 9780486430904; O'DONNELL, Elliott. *Werewolves*. London : Methuen & Co., 1912; EISLER, Robert. *Man Into Wolf*. London : Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd, 1951; SENN, Harry. Romanian Werewolves : Seasons, Ritual, Cycles. In *Folklore*, 1982, Vol. 93, No. 2, p. 206-215. ISSN 0015-587x; OTTEN, Charlotte F. *A Lycanthropy Reader. Werewolves in Western Culture*. New York : Syracuse University Press, 1986. ISBN 9780815623847; DOUGLAS, Adam. *The beast within. A History of the Werewolf*. New York : Avon Books, 1994. ISBN 9780380722648; VEENSTRA, Jan R. The ever-changing nature of beast. Cultural change, lycanthropy

the Gilgamesh Epic from the 13th – 10th centuries BC. Gilgamesh rejected the goddess Ishtar and reminded her of all the lovers she had. One of them was a shepherd, who she changed into a wolf when she got tired of him. The wolf was hunted by the other shepherds and by his own dogs.² The Greek goddess Leto, mother of Apollo and Artemis, voluntarily changed into a wolf to escape from Hera. In myths, Leto and Apollo are close to wolves or wolves are close to them.³ According to one version of the myth, Leto gave birth to Apollo while she was in the form of a wolf, and the wolves formed his community. Apollo is supposed to have gained the title “Lykégenés” from this, and he also had the attribute “Lykios”. The temple at Delphi contained a statue of a wolf in memory of Apollo’s birth.⁴ The inhabitants of Delos apparently claimed that the she-wolf spent twelve days and nights giving birth to her young, because this was the length of time Leto travelled from the mythical Hyperboreans to Delos.⁵ Morrigan, the Irish goddess of fertility, war and death, also changed into a she-wolf. Before a battle, she wanted to give her favour to the Irish hero Cú Chulainn, but he did not recognize and rejected her. Then the insulted Morrigan attacked him in the form of various animals, including a reddish-grey she-wolf. Cú Chulainn defeated all her attacks and healed her wounds, but he lost the battle with the enemy.⁶ The Norse goddess Idun, wife of Bragi also received

and the question of substantial transformation. In BREMER, Jan N. – VEENSTRA, Jan R. (eds.). *The Metamorphosis of Magic from Late Antiquity to the Early Modern Period*. Leuven : Peeters, 2002, p. 133-166. ISBN 9042912278; LECOUTEUX, Claude. *Witches, Werewolves, and Fairies: Shapeshifters and Astral Doubles in the Middle Ages*. Inner Traditions, 2003. ISBN 9780892810963; BOURGALT du COUDREY, Chantal. *The Curse of the Werewolf: Fantasy, Horror and the Beast Within*. London; New York : I.B. Tauris, 2006. ISBN 9781845111588; De BLÉCOURT, Willem. „I Would Have Eaten You Too“: Werewolf Legends in the Flemish, Dutch and German Area. In *Folklore*, 2007, Vol. 118, No. 1, p. 23-43; SCONDUTO, Leslie A. *Metamorphoses of the Werewolf: A Literary Study from Antiquity through the Renaissance*. Jefferson NC; London : McFarland, 2008. ISBN 9780786435593; MABERRY, Jonathan – KRAMER, David F. *They bite*. New York : Citadel Press, 2009, p. 152-184. ISBN 9780806528205; ANTONÍN, Luboš. *Bestiář. (Bestiary)*. Praha : Půdorys; Argo, 2010, p. 154-174. ISBN 9788025703472; STYPCZYŃSKI, Brent A. *The Modern Literary Werewolf : A Critical Study of the Mutable Motif*. Jefferson NC : McFarland, 2013. ISBN 9780786469659; BERESFORD, Matthew. *The White Devil*. London : Reaktion, 2013. ISBN 9781780231384.

- 2 *Epos o Gilgamešovi, tabuľka VI (Gilgamesh Epic, tablet VI)* (edition: ZAMAROVSKÝ, Vojtech. *Gilgameš*. Bratislava : Perfekt, 2000, p. 35. ISBN 8080461414).
- 3 OVIDIUS, *Metamorphoses VI, 313-381* (Slovak translation: OVIDIUS. *Metamorfózy*. 2 zv., prel. I. Šafár, Martin : Thetis 2012, ISBN 9788089520077); ANTONINUS LIBERALIS, *Metamorphoses 35* (edition: *Mythographoi, Scriptorum Poeticae Historiae Graeci*. Ed. A. Westermann, Brunswigae : G. Westermann, 1843).
- 4 AELIANUS, *De natura animalium X, 26* (edition: *Claudii Aeliani De natura animalium libri XVII*. Rec. R. Hercher. Lipsiae : B. G. Teubner, 1864). Compare ARISTOTELES, *Historia Animalium VI, 35* (edition: ARISTOTLE. *Historia Animalium*, Vol. 1. Ed. D. M. Balme. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2002. ISBN 0521480027).
- 5 AELIANUS, *De natura animalium IV, 4*.
- 6 *Táin Bó Cúailnge XV 2302-05 and 2365-66* (edition: *The Ancient Irish Epic Tale Táin Bó Cúailnge, 'The Cúailgne Cattle-raid'*. Trans. by J. Dunn. London : David Nutt, 1914, p. 170-173). One version of the story, which is part of the extensive Ulster cycle, is preserved in the *Yellow Book of Lecan* and the *Book of the Dun Cow* (edition: *The Táin bó Cúailnge from the Yellow book of Lecan with variant readings from the Lebor na huidre*. Ed. by J. Strachan and J. G. O’Keeffe. Dublin; London : Royal Irish Academy, 1912 (the encounter of Morrigan with Cú Chulainn p. 59-60)), the second, from which J. Dunn’s translation derives, is in the *Leinster Book*. More recent editions of both versions with translations, but with different

a wolf's skin. However, the wolf form changed her feelings and nature.⁷ The sorceress Kirké changed her suitors and accidental sailors into predatory animals with the help of spells and magic drinks, but leaving them with human minds. The wolves and lions lived near her house and were all peaceful and friendly. They ran around Odysseus and wagged their tails like dogs expecting morsels.⁸ Kirké also changed Odysseus' companions into pigs, but according to *Pseudo-Apollodorus*, not all of them. She transformed some of them into wolves, lions or asses.⁹

Undoubtedly the most important Greek story about the transformation of a human being into a wolf, is the story of Lykaon, mythical founder and king of the Arcadian city of Lykosura, not far from Lykaion, the highest mountain in Arcadia and sacred to Zeus Lykaios. It is preserved in several versions. Lykaon wanted to test the divinity of Zeus by offering him as food or a sacrifice, the internal organs or flesh of a slaughtered child, mixed with other food. The enraged Zeus overturned the table and killed all Lykaon's fifty sons with one thunderbolt as punishment for being the most godless of all people. He transformed King Lykaon into a wolf.¹⁰ Lykaon never returned to his human form.

The Greek traveller and writer *Pausanias* (c. 110 – 180) considered this old story probable and believed it. Allegedly a person in Arcadia could still change into a wolf and remain in this form for nine years. However, if he tasted human flesh, he remained a wolf until the end of his life.¹¹ On the other hand, *Pliny the Elder* (23 – 79) thought that

numbering, were produced by Cecile O'Rahilly in 1970 and 1976.

- 7 *Edda, Hrafnagaldr Odins 8* (this incomplete and especially unclear poem is not included in the more recent editions, but it appears, for example, in the edition: *Edda Sæmundar Hinns Froða – The Edda Of Sæmund The Learned*. Trans. by B. Thorpe. London: Trübner, 1866). GUÐMUNDSDÓTTIR, Aðalheiður. The Werewolf in Medieval Icelandic Literature. In *Journal of English and Germanic Philology*, 2007, Vol. 106, No. 3, p. 288-289. ISSN 0363-6941. The Norse god Vali Loki's son was changed into a wolf to tear apart his brother Narfi. SNORRI STURLUSON, *Edda, Gylfagining 50* (edition: SNORRI STURLUSON, *Edda a Sága o Ynglingich (Edda and Yngling Saga)*). Trans. H. Kadečková. Praha: Argo, 2003. ISBN 8072034588), similarly the poem *Lokasena* (edition: *Edda*. Translated by L. Heger. Praha: Argo, 2004, p. 145. ISBN 8072035339).
- 8 HOMER, *Odyssey IX*, 208-243 (Slovak translation: HOMÉROS. *Odysseia*. 2 volumes. Translated by M. Okál. Martin: Thetis, 2011. ISBN 9788089520053); OVIDIUS, *Metamorphoses XIV, 254-261*; VERGILIUS, *Aeneas VII, 18-20* (Czech translation: VERGILIUS. *Aeneis*. Translated by O. Vaňorný, AK 7. Praha: Svoboda, 1970); BOETHIUS, *Consolatio philosophie IV, 3, 13-14* (Czech translation: BOETHIUS. *Filosofie utěšitelkou*. Translated by V. Bahník. Praha: Vyšehrad, 2012. ISBN 9788074293023).
- 9 PSEUDO-APOLLODORUS, *Bibliotheca E7. 14-19* (edition: APOLLODORUS, *The Library*, Vol. 2, with an English translation by J. G. Frazer, Loeb Classical Library No. 122. Cambridge: Heinemann; London: Putnam's sons, 1921).
- 10 OVIDIUS, *Metamorphoses I, 163-239*; APOLLODORUS, *Bibliotheca III, 8, 1* (edition: *Mythographoi*, ref. 3); PAUSANIAS, *Descriptio Graeciae VIII, 2, 1 and VIII, 2, 3-5* (Czech translation: PAUSANIAS. *Cesta po Řecku I a II*. Translated by H. Businská. AK 20, Praha: Svoboda, 1973); LYCOPHRON, *Alexandra 479-480* (edition: *Lykophron's Alexandra*. Ed. C. von Holzinger. Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1895); PSEUDO-ERATOSTHENES, *Catasterismi 1* (edition: *Mythographoi*, ref. 3); HYGINUS, *Fabulae 176* (edition: *Hygini Fabulae*. Ed. M. Schmidt, Jenae 1872). On transformation into a wolf as a punishment see VEENSTRA, ref. 1, p. 136, 140-142.
- 11 PAUSANIAS, *Descriptio Graeciae VIII, 2, 6*. On Greek ideas about wolves and werewolves see BUXTON, Richard. Wolves and Werewolves in Greek Thought. In BREMMER, Jan (ed.). *Interpretations of Greek Mythology*. New York: Routledge, 1987, p. 60-80. ISBN 9780415744515.

the transformation of a person into a wolf and back was complete fiction.¹² According to him, the idea of the skin-changer (*versipellis*) originated in Arcadia, where – quoting the Greek author *Euanthes* – the locals claimed that the descendents of a certain Anthos chose one from among them and took him to a lake. There, he undressed and hung his clothes on an oak tree. The young man then went into the water and came out as a wolf. He remained with others of his kind for nine years. If he had not attacked a human in that time, he returned to the same lake, went into the water and came out in human form, but nine years older, and – as a certain *Fabius* writes – put on the same clothes. *Pliny* lamented Greek credulity and referred to the Greek author *Agrippa* and his story of Demaenetus from Parrhasia, who tasted the internal organs of a sacrificed child during a ceremony in honour of the Arcadian Zeus Lykaios, and changed into a wolf. After ten years he returned to human form, participated in the Olympic Games and won.¹³ The Arcadian celebrations and transformation into a wolf were also mentioned by *Plato* (427 – 347 BC), who used this myth as a metaphor for consideration of tyrannical rulers.¹⁴ The Neo-Platonic philosopher *Porphyrus* also wrote about bloody ceremonies during the “Lupercalia”.¹⁵ Thanks to a mention of the human sacrifices to Zeus Lykaios by the Christian writer *St. Augustine* (354 – 430), the story of the Arcadians also became known in the Middle Ages.¹⁶

When *Herodotus* (484 – 425 BC) wrote about the nations living north of the Black Sea, he stated that the Neuri might be wizards. The Greeks and Scythians who lived there, said that once a year, each of them changed into a wolf, and after a few days returned to human form.¹⁷ Although *Herodotus* doubted this, his information was still used by the Roman geographer *Pomponius Mela* in the 1st century AD.¹⁸

The only Roman story about a werewolf was written by *Petronius* (27 – 66). Niceros, one of the guests at Trimalchio’s dinner party, told of his terrible experience on a journey to visit his girlfriend. When he came among grave monuments, a soldier, who accompanied him, took his clothes off, laid them on the ground and made a circle around them by urinating. Then he immediately changed into a wolf, began to howl and ran off into the forest. Niceros wanted to pick up his clothes, but they had become as heavy as stone. When he eventually came to Melissa, she told him about the wolf that had come into the enclosure and began to kill sheep. It went away only when one of the slaves injured its neck with a spear. In the morning, Niceros hurried to go home. Where the clothes had

12 PLINIUS, *Naturalis historia VIII, 34, 80* (edition: *C. Plini Secundi Naturalis historiae libri XXXVII*. Ed. K. F. Th. Mayhoff. Lipsiae : B.G. Teubner, 1906).

13 PLINIUS, *Naturalis historia VIII, 34, 82*; PAUSANIAS, *Descriptio Graeciae VI, 8, 2*.

14 PLATO, *De republica VIII, 16* (565d-e) (Czech translation: PLATÓN. *Ústava*. Translated by F. Novotný. Praha : Oikúmené, 2001. ISBN 8086005283).

15 PORPHYRIUS, *De abstinentia ab esu animalium II, 27* (edition: *Select Works of Porphyry*. Trans. Th. Taylor. London : Th. Rodd, 1823).

16 AUGUSTINUS, *De civitate Dei XVIII, 17* (Slovak translation: Sv. AUGUSTÍN. *Boží štát, Zv. I a II*. Translated by J. Kováč. Trnava : Lúč, 2005. ISBN 8071625736).

17 HERODOTUS, *Historia IV, 105* (Czech translation: HÉRODOTOS. *Dějiny*. Translated by J. Šonka. Praha : Academia, 2004. ISBN 8020011927).

18 POMONIUS MELA, *De Chorographia II, 1, 14* (edition: *Pomponii Melae De chorographia libri tres*. Rec. C. Frick. Lipsiae, B.G. Teubner, 1880).

been, he saw only traces of blood. When he arrived home, a doctor was with soldier, treating his injured neck. Then Niceros understood that his neighbour was a werewolf.¹⁹ The story does not make clear why the soldier changed into a wolf. However, he certainly did not change voluntarily. *Vergil* (70 – 19 BC) mentions the ability to deliberately change. A girl from one of his poems wanted to attract back her boyfriend with the help of magic. She had already prepared herbs, that grew in Pontus and a certain Moeris had given to her. She had allegedly seen how he changed into a wolf with their help and hid in the forest.²⁰

Marcellus of Sidé from the 2nd century was the first to write of lycanthropy or cynanthropy as an illness. His poem *On lycanthropy* is preserved in the prose work of another doctor of medicine *Aetius of Amida* (527 – 626).²¹ People afflicted with this illness wander around at night in February, imitating wolves and dogs in every way. They stay near graves until dawn. They are pale, have an absent look, dry eyes and tongue, legs injured from falls and dog bites. When the illness, which is a form of melancholia, develops, it is necessary to open a vein as long as the patient does not lose consciousness. This is followed by healthy feeding, bathing in fresh water, application of whey, cleaning with preparations according to the recipes of Rufus, Archigenes or Justus, and finally viper anti-venom. When evening approaches and the illness begins to manifest itself, it is necessary to apply sleep-inducing ointment, calm the patient with damp poultices, apply opium to the nostrils and perhaps provide a drink promoting sleep. *Oribasius* (320 – 400), personal physician to the Emperor Julian the Apostate described lycanthropy almost identically,²² and this approach is also mentioned by the Byzantine physician *Paul of Aegina* (7th century), the author of an extensive medicinal work of encyclopedic character in seven books, in which he collected the existing knowledge about illnesses, medical procedures and surgery. He placed lycanthropy among the neurological illnesses as a sort of melancholia.²³ The Byzantine scholar *Michael Psellos* (1017 – 1078) and the physician *Zacharias Actuarius* (1275 – 1328) also devoted attention to lycanthropy, its symptoms and treatment.²⁴

19 PETRONIUS, *Satyricon* 62 (Czech translation: PETRONIUS. *Satirikon*. Translated by R. Hošek et al., AK 9. Praha : Svoboda, 1971). On the change of a wolf in moon light see VEENSTRA, ref. 1, p. 138-140.

20 VERGILIUS, *Bucolica, Ecloga VIII, 95-99* (Czech translation: *Pisne pastvín a lesů*. Přel. F. Novotný et al., AK 37. Praha : Svoboda, 1977); CROXEN, Kevin. *Lupum fieri: Werewolf Versipellis and Virgil's Eclogue 8*. In *Pomoerium*, 2000-2, Vol. 4, p. 51-59. ISSN 09452345; VEENSTRA, ref. 1, p. 135.

21 AETIUS AMIDENUS, *Libri medicinales VI, 11* (edition: *Aetii Amideni Libri medicinales V-VIII*. Ed. A. Olivieri, Corpus Medicorum Graecorum VIII/2. Berlin : Akademie Verlag, 1950).

22 ORIBASIUS, *Synopsis ad Eustathium filium VIII, 9* (edition: *Oribasii Synopsis ad Eustathium filium*. Ed. J. Raeder, CMG VI/3, Lipsiae et Berolini : B.G. Teubner, 1926).

23 PAULUS AEGINETA, *De re medica III, 16* (edition: *Paulus Aegineta, pars prior, libri I-IV*. Ed. I. L. Heiberg, CMG IX/1, Lipsiae et Berolini : B.G. Teubner, 1921).

24 MICHAEL PSELLUS, *Carmen de re medica*; JOANNES ACTUARIUS, *De methodo medendi I, 35*. On clinical lycanthropy and the Greek physicians see OTTEN, ref. 1, p. 13, 19-46; DOUGLAS, ref. 1, p. 8-9; VEENSTRA, ref. 1, p. 136-138 and 143-144; BREMMER, Jan N. *The Strange World of Human Sacrifice*. Leuven : Peeters, 2007, p. 71-73. ISBN 9789042918436; FODOR, Nandor. *Lycanthropy as a Psychic Mechanism*. In *The Journal of American Folklore*, 1945, Vol. 58, No. 230, p. 310-316. ISSN 0021-8715; DRAKE, Miles E. *Medical and neuropsychiatric aspects of lycanthropy*. In *Journal of Medical Huma-*

The wolf, imitation of it and accidental or deliberate transformation is also a theme of various Germanic stories. One of the oldest examples of “dog-heads” is the heroic saga narrated by *Paul the Deacon* (c. 720 – 799).²⁵ The Lombards allegedly claimed that dog-heads lived among them. They were persistent in battle and drank the blood of enemies and themselves. In another story, the Lombards came into conflict with the “Vulgars”, who were defeated by King Lamicho.²⁶ *Kemp Malone* explained his name as meaning “Little Dog” and identified him with Hungar (*Hundgar) mentioned in the Anglo-Saxon *Widsith* poem. This possibility is indicated not only by etymology, but also by Lamicho’s strange origin.²⁷ King Hunding appears in the *History of the Danes* by *Saxo Grammaticus* (c. 1150 – 1220) and in the *Edda* collection of Icelandic mythological and heroic poems from the 13th century.²⁸ Hunding killed Helgi, the most famous member of the hostile Wulfing, Wylfing or Ylfing clan. Under the assumption that the Hundings were Lombards and Wulfings Vulgari (*Wulf-gar), the subject of the Norse stories is the same as in the Lombard saga.

Strange stories about people with dogs’ heads came to Europe at the time of Alexander’s campaigns in Asia. Dogheads (*cynocephali*) were supposed to live somewhere in India. They dressed in animal skins and did not speak a human language, but barked like dogs and understood each other. They had dark skins, teeth bigger than those of dogs, longer and more rounded finger and toe nails. The inhabited high and inaccessible mountains near the River Indus. They did not build houses, but lived in caves. They did not trade, and lived only by hunting and herding. According to *Pliny*, dogheads also lived in Africa, but these were apparently baboons.²⁹

We also find mention of dogheads in *Augustine*, who was not concerned with where they live, but with whether they were really people.³⁰ According to *Isidore of Seville* (c. 560 – 636), the dogheads living in India “are so-named because they have dogs’ heads and bark, which suggests that they are more animals than humans”.³¹ They are similarly

nities, 1992, Vol. 13, No. 1, p. 5-15. ISSN 1041-3545; POULAKOU-REBELAKOU, E. – TSIAMIS, C. – PANTELEAKOS, G. – PLOUMPIDIS, D. Lycanthropy in Byzantine times (AD 330 – 1453). In *History of Psychiatry*, 2009, Vol. 20, No. 4, p. 468-479. ISSN 0957-154X.

25 PAULUS DIACONUS, *Historia Langobardorum I, 11* (edition: *Scriptores rerum Langobardicarum et Italicarum saec. VI. – IX.* Ed. G. Waitz. MGH : Scriptores rerum Langobardicarum et Italicarum. Hannoverae : Impendiis Bibliopolii Hahniani, 1878).

26 PAULUS DIACONUS, *Historia Langobardorum I, 15-17.*

27 Widsith, 116 (English translation: *Widsith, Beowulf, Finnsburgh, Waldere, Deor.* Trans. Ch. S. Moncrieff. London : Chapman & Hall, 1921). MALONE, Kemp. Agelmund and Lamicho. In *The American Journal of Philology*, 1926, Vol. 47, No. 4, p. 319-346. ISSN 0002-9475; HARRIS, Joseph. Myth and Literary History. Two Germanic Examples. In *Oral Tradition*, 2004, Vol. 19, No. 1, p. 9-10. ISSN 1542-4308.

28 SAXO GRAMMATICUS, *Gesta Danorum II, 5, 2-3* (edition: *Saxonis Gesta Danorum, Tomus I.* Rec. et ed. J. Olrik & H. Raeder. Kopenhagen : Levin Og Munksgaard, 1931). On Hunding and Helgi in the *Edda* see note 49.

29 CTESIAS, *Indica 37-43*; MEGASTHENES, *Indica*. Their works are lost and preserved only in fragments, quotations and excerpts. *Ctesias Indica* was quoted by the Byzantine scholar *Photios* (9th century). PLINIUS, *Naturalis historia VII, 2, 23* also referred to *Ctesias* and *Megasthenes*. On African dogheads see PLINIUS, *Naturalis historia VI, 35, 184, 190, VII, 2, 31* and *VIII, 80, 216*.

30 AUGUSTINUS, *De civitate Dei XVI, 8.*

31 ISIDORUS, *Etymologiae XI, 3, 15* (Czech translation: ISIDOR ZE SEVILLY. *Etymologiae XI - Etymo-*

described by the *Cosmographia of Aethicus Ister* from the 8th century.³² Their heads allegedly resembled dogs, but the rest of their bodies were human. They were tall, monstrous and with coarse faces. However, these dogheads did not live in India or Africa, but in a “northern island”, which was apparently Scandinavia. These pagans fought naked, coated their hair with grease, lived “sinful” lives and ate “impure” animals. We find a similar description of Germanic customs in *Tacitus* (56 – 117), according to whom, the Harii were one of the wildest tribes. They went into battle without armour and with only black shields to protect their naked, painted bodies. They fought mostly at night, when even the Moon was not shining, and they terrified their opponents with their appearance and cries.³³ *Saxo* preserved an old prophetic song, which encouraged warriors to drink the still warm blood of carnivorous animals and eat their raw meat, in order to gain their strength.³⁴ In the *Ynglinga Saga* by *Snorri Sturluson* (1179 – 1241), we read about Odin’s men, who were as furious as dogs or wolves, bit into shields, had the strength of bears or bulls and were not injured by fire or iron. They fought without armour, because Odin made their enemies blind, deaf and frightened, so that their weapons were as harmless as willow twigs. They were called *berserker*.³⁵

Before a battle, the berserker knew how to get themselves into a state similar to frenzy or madness, which was called *berserkergang*.³⁶ This battle frenzy did not last long and after the battle, weakness overcame them more than others. By imitating the form of the wolf or bear with the help of skin or behaviour, they aimed to gain for themselves his strength, courage and fury. Other people considered them brave, well-built and strong, but also ugly, bad-tempered and irritable. They aroused admiration and fear at the same time. In times of peace even their own people feared them, since they abducted women and challenged men to fight them. Berserker allegedly scorned armour because they believed that swords could not injure them. However, this was not entirely so, because the heroes of the Norse sagas killed many berserker. Their invulnerability also had another reason. They terrified opponents with their external appearance and war cries before they actually met in battle, and so undermined their will to fight. Berserker appear in various Norse sagas and songs. The first is the *Raven’s Song* (9th century), which is written in the form of a dialogue between a Valkyrie and a raven. In the song, those berserker who carry bloody shields into battle were called *ulfhednar*. When they went into battle, they also applied blood to their spears. On special occasions, kings relied on these brave men,

logie XI. Vol. 16. Translated by B. Kocánová et al. Praha : Oikúmené, 2009. ISBN 9788072983117). See also WHITE, David Gordon. *Myths of the Dog-Man*. Chicago; London : The University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 60-67. ISBN 0226895092.

32 *Aethici Istrici Cosmographia II*, 16 (edition: *Die Kosmographie des Aethicus*. MGH, Quellen zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, Bd. 14, hrsg. von O. Prinz. München : Gebr. Parcus KG, 1993. ISBN 3886120740).

33 TACITUS, *Germania* 43.

34 SAXO GRAMMATICUS, *Gesta Danorum I*, 6, 8.

35 SNORRI STURLUSON, *Heimskringla: Ynglinga Saga* 6.

36 FABING, H. D. On Going Berserk: A Neurochemical Inquiry. In *The Scientific Monthly*, 1956, Vol. 83, No. 5, p. 232-237. ISSN 0096-3771. On berserker see SPEIDEL, Michael P. *Ancient Germanic Warriors: Warrior Styles from Trajan’s Column to Icelandic*. London; New York : Routledge, 2004, p. 51-72. ISBN 0415311993.

who fought without fear or hesitation.³⁷ Ulfhednar are also mentioned in the Icelandic *Vatnsdæl Saga* (13th century): Some berserker were known as ulfhednar, they wore wolf skins instead of armour, and defended the front of the royal ship.³⁸ In the *Hervarar Saga* (13th century) twelve brothers were berserker. There were never more than twelve on their military expeditions, but when they went into battle, they always achieved victory. They were famous in all countries, and there was no king, who would deny them anything.³⁹ The legendary King of Sweden Adils also had twelve berserker, and the mythical King of Denmark Hrolf Kraki also sent against Adils the best twelve berserker, who jumped over fire.⁴⁰

In *Egil's Saga* (13th century), Ulf, nicknamed Kveldulf (Evening Wolf), was a shape-shifter (*hamrammr*). He had two sons, Thorolf and Grim. After Thorolf's death, Kveldulf and Grim fled to Iceland from the King of Norway Harald (872 – 930), for whom also twelve berserker fought. Egil Grim's son, the main figure in the saga, killed another berserker Ljot the Pale. Ljot was well-built and strong, but everybody hated him, because he was a ruffian, who challenged men to fight him and demanded their daughters. Before the fight with Egil, which he did not guess would be his last, rage seized him, he began to scream terrifyingly and to bite his shield.⁴¹ Berserker and ulfhednar are also mentioned in *Grettir's Saga* (14th century). Allegedly no weapon could harm the ulfhednar, and when they attacked no-one could resist them. The Norwegian Jarl Eirik prohibited combats (*holmgang*) and the berserker, who robbed and disturbed the peace, were outlawed in the whole of Norway. The worst of them were Thorir and Ogmund. When rage seized them, they began to howl like dogs. Nobody escaped them. They abducted the wives of other men and kept them for a week or two. Only the hero Grettir stopped their ravages. He also came into conflict with another group of berserker led by Snaekoll. When Snaekoll became enraged, he began to scream and bite his shield like a madman. Grettir used all his strength to drive the shield into Snaekoll's mouth and so kill him.⁴²

Saxo also describes berserker in several places, although he does not use this word for them. A certain Siwald allegedly had seven sons and all were experienced and had magic powers. They were often seized by a sudden strength of anger, they uttered terrifying screams, bit shields, swallowed red-hot coal and went through fire. They could

37 *Hráfnsmál 13* (edition: *Anglo-Saxon and Norse Poems*. Ed. and trans. by N. Kershaw. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1922, p. 84-85).

38 *Vatnsdæla saga 9* (edition: *Vatnsdæla saga ok Saga af Finnboga hinum rama*. Ed. J. Aal. Kjøbenhavn, 1812). On the ulfhednar and vargs (disinherited) in the Norse sagas see GUÐMUNDSDÓTTIR, ref. 7, p. 280-282.

39 *Hervarar Saga 2* (edition: *Sága o Hervaře – Hervarar Saga*. Prepared by Ján Kozák Jr. Praha : Herrmann a synové, 2008. ISBN 9788087054147).

40 *Hrólfs saga kraka 16-22 and 37* (edition [online]: *The Saga of Hrolf Kraki and his Champions*, © Peter Tunstall, 2003); SNORRI STURLUSON, *Edda, Skáldskaparmál 54* states that Hrolf sent twelve berserker to Adils. However, when Adils refused to pay them for their victory, Hrolf sent the berserker to Uppsala again against Adils.

41 *Egils saga 1, 9, 25, 27, 47 and 67* (edition: *The Story of Egil Skallagrimsson*. Trans. by W. C. Green. London : Elliot Stock, 1893).

42 *Grettis saga 2, 19, 20 and 40* (edition: *The Saga of Grettir the Strong*. Trans. by G. H. Hight. London : J.M. Dent, 1914).

be controlled only with chains, or they calmed themselves so that they could kill some people. Their fury allegedly had its origin in their coarse nature or evil power.⁴³ A similar fury could also overcome Harthben. This feared warrior was accompanied by twelve men, who bound him with chains and calmed his urge to fight. Before the struggle that became his last, he also got into a state of fury. He bit off the edge of his shield, swallowed red-hot coals, ran through the flames of a fire and killed half his men.⁴⁴ In another place, *Saxo* writes about Westmar, who had twelve sons. They were all brave, and skilled in battle and work with the sword. However, they were unscrupulous and amoral. They abducted the wives and daughters of other men, defiled virgins and did not avoid even old women. Men were afraid of them, and women feared for their honour. One of the Brothers, Grep, desired the king's daughter, who fled from him to a fortress.⁴⁵ *Saxo* also mentions twelve brothers from Norway. All were brave, well-built and strong, famous for many victories over giants and for the wealth they gained from subjugated peoples. They attacked and plundered the surrounding territories, looted and burnt houses, killed cattle and people.⁴⁶

We have a case of physical transformation into a wolf in the Icelandic *Saga of the Völsungs* (13th century).⁴⁷ King Völsung was killed by Siggeir, husband of his daughter Signy, and all his ten sons were captured. Their lives were spared only so that a worse death could be prepared for them. They were bound to trees in the forest and left so that Siggeir's mother, who knew how to change herself by magic into a huge she-wolf, could eat one of them every night. When only the eldest and strongest Sigmund remained, Signy smeared him with honey. Instead of killing him, the she-wolf began to lick him. When she pushed her tongue into his mouth, Sigmund bit it off and killed her. Signy, wishing to avenge the death of her father and nine brothers, later sent two of her young sons to Sigmund, who was hiding in the forest, so that he could prepare them for revenge. However, both failed a test and the disappointed Signy let them be killed. Finally, disguised as a völvu, a pagan priestess and fortune-teller, she visited her brother and conceived with him a third son, Sinfjötli, who passed the test and completed the training. Without knowing that they were father and son, they succeeded in killing Siggeir. One of the incidents during training by attacking and robbing people in Siggeir's territories, was transformation into wolves. With the aim of seizing gold rings, they entered a cottage and killed the two owners, who, coincidentally, were sons of Siggeir. In the house hung two wolf skins, which enabled their wearers to change into wolves for ten days.⁴⁸ The two put them on and not only turned into wolves, but also began to howl like wolves and to understand this howling. Since they could not immediately take off the wolf skins, they returned to the forest and separated. They could always call each other if got into danger.

43 SAXO GRAMMATICUS, *Gesta Danorum VII*, 2, 7.

44 SAXO GRAMMATICUS, *Gesta Danorum VII*, 2, 11.

45 SAXO GRAMMATICUS, *Gesta Danorum V*, 1, 3.

46 SAXO GRAMMATICUS, *Gesta Danorum VI*, 2, 1-7.

47 *Völsunga saga* 8 (edition: *Völsunga Saga – The Saga of the Volsungs*. Ed. and trans. by R. G. Finch. London : Nelson, 1965).

48 Similarly, Siggeir's mother had changed into a she-wolf for ten days, when she killed Völsung's ten sons in the forest.

However, young Sinfjötli did not listen, he did not call Sigmund and was injured in a fight with a stronger opponent. Sigmund angrily bit his neck, and cursing the wolf skins, hid him until the wounds healed. When they eventually took off the wolf skins, Sigmund threw them into a fire so that they would not cause such suffering to anybody again. While they were wolves they did Siggeir much harm. Sinfjötli's past as a werewolf is also recalled in the Eddic poem *The First Lay of Helgi Hundingsbane*.⁴⁹

Transformation into a wolf is also a subject of the Icelandic verse saga about Ála Flekk (14th – 15th century).⁵⁰ Ála, son of King Richard of England, was changed into a wolf by the troll Glóðarauga with the help of magic. However, the transformation is only one of the motifs and events in the saga. It appears only in the middle of the story (chapters VIII – X). According to a curse, he had to change into a wolf, flee into the forest and kill sheep and people. He could never be freed to the end of his life, unless a woman would intercede for him when he was caught, but it would never happen. However, it happened. His stepmother, who recognized him by his eyes, took him under her protection and he became human again. Then they burnt the wolf skin. This saga, like *Úlfhams saga*, *Tíóðels saga* and *Jóns saga leikara*,⁵¹ may already be inspired by Celtic stories and the chivalrous epics and prose of the time.

One of the best-known Irish stories about wolf people dates from the end of the 12th century. *Gerald of Wales* wrote the story of a priest, who talked with a wolf.⁵² When the priest and his companion spent the night in a forest somewhere between Ulster and Mide (today's County Meath), a wolf that knew how to speak and pray came to them. He informed them that there were two of them in the forest, him and his wife, both from the Ossory region (Osraige, today's County Kilkenny). For sins their clan had committed long ago, the 6th century Abbot Natalis had cursed their ancestors. From that time, every seven years, a man and woman put aside their human form to become wolves and go away from human habitations. At the end of seven years, if they survived, another couple replaced them and they returned home as people. However, since his wife was dying, he begged the priest to give her his blessing. Therefore, the priest went away with the wolf to a nearby tree, under which he saw a she-wolf groaning with a human voice. He did everything necessary, up to the final anointing. To convince him, the wolf pulled off the skin of the she-wolf with his mouth and uncovered the body of an old woman. The

49 *Edda, Helgakviða Hundingsbana I*, 36, 40, 41.

50 KITTREDGE, George Lyman. Arthur and Gorlagon. In *Studies and Notes in Philology and Literature* 8, Boston : Ginn and Company, 1903, p. 255-256; MORGAN, Hubert E. William of Palerne and Álaflekks Saga. In *Florilegium*, 1984, Vol. 6, p. 141-143. ISSN 0709-5201; GUÐMUNDSDÓTTIR, ref. 7, p. 295-298.

51 *Úlfhamr* (literally "wolf skin", compare *Völsunga Saga* 8, where Sigmund and Sinfjötli put on *úlfahamir*) is also mentioned in the lost *Skjöldung's Saga*, part of which was preserved in Latin by Arngrímur Jónsson. On this saga see GUÐMUNDSDÓTTIR, ref. 7, p. 279-280. A girl also recognized Bjorn Hringsson by his eyes. The queen had changed him into a bear with a blow from a glove made from wolf skin. However, in contrast to Ála, Bjorn remained a bear for life. *Hrólfs saga kraka* 25, 26.

52 GIRALDUS CAMBRENSIS, *Topographia Hibernica II*, 19 (edition: *Giraldi Cambrensis Opera, Vol. V : Topographia Hibernica et Expugnatio Hibernica*. Ed. by J. F. Dimock. Rerum Britannicarum Medii Aevi Scriptores, Rolls Series 21. London : Longmans [etc.], 1867). VEENSTRA, ref. 1, p. 148-150; SCONDUTO, ref. 1, p. 26-38; BYNUM, Caroline Walker. Metamorphosis, or Gerald and the Werewolf. In *Speculum*, 1998, Vol. 73, No. 4, p. 987-1013. ISSN 0038-7134.

priest then did what he had to do and the wolf covered her again with the wolf skin. Then the wolf spent the rest of the night with the priest and his companions by a small fire. In the morning, he led them out of the forest, showed them the path and thanked them for everything. The priest informed the bishop about what he had experienced, but the wolf was not found by *Gerald*, who visited the region himself.

Wolf people in the forests of Ireland are also mentioned in the work *The King's Mirror* from the 13th century, which was written for the son of King Haakon Haakonsson of Norway.⁵³ The book, partially in the form of a dialogue between father and son, gives the youth information about trade, seafaring, climate, countries and nature. It provides instructions on courtesy, chivalry, politics, morality, justice, military matters and tactics, but also on the specialities and wonders of various countries. According to the book, the strange feature of Ireland, which seems to be unbelievable but the inhabitants of the country testify that it is true, is the ability to change into a wolf as a result of the anger of a saint. The holy man was not St. Natalis, but St. Patrick, who preached Christianity to the pagans of that country. An unnamed clan allegedly resisted more than others, and offended him and God. When they even began to howl at him like wolves during a sermon, Patrick understood that his mission was not complete. He was very angry and prayed to God that he would send them a punishment which would also afflict their descendants as a lasting reminder of their defiance. From that time, all members of this clan changed into wolves for a certain time. They wandered in the forests and found food like wolves. However, they were said to be worse than wolves, because although they were just as eager to eat people, they had the ingenuity of people in their tricks. This change allegedly happened to some every seventh winter. For others it continued for a whole seven years, but then they were not afflicted by the curse.

People, who knew how to change into wolves, are also mentioned in the chronicle attributed to the 9th century Welsh monk *Nennius*. There are two versions of the chronicle: Latin and Irish from the 11th century. The Irish version speaks of the people in Ossory, who allegedly had the gift of changing into wolves. A special feature of their transformation was that they did not change into wolves physically, but their souls left their human bodies and entered wolves or took control of wolves. They ordered their families not to move their bodies, since otherwise they would not be able to return. When they were killed as wolves with flesh in their mouths, the flesh was also found in their human bodies. Another manuscript of this chronicle is more specific and states that they were the descendants of *Laighnech Faeladh*, who could change into wolves by strength of will and then kill cattle.⁵⁴ A 13th century poem: *On people who change into wolves*, has been added to the Latin version of *Nennius'* chronicle. There are allegedly certain people of "Scottish" origin, who inherit from their ancestors a strange ability to quickly change into wolves whenever they want to. Allegedly they often killed sheep, but always fled

53 *Konungs skuggsjá XI* (edition: *The King's Mirror*. Trans. by L. M. Larson, New York : The American-Scandinavian Foundation, 1917, p. 115-116).

54 *Leabhar Breathnach Annso Sis, XIV* (edition: *The Irish version of the Historia Brittonum of Nennius*. Ed. and trans. by J. T. Todd. Dublin : Irish Archaeological Society, 1848, p. 204-205). Similarly in *Hrólfs Saga Kraka*, consciousness left *Böðvar Bjarki* ("Fighting Bear") and materialized in a bear. His body remained sitting immobile: *Hrólfs saga kraka* 50-51.

like ordinary wolves, when people began to shout at them or threaten them with sticks and swords. They instructed their relatives not to move their bodies, for the same reason as in the Irish version of the chronicle. If somebody injured them as wolves, their injuries were also visible on their human bodies. Their companions allegedly also saw raw flesh in the mouths of their real bodies, while they were away.⁵⁵ A man named Laignech Faeladh is also mentioned in the 12th century Irish text known as the *Fitness of names*, which considers the origin of names.⁵⁶ Laignech Faeladh and his descendants were allegedly able to change into wolves, since Faeladh was the first to do it.⁵⁷

The fighting *faeladh*, who came from County Tipperary, west of Ossory, offered their services to the king, who paid them. They dressed in wolf skins and were especially furious and cruel in battle. It was said that they were not paid in gold, but in the flesh of new-born babies, which they ate raw like wolves. Their behaviour, fury and strange customs recall the Norse berserker. The Irish stories about wolf people have their origin in the pre-Christian history of Ireland, in brotherhoods of warriors and their ancient rituals, which Christians and foreigners did not understand. *Gerald's* conversation of a wolf with a priest, the stories about Laignech Faeladh or the wolves from Ossory are deformations of the wolf brotherhoods of pagan Ireland. People began to explain their origin by curses or other supernatural interventions. The wolf represented the wild, untamed and free animal connected with nature. In the Irish language, the wolf is still described as *mac tíre*, which literally means "son of the country". The European environment, the wolf was the ideal role-model for hunters and young warriors. By imitating the wolf, whether by wearing wolf skins, by hairstyle, careless exterior or even nakedness, they aimed to transfer his characteristics to themselves. By howling before a battle, they could also get into a state of furious rapture and terrify the enemy. A different hierarchy and relationships prevailed in their community, distinct from the customs of the settled civil inhabitants, who avoided them and could be in danger from them. They could often be disinherited men, who found a new chance and place in a wolf brotherhood.⁵⁸

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- 55 NENNIUS, *Historia Brittonum VII: De mirabilibus Britanniae* (edition: *Chronica minora saec. IV, V, VI, VII, Vol. III*. Ed. Th. Mommsen MGH, Auctores antiquissimi XIII. Berolini : Apud Weidmannos, 1897, p. 221-222).
- 56 *Coir Anmann 215* (edition: *Irische Texte mit Wörterbuch, Vol. III/2*. Ed. & trans. by Wh. Stokes und E. Windisch. Leipzig : Verlag von S. Hirzel, 1897, p. 376-377).
- 57 The young *Faelad* in the Connaught region are mentioned in the story "The Destruction of Da Derga's Hostel": *Togail Bruidne Da Derga 20* (edition: *The Destruction of Da Derga's Hostel*. Trans. by Wh. Stokes. Paris : Librairie Émile Bouillon, 1902 [reprinted from *Revue Celtique*, 1901, Vol. 22, p. 9-61, 165-215, 282-329, 390-437]). Another Irish word for werewolf is *conriocht*, literally "dog like". The word *conriocht* appears in *Ideas of Resurrection*, which states among other things that the resurrection of the dead on the Day of Judgement is entirely different from the "metaformation" of werewolves: *Scéla na Esergi 36b, 2706-2707* (edition: *Lebor na hUidre – Book of the Dun Cow*. Ed. by R. I. Best and O. Bergin. Dublin : Hodges, Figgis & Co., 1929).
- 58 WYATT, David R. *Slaves and Warriors in Medieval Britain and Ireland: 800–1200*. Leiden : Brill 2009, p. 68-73. ISBN 9789004175334. MacCULLOCH, J. A. *The Religion of the Ancient Celts* (From a 1911 Edition). The Floating Press : 2009, p. 281. ISBN 9781775414018. See also CAREY, John P. *Werewolves in medieval Ireland*. In *Cambrian Medieval Celtic Studies*, 2002, Vol. 44, p. 37-72. ISSN 1353-0089; BERNHARDT-HOUSE, Phillip A. *Werewolves, Magical Hounds, and Dog-Headed Men in Celtic Literature : a typological study of shape-shifting*. Lewiston, NY : Edwin Mellen Press, 2010. ISBN 9780773437142.

Werewolves also appear in *Tales of the Elders (Acallamh na Senórach)* from the 12th century. Airitech's three daughters changed into she-wolves, and once a year they came from their Cave of Cruachan to kill sheep. The only thing they could not resist was music. Only the bard Cas Corach gained their confidence by playing all day on his harp. They came to him, lay down and listened. When he finally persuaded them to return to human form, the hero Cailte mac Rónáin killed all three with one spear and cut off their heads. The valley where they were killed has been called Glen of the Wolf-shapes since then.⁵⁹ The transformation of a person into a wolf is also a feature of the Irish story of Morraha. Morraha under a curse that he would never finish a meal at one table, had to pay his debt by bringing Niall's Sword of light and the news of Anshgayliacht's death.⁶⁰ After various attempts, Morraha gained control of the sword and threatened to kill Niall with it he did not tell him how Anshgayliacht died. Niall began to tell how his wife lashed him with a shoot from a magic branch and changed him first into a raven, then into a horse, into a fox and finally into a wolf, so that she could be rid of him for good. When people began to hunt him as a wolf, he saved himself by fleeing to the king and jumped up to him. The king took the strange wolf home. Eight sons and three daughters had been born to this king, but somebody took them all away on their first night. Therefore, he had the wolf guard his twelfth child. When the wolf caught sight of a huge hand from the chimney reaching for the child, he seized it and bit it off. He placed the hand with the child in the cradle and slept contentedly. However, when he woke up, the hand and the child were gone. He summoned help by howling and led the king to a cottage in which they found the kidnapped boy and the bitten off hand. The woman, who owned the house, had already gone. The wolf continued to guard the prince. To avoid losing him, they attached him with a chain. However, as he grew, the boy learnt to release the chain. He wandered away and the wolf could not find him. He lost the favour of the king and court, so he decided to return home in the hope that his foolish wife would return him to human form. However, at home, he was surprised to see his wife coming with the kidnapped boy. With a trick, he succeeded in getting the boy to strike him with the magic branch and he became a man again. On the way to the king, he stopped at a house, where a certain old woman and her son lived. He learnt that twelve years before, a dog had bitten off her son's hand and he had been tortured by pain since then. Since Niall knew what had happened twelve years before, he suggested to the woman that he would help her son. As a reward, she offered eight boys and three girls. Then Niall saw the man in the room. He had a stump of his arm. Niall heated an iron rod until it was red hot, and thrust it into the man's eye. Thus Morraha learnt how Anshgayliacht died. Then Niall

59 *Acallamh na Senórach 7674-7717* (edition: *Irische Texte mit Übersetzungen und Wörterbuch, Vol. IV/1*. Ed. Wh. Stokes und E. Windisch. Leipzig : Verlag von S. Hirzel, 1900, p. 214-216, translation p. 264-266). On this see also KITTREDGE, ref. 50, p. 258-259.

60 LARMINIE, William. *West Irish folk-tales and romances*. London : Elliot Stock, 1893, p. 10-30; JACOBS, Joseph. *More Celtic Fairy Tales*. London : David Nutt, 1895, p. 91-108; GRAVES, Alfred Perceval. *The Irish Fairy Book*. London : T. Fisher Unwin, 1909, p. 269-286; KITTREDGE, ref. 50, p. 163-165.

took all twelve children to the king. Morraha returned home with the sword and with the story and paid his gambling debt.

Another Irish story of ancient origin, handed down from generation to generation is the *Wolf's Story*.⁶¹ It is about Connor, a young farmer, who went looking for two lost cows. At dusk, he knocked on the door of a cottage, not guessing that it was the home of a family of werewolves. An old man invited him in and he sat down at a table. Soon after, a black wolf came into the house, went into another room, came out of it as a young man, and sat by the table. Before Connor could say anything, another wolf came into the house and like the first, went into the other room, returned as a human and sat down for the evening meal. When Connor asked them if they had seen his cows, they all began to laugh at him. He got angry, rose from the table and wanted to leave. However, the elder son stopped him with the words that although they were bad and rough, but they did not forget kindness. Did he remember how he had once helped an injured young wolf get out of a hole? He was that wolf, and so he would help now. Connor woke up the next morning in the haystack in his own field. When he found no cows at home, he thought the incident of the night before was only an unusual dream. However, he finally discovered that his friend the wolf had brought him three of the most beautiful cows he had ever seen. This exceptional gift helped the poor farmer to achieve prosperity and property, but he never found the cottage or the family again, so he could not thank them.⁶²

The transformation of people into wolves also occurs in the story of *Math Mathonwy's son* in the Welsh collection now known as the *Mabinogion* from the 14th and 15th centuries.⁶³ The great Lord Math, whose feet always had to be in the fold of a maiden's lap, used a magic wand and curse to change his two nephews Gwydion and Gilwaethy successively into male and female pairs of deer, wild boar and finally wolves as punishment for the fact that Gwydion had lured him away to war, while Gilwaethy took away the virginity of the maiden on whose lap Math placed his feet. The brothers spent one year in each form and produced one offspring. After three years their punishment ended.

We read about werewolves in England in the *Recreation for an Emperor* by *Gervasius of Tilbury*, an English lawyer and writer from the 12th – 13th centuries. The book of an encyclopedic nature, devoting attention to various peculiarities, was written for the Emperor Otto IV. Allegedly, writes *Gervasius*, we in England often see people change into wolves in a monthly cycle. The French call these people *gerulfos*, the English *werewolf*.⁶⁴ He repeats this in another place. Allegedly it is common for his compatriots to change into wolves according to the phases of the Moon. This is one of the few texts, where transformation into a wolf is associated with the Moon, although it is not clear

61 WILDE, Francesca Speranza. *Ancient Legends, Mystic Charms, and Superstitions of Ireland, Vol. I*. Boston : Ticknor and Co., 1887, p. 31-35.

62 The story is supposed to have happened in the reign of Queen Elizabeth I of England (1558 – 1603). She waged bloody wars against the rebellious Irish, accompanied by repression and famine, until there were allegedly more wolves in Ireland than people. Therefore, the story of Connor, the cows and the wolf family may have a social and rebellious undertone.

63 GUEST, Charlotte. *The Mabinogion, From the Welsh of the Llyfr Coch o Hergest (The Red Book of Hergest)*. Trans. with notes by Lady Charlotte Guest. London : Bernard Quaritch, 1877, p. 420.

64 GERVASIUS TILBERIENSIS, *Otia Imperialia I, 15* (edition: *Gervasius von Tilbury*. Ed. A. Liebrecht. Hannover : Carl Rümpler, 1856).

which phase of the Moon *Gervasius* had in mind under the word *lunatio*. His claim that people changing into wolves can often be seen in England is strange especially because both the examples he gives come from France. The first is a case from the diocese of Clermont in Auvergne, where the knight Raimbaudus de Pineta (Raimbaud de Puget) began to wander in the country and got lost in the forest like an animal after his lord deprived him of his property. One night, when much disturbed by noise, he lost his senses and changed into a wolf. He did great damage to the countryside, devastating many peasant homes. In the form of a wolf, he devoured children and tore old people apart. He returned to human form only when a woodcutter threw an axe at him and cut off his leg. Then Raimbaud publicly declared that he actually welcomed his loss, because it meant the end of his suffering. As some allegedly testify, amputation of a limb may “*free people from misfortune of this kind*”. A second case of a werewolf was a man named Calcevayra (Chaucevaire) from the surroundings of Luc Castle between the dioceses of Viviers and Mende. During the new Moon, when the time came, he left all his companions, took off his clothes and hid them in a bush or under a stone. If he rolled naked on the ground for long enough, he acquired the form of a wolf and its hunger. He scented prey with bared teeth. This “werewolf” also claimed that the wolf runs with open mouth because he can open his jaws only with great effort and with the help of his paws. He cannot do this when hunters catch up with him, and so he would only hunt easy prey.⁶⁵ *Gervasius* offered two different examples of werewolfism. The knight Raimbaud did not want to become a wolf. He did not decide that he would change into a wolf or choose the time of the transformation. He did not want to attack people, but he could not control his behaviour, which had features of insanity. Therefore, he was pleased when he lost a leg and became again human. In contrast to this, Calcevayra was the “typical” werewolf, who always withdrew from people and changed into a wolf at a certain phase of the Moon, in this case the new Moon. It is not known what he did as a wolf. However, he does not appear to have regretted his lot or regarded it as a curse. However, the nonsense on the life of wolves suggests that he did not really change into a wolf.⁶⁶

Apart from entertaining instructive literature, the werewolf also became one of the themes of medieval courtly and chivalrous epics. These works, which were inspired by older Celtic (Breton or Welsh) stories, originated in the French and English environments. The most important of them is the *Ballad of Bisclavret*. Its author is the 12th century poet *Marie de France*, who created the archetype of the likeable werewolf.⁶⁷ The *Lai*

65 GERVASIUS TILLBERIENSIS, *Otia Imperialia III*, 120.

66 See SCONDUTO, ref. 1, p. 35-37.

67 *Lais* de Marie de France VIII, *Bisclavret* (edition [online]: BISCLAVRET – Marie De France, trans. Judith P. Shoaf ©1996). SCONDUTO, ref. 1, p. 39-56; BAMBECK, Manfred. Das Werwolfmotiv im „Bisclavret“. In *Zeitschrift für romanische Philologie*, 1973, Vol. 89 (1-3), p. 123-147. ISSN 1865-9063; CREAMER, Paul. Woman-hating in Marie de France's *Bisclavret*. In *Romanic Review*, 2002, Vol. 93, No. 3, p. 259-274. ISSN 0035-8118. On the importance of clothes see WRIGHT, Monica L. *Weaving Narrative : Clothing in Twelfth-century French*. Pennsylvania State Press, 2009, p. 127-129. ISBN 9780271035666. On the forest see SAUNDERS, Corinne J. *The Forest of Medieval Romance : Avernus, Broceliande, Arden*. Cambridge : Boydell & Brewer Ltd, 1993, p. 51-57. ISBN 9789859913812; CRANE, Susan. *Animal Encounters : Contacts and Concepts in Medieval Britain*. Philadelphia : University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013, p. 42-68. ISBN 9780812244588.

de Bisclavret differs from her eleven other poems in the collection. While love triumphs in them, in this poem break up happens. Bisclavret is both the name of a character and the Breton word for werewolf,⁶⁸ equivalent to the Norman word *garwall* or similar, which is a French version of the Germanic word *werwolf*. *Marie de France* began her story, which is “true to the last word”, with the words that werewolves were known in every country and a considerable number of good men became werewolves. A werewolf was a terrifying animal. It wandered in dense forests, attacked people and did any evil deed that it could. *Marie de France* apparently knew the same werewolf stories as *Gervasius*. The reader begins to expect a story about a monster, but exactly the opposite follows. In Brittany there lived a nobleman, who was honoured by the king and by his neighbours. However, his wife was troubled by the fact that every week he went away for three days and nobody knew where. When she accused him of infidelity, he admitted to her not only that he changed into a wolf, but also why, and where he hid his clothes. Without his clothes he would not be able to return to his human form. However, the woman could not reconcile herself with the fact that her husband was a werewolf and she decided to free herself from him. She asked a knight, who had long loved her, and promised him her love, if he helped her. The knight followed Bisclavret to the place where he had hidden things and stole them. Therefore, Bisclavret remained a wolf. After a time, people stopped looking for him, considered him lost, and his widowed wife married the knight. A year after Bisclavret disappeared, the king went hunting in a nearby forest. His dogs scented a wolf and they pursued it all day. The exhausted animal ran to the king and begged for mercy. The king, surprised by this almost human behaviour, took the wolf home. The wolf then accompanied him at every step and everybody was amazed by his tameness and obedience. Therefore, they were surprised when he suddenly attacked one of the guests at a royal banquet. It was the knight, who had stolen his clothes. They allowed this attack with the explanation that perhaps this person had harmed him and the wolf wanted to take revenge. Later the king again went hunting in the forrest where he found the wolf. The presence of the king had not escaped the attention of Bisclavret’s wife, who wanted to appear at court. However, as soon as the wolf saw her, it attacked and bit off her nose. They would have killed the furious wolf, if a wise man had not persisted with the view that this always tame animal must have had a reason for the attack, and he recalled that the knight the wolf had attacked was the husband of the woman. The woman finally admitted everything and brought the clothes. Bisclavret put the clothes on in an adjoining room and came before the king in human form. The king returned all Bisclavret’s property and added more. The wicked wife and the knight were banished from the country. Some of their daughters were born without noses.

The anonymous French story *Biclarel*, perhaps from the 14th century, is very similar.⁶⁹ It begins with the words that it is very foolish to marry an unreliable girl. It causes

68 The word *bisclavret* may derive from **bleiz claffet*. In Breton, wolf is *bleiz* (in related Welsh: *blaidd*) and sickness *kleñved* (in Welsh *clefyd*). Bisclavret appears to be a mangled Breton expression with the meaning “wolf sickness”. The most recent work is BOYD, Matthieu. The Ancients’ Savage Obscurity: The Etymology of Bisclavret. In *Notes and Queries*, 2013, Vol. 60, No. 2, p. 199-202. ISSN 1471-6941.

69 *Biclarel* (vydanie: Melion and Biclarel. *Two Old French Werewolf Lays*. Ed. and trans. by A. Hopkins. Liverpool Online Series, Critical Editions of French Texts 10. The University of Liverpool, 2005.

undeserved suffering and shame, and it threatens one's life. However, the man who understands the female heart will never get into such danger. And since nobody understands women, the story of Biclarel is told. In contrast to the *Ballad of Bisclavret*, the obvious inspiration for *Biclarel*, the story is not placed in Brittany and Biclarel is one of King Arthur's knights. He loved his wife so much that he did everything she asked of him. However, he paid the price for unreservedly trusting her. He had a secret – every month he changed into a wolf and remained one for two or three days. During this time he lived in the forest and ate raw meat. He hid his clothes in a secret place, since without them he would remain a wolf for the rest of his life. When his wife asked him where he went every month, and tearfully insisted on an admission, he told her the truth on condition that she told nobody. Unlike Bisclavret's wife, she kept this promise. She followed him into the forest herself, took his clothes and returned home happy. Later she married her lover and lived contentedly for several years. Biclarel lived in the forest as an animal until the day King Arthur came there hunting. He avoided the hunting dogs, ran straight to the king and adopted a submissive position. Surprised by this behaviour, Arthur drove the dogs away and took the wolf under his protection. From that time, the wolf lived with the king in the castle and was always tame. However, when he saw his wife at a banquet, he immediately attacked her. He seized her by the hair and bit her face. The king did not allow anybody to harm the wolf and let him leave the hall. He was curious about whether the wolf would attack anybody else. When Biclarel did not find his wife among the guests, he quietly left the hall. He found his wife in the town and attacked her again. He knocked her off a horse and began to bite. Only the town's people saved her from certain death. The wolf then sat and began to loudly and sadly howl. The king now decided to find out the truth. The woman confessed to everything under threat of death. They let her bring his clothes and Biclarel returned to human form.

The anonymous Breton story of Melion from the end of the 12th century is less well-known than the *Lay of Bisclavret*.⁷⁰ In spite of the fact that the names of the characters, plot and structure of the story are different from those of the stories of *Bisclavret* and *Biclarel*, similarities indicate that their prototype was the same. The gallant and brave Melion was one of King Arthur's most popular knights. However, he foolishly promised that he would never love a woman, who already loved another or even talked about another man. This offended the court ladies and they refused to even speak with him. After that, the disappointed Melion lived alone in his castle until the coming of the daughter of the King of Ireland, who had not loved or wished to love another. Melion was delighted that his vow was ended, he got married and lived happily for several years. Once when a deer escaped during a hunt, Melion assured his beloved wife that he would catch it. He told her that he had a ring with two magic stones, white and red. When he touched his forehead with the white stone, he became a large and strong wolf. When he returned, he had to touch his forehead with the red stone or he would remain a wolf. However, the woman with her servant took his clothes and sailed away to Ireland. Melion went

ISBN 0953381692).

70 *Melion* (edition: Melion and Biclarel, ref. 69). SCONDUTO, ref. 1, p. 57-75. On Melion's pack and its interpretation see BOYD, Matthieu. Melion and the Wolves of Ireland. In *Neophilologus*, 2009, Vol. 93, No. 4, p. 555-570. ISSN 1572-8668.

there secretly on the same ship. He hid in the Irish forests, where he was joined by other wolves and became their leader. This is a unique feature in comparison with the other werewolf stories. They wandered around the country attacking animals and people. They devastated the country for a year, until they were driven into a wood from which there was no escape. Only Melion saved himself because he was the largest and strongest of the wolves. The hunters were satisfied because they had succeeded in killing ten out of eleven wolves. Then Melion lived alone until King Arthur and his retinue came to Ireland. He recognized the king, ran to him and lay at his feet. When Arthur saw that the wolf was tame, he kept him. The wolf went everywhere with Arthur and was also with him during the meeting with the King of Ireland. However, Melion was not interested in politics. He looked for the people, who had betrayed him, among those present. When he found the servant, he attacked him. However, Arthur did not allow anybody to harm the wolf and insisted on a confession. The servant, whose shoulder was still held by the wolf, begged for mercy and told everything. Then Arthur demanded that the King of Ireland hand over his daughter and the magic ring. After changing, Melion left his dishonourable wife in Ireland and returned home with Arthur.

Another werewolf from the time of the legendary Arthur was Gorlagon, whose story is told in an anonymous Latin tale probably from the 14th century.⁷¹ After a discussion with his wife, Arthur swore that he would not eat, as long as he did not know the heart, nature and thinking of women. He saddled a horse and set off to visit King Gorgol,⁷² who was famous for his wisdom. However, Gorgol sent him to his older and wiser brother Gorleil,⁷³ king of a neighbouring kingdom, who referred him to the eldest brother Gorlagon. When Arthur arrived and still insisted that he would not eat, Gorlagon began to speak. Allegedly he had known a noble, rich and just king. In a garden, which had no equal, all kinds of tree grew. There was a slender tree that began to grow on the night the king was born. Fate decreed that if somebody cut down the tree and used the end of it to lash the king's head with the words: "*Become a wolf and have a wolf's mind*", he would change into a wolf. Therefore, the king let nobody into the garden and checked it himself

71 *Narratio de Arthure rege Britanniae et rege Gorlagon lycanthropo* (edition with part of a study: KITTREDGE, ref. 50, p. 150-266). HAGGERTY KRAPPE, Alexander. Arthur and Gorlagon. In *Speculum*, 1933, Vol. 8, No. 2, p. 209-222; SCONDUTO, ref. 1, p. 76-89. See also DAY, Mildred Leake. *Latin Arthurian Literature*. Cambridge : D. S. Brewer, 2005, p. 41-48. ISBN 1843840642; ECHARD, Siân. *Arthurian Narrative in the Latin Tradition*. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 193-231. ISBN 9780521021524; MASSEY, Jeff. The Werewolf at the Head Table. The Metatheatric "subtlety" in Arthur and Gorlagon. In TRACY, Larissa – MASSEY, Jeff (ed.). *Heads Will Roll: Decapitation in the Medieval and Early Modern Imagination*. Leiden and Boston : BRILL, 2012, p. 183-206. ISBN 978-9004211151; TRACY, Larissa. *Torture and Brutality in Medieval Literature : Negotiations of National Identity*. Cambridge : D.S. Brewer, 2012, p. 155-168. ISBN 9781843842880.

72 His name recalls the Germanic word *werewolf*, compare *gerulfos* in *Gervasius* and *garwall* in *Bisclavret*. A similar sounding name also appears in other Arthurian stories, e.g. *The knightly tale of Gorlagas and Gawain*. If Gorgol means werewolf, then Gorlagon and Gorleil undoubtedly do as well and they are only variations of the same name. This view is expressed by KITTREDGE, ref. 50, p. 203-205, and his explanation is acceptable.

73 KITTREDGE, ref. 50, p. 201, assumes that his name also began with G, Gorleil (Gorbeil), and the change of G to T was a copyists mistake. The name Gorleil is really found in the manuscript as well as five forms beginning with T.

several times every day. His wife began to suspect that he was meeting a lover there. In the end, since he loved her and could not resist her blackmail, he told her his secret, which she should not tell to anybody. However, immediately on the next day, when he went hunting, the woman took an axe, went into the garden, cut down the tree and took a twig with her. When the king returned, she lashed him, and in haste, said: "*Become a wolf, become a wolf and have the mind of a human*". The king immediately changed into a wolf, but kept his human mind. Pursued by dogs, he fled into the forest. When the queen had got rid of him, she married a young man she loved and made him ruler of the kingdom. The wolf king wandered in the forest for two years, found a she-wolf mate and had two wolf-cubs with her, while he waited for an opportunity to take revenge. With his small pack, he went into the town, attacked and tore apart two of the queen's sons and later also two of her brothers. However, after this attack, he remained alone and saved his life by escaping into a neighbouring country. When they began to pursue him also there, he fled further. As in the other stories, when the wolf saw that he could not escape, he ran to the king and begged for mercy. The king did not allow the hunters to harm the huge wolf in which he perceived signs of human thinking. From that time, the wolf sat at his table, ate his bread, drank from the same cup and slept in his bed. Once, when the king had to go away, he entrusted the wolf to his wife. However, she hated him, since "*a woman often hates that which her husband loves*". When the wolf saw her with a lover, he tore away the chain that restrained him and attacked. He injured the lover, but did not harm her. The queen caught in infidelity, began to claim that the wolf had devoured her little son and torn apart the tailor, who wanted to protect him. However, nothing had happened to the little boy. The queen hid him and his nurse in an underground room. When the king returned, he did not know whether to believe his wife or the devoted wolf. The wolf began to pull his clothes and led him to the place, where their son was hidden. Then he led the king to the dying tailor, who confessed to everything. After this event, the king began to believe that his wolf was a human being, who had become an animal because of a curse. He decided to find a way to return him to human form. He released the wolf and followed him. The wolf set off back to his own kingdom, and immediately in the first town, the king understood what had happened. The burghers groaned under the tyranny of the "*king, who succeeded after the wolf*" and lamented for their lord, who was changed into a wolf by magic and the treason of his wife. He returned with an army, attacked the castle and captured it. The woman confessed and handed over the magic wand. The king lashed the wolf on the forehead with it and said: "*Become a human being and have a human mind*". The wolf changed into a man. Then Arthur asked Gorlagon, who is the sad woman sitting at the table with an embalmed human head. Gorlagon replied that the one sitting by him was his wife and the other is the woman, who betrayed him. Since he is the king, who was changed by magic into a wolf and as a wolf fled first to his brother Gorleil and then to Gorgol, who helped him to again become human. The head belongs to her lover and is intended to remind her of her treason. On the next day, Arthur, who had finally eaten, saddled his horse and went home.

The plot of the story of Gorlagon is similar to that of the Irish story of *Morraha*.⁷⁴ Gorlagon like Niall told his story against his will to somebody, who was bound not to eat by a vow (Arthur) or by a curse (Morraha), until he had learnt what he had to find out. Neither Gorlagon nor Niall were born as werewolves. They became wolves only by lashing with magic wands and by the hands of their wives. Both found hidden or kidnapped children. Then the stories diverged. We can also see some similarity with the Welsh story, where Math changed his nephews into wolves and said similar words to those of Gorlagon's wife.

The last of Arthur's werewolf knights was Marrok, who appears briefly in *Thomas Mallory's* work *Le Morte D'Arthur* from the 15th century.⁷⁵ *Mallory* did not pay attention to Marrok's past. At this time, the werewolf theme was already exhausted, and *Mallory* was not interested in describing the background to Marrok's transformations. It was enough for him to state that Marrok was a good knight, who became a werewolf for seven years because of betrayal by his wife. His inspiration was undoubtedly the Celto-Norman stories, although the origin of the name of his knight remains unclear.

The oldest werewolf story with a different plot to those already mentioned is the anonymous French epic poem about *William of Palermo* from around the year 1200. It was translated into English in the 14th century.⁷⁶ This verse novel is clearly inspired by the same prototype as the others, but in contrast to them, the wolf is only one, although the more interesting of the two main characters, and the transformation of a human into a wolf is only one of the motifs. The wolf is also devoted to a king, who was unaware of his royal blood. Like Niall and Gorlagon, the wolf is the defender of a child. Although the characters in the story are invented, their names were borne by real rulers of the kingdoms in which the story is set. Thus, the story is placed in a real environment and real time. The poem follows the story of Prince Alfonso, heir to the throne of Spain, and William, Prince of Apulia and Sicily. The young Alfonso was changed into a wolf by his jealous step-mother with the help of a magic drink, when her son was born, and a power-hungry uncle wanted to get rid of William. The young boy was saved from death by the wolf Alfonso. They lived in the forest for seven years, until the Holy Roman Emperor found them. William became a servant to the Emperor's daughter Melior, who fell in love with William, and thanks to magic William fell in love with her. When the Byzantine Emperor asked for her hand for his son and her father agreed, the two lovers and the wolf fled to the forest. They would have been caught, but the wolf always protected them. They went to Sicily, where the Spanish were attacking. Not knowing that he was defending his own family and kingdom, William offered his services to Palermo and he defeated the Spanish. After the third and final defeat, the King of Spain made peace and

74 The similarity was already noticed and considered by KITTREDGE, ref. 50, p. 162-163.

75 Sir Thomas MALLORY, *Le Morte D'Arthur XLX, 11* (edition: MALLORY, Thomas. *Artušova smrt III, kniha XI – XXI*. Translated by I. Rodriguez. Brno : Jota, 1998. ISBN 8072170082).

76 *The romance of William of Palerne* (edition: Guillaume de Palerne: An English Translation of the 12th Century French, trans. and ed. L. A. Sconduto. Mac Farland, 2004. ISBN 0786419644). SCONDUTO, ref. 1, p. 90-126. See also TIBBALS, Kate Watkins. Elements of Magic in the Romance of William of Palerne. In *Modern Philology*, 1904, Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 355-371. ISSN 0026-8232; McKEEHAN, Irene Pettit. Guillaume de Palerne: A Medieval „Best Seller“. In *PMLA*, 1926, Vol. 41, No. 4, p. 785-809; MORGAN, ref. 50, p. 137-158.

when he saw William with the wolf, he remembered his lost wolf son Alfonso. On the urging of William, who saw a human mind in the wolf, Alfonso's step-mother also came to Palermo and under threat of death, cancelled the curse with a ring. Alfonso put on his clothes and since he could now speak, he revealed William's origin to everybody. Then Alfonso married William's sister and William married Melior. After his father-in-law's death, William became Holy Roman Emperor.

The motif of the transformation of a human being into a wolf is also found in Slavonic literature. However, since this ability was only one and not the main aspect of characters, mostly magicians and heroes, it is not known why they changed into wolves or exactly how the change happened. These werewolves were not bad and they did not harm people while they were wolves. Bojan (Baianus), son of Tsar Simeon of Bulgaria (893 – 927), allegedly knew how to change himself into a wolf or other animal by magic at any time.⁷⁷ The Prince of Polock and wizard (*volchv*) Všeslav Brjačislavič (1044 – 1101) also became a wolf at night. The Russian heroic epic about Igor's Retinue describes how Všeslav ruled during the day and at night he prowled around as a wolf. First he ran from Kyiv to Tmutorakan, until the cock crowed and he ran faster than the Sun. His birth was also remarkable. His mother gave birth to him with magic and he was born with the new born's membrane on his head. He wore it as an amulet for his whole life.⁷⁸ Volga (Volch) Svjatoslavič (Buslajevič, Všeslavjevič, whose name is apparently derived from the word *volchv*), who fought against the Tatars and became the hero of one of the Russian bylinas, could also change into a wolf. Volga, probably inspired by Všeslav or another historical figure, was the son of Marfa Všeslavevna and a dragon or snake. His birth was accompanied by various strange signs. When he was ten years old, he could change into a pike, a falcon or a grey wolf. He was an excellent hunter and like Všeslav, he did not sleep at night.⁷⁹ People regarded the Despot (ruler) of Serbia Vuk Grgurevič Branković (1440 – 1485) as a werewolf. After the fall of the Serbian Despotate, he fought against the Turks in the service of King Matthias Corvinus of Hungary. Thanks to his courage and victories, he was described as the Fiery Dragon Wolf (Zmaj Ognjeni Vuk) and became a

77 LIUDPRANDUS, *Antapodoseos III, 29* (edition: *Liudprandi Opera*. Ed. J. Becker. MGH, *Scriptores rerum Germanicarum in usum scholarum separatim editi* 41: Die Werke Liudprands von Cremona. Hannover und Leipzig : Impensis Bibliopolii Hahniani, 1915); SIGIBERTUS, *Chronica 967* (edition: *Sigiberti Gemblacensis Chronica, Chronica et annales aevi Salici*. Ed. H. Pertz, MGH, *Scriptores* (in Folio) 6. Hannoverae : Impensis Bibliopolii Aulici Hahniani, 1844); THOLOMEUS LUCENSIS, *Historia ecclesiastica nova XVII, 26* (edition: *Tholomeus Lucensis, Historia ecclesiastica nova*. Ed. O. Clavout, MGH, *Scriptores* (in Folio) 39. Hannoverae : Impensis Bibliopolii Hahniani, 2009. ISBN 9783775255394).

78 *Slovo o pluku Igorovom (The Story of Igor's Retinue) 155, 157-159* (edition: *Slovo o pluku Igorovom*. Translated by J. Komorovský. Bratislava : Slovenské vydavateľstvo krásnej literatúry, 1960). *Povešť vremennych let 6552 (Tale of Bygone Years – Primary Chronicle)* (edition: *Povešť vremennych let I-II*. Red. i perev. D. S. Lichačev, B. A. Romanov. Moskva : Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk CCCP, 1950).

79 *Volch Všeslavjevič 43-48, 70* (the edition is part of the study: JAKOBSON, Roman – SZEFTTEL, Marc. *The Vseslav Epos*. In JAKOBSON, R. – SIMMONS, E. J. (ed.). *Russian epic studies*. Philadelphia : American Folklore Society, 1949, p. 13-86, reprint 1966, see note 80). See also MÁCHAL, Jan. *O bohatýrském epose slovanském (On the Slavonic Heroic Epic)*. Praha : Nákladem spisovatelovým, 1894, p. 196-198; MAGNUS, L. A. *The heroic ballads of Russia*. London : Kegan Paul [etc]; New York : E. P. Dutton & Co., 1921, p. 26-29.

subject of Serbian heroic poems.⁸⁰ Thus, he has two biographies, historical and mythical. Like Vseslav, he was born with strange marks on his body, namely hair on the palms of his hands, and like Volga he was a dragon's son or lived among dragons. Volga and Vuk both grew up and matured very quickly. All these similarities between Russian and Serbian heroes point to an older Slavonic tradition.

The Slavs did not perceive the wolf only negatively. They regarded it as an animal with the power to protect. Parents gave their children names based on "vlk", the Slavonic word for wolf, to protect them against the forces of evil and bring them strength, health and happiness. In the territory of Slovakia, wolf names are already documented from the 9th century, for example: Vlkina, Vlčen, Viko, Vikan, Vlčuta, Vlkoslav, Vlkas, Vlkašin, Vlk, Vlčík. However, later, like the majority of Slavonic names, they were replaced by Biblical names.⁸¹ The werewolf, in Slovak "vlkolak", was a firm part of Slavonic mythology and folklore. Belief in the existence of werewolves was old among the Slavs and so strong that the word "vlkolak" spread into other languages, including Greek, Albanian, Rumanian and even Turkish.⁸² Among the South Slavs, the werewolf was associated with the dead and especially with the vampire or upír, with which it sometimes merged.⁸³ In Slavonic tradition, a living person could become a werewolf in three ways: voluntarily – with the help of spells, magic, a wolfskin belt or water from a wolf's footprint,⁸⁴ by a curse or by being one from birth, for example, by being born at the time of a new Moon, by having a wizard as his father, or by being born feet first. Any anatomical anomaly,

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- 80 MÁCHAL, ref. 79, s. 124-129; JAKOBSON, Roman – RUŽIČIĆ, Gojko. The Serbian Zmaj Ognejni Vuk and the Russian Vseslav Epos. In JAKOBSON, Roman. *Selected Writings IV : Slavic Epic Studies*. Hague; Paris : Mouton, 1966, p. 369-379; VÁŇA, Zdeněk. *Svět slovanských bohů a démonů (The World of Slavonic Gods and Demons)*. Praha : Panorama, 1990, p. 122 and 260. ISBN 8070381876.
- 81 Some Slavonic tribes also had wolf names, e.g. Vilci-Lutici: VÁŇA, ref. 80, p. 149 and 238; MALINIÁK, Pavol – ULAŠIN, Bohdan. Vlk v stredovekej ľudovej kultúre na Slovensku. (The wolf in medieval folk culture in Slovakia.). In KOŽIAK, R. – NEMEŠ, J. (ed.). *Pohanstvo a kresťanstvo*. Bratislava : Chronos, 2004, p. 239-241 and 243. ISBN 8089027121.
- 82 In Greek the word *vrykolakas* still means vampire. VÁŇA, ref. 80, p. 49; PROFANTOVÁ, Naďa – PROFANT, Martin. *Encyklopedie slovanských bohů a mýtů (Encyclopedia of Slavonic Gods and Myths)*. Praha : Libri, 2004, p. 234. ISBN 8072772198. See also PÓCS, Éva. Possession Phenomena, Possession-systems. Some East-Central European Examples. In KLANICZAY, Gábor – PÓCS, Éva (eds.). *Demons, Spirits, Witches Vol 1*. Budapest; New York : CEU Press, 2005, p. 107-121. ISBN 9637326138.
- 83 WOLLMAN, F. Vampyrické pověsti v oblasti středoevropské (dokončení). (Vampire stories in Central Europe (completed)). In *Národopisný věstník Československý*, 1926, year 18, p. 133-156; MURGOCI, Agnes. The Vampire in Roumania. In *Folklore*, 1926, Vol. 37, No. 4, p. 320-349; SENN, Harry. Romanian Werewolves: Seasons, Ritual, Cycles. In *Folklore*, 1982, Vol. 93, No. 2, p. 206-215; ELIADE, Mircea. Some Observations on European Witchcraft. In *History of Religions*, 1975, Vol. 14, No. 3, p. 158. ISSN 0018-2710. The word *upír (vampire)* was borrowed from the Slavs by other languages. The origin of the word is unclear, but is sought in Slavonic and Turkic languages. See OINAS, Felix J. Heretics as Vampires and Demons in Russia. In *The Slavic and East European Journal*, 1978, Vol. 22, No. 4, p. 436-437. ISSN 0037-6752; WILSON, Katharina M. The History of the Word „Vampire“. In *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 1985, Vol. 46, No. 4, p. 577-583. ISSN 0022-5037.
- 84 Compare the Slovak folktale Jelenček, where a step-mother curses her step-children, so that they would change into the animal that made the footprint from which they drink. They avoided the bear and wolf footprints, but a thirsty little brother could not resist any longer and drank from a deer footprint. See DOBŠINSKÝ, Pavol. *Prostonárodné slovenské povesti Zväzok I. (Slovak Folktales. Vol. 1.)*. Bratislava : SVKL, 1958.

such as excessive body hair, eyebrows grown together, teeth at birth or remnants of a tail, could be regarded as the signs of a werewolf. People had to explain every deviation from the norm, and in those days, the only rational explanation was to seek the answer in unclean forces, magic and evil beings. A mention of beings (*vědi*) that devour people, in the *Alexandreida*, a 14th century Czech epic poem, is regarded as evidence of belief in vampire werewolves in the Czech Lands.⁸⁵ From the Slovak environment, we can mention Dobšinský's tale *Vlkolak* about the cannibal father of three daughters. The youngest fled from him and found protection with the king, who married her and they had two children. One night during a storm, they gave shelter to a beggar (her father), who cut the throats of both children and planted the bloody knife on the woman. On the advice of the beggar, the king had her hands cut off, the dead bodies wrapped in a sheet and tied on her back, and then she was driven away. However, the story finally had a happy ending. The werewolf-like father died, his daughter found her hands in a magic spring and they grew back onto her arms. The water from the spring also revived her dead children. The king recognized that she was innocent, he returned to her and they lived together happily.⁸⁶ In this story, the "werewolf" does not have anything in common with a real werewolf. He does not change into a wolf, but only has wolf-like characteristics. Here, the "werewolf" is a man, but he is a coarse, violent serial killer and a cannibal with possible tendencies towards incest.⁸⁷

The review of ancient texts, Celtic (Irish and Welsh) stories, Norse sagas, medieval chivalrous epics, Russian bylinas and Slavonic songs and myths shows that transformation into a wolf is a theme of human imagination and literature from the earliest times and in various parts of the world. Ancient, medieval and modern werewolves differ from each other in appearance, behaviour and needs, as well as in the causes, time and duration of their transformation. In spite of some similarities, we see that the majority of ancient and medieval werewolves do not fulfil our "criteria" for werewolves, namely: anthropomorphic elements, loss of humanity, cyclic transformation of temporary duration, the full Moon and so on.

1. In Antiquity and the Middle Ages, werewolves were anatomically ordinary wolves. With a few exceptions, they remained people, but in the form of wolves. They kept their minds, memories and even habits. In the Norse sagas, a person could be distinguished from an animal by his eyes, in the chivalrous epics by his nature. With the exception of the knight Raimbaud, we do not find signs of madness or unjustified aggression, and so no similarity with the condemned and executed werewolf-like men of violence or killers from around 1600 or the modern literary and film werewolves. In the works consid-

85 *Alexandreida: Zlomek svatovitský (The Alexandreida: The St. Vitus Fragment) 2352-2353 and Zlomek jindřichohradecký (The Jindřichův Hradec Fragment) 446-447* (edition: *Alexandreida*. Připravil V. Vážný. Památky staré literatury české sv. 28, (The Alexandreida. Edited by V. Vážný. Monuments of Old Czech Literature vol. 28), Praha : Nakl. Československé Akademie Věd, 1963). JAKOBSON – SZEFTTEL, ref. 79, p. 66; PROFANTOVÁ – PROFANT, ref. 82, p. 234.

86 DOBŠINSKÝ, ref. 84. This story was also by Božena Němcová, but with nine daughters.

87 SCONDUTO, ref. 1, 180-200; OTTEN, ref. 1, p. 51-56; BLÉCOURT, Willem de. The Werewolf, the Witch, and the Warlock: Aspects of Gender in the Early Modern Period. In ROWLANDS, Alison (ed.). *Witchcraft and Masculinities in Early Modern Europe*. Basingstoke : Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p. 191-213. ISBN 9780230553293.

red here, attacks on people are exceptional, cannibalism absent. Zeus changed Lykaon into a wolf because he killed a child and offered him as food. The story of the mythical Arcadian king and rumours about bloody rituals were already widespread in Antiquity, but so far no human bones have been found at the altar of Zeus Lykaios, where the human sacrifices were supposed to happen.⁸⁸ Although ritual or symbolic cannibalism may have happened, these stories are more likely to originate from local initiation rituals, which were clearly secret and not accessible to women, the uninitiated and especially foreigners, and so were not understood. In this initiation ritual, young male Arcadians may have symbolically become men and members of a warrior brotherhood, similar to those made up of Norse berserker, Irish faeladh and warriors from other Indo-European nations. The ceremony may have meant that when Arcadian boys reached a certain age, they left their families and separated from the community. They symbolically threw away their clothes, which tied them to their previous lives, swam across a lake and emerged from it as new adult people. They joined military or exploratory units, where they received training lasting perhaps several years.⁸⁹ Some form of physical preparation is indicated by the athlete Damarchos, who became a victor in the Olympic Games immediately after he stopped being a “wolf”. Mountainous Arcadia, where a tribal organization and rural way of life long persisted, and where agriculture and pastoralism formed the most important part of the economy, was poor and backward in comparison with other parts of ancient Greece. For many young men, the only way to achieve a better life was to offer their service in return for money or war loot. Arcadian mercenaries were especially valued in Antiquity. Precisely the training, these sons of ordinary herdsmen and farmers underwent, may have contributed to their reputation.⁹⁰

2. Werewolfism was considered an incurable condition in the past just as it is today. When *Gerald* wrote about meeting the wolves from Ossory, the curse on the Irish clan had already lasted for 600 years. The curse on them for the ancient sins of their ancestors was permanent and there was no way to break it. Bisclaret and Biclarel returned to their human forms, but they did not cease to be werewolves. We do not learn from the lay why they were. Since werewolfism was not regarded as an illness, it did not spread as an illness. None of the researched ancient and medieval works contains a statement that a person could become a werewolf by being bitten by a werewolf. Supernatural or magic intervention was always necessary for the physical transformation of a human being

88 BREMMER, ref. 24, p. 78; LARSON, Jennifer. *Ancient Greek Cults*. New York; London : Routledge, 2007, p. 16-18. ISBN 9780415324489.

89 PAUSANIUS, *Descriptio Graeciae IV, 11, 3* mentions that the Arcadian mountain people wore clothes made from wolf and bear skins.

90 VEENSTRA, ref. 1, p. 142-143; BREMMER, ref. 24, p. 73-75. See also GRIFFITH, Guy Thompson. *The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World*. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1935, p. 236-239; TRUNDLE, Matthew. *Greek Mercenaries : From the Late Archaic Period to Alexander*. London; New York : Routledge, 2004, p. 52-54 and 58-59. ISBN 0415338123; TRUNDLE, Matthew. The Business of War: Mercenaries. In CAMPBELL, Brian – TRITLE, Lawrence A. (eds.). *The Oxford Handbook of Warfare in the Classical Worlds*. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2013, s. 333. ISBN 9780195304657; SEKUNDA, Nicolas V. War and Society in Greece. Tamtiež, p. 204. See also CEBRIÁN, Reyes Bertolin. Some Greek Evidence for Indo-European Youth Contingents of Shape Shifters. In *The Journal of Indo-European Studies*, 2010, Vol. 38, No. 3 & 4, p. 343-357. ISSN 0092-2323.

into an animal. Werewolfism was a gift, a curse, a punishment, a destiny or a choice. The most frequent way to become a wolf in antiquity was to be cursed by a god such as Ishtar, Zeus or Poseidon, or by a magician such as Kirké. In the medieval chivalrous epics, gods and magicians are replaced by saints such as St. Natalis and St. Patrick, and especially by women. Bisclavret, Biclarel, Melion, Gorlagon, Marrok and Niall were betrayed by their own wives, Prince Alfonso by his step-mother. A person could also become a wolf deliberately with the help of magic spells as Moeris and Bojan did, or using wolf skins and belts like Sigmund and Sinfjötli. All the cursed or punished werewolves kept their minds. Another type of transformation into a wolf was spiritual, when a person voluntarily entered a state similar to a trance and believed that his spirit left his body and materialized in a wolf or other animal such as a bear or falcon. The deliberate change of a person also did not affect the mind and memory, since the aim was to gain and use the physical abilities of the wolf, which required control over them. This occurred in the cases of Moeris, Böðvar, Bojan, Vseslav, Volga and Vuk.

3. Transformation into a wolf was not connected with the Moon. Although *Petronius* already mentioned a shining Moon, he does not say it was full and does not give it any connection with the transformation. Regular, cyclical changes occur only in three cases. Bisclavret changed every week, while Biclaret and Calcevayra changed once a month. Sigmund and Sinfjötli were not werewolves, but changed into wolves only because they put on magic wolf skins. They could take them off only after ten days and already did not want to see more of them. The knight Melion also was not a werewolf, and could become a wolf only thanks to a magic ring, which he apparently inherited from his ancestors and which belonged to his family. He remained a wolf because apart from the ring, he needed the help of another person. Neither was Alfonso a werewolf. He did not own any magic objects, but was changed into a wolf with the help of magic by his jealous step-mother. His curse was cancelled with a magic ring by the same person who imposed it. Gorlagon was not a werewolf either. Whether he became one or not depended on the strange tree growing in his garden. Niall also had nothing in common with wolves. Like Gorlagon or the brothers Gwydion and Gilwaethy, he was changed by a magic wand and spell. In the cases of Gorlagon and Niall, it was enough for anybody to disenchant them with a wand. For the Welsh brothers, transformation was a form of punishment, and when they had served their time, they became human again. Werewolfism was usually not time limited. They remained wolves sometimes for days, sometimes for years and sometimes for life, if certain conditions were not changed. One of them was clothes. The motif of clothes is very old, already appearing in the stories about the young men of Arcadia. However, while for them, one of the conditions was not to attack or eat people, for Bisclavret and Biclarel clothes were the only key to their return. Niceros saw clothes that were as heavy as stones, so that nobody would move them. Clothes are also mentioned in the cases of Melion, Alfonso and Calcevayra. Sigmund and Sinfjötli did not need to undress because they put on wolf skins. The details of transformation of the Slavonic literary werewolves are not known.

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WERWOLF IN DER MITTELALTERLICHEN LITERATUR

PETER BYSTRICKÝ

Gegenstand dieser Studie sind die Verwandlungen des Menschen zum Wolf in den mittelalterlichen Ritterromanen (= Höfischer Roman), Balladen in Versen (lais), Lehr- und Erziehungswerken, nördlichen Sagen, in der russischen Literatur und in den serbischen Volksliedern. Am Anfang befasst sich der Autor mit der griechischen Sage über den Lykaon, der Geschichten über die Verwandlungen zum Wolf in altertümlichen Arkadien und die Gruselgeschichte im Petronius Werk Satyricon.

In dem zweiten Teil der Studie widmet sich der Autor den Berichten über die germanischen Hundsköpfe und setzt vor, dass es sich um die Krieger handelte, die später zu skandinavischen berserker und úlfhéðnar wurden. Die irischen Werwölfe werden in der lateinischen sowie irischen Version von Historia Brittonum erwähnt, jedoch die bekannteste Geschichte über die irischen Werwölfe verfasste der Chronist und Reisende Gerald von Wales.

Der bekannteste Werwolf der mittelalterlichen höfischen Literatur ist zweifelsohne Bisclavret, eine Gestalt aus der gleichnamigen Ballade in Versen vom Ende des 12. Jahrhunderts. Das Thema der Verwandlung eines Mannes zum Wolf und des Wiedererlangens von menschlichen Gestalt wurde noch mehrmals verarbeitet (Biclarrel, Melion, Gorlagon). In der slawischen Welt wurde die Fähigkeit der Verwandlung zum Wolf dem bulgarischen Prinzen Bojan (Baianus), dem Fürsten von Polock Vseslav Brjacislavic, einer Gestalt aus der russischen Byline (Heldenlied) Voleg Svjatoslavic oder dem serbischen Despoten Vuk Grgurević Branković zugeschrieben.

Aufgrund des Vergleichs der gegenständlichen literarischen Werke ist es ersichtlich, dass in der mittelalterlichen Vorstellung die Werwölfe anatomisch normale Wölfe waren, die sich aber ihr Gedächtnis, ihren Geist und ihre Erziehung beibehielten. Die Männer wurden zum Wolf entweder freiwillig, mithilfe vom Zauber, Wolfspelz oder magischen Gegenständen, oder unfreiwillig durch einen Fluch oder Verrat. In der mittelalterlichen Ritterliteratur war ein solcher Verräter immer eine Frau – läppische Ehefrau oder eifersüchtige Stiefmutter. Sehr oft war die Bedingung für die Rückkehr des Werwolfes zur menschlichen Gestalt die Kleidung. Die Werwölfe mit einer zyklischen Verwandlung versteckten ihre Kleidung, weil ohne die, sie lebenslang Wölfe bleiben würden.

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CONFESSIONALLY MIXED MARRIAGES. LEGAL NORMS AND SOCIAL PRACTICE IN THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY UP TO 1848

PETER ŠOLTÉS

ŠOLTÉS, Peter. Confessionally mixed marriages. Legal norms and social practice in the Kingdom of Hungary up to 1848. *Historický časopis*, 2015, 63, 5, pp. 813-845, Bratislava.

The aim of the study is to present the development of ecclesiastical and civil legal norms regulating the conclusion of mixed marriages and the question of the religious allegiance of children in the Kingdom of Hungary. It analyses the interventions of the state authorities and the Catholic Church in the period from the middle of the 18th century to the revolution of 1848. Joseph II's ecclesiastical policies created a new legal framework in which the interests and aims of the state and the Catholic Church began to diverge. During the Napoleonic Wars and especially in the reform period, mixed marriages became a subject of politicization and struggle between the liberal opposition and the conservative pro-government group supported by the Catholic hierarchy. The study also includes a sounding into the discourse of the time and analyses representative texts of both Catholic and Protestant origin. In the final part, the author considers the social strategies developed in confessionally mixed local communities in reaction to the disciplinary pressure from the authorities.

Confessionally mixed marriages. Kingdom of Hungary. Josephinism. Ecclesiastical norms. Social norms. Reverses. Reform period.

Confessionally mixed marriages represent an interesting and inspiring research theme not only in religious, but also in social and cultural history. Such marriages were found on the boundaries or in the field of interests of different normative systems, ideas and aims, associated with particular confessional churches, the state, landlords, the local community and obviously also specific families and individuals. By examining the example of mixed marriages,¹ it is possible to trace and analyse processes of social discipline, establishment of civil and religious legal norms as well as uncodified social norms, their perception and the degree of observance in everyday social practice.

In religiously heterogeneous regions, mixed marriages were and still are the location of the most intensive inter-confessional communication. In German historiography, the

1 The term *confessionally mixed marriage*, Latin *matrimonium mixtae religionis* (from now on I will use the synonymous, but shorter form *mixed marriage*) comes from Catholic Church Law, canon 1124 CIC/1983, and is defined as marriage between two baptized persons, one of them a member of the Catholic Church and the other of another church community, which is not fully united with the Catholic Church. See also: *Evangelisches Kirchenlexikon. Internationale theologische Enzyklopädie*. Dritter Band. Dritte Auflage (Neufassung), Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1992, p. 417-418. ISBN 3525501447; *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche*. Sechster Band. Freiburg; Basel; Rom; Wien: völlig neu bearbeitet Auflage, Herder, 1997, p. 238-240. ISBN 9783451221002.

processes of mutual exchange and interaction between individuals and groups belonging to different confessions are designated with this term. This interaction and exchange of influences is relevant in relation to the perception and reflection of other confessions. In conditions of confessional plurality, they could, in certain conditions, acquire the form of transconfessionality, which meant conscious crossing of existing boundaries. The motivation of such activity was varied and depended on local circumstances. Most frequently it involved an effort to relativize the boundaries established in the process of confessionalization and application of social discipline, which were in conflict with local power structures and rooted social norms.²

The creation of family ties between two persons from different confessions did not have a direct influence only on the functioning of a specific family or on its extended family network. It influenced the whole local community in which the confessionally mixed family lived. Weddings, christenings, funerals and other family festivities were opportunities for the strengthening of relationships within extended families in pre-modern society. Reciprocal participation in family and often also religious festivities of the “other” confession, whether for reasons of duty as godfather or godmother, family visits on the occasion of the feast day of the patron of a church, at funerals and so on contributed to greater empathy towards the “other” confession. Two opposing tendencies existed in parallel within the individual confessional communities. On one side there was an effort to ostracize and as far as possible minimize contacts with people from outside their own church. This was promoted especially by the religious authorities, but, at the same time, local norms, economic, family, neighbourly and other ties often gave priority to local endogamy over confessional exclusiveness.

In some circumstances, mixed marriages could represent a significant conflict factor, which burdened inter-confessional relations. Such a situation occurred when state and church institutions attempted to set consistent legal norms and did not take into account local traditions and the usual ways of functioning of mixed marriages. In the period considered here, namely from around the time of the accession of Maria Theresa until the revolution of 1848/9, several periods with sometimes more, sometimes less intensive discipline in relation to mixed marriages can be observed in the environment of Hungary.

Until the coming of Josephinism, the attitude of the Habsburg state towards mixed marriages entirely agreed with the position of the Catholic Church. The civil legal norms regulating the conclusion of mixed marriages and the upbringing of children were derived from canon law and the regulations valid in the Catholic Church. However, from the time of the Toleration Patent, the interests and aims of the state and the Catholic Church began to diverge. An answer was sought to the following questions: A priest of which confession is authorized to marry a mixed couple, under what conditions and

2 For further information see: GROCHOWINA, Nicole. Grenzen der Konfessionalisierung. Dissidententum und konfessionelle Indifferenz im Ostfriesland des 16. und 17. Jahrhundert. In GREYERZ, Kaspar von – JAKUBOWSKI-THIESSEN, Manfred – KAUFMANN, Thomas – LEHMANN, Hartmut (Eds.). *Interkonfessionalität – Transkonfessionalität – binnenkonfessionelle Pluralität. Neue Forschungen zur Konfessionalisierungsthese*. Schriften des Vereins für Reformationsgeschichte, Band 201, Heidelberg : Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2003, p. 48-72. ISBN 3579017608.

which faith should the children be brought up in? On one side stood the state supported principle of the *bonum communa*e or *bonum publicum*, and on the other the principle defended by the Catholic Church of *bonum proli*s and the condition of bringing up all the children *in vera fide*.

The norms of the Catholic Church

The decrees of the Council of Trent defined the form and conditions under church law for the conclusion of marriage in the Catholic Church. A valid marriage could be concluded in the presence of a Catholic priest and two or three trustworthy witnesses. Before receiving the sacrament of marriage, the engaged couple had to make their confessions and receive the sacrament of the Eucharist.³ In contrast to civil legislation, canon law did not distinguish between different types of marital union depending on the estate (morganatic) or property status of the engaged persons.⁴ The conditions for concluding mixed marriages were not explicitly defined by the Council of Trent. However, confirmation of the dogma of the sanctity of marriage and the need to receive the sacraments of reconciliation and the Eucharist before receiving the sacrament of marriage automatically excluded the possibility of concluding confessionally mixed marriages. Difference of confession was placed among the obstacles to marriage only later by particular synods of the Catholic Church.⁵

In the course of the 18th century, previously rare cases of mixed marriages came to the attention of local church hierarchies and through them of the Holy See. Reports from the Netherlandish, German and Polish bishops on the growing number of mixed marriages and the enormous increase in the number of requests for dispensations because of difference of religion led to the Roman Curia beginning to seriously consider the question of how to regulate the conclusion of marriages between Catholics and non-Catholics in terms of church law. Benedict XIV (1740 – 1758) issued the bull *Matrimonio quae in locis* (4 November 1741) and the encyclical *Magnae nobis* (29 June 1748), which reacted to developments in the dioceses of the Netherlands. In these documents, as in the brief *Singulari nobis* (9 February 1749) addressed to the Polish bishops, he started from older legal practice of the invalidity of marriage between persons from different confessions.⁶ Only the Pope had the right to dispense this obstacle to marriage. Diocesan bishops could grant dispensations only on the basis of papal delegation and after fulfilment of the following conditions: no danger that the Catholic partner would fall away, ensuring the Catholic upbringing of all children in the Catholic religion and willingness or promise

3 ROSKOVANY, Augustinus. *De matrimonio in Ecclesia Catholica. Tomus I. De potestate Ecclesiae legislativa circa matrimonium*. Augustae Vindelicorum : Carol Kollmann, 1837, p. 35-42.

4 SCHULTE, Johann Friedrich. *Handbuch des Katholischen Eherechts nach dem gemeinen katholischen Kirchenrechte und Österreichischen, preussischen, französisches Partikularrechte mit Rücksichtnahme auf noch andere Civilgesetzgebungen*. Giesen : Verlag der Ferber'schen Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1855, p. 399-400.

5 SCHULTE, ref. 4, p. 243.

6 PERRONNE, J. (Giovanni). *Ueber die gemischten Ehen. Eine dogmatische Abhandlung*. Aus dem Lateinischen übersetzt durch Joseph Maria Aringer. Augsburg : Verlag der Karl Kolmann'schen Buchhandlung, 1840, p. 15-16; KUTSCHKER, Johann. *Die gemischten Ehen vom katholisch-kirchlichen Standpunkte betrachtet*. Dritte, vermehrte Ausgabe. Wien : Wimmer, Schmidt & Leo, 1846, p. 325-347.

of the Catholic partner to strive for the conversion of the non-Catholic partner.⁷ For the later development of the attitude of the Catholic Church to the question of mixed marriages, it is important to state that marriages concluded without the written commitment to maintain the Catholic character of the family – the so-called reverse, and marriages concluded in front of a Protestant pastor, were still considered valid from the point of view of church law.

The attitude of the Catholic Church to mixed marriages remained negative in the next period. It was based on the dogmas *De una sancta, catholica, apostolica Ecclesia* and *Extra ecclesiam nulla salus*. Pope Pius VII (1800 – 1823) defended the negative view of the Catholic Church, in spite of strengthening political pressure to revise this position. He still used the same arguments as Benedict XIV. The first was deformation of religious life in confessionally mixed families under the assumption that both parents would continue to practice their faiths in the framework of their confessional churches. From this flowed the danger that the Catholic partner and children would fall away from the Catholic Church. The third argument was the so-called *pax familiarum* – peace in the family, one of the important pre-conditions for which was that marriage partners shared the same religion. According to the instructions from Pius VII, the Catholic clergy had to avoid public statements, which might be perceived as expressions of approval of mixed marriages. At the same time, however, they had to avoid steps leading to forcible restriction of the conclusion of marriages between Catholics and non-Catholics.⁸

However, the number of applications for dispensations and decisions on the question of the validity of mixed marriages concluded before Protestant pastors continued to grow in the next period. The Roman Curia received them from German, Dutch and Polish bishops, and in ever increasing numbers also from the bishops of dioceses in the Habsburg Monarchy. In the course of the 1820s and 1830s, a total of six Papal bulls were issued to regulate the questions connected with the conclusion of mixed marriages.⁹ Pope Pius VIII (1829 – 1830) repeated the existing position on their validity, and to avoid any further ambiguity, he declared that marriages concluded before the Protestant clergy were valid and would remain so in future. This step was motivated by the growing effort to cast doubt on the indissolubility of such marital unions. However, Pius VIII decreed some changes, which reacted to cases in which engaged couples were not willing to accept the conditions required by Catholic priests and so turned to the Protestant clergy.

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- 7 AMMON, Christoph Friedrich. *Die gemischten Ehen namentlich der Katholiken und Protestanten nach den Ansichten des Christentums, der Geschichte, des Rechtes und der Sittlichkeit, mit besonderer Rücksicht auf das religiöse Zeitbedürfniß*. Zweite Auflage. Dresden und Leipzig : in der Arnoldischen Buchhandlung, 1839, p. 246-247. On the views of Protestant and Catholic theologians in the territories of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation and the Habsburg Monarchy see: GERINGER, Karl-Theodor. Die Konfessionsbestimmung bei Kindern aus gemischten Ehen in der Zeit seit dem Ende der Glaubenskriege (1648) bis Benedikt XIV (1758). In PAARHAMMER, Hans – RINNERTHALER, Alfred. *Scientia Canonum. Festgabe für Franz Pototschnig zum 65 Geburtstag*. München : Verlag Roman Kovar, 1991, p. 27-54, here p. 36. ISBN 3925845321.
- 8 KUTSCHKER, Johann. *Die gemischten Ehen von dem katholisch-kirchlichen Standpunkte aus betrachtet*. Zweyte vermehrte Ausgabe. Wien : Im Verlage bey Franz Wimmer, 1838, p. 267.
- 9 KUTSCHKER, Johann. *Die gemischten Ehen von dem katholisch-kirchlichen Standpunkte aus betrachtet*. Dritte vermehrte Ausgabe. Wien : Verlag der Buchhandlung Franz Wimmer, 1842, p. 359-360.

The civil legislation enabled this practice in some Protestant countries. Catholic priests were authorized to marry mixed couples even without the former reverse from the non-Catholic partner, under the following conditions: A declaration that there were no impediments to marriage had to precede conclusion of the marriage. The ceremony had to be held with the passive assistance of the Catholic priest “*in loco non sacro*”, without any Catholic ceremonies, but it had to be recorded in the Catholic register of marriages.¹⁰

The rules Catholic priests and lay people had to follow in the case of mixed marriages were defined in detail by Gregory XVI (1831 – 1846) in the encyclical *Summo iugiter studio* from 27 May 1832. It was originally addressed to the archbishops and bishops of the Kingdom of Bavaria, but over time it became a generally binding document for all Catholic dioceses. If persons approached a Catholic priest with the intention of concluding a confessionally mixed marriage, he had to thoroughly inform them about the risks, temptations and consequences of such a step. He had to especially emphasize the obligation to observe church rules and to bring up children in the Catholic religion.¹¹ If the Catholic priest could not persuade the Catholic partner to give up the intention of concluding a mixed marriage and the couple were not willing to fulfil the conditions for the granting of a dispensation by the Church, he had to withdraw from the whole matter. He had to avoid behaviour that could be interpreted as agreement with such a marriage.¹² When a mixed marriage was concluded, a Catholic priest could not go beyond the framework of the requirements set by the Council of Trent for the legal conclusion of a marriage. In practice this meant that he announced the intention to conclude a marriage (the so-called banns), but without mentioning the church membership of the engaged couple and accepted the mutually expressed agreement to enter into marriage. The marriage had to be concluded outside the church building without any religious ceremony, and so without blessing of rings, blessing of the couple and without celebration of Holy Mass.¹³

The granting of the priestly blessing to the newly married couple was an especially sensitive question. The older church norms from Benedict XIV and Pius VI explicitly prohibited the blessing of mixed marriages by priests, even if all the conditions for a dispensation were fulfilled. However, in confessionally mixed German areas, it was usual for the priest to give his blessing to mixed couples to avoid the risk that they would ask for the services of a Protestant pastor. Gradually, under the influence of the German tradition, the Roman Curia came round to the view that Catholic priests could grant their blessing, but only to couples, who had received dispensations.

Varying legal practices existed in different dioceses not only on the question of priestly blessing, but also where the granting of dispensations for confessionally mixed marriages was concerned. Priests were supposed to send applications for dispensations to their bishops, who submitted the whole matter to the Roman Curia. If the bishop had

10 KUTSCHKER, ref. 9, p. 376.

11 KUTSCHKER, ref. 6, p. 413.

12 Kutschker, 1846, ref. 6, p. 414-416. For the Latin text see: ROSKOVÁNY, Augustinus. *De matrimonii mixtis inter catholicos et protestantes. Tomus II. Monumenta ad historiam matrimoniorum mixtorum spectantia complectens*. Quinque-Ecclesiis : Typis Lycei Episcopalis, 1842, p. 212-218.

13 KUTSCHKER, ref. 6, p. 485.

the right to grant dispensations, he decided on the case himself.¹⁴ However, a different approach was applied in the Kingdom of Hungary, as in Bavaria, Prussia and some other countries. As a result of the large number of mixed marriages and the threat of concubinage unions, the priests either gave up getting dispensations or obtained them from their bishops only as supplements.¹⁵ At the beginning of the 1840s, the Roman Curia directly intervened in the question of mixed marriages in the dioceses of Hungary. In Hungary, in contrast to the Cisleithanian provinces, where the General Civil Code applied from 1811, there was no marriage law. Catholic and mixed marriages were directed by canon law. Whether and under what conditions a Catholic priest was authorized to bless a mixed marriage was not only discussed by church bodies, but also by assemblies of the county nobility and sessions of the Hungarian Parliament. Cardinal Luigi Lambruschini reacted to a request from the Hungarian bishops in an instruction from 22 May 1841. According to him, such unions could be blessed after fulfilment of the conditions prescribed for the granting of a dispensation, namely a guarantee of a Catholic upbringing for children and the Catholic allegiance of the partner. When they were not respected, the Catholic priest could only passively assist in the ceremony (*assistentia passiva*). According to the instruction, mixed marriages had to be concluded “*outside the church building, without priestly assistance, but [...] they had to be recorded in the marriage register*”.¹⁶ This was the same as the model introduced in the Archdiocese of Cologne in 1830 and in the Catholic dioceses of Bavaria in 1832.¹⁷ The validity in church law of mixed marriages concluded before Protestant clergy was confirmed for the dioceses of Hungary and Transylvania, just as in the German environment.¹⁸

Normative interventions by the state

As I already mentioned, until the beginning of the 18th century, in Hungary as in other parts of the Habsburg Monarchy, all legal norms concerning the marriage of Catholic serfs were taken or derived from canon law. The question: *Who has to marry engaged people from different confessions?* remained unanswered in the Hungarian legal system.¹⁹ It was regulated for the first time by point VII of the *Resolutio Carolina* from 1731. Confessionally mixed couples “*...both in article and non-article places*” should be married only by the local Catholic priest and all children, regardless of sex, had to be brought up in the Catholic religion.²⁰ The obligation to sign the so-called reverse before

14 KUTSCHKER, ref. 6, p. 479-482.

15 SCHULTE, ref. 4, p. 245-247.

16 RICHTER, Aemilius Ludwig. *Lehrbuch des katholischen und evangelischen Kirchenrechts. Mit besonderer Rücksicht auf deutsche Zustände. Sechste Auflage.* Leipzig : Verlag von Bernhard Tauchnitz, 1867, p. 872.

17 ROSKOVÁNY, ref. 12, p. 218-220.

18 ROSKOVÁNY, ref. 12, p. 811-820.

19 Anonym (HAJNÓCZY, Jozsef). *Intoleranz des katholischen Klerus gegen die ungarischen Protestanten nach zuverlässigen Aktenstücken oder Ideen zur gebührenden Schätzung der Verdienste der beyden großen Kaiser Josephs und Leopolds um die protestantische Kirche in Ungarn, ein Pendant zum Manch-Hermäon.* Gedruckt in protestantischen Deutschlande 1792, p. 107.

20 ROSKOVÁNY, ref. 12, p. 437; RIBINI, Johann. *Memorabilia Augustanae Confesionis in Regno Hungariae.* Tomus 2, Posenii : sumptibus Caroli Gottlob Lippert, 1789, p. 241.

the conclusion of a mixed marriage was introduced to the territory of Hungary by a royal resolution of 2 January 1749 to achieve better enforceability of this legal norm following the example of other countries. Signing of the reverse committed the engaged couple to bring up all their children in the Catholic faith.²¹ However, it was not easy to put the new norm into practice. Especially in those parts of Hungary, where Protestantism competed with or even surpassed the Catholic Church in terms of number of believers and representation among the privileged classes, the ideas of the state could not be implemented for a long time. The strongest obstacle was the already existing social norms regulating the conclusion of mixed marriages and up bringing of children born to them or coming from previous marriages. A complicated system of power relations and ties was created in confessionally mixed local communities, and it was resistant to intervention from outside. Royal resolutions from 30 August 1756 and 29 January 1761, which introduced a criminal sanction (*Actio Fiscalis*), were reactions to the frequent violation of the reverse obligation.²²

The most difficult conflicts arose in the cases of the marriages of persons, who should have been brought up as Catholics according to the law, as their parents had confirmed by reverse, but they actually appeared before the altar as Protestants. The inability of the state and church authorities to ensure observance of the law and the resulting disputes about the confessional position of already adult persons led to frequent conflicts, which also occupied the Protestant representatives at the Vienna court and the Hungarian Royal Council of Lieutenancy. The official notice of 12 February 1767 was a concession by the state in reaction to a growing number of complaints. It allowed couples from which one or both should have been brought up as Catholics in accordance with the reverse, but whose parents had not observed this obligation, to be married in front of Protestant clergy.²³

In the period of enlightened absolutism, the problem of the legal regulation of mixed marriages received ever more attention from the state. During the half century of rule by Maria Theresa and Joseph II, eight changes were made to the Austrian legislation on the question of the conclusion of mixed marriages, especially concerning the right to grant dispensations.²⁴ Some of these norms also influenced the development of Hungarian marriage law. In Hungary, where Charles III had deprived the Estates of the right to concern themselves with religious questions in parliament, the monarch was the only institution with the right to legislate in this field. In the last years of her reign, Maria Theresa further strengthened this privileged position by limiting the influence of Rome over the local Church. In official notices from 27 September 1777 and 23 January 1778, she decreed that the clergy could not turn to the Roman Curia on the matter of granting

21 ROSKOVÁNY, ref. 12, p. 448.

22 ROSKOVÁNY, ref. 12, p. 452-454, 457-459.

23 KUZMÁNY, Karl. *Praktische Theologie der evangelischen Kirche augsb. und helvet. Confession. Erster Band, III. Abth. Handbuch des allgemeinen und österreichischen evangelisch-protestantischen Eherechtes mit durchgängiger Berücksichtigung des Eherechtes anderer christlicher Confessionen*. Wien : Wilhelm Braumüller, 1860, p. 550, note 51.

24 DOLLINER, Thomas – GRASSL, Ignaz. *Handbuch des österreichischen Eherechtes*. Zweiter Band, neue Ausgabe. Wien : Wilhelm Braumüller, 1848, p. 60-64.

dispensations, but directly to the relevant bishop, who had to decide the given matter alone and only ask the Holy See for a dispensation in exceptional circumstances. Finally, in 1781 Joseph II ordered the episcopate of the whole Monarchy to independently consider all canonical impediments to the conclusion of marriage, and use the right of dispensation originally belonging to them.²⁵ In 1790 – 1791 parliament approved legal article 26, which returned religious questions to the floor of parliament. After this, the problem of mixed marriages regularly appeared in the programme of the Hungarian parliament.²⁶ In the 1830s and 1840s, it became an important part of the political struggle between the reform oriented parliamentary opposition and the pro-government party. I will devote more detailed attention to this question in another place.

During the reign of Maria Theresa, *matrimonia mixtae religionis* and the reverse were used as an important instrument of the re-Catholicization policy in Hungary. It was very difficult to penetrate into the traditionally closed Protestant environment other than through family ties. Mixed marriages, under the assumption that the reverse obligation was observed and children were brought up as Catholics, were regarded as a promising mission field by part of the Catholic episcopate.²⁷

The representatives of the two Protestant churches in Hungary were well aware of the risk of mixed marriages and they consistently rejected them until the coming of Josephinism. They started from the views of church authorities of the 17th and 18th centuries. Benedict Carpzov (1595 – 1666), an important Evangelical theological and one of the creators of the doctrine of Evangelical church law, saw the main problem of mixed marriages in the threat to the upbringing of children in the “true” faith. It was possible to agree with them only when it was possible to expect the conversion of the Catholic partner or at least if there was no danger of the Evangelical partner falling away and if agreement was secured that all the children would be brought up as Protestants.²⁸

The Toleration Patent and legal article 26/1791 brought a fundamental change to the previous legal regulation of the upbringing of children in mixed marriages. Article 7 of the Toleration Edict for the Kingdom of Hungary issued on 25 October 1781 abolished the obligation of the non-Catholic partner to sign the reverse on the upbringing of children in the Catholic religion before concluding the marriage. The edict decreed:

*“If the father is a Catholic, all the children, both male and female, have to be brought up in the Catholic religion. This needs to be perceived as the prerogative of the dominant religion. If the father is a Protestant and the mother a Catholic, [the children – P. Š.] have to follow religion according to sex.”*²⁹ Since the law precisely determined the religious

25 DOLLINER – GRASSL, ref. 24, p. 61-62; For further details on the problem of dispensations see: MÜHLSTEIGER, Johannes. *Der Geist des josephinischen Eherechtes*. Forschungen zur Kirchengeschichte Österreichs, Band 5. Wien; München : Verlag Herold, 1967, p. 36-39.

26 IRINYI, Josef. *Geschichte der Entstehung des 26. Gesetzartikels von 1790/1 über die Religionsangelegenheit. Mit staatsrechtlichen Bemerkungen auf Grundlage des Wiener und Linzer Friedensschlusses*. Pest : In Kommission bei Georg Kilian, 1857, p. 66, 131, 242-243.

27 Reflexiones quoad educationem religionariam prolium e mixtis connubiis, nomine Regio cum Archi- et Episcopis Colocensi, Vacienti, Agriensi, Quinque-ecclesiensi, et Nitriensi. dd. 28. Dec. 1767. communicatae. ROSKOVÁNY, ref. 12, p. 470-472.

28 GERINGER, ref. 7, p. 37.

29 KUZMÁNY, ref. 23, p. 403; BARTON, Peter F. „Das“ Toleranzpatent von 1781. Edition der wichtigsten

allegiance of children in mixed marriages, reverses lost their justification and legally binding character from the point of view of the state. The fifteenth paragraph of legal article 26/1791 made the provisions of the Toleration Patent more precise: “*Children born or to be born from mixed marriages, which always have to be concluded in front of a Catholic parish priest and to which no obstacles can be placed for any reason, should follow their father’s religion if he is a Catholic, but when the mother is a Catholic, only the children of male sex can follow their father’s religion.*” The next paragraph further decreed: “*The affairs of marriages, which were already mixed when concluded and those which became mixed because of the conversion of one partner, are subject to the Catholic religious authorities, because in both cases, it is a matter of a true sacrament.*”³⁰

Both legal norms encountered opposition of varying intensity from the beginning and from both sides. In the case of the Catholic hierarchy, this was caused by the fact that the new civil law came into conflict with canon law. Catholics, who wanted to conclude mixed marriages, were faced with the dilemma of which norm to observe. However, the legally determined solution to the question of the upbringing of children from mixed marriages did not satisfy the Protestant churches either. In the proposal they presented before the discussions of parliament in 1790, they demanded that religious freedom should be respected, and that everybody should be allowed to believe, confess and act according to his or her religious convictions. This meant that the children of mixed marriages should be brought up in the religion on which their parents decided. But if they could not reach agreement “*sex should decide religious allegiance. Boys should follow their father’s religion and girls their mother’s*”.³¹ However, the proposal of the Catholic Estates of the united districts west of the Tisza (the so-called Sauer proposal) was included in the approved law. According to it, only the children of a Protestant father could follow him in religion and agreements between spouses regarding the upbringing of children could be concluded only in favour of the Catholic religion.³²

Josephinism did not invent this model for solving the religious upbringing of children in mixed marriages. It had already been used for several generations in some German states. For example since 1713 a law of the principality of Brunswick – Lüneburg had stated that if there was no agreement before the wedding, the children of a Catholic father and Protestant mother had to receive their religious upbringing according to sex, while all children of a Protestant father had to follow his religion.³³

Fassungen. In BARTON, Peter (Ed.). *Im Zeichen der Toleranz. Aufsätze zur Toleranzgesetzgebung des 18. Jahrhunderts in den Reichen Joseph II., ihren Voraussetzungen und Folgen*. Studien und Texte zur Kirchengeschichte und Geschichte. Zweite Reihe, Band VIII. Wien : Eigenverlag des Instituts für protestantische Kirchengeschichte, 1981, p. 152-202, here p. 181.

30 Slovak translation cited from: ADAMIŠ, Július. *Pamätajme! Stopäťdesiate výročie zákonného článku XXVI. z roku 1791* (Remember! The hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the legal article XXVI from 1791). Liptovský Sv. Mikuláš : Tranoscius, 1941, p. 53.

31 ADAMIŠ, ref. 30, p. 13.

32 ADAMIŠ, ref. 30, p. 17.

33 LINDE, Justin Timotheus. *Beiträge zum Eherecht über Abschließung und Auflösung der Ehe, über gemischte Ehen, insbesondere auch zwischen Christen und Juden, und über religiöse Kindererziehung*. Gießen : Verlag der Ferber’schen Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1847, p. 22.

The Toleration Patent led to gradual relaxation of the barrier of confessionalism. One of the accompanying phenomena was an increase in the number of confessionally mixed marriages. The fact that civil and religious norms regulated the question of the upbringing of children differently led to conflicts, which burdened inter-confessional relations for a long time. First of all the state endeavoured to ensure the keeping of exact records of children from mixed marriages and monitoring of the observance of legal article 26/1791. To achieve better control of observance of the law on the upbringing of children from mixed marriages, an official notice from 23 June 1793 ordered Catholic parish priests in the Kingdom of Hungary to keep special registers of them.³⁴

Until the Toleration Patent conversion from Catholicism to Protestantism was illegal. Apostasy, which meant falling away from the Catholic Church, had to be punished with loss of property and exile from the homeland. After Joseph II legalized conversion, disputes about the upbringing of children from marriages, which became mixed only after the wedding, also began to appear. In this case, the law started from the principle of the prerogative of the dominant religion. The conversion of the mother had no influence on the upbringing of the children. If the father converted, all the children baptized before his conversion had to be brought up in the Catholic religion until they were adults. Only then could male children decide which confession they wanted to join. Girls followed the faith of their mothers. Only if both parents converted to Protestantism, could their children, baptized into the Catholic Church, also convert on reaching a certain age.³⁵

If Protestant parents converted to Catholicism, paragraph 8 of the Toleration Patent gave them the right to “take with them” children, who had not reached an age when they were able to decide for themselves. If only the mother converted, only her daughters had the right to follow her, but if the father became a Catholic, all children “capable of deciding” could convert.³⁶

The age at which children could freely decide whether to remain in their parents’ original confession or follow their example and convert, was not precisely stated in the Toleration Patent. This caused disagreements and tensions in families and religious communities. On 14 September 1785 a royal decree for the Kingdom of Hungary was issued, stating that all children younger than 12 or those who had not started confession and communion could follow the confession of their parents, if both of them converted to Catholicism. When a father converted to Protestantism only sons aged younger than 12 could follow him. Children aged 12 to 17 were removed from their father’s authority (*patria potestas*) where religious upbringing was concerned and placed under the supervision of the Catholic Church.³⁷ The rule still applied that if a mother converted to Protestantism, the religious upbringing of her children had to remain unchanged. This situation continued for more than 50 years. Only the official notice published on 6 September

34 GUSTERMAN, Anton Wilhelm. *Oesterreichisches Kirchenrecht in den teutschen, ungerischen, und galizischen Erbstaaten*. Erster Band, Wien : Bey J. Georg Ritter v. Mööle, 1812, p. 115-116.

35 SCHULTE, Johann Friedrich. *Ueber gemischte Ehen vom Standpunkte der Parität in besonderer Beziehung auf die deutsch-slawischen Kronländer Oesterreichs*. Prag : Franz Rziwnatz, 1862, p. 11.

36 SCHULTE, ref. 35, p. 11.

37 KUZMÁNY, ref. 23, p. 449-450.

1838 lowered to seven the age at which Catholic children could convert to Protestantism with their parents.³⁸

The most complicated situations continued to arise at the weddings of persons coming from mixed marriages, who, in conflict with the law, were not brought up as Catholics. An official notice from 7 August 1798 reacted to increasing complaints and essentially legitimized the cases of breaking the law. It allowed such persons, who had reached the age of 18, to remain in one of the recognized Protestant confessions and conclude their marriages before clergy of their church. The only condition was undertaking the ritual of formal public conversion.³⁹ It appealed to the above mentioned official notice from 12 February 1767, which allowed the legitimation of such cases in exceptional circumstances for the *bonum commune*. However, only two months later, on 16 October 1798, another official notice decreed a different approach in questionable cases. In the event that there was proof or only justified doubt about the legality of the Protestant upbringing of a person engaged to be married, the couple had to be married in front of a Catholic priest. If the marriage was confirmed by a Protestant clergyman, there was a threat it would be declared invalid. However, this legal norm joined the large group that could not be consistently applied in practice either by the state authorities or by the Catholic Church. This is already shown by the fact that in the course of the next eight years up to 1806, another five official notices with more or less the same content were issued for the Kingdom of Hungary.

The following years brought a tightening of the state policy on violation of the norms on the religious upbringing and so the church membership of children. An official notice from 1 July 1806 decreed that if there was doubt about whether an engaged person legitimately belonged to a Protestant church, there was an obligation to submit official evidence. Less than two months later, on 26 August 1806, another official notice decreed that mixed marriages concluded before a Protestant pastor had to be repeated (*recopulatio*).⁴⁰ Protestant clergy, who assisted the conclusion of mixed marriages, were threatened with dismissal. In the course of the years 1806 – 1812 six official notices were issued in efforts to put new, stricter norms into practice. Another followed in 1827. The older practice, according to which legally Catholic persons, who had been brought up as Protestants until their eighteenth year, could marry Protestant partners in front of clergy of their own confession, was allowed again only in 1838.⁴¹

The state authorities were constantly forced to react to the various strategies that local communities followed in an effort to evade disciplinary pressures. The simplest method was hiding of children from the authorities. It was not necessary to wait long for the reaction in the form of a legal norm. Official notices from 9 November 1813 and 24 August 1819 strictly prohibited this practice. Catholic priests were given the duty of keeping precise records of children from mixed marriages, who had to be brought up in

38 KUZMÁNY, ref. 23, p. 401-402.

39 PRIMETSHOFER, Bruno. *Rechtsgeschichte der gemischten Ehen in Österreich und Ungarn (1781–1841)*. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Beziehungen zwischen Kirche und Staat (Kirche und Recht 6), Wien : Herder, 1967, p. 56-57.

40 KUZMÁNY, ref. 23, p. 307.

41 KUZMÁNY, ref. 23, p. 308.

the Catholic religion according to the law. Catholic parish priests had to inform the relevant Protestant clergy on these lists, the so-called *elenchi*. If they did not respect these lists and continued to give pastoral care to problematic persons, they were threatened with financial penalties.⁴² The church hierarchies and the Protestant lay people in general reacted to these steps with dissatisfaction. They turned to the monarch with complaints, in which they demanded the repeal of these legal norms, which contradicted legal article 26/1791.⁴³

In the first half of the 19th century, state policy on the question of mixed marriages pursued two basic aims: to preserve the principle of the prerogative of the state religion, and to secure the loyalty of the non-Catholic part of the population. This was reflected in normative measures, court decrees and official notices issued by the monarch and Governor's Council. Francis I rejected the repeated efforts of the Catholic bishops to get difference of religion placed among the civil impediments to the conclusion of marriage. He argued that the Catholic priests had enough possibilities to warn the faithful against entering mixed marriages from the pulpit or in the confessional.⁴⁴

Court decrees from 1809, 1813 and 1817 repeatedly ordered "*strict punishment of proselytism from the Evangelical side*" in the case of mixed marriages.⁴⁵ On the other hand, various official notices from the period 1808 – 1825 confirmed the invalidity of reverses and banned the use of punishments and any pressure against persons, who refused to sign a reverse before marriage to a Catholic partner. Only voluntarily observed promises or so-called contracts were allowed.⁴⁶

During the Napoleonic Wars, the Vienna government attempted to reduce conflicts between the confessions, which could threaten the loyalty of the non-Catholic inhabitants of the Empire.⁴⁷ Official notices allowing people from mixed marriages, brought up as Protestants until their eighteenth year, to conclude their marriages in front of Protestant pastors, were issued in 1803 and 1806.⁴⁸

A further source of conflict was the different views of the reverse in civil and church law. The Toleration Patent abolished the reverse. The civil norms adopted later left the possibility of a voluntary promise, but only from the side of the Protestant partner. Catholic discourse gradually adopted the view that the reverse as a legal condition for the conclusion of a mixed marriage before 1781 was something different to a voluntary

42 KUZMÁNY, ref. 23, p. 418. Official notices for the Kingdom of Hungary from 13 December 1796, 13 August 1805, 25 August 1807, 28 March 1808, 27 February 1816. See also: FRIEDERICH, Ferdinand. *Vertraute Briefe über die äussere Lage der evangelischen Kirche in Ungarn*. Leipzig und Groitzsch : bei Ludwig Lucius, 1825, p. 162.

43 BERZEVICZY, Gregor. *Nachrichten über den jetzigen Zustand der Evangelischen in Ungarn*. Leipzig : in Commission der Kummerschen Buchhandlung, 1822, p. 134.

44 PRIMETSHOFER, ref. 39, p. 67-69.

45 KUZMÁNY, ref. 23, p. 416.

46 KUZMÁNY, ref. 23, p. 416. Official notices from 1808, 1811, 1817, 1821 and 1825.

47 SCHWARZ, Karl. Das josephinische Toleranzpatent und seine Bedeutung für die evangelischen Minderheit in Slowenien. In HAERING, Stephan et al. (Eds.) *Mandatis meditari*. Festschrift für Hans Paarhammer zum 65. Geburtstag. Berlin : Duncker & Humblot, 2012, p. 819-836, here p. 833. ISBN 9783428137459.

48 KUZMÁNY, ref. 23, p. 418.

promise, whether it was called a *contract*, *reverse* or something different. According to Karol Kuzmány, who served as a pastor of the Evangelical Church of the Augsburg Confession in Zvolen and Banská Bystrica in the 1830s and 1840s, Catholic parish priests still made the reverse a condition for concluding mixed marriages, in spite of the fact that official notices and court decrees prohibited the use of threats or pressure and allowed only voluntary promises.⁴⁹

By the abolition of the reverse obligation leaving the possibility of a voluntary promise, a hitherto effective instrument of discipline lost its legally binding nature. To some degree it was supposed to be replaced by another instrument of discipline – the priestly blessing at weddings, which Catholic priests could only grant to dispensed couples.

At the beginning of the 1840s, the problem of the priestly blessing became a socially and politically important theme. The core of the dispute, which affected all classes of society was different interpretations of the formulation of legal article 26/1791 “*matrimonia mixta semper coram Parochis catholicis inuenda erunt*”. The Catholic side interpreted this as the presence of the parish priest at the act of concluding a marriage. In an anonymous publication from 1841 with the descriptive title: *Does a Catholic priest in Hungary violate § 15 of article 26 from 1790/91, when he does not want to bless mixed marriages?* the position of the church authorities is formulated entirely unambiguously: “*Although mixed marriages are allowed in Hungary according to state law, they are still not allowed by the Church. Therefore the Catholic parish priest in Hungary can do everything needed to confirm a mixed, unconditional marriage according to civil law, without such a marriage acquiring the appearance of being approved by the Church.*”⁵⁰ The Catholic priest was only present as a state authorized official at marriages concluded without fulfilling the conditions for a dispensation, not as a servant of the Catholic Church. The interpretation of the Protestant side was that the Catholic parish priest was obliged to bless mixed marriages without the fulfilment of any conditions.⁵¹

The dispute was not “only” about the religious act of blessing, but also whether and under what conditions, mixed couples had a legal claim to a full wedding ritual, consisting of a wedding Mass and ceremonies. Whether the couple was confessionally homogeneous or mixed, the Catholic Church required for the legal conclusion of a marriage, the voluntary consent expressed by both partners in the presence of two or three witnesses. Priestly blessing of the bride, blessing of both partners, blessing and exchange of rings and a ceremonial procession to the church were all “*sollennitates accidentales*” from the point of view of canon law.⁵² However, what represented only “*praise-worthy*

49 KUZMÁNY, ref. 23, p. 419.

50 *Verletzt der katholische Clerus Ungarns den §. 15 des Artikels 26. von 1790/91, wenn er die gemischten Ehen nicht einsegnen will?* Beantwortet von W. v. K. Tirmau : Verlag von Felix Wachter, p. 26. In 1840 Martin Joseph Mack (1805 – 1885), rector of the Eberhard Karl University in Tübingen, published the work *On the blessing of mixed marriages*, which evoked a turbulent response and even led to his dismissal from the post of rector. See: MACK, Martin Joseph. *Über die Einsegnung der gemischten Ehen. Ein theologisches Votum.* Mainz & Tübingen : Verlag Josef Rauch & Verlag H. Laupp'schen Buchhandlung, 1840.

51 Ref. 50, p. 8.

52 Ref. 50, p. 11; See also: FEJÉR, Georgius. *Rationes Ecclesiae catholicae adversus matrimonia mixta irrestricta.* Augustae Vindelicorum : sumptibus Caroli Kollmann, librarii, 1840, p. 96.

customs” with no influence on the validity of the marriage from the point of view of church law, were perceived in popular piety as important parts of the full wedding ceremony. Complaints from the Protestant side that many mixed couples had given up their intention to marry only because they did not want to reconcile themselves to the idea of a deficient wedding, testify to this.

If the non-Catholic partner refused to convert to Catholicism before the wedding and did not consent to the upbringing of all the children in the Catholic religion, the couple could not get a dispensation for the impediment of difference of religion. If they still decided to enter a mixed marriage, it had to be concluded in front of a Catholic priest, who only passively assisted with the ritual as *testis qualificatus*. He could not accompany this act with any public prayers or blessing. His presence only as a representative of the secular authorities was also shown by the fact that he could not wear his vestments.⁵³ In some cases Catholic parish priests refused to even passively assist with the conclusion of mixed marriages, with the aim of securing a promise of a Catholic upbringing for the children from the non-Catholic partner.

This created a complicated situation, in which the conclusion of a mixed marriage without the preceding dispensation was not allowed from the point of view of the Catholic Church, but the concluded marriage was legally valid according to both civil and church law. Various official notices actually explicitly prohibited any obstruction of such unions or setting of any conditions other than those determined by law. The situation was further complicated by the different laws regulating the conclusion of marriages in different provinces of the Monarchy. The basic legal norm for the conclusion of marriages between Protestants in the Kingdom of Hungary was the Josephine Marriage Patent from 1783, which entrusted decisions about Protestant marriages to the civil courts. Only the Catholic Church had the right to exercise jurisdiction over mixed marriages. The General Civil Code, valid in the Hereditary Lands since 1811, was introduced into legal practice in the Kingdom of Hungary only on 1 May 1853. Paragraph 140 took over the model for the upbringing of children in mixed marriages introduced by the Toleration Patent.⁵⁴ Questions connected with the conclusion of mixed marriages and the upbringing of children were specifically regulated in Transylvania. Confessionally mixed couples were married there in front of the bride’s priest and religious upbringing of the children was divided according to sex, with boys following their father and girls their mother.⁵⁵

From the beginning of the reform movement, equal religious rights for Protestants and just settlement of inter-confessional relations became one of the main political aims of the liberal opposition. In the pre-March period, the question of mixed marriages became a regular theme of discussion in county assemblies and from 1830 also in the Hungarian Parliament. According to Gregor Berzeviczy, up to one third of the problems discussed at county assemblies, in some counties already from the 1820s, concerned religious questions with disputes concerning mixed marriages predominating among them.⁵⁶

53 KUZMÁNY, ref. 23, p. 333.

54 BARTH-BARTHENSHEIM, Johann Ludwig. *Oesterreich's geistliche Angelegenheiten in ihren politisch-administrativen Beziehungen*. Wien : Bei Braumüller und Seidel, 1841, p. 782.

55 On the legal situation in Transylvania and other Austrian provinces see: KUZMÁNY, ref. 23, p. 76-80.

56 BERZEVICZY, ref. 43, p. 20.

In 1830, the representatives of the County of Novohrad (Nógrád) submitted to parliament a proposal that the validity of reverses concerning the religious upbringing of children in mixed marriages should be abolished. The Religion Act from 1791 had nullified them, but a decree of the Governor's Council from the next year allowed the Catholic clergy to demand them from engaged couples before the conclusion of a mixed marriage. The proposal also demanded abolition of the six weeks of instruction, which legal article 26/1791 required from Catholics before they could convert to Protestantism. However, discussion of this point was shifted to the programme of the next parliament, held in the years 1832 – 1836. This parliament established a commission to work out proposed legislation, which had twelve points abolishing the remaining restrictions on religious freedom. Among other things, it banned the limitation of conversion from one faith to another, abolished the six weeks of instruction and reverses. Protestant students had to be able to attend foreign universities without restrictions and Catholic parents would be able to send their children to Protestant schools.⁵⁷ The upper house (tabula) was not willing to approve the proposals. After more than half a year of seeking a compromise, especially on the question of the conditions for conversion, the proposal was withdrawn by the lower house (tabula).⁵⁸

Complaints about the refusal to bless mixed marriages concluded without the reverse were also zealously discussed by the lower house of the 1839/40 parliament. The proposed legislation withdrawn at the last parliament was again discussed. After long debates, it was passed also by the upper house with only small amendments. On the question of upbringing of children in mixed marriages, the legislation decreed that children, regardless of sex should follow the religion of their father. However, the monarch, with encouragement from the Catholic clergy of Hungary, adopted a delaying position. The Bishop of Csanád József Lonovics was sent to Rome to represent the Hungarian episcopate in consultations with the Holy See. The monarch delayed signing the act until the reply from Rome was known.⁵⁹

The conflict between the two camps intensified further in the following months. On one side stood the liberal and reformist nobles, who controlled the majority of the Hungarian county administrations and the opposition press. On the other side was the majority of the Catholic hierarchy and clergy and part of the conservative political circles. The struggle was carried on in the newspapers, polemical writings and pamphlets. It was discussed in the county assemblies, gentlemen's clubs and cafes. The question of mixed marriages became a problem for the whole society. It was seen as a decisive step on the way to completing the emancipation of the non-Catholic inhabitants and applying the principles of a civil society.

At a time when the monarch was delaying signing legislation on mixed marriages passed by parliament, the Hungarian bishops issued a pastoral letter, in which they

57 HORVÁTH, Michael. *Fünfundzwanzig Jahre aus der Geschichte Ungarns von 1823 – 1848*. Erster Band. Leipzig : F. A. Brockhaus, 1867, p. 216, 276-277.

58 HORVÁTH, ref. 57, p. 295.

59 [BAUHOFER, Johann Georg]. *Geschichte der evangelischen Kirche in Ungarn vom Anfange der Reformation bis 1850 mit Rücksicht auf Siebenbürgen*. Mit einer Einleitung von Merle d'Aubigné. Berlin : Wiegand und Grieben, 1854, p. 582-584.

ordered priests not to grant the Church's blessing to mixed marriages in which the Catholic upbringing of all the children was not secured. In accordance with legal article 26/1791 they had to limit themselves to so-called passive assistance. The letter from the bishops provoked sharp disagreement in the majority of counties.⁶⁰ The assembly of the County of Pest was the first to react. The already tense situation was further sharpened by the fact that, by coincidence, the first mixed pair to be refused the marital blessing by a Budapest Catholic priest was composed of Lajos Kossuth and Theresa Meszlényi. Kossuth had recently returned from imprisonment with the halo of a martyr and he became one of the leaders of the liberal nobility. The opposition took up his case on the floor of parliament. They demanded that the parish priest in question and all others, who refused to grant the blessing, should be punished with a fine of 600 Gulden in accordance with legal article 14/1647.⁶¹ The opposition controlled counties gradually expressed their agreement with the County of Pest and sent an address on this issue to the king. However, the monarch decided to shift the whole matter to the programme of the next parliament. It was decided that the accumulating cases against Catholic priests would be sent to the Court Chancellery, but it did nothing further.

The reply that came from Rome on 30 April 1841 fully confirmed the existing position of the Hungarian bishops as expressed in their pastoral letter. This only poured oil on the fire of an already explosive situation. Papal letters could only be proclaimed in Hungary with the prior permission of the king (*Placetum regium*). Ferdinand V granted it on 12 October of the same year, and the Hungarian bishops interpreted this as an expression of agreement with the content of the Papal reply. The liberal opposition refused to accept the fact that the issue was not decided by the Hungarian Parliament but by the Roman Curia. The county authorities reacted in the same spirit. Apart from the traditional opposition bastions such as the counties of Pest, Vas, Borsód and Zala, the County of Zvolen (Zolyóm) was one of the most active. At the end of 1841, a Roman Catholic parish priest in Banská Bystrica refused to hold a wedding ceremony with blessing for a couple composed of a Catholic bride and Evangelical groom. He was only willing to assist with the ceremony passively because they did not want to sign the reverse. The county authorities entered the dispute and ordered that the wedding ceremony would be performed by the local Slovak Evangelical parish pastor Karol Kuzmány.⁶² At an assembly on 29 March 1841, the nobility of Zvolen had already decided to order fiscal proceedings against

60 Already in 1836, the Bishop of Rožňava Ján (János) Scitovszky and three years later the Bishop of Oradea Ferenc Lajcsák issued bishops' circulars in which they prohibited marriage ceremonies without guarantees of the Catholic upbringing of children. FAZEKAS, Csaba. The Dawn of Political Catholicism in Hungary, 1844 – 1848. In *Hungarian Studies* 13 (1998/99), p. 13-26, here p. 15-16. ISSN 0236-6568-99.

61 HORVÁTH, Michael. *Fünfundzwanzig Jahre aus der Geschichte Ungarns von 1823 – 1848*. Zweiter Band. Leipzig : F. A. Brockhaus, 1867, p. 75.

62 SNA, Archive of the Révay family, Trebostovský line, box 5, fasc. 5. Diaries of Žigmund Raksányi 1833 – 1869. *Hystorya wecy prýrozených w nowe na swetlo wydana, skrz Raksanyi Sigmunda mladssjho*, p. 165/f. 85. In his diary, the Turiec yeoman devoted a lot of space to the question of mixed marriages. He noted a multitude of events from his surroundings and from the press, and devoted a lot space to interesting comments on them. I thank my colleagues E. Kowalská and T. Janura for drawing my attention to this valuable source.

Catholic parish priests, who refused to hold complete wedding ceremonies and bless mixed marriages without any preceding commitments.⁶³ One such case was reported in the pro-government *Vereinigte Ofner-Pester Zeitung* in September 1841. A fiscal proceeding was ordered against the parish priest of Krupina František Klein in March 1841 because he had refused to grant blessings in front of the altar to two mixed couples. “*Celebrated speakers from our province*” participated in the hearings on the case for both sides. In the end, the records of the case were demanded by the Governor’s Council for assessment and the county again decided to submit to the monarch an address on the matter of mixed marriages.⁶⁴

The county authorities of Zemplín (Zemplén), Abov (Abaúj), Gemer (Gömör) and Turiec (Turócz) also actively participated in disputes concerned with mixed marriages. An assembly of the County of Turiec in November 1840 discussed complaints against several Roman Catholic parish priests, who refused to hold such ceremonies inside the church, but only in the porch or in the priest’s house. Judicial investigations were ordered against the Roman Catholic parish priests in Turany, Martin and Turčiansky Michal.⁶⁵

The two chambers reached a compromise only at the 1843/4 parliament and the monarch approved the proposed legislation. The first paragraph guaranteed the free profession of the Protestant faith for persons, “*who were brought up in the Evangelical religion up to their eighteenth year, and in the case of women, who were married although they had still not reached the age of 18. Their religious allegiance and that of their descendants cannot be questioned by anybody*”.⁶⁶

The second paragraph recognized the legality and validity of mixed marriages concluded in front of Evangelical clergy. The third paragraph declared the legality of the mixed marriages concluded not in front of a Catholic priest but in front of clergy from one of the Protestant confessions in the period from 15 March 1839 to 10 November 1844. Other paragraphs simplified the process of conversion from Roman Catholicism to one of the Protestant churches. For legally valid conversion, it was enough for an adult person to express his intension twice in front of the local Catholic parish priest in the presence of two witnesses.⁶⁷

Even before the outbreak of the revolution, a solution to inter-confessional relations that started from the principle of reciprocity and abolished the prerogative of the state religion, had been successfully adopted by the Hungarian Parliament. However, as a result of the continuing differences between civil and church norms and varied local traditions, the process of putting this model into practice was complicated and lengthy.

63 Ref. 62, p. 141/f. 71.

64 *Vereinigte Ofner-Pester Zeitung*, Nr. 70, 2 September 1841, p. 843-844.

65 Ref. 62, p. 188/f. 65.

66 *Gesetzartikel des ungarischen Reichstages 1843 – 1844*. Aus dem ungarischen nach der Originalausgabe übersetzt und mit den Zitatzen der veränderten Gesetzartikel versehen von Dr. J. Zima. Tirnau : Verlag von Felix Wachter, 1844, p. 3-4; For another German translation see: KUZMÁNY, Karl. *Urkundenbuch zum oesterreichisch-evangelischen Kirchenrecht*. Wien : Wilhelm Braumüller, 1855, p. 161-163.

67 *Gesetzartikel*, ref. 66, p. 3-4.

“Marriages divided in faith” – a sounding into contemporary discourse

Mixed marriages were one of the themes that most resounded in public discourse in the Kingdom of Hungary during the pre-March period. The fact that the most important personalities from theology and church law as well as the leading church representatives participated on both the Catholic and Protestant sides, testifies to their importance. On the Catholic side were Augustin (Ágoston) Roskoványi (1807 – 1892) and György Fejér (1766 – 1850), and on the Evangelical side K. Kuzmány. Roskoványi was prefect and vice-rector of the seminary in Eger. On 1851 he became Bishop of Vac and in 1859 Bishop of Nitra. Fejér, known mainly as a historian, was also a canon of Oradea and later university librarian in Budapest. Kuzmány's work appeared only after the revolution, when he was a professor at Vienna University. In 1860 he became superintendent of the Lutheran patent communities.

The Hungarian discourse on mixed marriages was naturally significantly influenced by events in Europe, especially in the German speaking regions. The most intensive cultural and knowledge transfers were carried on with the Austrian and Czech provinces of the Monarchy. During the period of the Napoleonic Wars, many of the German states adopted legal norms adjusting matters connected with the conclusion of mixed marriages and the upbringing of children. A second wave of normative interventions by the state in marriage law came in the 1820s and 1830s. Their common feature was emancipation of hitherto marginalized religious groups or their equalization with the state religion. Many of the legal changes introduced the principle of reciprocity. For example, from 1831, the Kingdom of Württemberg had a law according to which the principle that “*daughters follow the mother and sons the father*” had to be followed in the religious upbringing and so confessional allegiance of children from mixed marriages.⁶⁸ From 1838, the determining factor in Bavaria was mutual agreement between the spouses, if one of the partners was not converted. If there was no marital agreement, boys had to follow their father's religion and girl's their mother's.⁶⁹

Mixed marriages were also an important political theme in the Kingdom of Hungary throughout the pre-March period. A large number of works were published on this problem, examining it from the points of view of various disciplines including theology, church law and civil law.⁷⁰ A negative evaluation of mixed marriages predominated in Catholic discourse. Some of its leading representatives saw *matrimonia mixtae religionis*

68 On the legal norms concerning mixed marriages in the German states of the pre-March period see: LINDE, ref. 33, p. 15-19. A review of the German literature on mixed marriages with some titles of Austrian origin: SCHULTE, ref. 4, p. 226-227, note 1. On the development of civil legislation on the upbringing of children from mixed marriages in Bavaria see: *Die religiöse Erziehung der Kinder aus gemischten Ehen. Eine geschichtlich-rechtliche Erörterung.* Aus dem „Katholiken“ besonders abgedruckt. Speyer : gedruckt bei Daniel Kranzbühler, 1837.

69 BARTH-BARTHENSHEIM, ref. 54, p. 400.

70 According to the reviewer of the book by Friedrich Kunstmann (1811 – 1867) *Die gemischten Ehen unter den christlichen Confessionen*, geschichtlich dargestellt (1839), expressed in the pages of the periodical *Historisch-politischen Blätter für das katholische Deutschland* mixed marriages were “*the most discussed theme in the recent period*”. *Die gemischten Ehen unter den christlichen Confessionen*, geschichtlich dargestellt von Dr. Friedrich Kunstmann. In *Historisch-politische Blätter für das katholische Deutschland*. Vierter Band, München 1839, p. 22-35, here p. 22.

as one of the accompanying features or even one of the main causes of the spread of religious indifferentism and secularism.⁷¹ At the Hungarian national synod held in 1822, the representatives of the dioceses, abbots of monasteries and professors of theology endeavoured to identify the causes of the deepening decline of the Catholic Church, moral decay and weakening religiosity at all levels in society. One of the five commissions was concerned with questions connected with the functioning of priestly seminaries, public schools and improvement of morals among the people. It placed the increasing number of mixed marriages among the causes of the bad situation.⁷²

The work, which significantly influenced the polemics of the time and represented the Catholic current for twenty years in all the provinces of the Monarchy, was published in 1827 under the title *The rights and position of the non-Catholics in Austria*. Its author was Joseph Helfert (1791 – 1847), professor of Roman and canon law at Olomouc and later Prague University. It was one of the most cited works and was published for the third time in 1843. The author summarized the main arguments against mixed marriages in the following points: the constant threat of turning away from the Catholic faith, threat to the Catholic upbringing of the children, and the actual religious difference between husband and wife, which “*can easily lead to mutual aloofness and estrangement of thought, even if this does not cause any obvious disputes and hostility*”.⁷³ Helfert defined the ailments associated with mixed marriages. In first place was the “*ailment of badly understood tolerance*”, which, in his view, leads “*to the continual spread of religious indifferentism [...] and the unrestrained freedom of mixed marriages*”.⁷⁴

Similar arguments against mixed marriages were presented by Johann Rudolph Kutschker (1810 – 1881), professor of Catholic morality at Olomouc University, suffragan bishop of Vienna from 1862 and Archbishop of Vienna from 1876. In 1837 – 1839 he published in the periodical *Neue theologische Zeitschrift* a study with the title *Mixed marriages seen from the Catholic point of view*. Kutschker also published his text as a book, which appeared a total of three times up to 1842. He presents a view of mixed marriages in chronological order from the Old and New Testaments, the teachings of the Church Fathers, the conclusions of church councils and the decisions of the Holy See. The fifth chapter has the title: *The nature of things speaks against allowing mixed marriages*. It presents theological and moral arguments against mixed marriages. They

71 The Hungarian legal and polemical literature on the theme of mixed marriages from 1825 – 1841 is collected and considered in the work: ROSKOVÁNYI, ref. 12, p. 527-569. From about 50 works, the greater part originated in 1841.

72 SZOKOLSZKY, Bertalan. *Százéves Kassai püspökség 1804 – 1904*. Kassa : Vitéz A. Ut. Nyomása, 1904, p. 36-38; ČIŽMÁR, Marián. *Páslí zverené im stádo. Košickí biskupi v rokoch 1804 – 2004. Dejiny Košického arcibiskupstva IV. (They shepherd the flock entrusted to them. The Bishops of Košice, 1804 – 2004. History of the Archdiocese of Košice IV)*. Prešov : Vydavateľstvo Michala Vaška, 2006, p. 93, ISBN 8071655538.

73 HELFERT, Joseph. *Die Rechte und Verfassung der Akatholiken in dem Oesterreich. Nach den k. k. Verordnungen zusammengestellt*. Wien : J. G. Ritter v. Möslle sel. Witwe, 1827, p. 97-98. The same evaluation also appears in the third edition. HELFERT, Joseph. *Die Rechte und Verfassung der Akatholiken in dem Oesterreichischen Kaiserstaate*. Dritte, sehr vermehrte und verbesserte Auflage. Prag : gedruckt bei Thomas Thabor, 1843, p. 97.

74 HELFERT, ref. 73, p. 97-99.

led to the formation of families belonging to two competing church communities with different feast days, prayers, fasting traditions and so on. The last two paragraphs of the sixth chapter contain practical instructions for priests on how to react when engaged couples are willing to accept the conditions of the Catholic Church for the granting of dispensations for mixed marriages, and in the situation when they refuse to do so. In the first case, they were obliged to strive to persuade the Catholic partner not to take this step and to inform him or her of all the risks and consequences. If the priest did not succeed, he had to secure conditions that would ensure the allegiance to Catholicism of the Catholic partner and all the children. Only in such a case could he grant a dispensation to the Catholic partner.⁷⁵

A tendency to reject the conclusion of mixed marriages also prevailed in Protestant discourse throughout the 18th and the first half of the 19th centuries. This did not change after the Toleration Patent and the adoption of legal article 26/1791, which improved the position of non-Catholic partners in mixed marriages. Apart from theological reasons, one of the causes was the inequality in the solution of the question of the religious upbringing of children. In principle only a quarter of the children from mixed marriages, namely sons of Protestant fathers, could or it is better to say might be brought up in the Protestant faith.

Kristián Fornet, the parish pastor of Vyšná Boca left contemporary evidence of how the Evangelical clergy saw mixed marriages at the beginning of the 19th century. He gave his manuscript written in 1817 the title *Warning against marriage of different religions*.⁷⁶ The title already suggests the author's negative position, which he emphasizes with a quotation from the Old Testament in the introduction: "*Thou shalt not plow with an ox and an ass together*".⁷⁷ The reason he decided to write his text was the growing number of mixed marriages. They had occurred in the past, but their number had significantly increased. "*The reason is that now such marriages are not hindered by state law, and that our people are not so pressured to change their religion as in the past, if they were never without temptation*".⁷⁸ From the point of view of the Evangelical Church, "*the corruption and harm*" of such marriages lay in the fact that they caused depletion of the faithful in favour of the Catholic Church.⁷⁹

Like other authors of this type of literature, Fornet started with examples from the Old and New Testaments, which criticized the conclusion of marriages between Jews and pagans or Christians and non-Christians.⁸⁰ He theologically explained the harmful-

75 KUTSCHKER, ref. 6, p. 473-478.

76 SNK-Archív literatúry a umenia. Sign. J 2736, Dejiny cirkvi. Wystraha pred Manželstwjm rozdjlného Naboženstwj zepsana skrz Krystyana Fornet na Bocy Roku 1817 (Warning again marriage between different religions, written by Krystyan Fornet at Boca in 1817), (hereinafter: Wystraha).

77 Deuteronomy 22, 10

78 Ref. 76, p. 1.

79 Ref. 76, p. 1.

80 On the origin and on the literary and educational work of Juraj Fornet and his sons Jozef and Kristián see: ŠVORC, Peter. Rod Fornetovcov a jeho vklad do slovenskej kultúry a vzdelanosti v 18. storočí. (The Fornet family and its contribution to Slovak culture and education in the 18th century.). In *Historický časopis*, 1997, year 43, n. 4, p. 655-666. It does not mention the work *Wystraha* among the writings of K. Fornet.

ness of such unions and the complications they bring to the practice of faith. He stated five reasons why they cannot be approved. 1. *“Since such unequal marriages do not please the Lord God. This is so clear from the sacred writings of the Old Testament that there cannot be the slightest doubt about it...”* 2. *“Since corruption and debasement are brought into the true Church through difference of religion...”* 3. *“Since an Evangelical Christian man or woman places him or herself in such great danger by entering an unequal marriage voluntarily and without need, that it may lead to eternal damnation. They certainly should not be led to abominable falling away from the true religion, and to denial of Christ the Lord.”* 4. *“Since our side cannot keep children from such an unequal marriage in our religion, but loses all or some of them.”* 5. *“Since spouses of different religion cannot serve God together as they would like and as they should, and not only in church, but also at home, because they pray differently and serve God in different ways...”*⁸¹

Works of a similar orientation inevitably include a preventive part – warnings, recommendations and instructions for individual actors, from young people seeking life partners, parents and the clergy to Evangelical believers already in mixed marriages. The main means by which the Evangelical Christian was supposed to guard against this danger was religious upbringing, knowledge of the basics of their own faith and the errors of other religions. Fornet demanded from parents that they strengthen their children in the conviction that the Evangelical religion is the *“only true and salvation bringing way”*. They also had to limit their children’s contacts with people of the other religion. They were not supposed to place them in service or send them for training with people of the other religion. Above all, they should not be allowed to live with them. Special attention had to be devoted to supervision of young single people. *“So that a single person, who intends to enter into marriage should not get to know a person of another religion either of male or female sex, yes and should avoid all opportunities for this, and flee temptation from afar and betimes. They must avoid such persons, as it sometimes happens, so he has always to consider her not otherwise than as that forbidden tree in paradise that should never be touched, and without letting her to touch him. So that he will not love her, even if she is beautiful or rich or of an illustrious birth.”*⁸²

Stigmatization of contacts with members of other confessions was naturally strongest at an age, when an individual is most easily influenced and the period of life when he or she seeks a life partner. In the post-Josephine period, the confessional barriers were gradually relaxed and inter-confessional communication intensified. The mobility of the population also increased, which demanded from parents greater control over their children’s social contacts and more activity to strengthen their confessional identity.

Fornet urged parents, who lived in mixed marriages, to watchfulness and religious zeal. First of all they should realize what a great mistake they had made and how they had sinned *“against God and their children, but also against the whole Church”*; they should beg God for forgiveness and to make amends they should observantly protect their faith and consciences and persist in their religion. In relation to children, Fornet advised

81 Ref. 76, p. 2-10.

82 Ref. 76, p. 12.

parents “*that they should warn their children who they could keep in their religion, and bring them up in the fear and awareness of the Lord: to those who must follow the other religion, that they should in an innocent way show, what they should think about our religion, they should in no way dishonour it, and, at the same time, they should fervently pray to the Lord God that His Holy Spirit will enlighten them, and with time deign to lead them onto the path of truth*”.⁸³

In his Warning, Fornet also warned against the problems the Evangelical partner in a mixed marriage had to overcome in the everyday practice of his or her faith. It was not only a matter of different prayers, worship and religious calendar. Even when the law allowed the upbringing of children in the non-Catholic religion, it was very difficult for a father to pass on his faith to his sons. It was usually the mother who gave children their first contact with faith, prayed with them and shaped their religion. Mothers spent substantially more time than fathers with their children and had more opportunity to influence them.

The view on the decisive role of the mother in the religious upbringing of children also prevailed in Catholic discourse. In his already mentioned work J. Kutschker wrote: “*It is the mother, who first directs the attention of the child to the Father, who teaches him or her to pray. Experience shows what great influence the mother can have on the religiosity of the children, so great that it lasts far into later years, when other impressions acquired in youth are wiped away. [...] Children usually first enter the Lord’s House holding their mother’s hand, and perform their first religious exercises in their mother’s company.*”⁸⁴ The generally held assumption was that the danger of falling away from the faith was much greater in marriages, where the non-Catholic parent was the mother, than in mixed marriages with a non-Catholic father. Examples of Old Testament men such as Adam, Solomon and Achab were thought to warn against the great influence of women, who could use their allure and charm to blind men and lead them into acting against their convictions.⁸⁵

Gregor Berzeviczy and Ferdinand Friederich, authors of the two most influential works on the position of the Evangelical Church in Hungary, naturally did not avoid the problem of mixed marriages. In 1822, Berzeviczy published his *Reports on the present state of the Evangelicals in Hungary* and it had great impact. It was based mainly on complaints that individuals and the representatives of communities and seniorates had addressed to the monarch from the end of the 18th century to the 1820s. Mixed marriages, confessional conversions and the church membership of children were the most frequent sources of conflict and subjects of complaints and legal disputes. The so-called *Main complaint of the Evangelicals in Hungary*, which reacted to the failure to observe the Religion Act from 1791, was compiled in 1799 (17 July). It contained criticism of illegally enforced reverses and the manipulation of illiterate engaged couples by Catholic parish priests. Allegedly up to a third of reverses were signed without the people invol-

83 Ref. 76, 14-15.

84 KUTSCHKER, ref. 6, p. 458.

85 KUTSCHKER, ref. 6, p. 353-354.

ved knowing exactly what they were committing themselves to.⁸⁶ They also mentioned violence, which happened in cases of so-called transit. This meant forbidden conversion to the Evangelical Church, in the majority of cases of spouses and children from mixed marriages. In an effort to achieve legal correction, incidents happened that radicalized both confessional communities and represented a long-term potential for conflict.⁸⁷ Testimony about one such case came from Ján Molnár (1757 – 1819), Slovak Lutheran parish pastor in Pest in an anonymously published text from 1790. “*The aim of these reverses was as follows. When people of different religion were dating, they were not hindered, their love was even encouraged. However, if it came to an engagement, which was binding and could not be dissolved, even if it was intended in jest (these engagements brought the Catholic clergy more than a few ducats), these persons were married only on the condition that the Protestant partner renounced the upbringing of the children of both sexes. I myself know a father, who, in spite of the reverse, but with the consent of his Catholic wife, wanted, at first publicly but later, after complaints, secretly, to bring up his children in the Protestant religion. The legal case brought against him, cost him serious money and led to a long period of imprisonment.*”⁸⁸

According to Berzeviczy, the greatest ill-feeling was provoked by cases in which children were forcibly taken from their parents and placed for upbringing with families in neighbouring or sometimes distant counties. The parents had to pay for their living expenses. If a child ran away from the home to which he or she had been entrusted, the Protestant parent was imprisoned until the lost child returned, which could take years.⁸⁹ Berzeviczy also referred to a more recent complaint submitted to the monarch on 5 January 1819, mentioning various specific cases of the forcible removal of children from their parents, because they were brought up in the Evangelical religion in conflict with the law.⁹⁰ In the complaints, he appealed to the above mentioned official notice from 7 August 1798, which was published precisely for the purpose of calming the frequent conflicts in connection with the church membership of children, who were legally Catholic, but in reality brought up in the Evangelical religion.⁹¹

A much more frequent phenomenon than the forcible removal of children was the repetition (*recopulatio*) of marriages that had been illegally concluded by a Protestant

86 An anonymous reader from Hungary sent a shortened version of the Complaints with commentary to the editorial office of the journal *Magazin der Religions-, Moral- und Kirchengeschichte*. The editor of the journal Karl Friedrich Stäudlin published it in book form as an interesting text about the position of Protestants in Hungary. See: STÄUDLIN, Karl Friedrich. *Von dem Zustande der Protestanten in Ungarn unter Regierung Kaiser Franz II.* Göttingen : bey Wandenhoek und Ruprecht, 1804, p. 65-66.

87 For an account of a specific example see: FRIEDERICH, ref. 42, p. 125-131.

88 Anonym, [Ján Molnár]: Politisch-kirchliches Manch-Hermaeon von den Reformen Kaiser Joseph in Ungern. (Gedr. in 8. ohne Bezeichnung der Jahrzahl (1790) und des Druckorts. In GRELLMANN, Heinrich Moritz Gottlieb. *Aufklärung über wichtige Theile und Gegenstände der österreichischen Monarchie*. Erster Band, Göttingen 1795, p. 229-434, here p. 253-254. Cases in which engaged couples of mixed confession entered or were forced into marriage without the consent of the non-Catholic parents, are also mentioned in the complaint of the Hungarian Protestants from 1799. See: STÄUDLIN, ref. 86, p. 54-57.

89 BERZEVICZY, ref. 43, p. 94-95.

90 BERZEVICZY, ref. 43, p. 105, 118.

91 BERZEVICZY, ref. 43, p. 113, 122.

pastor. There were cases of the county authorities ordering repeated marriages because one of the partners had been illegally brought up as a Protestant.⁹² Casting of doubt on the legal validity of marriages was an especially sensitive problem, because it meant casting of doubt on the inheritance rights of children born in these marriages, and threatened to make them illegitimate. Berzeviczy also commented on the complaint that the district conventus (assembly) of the West Tisza superintendency in Levoča compiled on 22 June 1820. It included a demand for the removal of the obligation of Catholic parish priests to regularly compile lists of children born in mixed marriages. The Protestant clergy were obliged to respect these lists and not intervene in the upbringing of the children on them. The complaint argued that *“these newly invented registers (elenchi), reverses, fiscal processes, conversions with the assistance of the county police, imprisonment, removal of children from their parents, separation of spouses and similar acts of violence must be ended as unworthy of the Catholic religion”*.⁹³ The complaint proposed that the parents should be able to decide freely, what religion children in mixed marriages should be brought up in until they were aged 16. After reaching this age, children claimed by the Catholic Church should receive six weeks of instruction from the Catholic parish priest, and then if they wanted to remain in their faith, it could not be hindered any further.⁹⁴

According to Berzeviczy, legal article 26/1791 also contributed to the legal chaos. In contrast to the Toleration Patent, it left the possibility of a voluntary reverse by the non-Catholic partner. The guarantees, which this act contained, gradually became doubtful or unclear as a result of official notices from the monarch, resolutions and other legal norms, so that confusion prevailed. According to Berzeviczy: *“Reverses are by their nature invalid, since how can parents have the right to permanently bind the faith, convictions and freedom of the spirit of their children? The Religion Act abolished reverses, while at the same time reintroducing them by means of the sophism that they do not have to give, but they can.”*⁹⁵ The Hungarian Protestants demanded that the upbringing of children should be left to agreement between the parents already from the end of the 18th century,⁹⁶ and this solution was also preferred in the reform period. The conflicts these cases provoked within families and religious communities were widely reported in the media of the time, and they traumatized society. The professor of theology and canon of Győr Laurenz Hohenegger produced the most extensive reactions to Berzeviczy and Friedrich. In 300 and 500 page texts he presented the view of the Catholic side on the complaints and demands of the Hungarian Protestants.⁹⁷ He accused both authors of presenting exceptional cases to the domestic and foreign public as if they were the widespread norm. He cast doubt on

92 BERZEVICZY, ref. 43, p. 74.

93 BERZEVICZY, ref. 43, p. 141.

94 BERZEVICZY, ref. 43, p. 141.

95 BERZEVICZY, ref. 43, p. 74, emphasis by G. Berzeviczy.

96 STÄUDLIN, ref. 86, p. 68-69.

97 HOHENEGGER, Laurenz. *Beleuchtung der Gregor von Berzeviczychen Schrift: Nachrichten über den jetzigen Zustand der Evangelischen in Ungarn*. Gran : gedruckt bei Joseph Beimel, 1825, 295 pages; HOHENEGGER, Laurenz. *Bemerkungen über Ferdinands Friedrich's Vertraute Briefe über die äußere Lage evangelischen Kirche in Ungarn*. Gran : gedruckt bei Joseph Beimel, 1828, 482 pages.

the truthfulness of the picture they gave of the position of Protestantism in Hungary, and pointed to various cases of violation of the law from the side of the non-Catholics.⁹⁸

Everyday social practice

Catholic lad and Lutheran lass

*I'm sorry, I'm sorry about one lad,
That he's a Catholic and I'm Lutheran.
"Why, lass, does your mother stop you?"
That you're Catholic and we're Lutheran.
In vain, in vain, our faithful love,
But the Lutheran faith divides us.
Really, my lad we're wasting time.
Father stops you, me the whole family.
You should have stopped us long ago,
Now you won't stop us, it's useless
They're not stopping us and they won't,
Take the lad away from us.*

Katoljk a Luteránka

*Lutugem, lutugem,
gedného šuhagka,
Že ge on Katoljk a ga Luteránka.
„Čože ti diewčatko tá twoga mať bránj?“
Že si ty Katoljk a my Luteráni.
Daromná, daromná naša werná láska,
Weť nás rozlučuge wiera luteranská.
Weru nám ge šuhag daromná hodina,
Tebe bránj otec, mně wšetká rodina.
Keď ste mali bránit, bolo bránit dáwno,
Už nezabráňte, weru wám ge darmo.
Nebráňá, ňebráňá, ani už nebudú,
Už sa nám šuhagko pobrat dowolugú.*

Very varied, locally conditioned social norms developed in confessionally heterogeneous communities, where mixed marriages often happened. They regulated various situations that arose in the case of mixed marriages, from the wedding ceremony, though religious upbringing, church membership of the children and choice of godparents, to their final resting place. The disciplinary pressure from the state struck against resistance of varying strength from handed down norms, customs and conventions. In mixed marriages, both partners attempted to achieve a consensus, which would respect the local power structures, the social status of both partners, the strength of the religious communities, the influence of local landlords and so on. Among other factors, it is necessary to mention distance from the Catholic and Protestant parish churches and the pastoral activities of the local clergy.⁹⁹

Reverses were the most effective disciplinary instrument for regulating mixed marriages. This legal instrument was introduced into the Hungarian legal system in 1749, but it was only from the end of the 1760s that its observance was more consistently controlled.

98 *Národné zpiewanky čili Pjsné swětské Slowáků w Uhrách, gak pospolitého lidu tak i wyššjch stawů, sebrané od mnohých, w pořádek uwedené, wyswětlenjmi opatřené a wydané od Jana Kollára.* Djl perwý. Wydánj hogně rozmnoženě i perwé dwa tištěné swazečky w sobě obsahuge. W Budjně, w králowské unwersické tiskárně. 1834. (*National song book or Secular songs of the Slovaks in Hungary, both of the common people and of the higher classes, collected from many, arranged, provided with explanations and published by Jan Kollár.* Part 1. Published abundantly enlarged and including the first two printed volumes. Budapest Royal University Press. 1834). p. 82.

99 ŠOLTÉS, Peter. *Tri jazyky, štyri konfesie. Etnická a konfesionalna pluralita na Zempline, Šariši a Spiši* (*Three languages, four confessions. Ethnic and confessional plurality in Zemplin, Šariš and Spiš*). Bratislava : Historický ústav SAV, 2009, p. 123-128, ISBN 9788097006068.

From the formal point of view, reverses were written declarations, in which the non-Catholic partner or both spouses committed themselves to the Catholic partner remaining in his or her faith and all the children being brought up in the Catholic religion. The exact text varied depending on various circumstances. One of them was the social status of the engaged couple. If the couple had a lower place in the social hierarchy, the terms stating confessional membership were more expressive: “*Lutheran sect*”, “*Evangelical heresy*” or “*a certain one and only saving faith*” and so on. An example of a more or less neutrally formulated reverse was signed in 1772 in front of the Roman Catholic parish priest of Svätý Kríž in the County of Liptov by “*Martin Bieleny Catholic and Susana Misowie Lutheran*”. According to the gracious royal decree, they bound themselves: “*that we want to bring up our children of both sexes in the saving Roman Catholic faith, and trained so that they know the Roman Catholic faith better, we make a commitment that when they reach the age of seven or eight we want to bring them diligently, and carefully to the parish priest, under the penalty, apart from the penalty set by the Royal Majesty, of twelve Rhenish gulden to the Church of Svätý Kríž, and twelve Rhenish gulden to our famous County of Liptov. The Reeve will take the penalty from us, if we neglect our duty to the parish priest for a full fifteen days*”.¹⁰⁰

Reverses mentioning not only the general commitments and obligations of the parents, but also precisely defined punishments to be imposed if they were not observed, point to the need for stricter controls on the observance of church discipline. Roman Catholic priests, considering their previous experiences, did not regard generally formulated reverses as an adequate guarantee that the children and the marriage partner would remain Catholic. The penalties for violations were not standardized, but varied, depending on the local conditions and the economic position of the given family. Apart from the legal norms, they often included additional fines for every failure to observe the reverse, varying from 20, 50, 80, up to 100 Rhenish gulden.

Reverses from the post-toleration period reacted to the changes in the civil legal norms. Emphasis was placed on guaranteeing the Catholic upbringing of all children, since the Toleration Patent and legal article 26/1791 allowed the sons of a Protestant father to follow his religion. From the formal point of view, there was an emphasis on voluntary acceptance of the reverse and an absence of any pressure. The sanctions for any violation were not defined so explicitly as in the period, when the reverse obligation was anchored in law. In 1796, the Roman Catholic Michael Rajtuch and Evangelical Marina Hulek signed a reverse, in which they confirmed that they would bring up all their children in the Catholic faith, in accordance with article 26/1791, since the father would be a Catholic, and when they reached the necessary age they would send the children to the parish priest for religious instruction without delay.¹⁰¹ In 1819, Mathias Holéci committed himself “*voluntarily, without any pressure or force to have all children of both sexes, whether boy or girl, with which the Lord God has blessed me, instructed in the Catholic Faith. I intend to make no obstacles to them continuing in the Catholic Faith. I am not*

100 Archive of the Roman Catholic parish of Svätý Kríž, miscellaneous documents, Reversales Martin Bieleny et Susana Misowie, 1775.

101 Ref. 100, Reversales Michaelis Rajtuch et Marina Hulek, 1793.

*doing this because of the penalty that any authority, secular or religious would impose on me, but strictly in the presence of trust-worthy witnesses I respect. Not knowing how to write my name and from my wife I mark and confirm with a cross”.*¹⁰²

The degree of observance or violation of reverses depended on various circumstances. First of all, there were the local social norms, developed in the framework of the local community, local religious bodies and feudal lordships. The choice of marriage partner in the pre-modern period was subject to firm rules and its legitimacy depended on the consent of the parents, especially the father. The position of the spouses in the family and so also the credit of the confession they represented, was also influenced by their individual social capital, personal characteristics, physical disposition and not least by the degree of their religiosity. People could enter marriage in various states, they could be single or widowed, they could come from the given village or parish, or they could marry into it.

Non-religious or non-confessional causes and motivations were usually dominant in cases of crossing of religious boundaries. Among them, it is necessary to mention first of all the principle of local endogamy and compatibility of social status of the potential marriage partners. Until 1785, pressure from the feudal landlord had strong influence in the countryside. Secondly, there was pressure from the local community for the formation of marriages according to possibilities only in the framework of their own community. Until the abolition of serfdom, couples needed to submit to the priest permission from their landlord before the wedding. This significantly limited the possibility to break the principle of local endogamy. Thus, on one side there was pressure to conclude confessionally homogeneous marriages, but there were also equally strong tendencies to respect the social status of the families of the engaged couple, their positions as serfs and local social strategies.

The important factors influencing inter-confessional communication included the spiritual authorities, especially the parish priests and teachers, but also priests from religious orders in the areas of their missionary activity. Priests were respected authorities in their church communities and often also in the wider local community. They mediated and interpreted church and civil norms. At the same time, they were also one of the agencies of social supervision and discipline. A record of a visitation by Bishop Károly Eszterházy of Eger from 1773 offers interesting testimony to the importance of the priest in the process of enforcing discipline and successfully developing a particular model of inter-confessional relations. In the town of Tarczal in Tokaj, the visitors described the local parish priest as follows: *“The parish priest is peace loving, he does not like force and allows many to break the law. The non-Catholic population is very numerous here, and because of the peace-loving nature of the present parish priest, it is represented in the local council. The authority of the Church is beginning to decline. A total of eighteen [Catholics – P. Š.] have already fallen away here.”*¹⁰³ The visitors blamed the parish priest of Tarczal for the fact that many mixed marriages had been concluded in

102 Ref. 100, Reversales Mathias Holeci Lutheranus, 1819.

103 The Archiepiscopal Archives in Košice (AACass), Districtualia, vol. 4, fasc. 1, Protocollum Canonicae Visitationis 1772, Comitatus Zempliniensis.

front of a Calvinist pastor. In comparison with other parts of the Kingdom of Hungary, the territory of the Diocese of Eger had a large number of cases of violation of reverse commitments, and the occurrence of apostates was so high that the Royal Governor's Council often asked the county authorities to work out exact information on them. The proportion of mixed marriages was especially high in the territories of counties such as Sabolcs, Borsód, Zemplín and Abov, where Calvinist nobles had a strong position. These areas were directed by local social norms, and the ideas or norms of the state could not be applied.¹⁰⁴

In the case of mixed marriages between persons of noble origin, the resistance to disciplinary pressure from the state and the Catholic Church was more effective than from other social groups. Noble privileges and prerogatives enabled them to put effective pressure on the church hierarchy and apply their individual, family or political interests in the case of the conclusion of mixed marriages. On the other side, Catholic parish priests and the state administration had a significantly more limited range of instruments that could be used in the case of people of noble origin. At the 1790/1791 parliament, the Protestant representatives formulated their position on the question of the religious upbringing of children in *matrimonia mixtae religionis* in the so-called representation dated 2 December 1790. It enables us to get an idea of the degree to which the norms regulating the conclusion of mixed marriages and upbringing of children were observed in the noble environment. The document argued against the proposed Religion Act, which became article 26/1790/1, with the view that until then it was customary to divide the upbringing of children in mixed marriages equally, with sons following their father and girls their mother, if both sides did not decide differently before they got married.¹⁰⁵

Up to now I have failed to mention one important aspect. On the micro- and middle levels, it is necessary to distinguish between local communities and regions where confessionally mixed marriages were frequent and seen as an accepted part of the social reality, and localities where *matrimonia mixtae religionis* occurred rarely, were a marginal phenomenon, and so they developed no specific social norms, which regulated them differently to the way determined by law. The first group included the confessionally mixed frontier regions on the north-eastern periphery of the Kingdom of Hungary, formed as a result of substantial migrations and unsuccessful re-Catholicization. In local communities where three and sometimes even four confessional churches had a significant presence, and where a complicated network of property and family relationships with a strong tendency to endogamy developed, frequent occurrence of mixed marriages was more or less a demographic inevitability.

Spiš (Szepes, Zips) and to some degree the whole territory of the Diocese of Spiš belonged to the regions where mixed marriages were a significant factor in inter-confessional communication. The first Bishop of Spiš Karl de Salbeck wrote about mixed marriages as a great pastoral problem in a report to Rome from 1780, immediately after he had acquainted himself with the situation in the diocese. "*We have learnt with concern and pain that many children with Catholic and non-Catholic parents are led astray*

104 ŠOLTĚS, ref. 99, p. 126.

105 IRÍNYI, ref. 26, p. 25-40.

into heresy, and the Catholic partners themselves fall into infidelity. Many bear the label Catholic in vain, because they sin under the influence of a heretical partner in marriage. For example, the children of a heretical father are diverted from learning about the Catholic sacraments, and the Catholic mother cannot do anything about it. Those, who are not worthy of being called Catholics in any way cause unbelievable concern and difficulty for confessors, when they from pure habit come before the court of penance. When the priest refuses to grant absolution, people threaten to turn to the Lutheran preachers and get absolution from them. An additional pain and concern is that these non-Catholics conclude marriages within the prohibited degrees of relationship, even in the first degree of relationship with permission of the royal concession, and they follow only those laws of the land with which they can avoid paying tax, evade punishment and ensure that their children can legally inherit their property. The bishop cannot stop them because they conclude their marriages in front of their own preachers.”¹⁰⁶

Bishop Salbeck was confronted in Spiš with complicated inter-confessional relationships and power configurations. The Catholics were often economically and politically weaker than the Protestants, who were more numerous in many places. This was also manifested in the frequency of mixed marriages and the degree of respect for the church and civil norms, which regulated them. In the Diocese of Spiš and in other confessionally mixed regions, the religious upbringing of children was solved in various ways. The conclusion of mixed marriages was one of the ways local endogamy and the principle of social, especially property compatibility between spouses could be preserved in confessionally heterogeneous communities. Another way was the conclusion of marriages within the prohibited degrees of relationship. It was exceptional for the Church to grant dispensations from this impediment to marriage. However, in the confessionally mixed Diocese of Spiš, a more moderate approach was applied to the granting of dispensations in cases of fourth, third or mixed degrees of relationship. In the rural environment, economic motives, lack of soil and efforts to facilitate the use of already small plots of land were decisive factors in the question of choosing life partners among ordinary people. In the case of towns' people, the bishop argued in his report to Rome in favour of granting dispensations, because of the predominance of Protestants in the towns of Spiš, which reduced the possibilities for concluding purely Catholic marriages. He wrote in the report: *“Catholic brides can scarcely hope to find Catholic bridegrooms. And let us leave aside the poverty of these settlements, which further complicates the situation. If we agree in principle to unite Catholic couples with dispensations, we think that it is better than to put one of them for life into the company of a different religion.”¹⁰⁷*

As a reaction to the growing number of mixed marriages and the general weakening of confessional boundaries, some Protestant communities created strategies to prevent closer contact with Catholics, and in the end to limit the “stealing of souls”. The Polizeihofstelle in Vienna was informed about one such case by its agent in Prešov in 1826. The agent reported that he had learnt from the Catholic parish priest Adam Alois of

106 BOUYDOSH, Ernest. The quadrennial reports of the bishops of Spiš and Banská Bystrica to Rome. In *Slovak Studies*, 16 (1976), p. 221-317, here p. 248-249.

107 BOUYDOSH, ref. 106, p. 249.

Bobrovec in the County of Liptov, that the Lutherans in his chapelry of Žiar, the mayor and the whole community had unanimously decided that every Lutheran, who decided to invite the local midwife – a Catholic – to assist with childbirth, would pay 5 gulden, and a “*father, who dared to allow Catholic godparents at a christening would pay 3 gulden and 30 kreuzers*”.¹⁰⁸ There is an interesting evaluation of the position of Protestantism in Liptov in the introduction to the report, where it states that “*in the whole of Hungary there are not such intolerant Lutherans as in the County of Liptov*”.¹⁰⁹

In local communities where three or sometimes even four equally numerous church communities existed along side each other, the composition of mixed marriages was relatively even roughly until the 1830s. However, in the next period, a social strategy that reacted to the tightening of control over observance of the laws on the upbringing of children was applied in some regions. Mixed marriages composed of a Protestant father and Catholic mother began to be significantly more numerous.¹¹⁰ We also have it documented from larger towns such as Košice and Prešov.¹¹¹ In mixed marriages between Greek Catholics and Evangelicals of the Augsburg Confession they sometimes applied an interesting solution to the question of the religious upbringing of the children, by which the parents decided for the Roman Catholic Church. Annual reports from the territories of the counties of Borsod, Zemplín and Šariš from the 1820s record some families in which a Protestant father and Greek Catholic mother had their sons brought up as Roman Catholics.¹¹²

Conclusion

The normative interventions of the Catholic Church and the state regulating the conditions for the conclusion of marriage and the upbringing of children encountered strong resistance in confessionally mixed regions. Social norms in many local communities showed considerable plurality even in the pre-toleration period. Partners living in mixed families used various strategies to escape the disciplinary pressures imposed by the state administration, Catholic Church structures and depending on confessional membership

108 Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv, Wien (AVA), Ministerium des Innern 2. Sektion, (1793 – 1848), Zl. 3666/1826 (Intoleranz der Lutheraner in Zsar im Liptauer Comitatus). Report dated in Prešov 26 May 1826. The presidium obtained the report on 3 June 1826.

109 Ref. 108. „...in ganz Ungarn keine so intolerante Lutheraner existieren, als im Liptauer Komitat“.

110 In the parish of Trhovište (County of Zemplín) in 1856 there were only two mixed marriages formed by a Protestant mother (one Evangelical and one Reformed) and a Catholic father, but 46 marriages between a non-Catholic father (18 Evangelicals and 28 Reformed) and a Catholic mother. From the 96 children, 47 were girls, from whom 30 received Catholic religious upbringing, 12 Calvinist and 5 Lutheran. Among the 49 boys, 15 were brought up as Catholics, 24 as Calvinists and 10 as Lutherans. AACass, Diocesan tribunal (Pars antiqua), Section: Matrioniae mixtae, Informatio de statu educationis prolium ex mixtae religionis matrimoniis progenitarum intra ambitum parochiis Vársarhelyiensis pro Anno 1856. praestita.

111 In 1856, Prešov, with a population of about 7,000, had 92 mixed marriages, among which more than two-thirds had a Catholic mother and Protestant father (63 Evangelicals and 3 Reformed). AACass, Diocesan tribunal (Pars antiqua), Section: Matrioniae mixtae, Informatio de Statu educationis prolium e mixtis Religionis Matrioniis intra ambitum Parochiae L.R. Civitatis Eperies progenitarum pro Anno 1855/6 praestita.

112 Archive of the Greek Catholic Archbishopric of Prešov (AGAP), Current agenda, 1824, Inv. Nr. 340, Sign. 97; 1827, Inv. Nr. 343, Sign. 42, 296; 1828, Inv. Nr. 344, Sign. 142.

also by the feudal landlords. Both sides strove to achieve a consensus on religious upbringing, which would take account of local social norms, local power configurations, and the social capital of marriage partners and their families.

The extent of observance of the legal and church norms was significantly influenced by the resources available to the bearers of power when identifying and especially sanctioning violations. The solutions included the upbringing of children in one confessional tradition, divided upbringing of the children according to sex, and the upbringing of one, usually the eldest son in the Protestant religion of his father. In some local communities, an interesting model of religious upbringing of children became established. The children were usually baptized in the Catholic Church, but other initiation ceremonies were left until they were old enough to decide for themselves which confession they wanted to belong to. In the 1820s, this model came to be seen as the best solution in Protestant discourse, and they attempted to promote it by means of complaints addressed to the Vienna court and the Governor's Council.

In the period before the reign of Joseph II, the position of individual actors in the development of social norms connected with confessionally mixed marriages varied depending on the specific power configuration, from a promising, relatively easy missionary region, through acceptable starting point from a complex social, confessional and ethnic structure in the territory of a feudal lordship or other geographically defined local community, to ostracism. Children born into mixed marriages or brought from previous unions were seen as potential proselytes and “in faith divided marriages” as “Achilles’ heels” and space for the spread of religious indifferentism.

The decrees of the Toleration Patent represented an important step towards the legal emancipation of the non-Catholic confessions recognized by the state. At the same time, however, they codified a model of the solution to the problem of the upbringing of children in mixed marriages, which burdened inter-confessional relations for a long time. Both sides considered it unacceptable. On the Catholic side it opposed canon law, while for the Protestant side its legal asymmetry was unacceptable. Moreover, it was a model that complicated the function of the family as the main space for catechesis and general religious formation, as authors belonging to both Catholic and Protestant discourse observed.

The Hungarian Catholic bishops and clergy most significantly revised their attitude towards *matrimonia mixtae religionis*. The deviation of the civil legal norms from canon law involved the abolition of the obligation to sign a reverse, legalization of conversion to Protestantism and the possibility that children could be brought up in a non-Catholic religion, although only if the father was Protestant. As a result, mixed marriages were no longer seen as a potential mission field and means of re-Catholicization. Limitation of the monopoly of the Catholic Church on supervision and the keeping of church records in favour of the state and partly of the competing confessions led to stricter control of the observance of the conditions for concluding mixed marriages, namely guarantees of the Catholicity of the partner and children.

The church policy of the state in the period of Josephinism showed two tendencies. The first, most significant in the period of the Napoleonic Wars, was characterized by an effort to limit the potential of mixed marriages to provoke conflict. In parallel to this

and under the influence of theological discourse, views were expressed on the negative consequences of frequent mixed marriages, especially the growing problems connected with the church membership of children. From the 1820s, the spread of religious laxity, indifferentism and the decline of morality became established as the dominant arguments against mixed marriages. Mixed marriages were an important space for social interaction. As a result of intensive contacts between members of the various confessions, confessional boundaries became relativized, and space was opened in which they could be more easily crossed. In some frontier regions, this even led to various forms of religious eclecticism, especially in expressions of folk piety.*

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KONFESSIONELL GEMISCHTE EHEN IN UNGARN. RECHTLICHE NORMEN UND SOZIALE PRAXIS BIS ZUM JAHR 1848

PETER ŠOLTÉS

Die konfessionell gemischten Ehen bieten für einen Historiker aus mehreren Gründen ein interessantes und inspirierendes Forschungsobjekt. Sie befanden sich im Spannungsfeld von verschiedenen Systemen von Normen, Vorstellungen und Zielen, welche einzelne Konfessionskirchen, der Staat, die Landesherrn, eine lokale konfessionell gemischte Gesellschaft, sowie die konkreten Familien und Individuen getragen haben. Am Beispiel der *Matrimonia mixtae religionis* lassen sich Prozesse der Sozialdisziplinierung und Verrechtlichung im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert analysieren, sowie die Etablierung der jurisdiktionellen Normen und Formgebung von nicht kodifizierten sozialen Normen, ihre Perzeption und Auswirkungen in der Alltagspraxis. Auch für die Untersuchung von Formen und Intensität der interkonfessionellen Kommunikation im konfessionell gemischten Milieu sind die gemischten Ehen ein wichtiger sozialer Interaktionsraum.

Bis zum Josephinismus waren die Vorstellungen und Ziele der Hauptakteure der Normsetzung, des habsburgischen Staates, der ungarländischen politischen Elite und der katholischen Kirche im Einklang oder zumindest ohne deutlichere Diskrepanz. Die zivilen rechtlichen Normen über die Bedingungen der Eheschließung, des konfessionellen Zusammenlebens der Eheleute und der religiösen Erziehung der Kinder haben die Bestimmungen der katholischen Kirche übernommen.

Das Toleranzpatent und die darauffolgende aufgeklärte kirchliche Politik haben die Einstellungen des Staates und der katholischen Kirche gegenüber Mischehen auseinandergbracht. Die Frage der Reverse und der Kompetenz, Trauungen bei Mischehen vorzunehmen, standen im Mittelpunkt der heftigen Diskussion in der ungarländischen Politik der Reformzeit und waren Ursachen von vielen sozialen Konflikte. Für die liberale Opposition war die Durchsetzung des Prinzip der Reziprozität in Mischehen ein Bestandteil des Kampfes um die vollkommene Emanzipation des Protestantismus aber auch der Auseinandersetzung mit der konservativen, regierungstreuen Partei.


Die Verordnungen des Toleranzpatentes waren einerseits ein Schritt vorwärts auf dem Weg zu einer rechtlichen Emanzipation, auf der anderen Seite haben sie ein Modell kodifiziert, das für die Funktionsfähigkeit einer Familie etliche Komplikationen und potentielle Konfliktsituationen bedeutete. In diesem Beitrag wurde der Versuch unternommen, auf die Besonderheiten in der Alltagspraxis der gemischten Familien sowie auf ihre spezifische Rolle in den lokalen Gesellschaften hinzu-

weisen. Die Mischehen waren Orte der intensivsten interkonfessionellen Kommunikation. Ihr Wirkungsradius beschränkte sich nicht nur auf die konkrete Familie, sondern betraf auch das breitere Milieu der Verwandtschaft, die Patenschaft, die Teilnahme an kirchlichen Festivitäten der „anderen“ Konfession usw.

Die lokalen Normen in vielen Lokalgesellschaften waren schon in der Vortoleranzzeit durch eine Pluralität der Lösungen bei der Erziehung der Kinder in Mischehen gekennzeichnet. Beide Partner strebten bei der religiösen Erziehung ihrer Kinder nach einem Konsens, der einer Prägung durch den örtlichen Usus, die lokale Machtfiguration, die soziale Stellung der Ehepartner und ihrer Familie in der Lokalgesellschaft sowie der Konfession des Landesherrn unterworfen war. Der Disziplinierungsdruck des Staates ist in den konfessionell heterogenen Gebieten auf den Widerstand der lokalen sozialen Normen gestoßen. Die in gemischten Ehen lebenden Partner haben spezifische Strategien entwickelt, um ihm auszuweichen. Der Umfang, bis zu welchem die kirchlichen und staatlichen Normen akzeptiert und eingehalten wurden, hing vorerst davon ab, durch welche Mittel und in welchem Ausmaß der bürokratische Staatsapparat und die Repräsentanten und Machttträger der katholischen Kirche in der Lage waren, Verstöße zu sanktionieren.

Die Neugestaltung des gesetzlichen Rahmens für die Mischehen im Josephinismus hat die Einstellung der einzelnen Akteure hinsichtlich der Normsetzung gegenüber Mischehen in unterschiedlichem Maße beeinflusst. Am deutlichsten revidierte der katholische Episkopat und Diözesanklerus seine Haltung. Denn infolge der neuen Regelung der religiösen Erziehung der Kinder und durch die Aufhebung des obligatorischen Reverses konnten matrimonia mixtae religionis nicht mehr als effektives Instrument zur Veränderung der demographischen Struktur im konfessionell gemischten Milieu wahrgenommen werden. Die Beschränkungen des bisherigen Monopols der katholischen Kirche in den Aufsichts- und Kontrollkompetenzen zugunsten des Staates und teilweise auch der Konkurrentenkirchen führten andererseits zur Verschärfung der Kontrolle über die Mischehen, besonders nach den napoleonischen Kriegen. Der Staat hat die josephinische Politik der Versöhnung der akzeptierten Kirchen allmählich korrigiert. Im öffentlichen Diskurs hat sich die Meinung etabliert, dass die gemischten Ehen zur Erweiterung des religiösen Indifferentismus und zum Verfall der Moral beigetragen haben.

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**PUTOVANIE DEJINAMI
POD MÚRMI ORAVSKÉHO HRADU**

MICHAL BADA - ALENA BARTLOVÁ a kol.
BRATISLAVA 2015

THE SYSTEM OF SOCIAL CARE IN 19TH CENTURY BRATISLAVA AND ITS MODERNIZATION AROUND 1900

GABRIELA DUDEKOVÁ

DUDEKOVÁ, Gabriela. The System of Social Care in 19th Century Bratislava and its Modernization around 1900. *Historický časopis*, 2015, 63, 5, pp. 847-876, Bratislava.

The study describes the main principles and stages of modernization in the long 19th century in the Kingdom of Hungary on both the state and local levels using the example of Pressburg / Bratislava. Since the reforms of Joseph II directed towards centralization of care for the poor in the Kingdom of Hungary were not implemented, care for poor and socially dependent people in the towns of Hungary was mainly the responsibility of municipal, church and charitable institutions. Until the fall of the Habsburg Monarchy, the Kingdom of Hungary devoted little attention to care for the poor, and state social policy had only weak effects. In comparison with other towns in Hungary, Pressburg / Bratislava had a mature network of communal and church institutions for social care, which were incorporated into an emerging system of communal social policy around 1900.

Communal social care. Social policy. Modernization. Kingdom of Hungary. Long 19th century.

The organization of social care in Pressburg¹ in the course of the 19th century and its modernization in the form of transition to a system of communal social policy cannot be described without consideration of its older forms and the basic principles of this type of care in the state or without knowledge of contemporary attitudes to socially dependent people. The new types of municipal poor relief institutions continued older forms of protective social net, in which religious charitable institutions had the most important role. The organized provision of social assistance in the Kingdom of Hungary had two basic pillars in modern times:

1. the obligation of municipalities to provide poor relief for their inhabitants on the basis of right of legal residence or domicile,
2. the principle of subsidiarity.

At the same time, a decisive factor was assessment of the justification of need to grant social assistance, which was based first of all on moral criteria, not on the real situation

1 For the period before the renaming of the city as Bratislava in March 1919, which represents a qualitatively different stage of development of the city in the framework of the Czechoslovak Republic, we will use in the text the old name Pressburg (in Slovak: Prešporok). For more details see: MANNOVÁ, Elena – DUDEKOVÁ, Gabriela. Úvod. Komu patrí Bratislava? Multietnické mesto ako miesto lokálnej, národnej a nadnárodnej reprezentácie. (Introduction. Who does Bratislava belong to? A multi-ethnic city as a location for local, national and supra-national representation.). In DUDEKOVÁ Gabriela a kol. *Medzi provinciou a metropolou : Obraz Bratislavy v 19. a 20. storočí*. Bratislava : Historický ústav SAV, 2012, p. 12. ISBN 9788089396214.

of social need. The greatest weakness of poverty policy organized like this was its inadequacy. Whole groups in the population remained outside the public social security net. The method of financing and its effectiveness or to be more exact, the question of financial resources and their adequate use represented another notorious problem.

The responsibility of the municipality as the basic principle of poor relief

Until the middle of the 20th century, the state had a subsidiary role in the field of social care in Slovakia. In the earliest times, its main organizer was the Church, which was gradually joined by the civil community, both in the form of the local administration, and various charitable and self-help activities by citizens without direct organization from the local authorities. Like elsewhere in Europe, the first poor relief institutions in Slovakia were established under the organizational leadership of the religious orders that specialized in charitable activities. Xenodochia, hospitals and poor houses, in which travellers, the sick, invalids, the old and orphans were placed, represented the oldest form of institutionalized public social care. The characteristic features of these institutions, which combined social with medical functions, persisted up to the 18th century. The process of civil take over of religious charitable institutions was already occurring in the royal boroughs of Slovakia in the 14th century. Apart from the Church and local authorities, the founders of hospitals included rich individual noblemen or burghers.²

In practice, the state left the burden of poor relief to the Church for a long time without limiting legislative measures. After the towns became organizers of poverty policy, a principle taken from the legislation of the Holy Roman Empire was anchored in the police regulations of the Habsburg Monarchy from 1552. The obligation to care for the poor was given to the municipality of legal residence as a political administrative unit.³ This principle, namely the obligation of the municipality to provide poor relief on the basis of place of legal residence, was further confirmed by later legislative measures⁴ and became a basic principle of modern social policy.

The idea that poor relief has to be provided first of all by the municipality essentially respected the existing system of the social security net in traditional, especially rural society. Traditionally the family represented the primary social security net, followed by the community of neighbours, the protection of the serf by the landlord and finally

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- 2 JUNAS, Ján – BOKESOVÁ-UHEROVÁ, Mária. *Dejiny medicíny a zdravotníctva. Prehľad. (The history of medicine and health care. An overview)*. Martin : Osveta, 1985, p. 22-25, 96-127, 411. ISBN 8021700041; RATZINGER, Georg. *Geschichte der kirchlichen Armenpflege*. Freiburg in Breisgau : Herder'sche Verlagshandlung, 1868, p. 313-315.
 - 3 BRUCKMÜLLER, Ernst. *Sozialgeschichte Österreichs*. Wien; München : Oldenbourg, p. 269. ISBN 10 3486564102; Chudinství (Poverty) In *Ottův obchodní slovník. Díl I*. Praha : publisher J. Otty [1914], p. 1128; CALL von. *Armengesetzgebung in Österreich*. In *Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften*. Band 1. 2. Auflage. Jena : G. Fischer, 1898, p. 1091-1105, here p. 1092; WENDELIN, Harald. *Schub und Heimatrecht*. In HEINDL, Waltraud – SAURER, Edith (eds.). *Grenze und Staat. Paßwesen, Staatsbürgerschaft, Heimatrecht und Fremden gesetzgebung in der österreichischen Monarchie (1750 – 1867)*. Wien; Köln; Weimar, Böhlau : 2000, p. 181-182. ISBN 9783205991991.
 - 4 From 1724, 1751, 1752 and later. For more details see: CSIZMADIA, Andor. *A szociális gondoskodás változásai Magyarországon (Changes in social care in Hungary)*. Budapest : MTA, 1977, p. 139; JANÁK, Jan. *Příčiny vzniku předlitavské sociální správy. (The causes of the origin of the Cis-Leithanian social administration)*. Brno : Universita J. E. Purkyně, 1970, p. 96.

the parish, community or municipality, first of all religious and in second place political – administrative. A landlord had to secure a minimal standard of living for his serfs. This moral duty, which Joseph II already emphasized in the civil law code from 1786, flowed from the patriarchal relationship of a landlord to his serfs.⁵ The principle of subsidiarity, which the Habsburg Monarchy took over from German legislation, respected this progression in the framework of traditional security nets. The municipality and later the state had only a subsidiary duty to provide poor relief as a supplement.

According to the Hungarian legislation on municipalities no. VIII from 1871 and no. XXII from 1886, which gave this duty to municipalities, an individual had to first of all care for himself, then to be taken care of by his family, followed by religious and civil charities. His municipality of legal permanent residence had a duty to help only if these possibilities were not enough.

Apart from this, the municipality had a regressive right towards an individual and his relations with the duty to support him. This meant that it could demand the return of expended resources if doubt was later cast on the social dependence of the supported individual. This would happen if it was proved that he had property or had “relations capable of paying”.⁶ This regressive right also applied when it was proved that the supported individual did not have the right of legal residence in the municipality, which had provided support. In that case the municipality where he was actually lived demanded repayment from the municipality that was his legal place of residence.⁷

Apart from right of legal residence (domicile), moral assessment of who should receive assistance and in what circumstances became a decisive criterion for granting social assistance. The coming of the enlightened state, which endeavoured to establish state control and supervision over all levels of society, changed the existing view of poverty and poverty policy. According to recent evaluation, the reorganization of poor relief in the German Protestant towns in the 15th-16th centuries was done not only for socio-economic reasons, but precisely as a result of change in the perception of poverty and the problem of begging.⁸ The idea of “holy” poverty from the will of God was replaced by the stereotype of the vagrant, who did not deserve help because of his unwillingness

5 KOCHER, Gernot. Der aufgeklärte Gesetzgeber und sein Menschenbild. In AMMERER, Gerhard – HAAS, Hans (eds.). *Ambivalenz der Aufklärung. Festschrift für Ernst Wangermann*. Wien : Verlag für Geschichte und Politik; München : Oldenbourg, 1997, p. 96. ISBN 3702803521; CASTEL, Robert. *A szociális kérdés alakváltozásai* (translation from the French original: *Les Métamorphoses de la question sociale*. Paris, Fayard 1995). Budapest : Kávé Kiadó, 1998, p. 136. ISBN 9638574437.

6 CSIZMADIA, ref. 4, s. 57; FORBÁTH Tivadar. *Adatok a magyar szegényügy rendezéséhez (Data concerning the organization of Hungarian poor-relief)*. Budapest : Márkus Samu könyvnyomdája, 1908, p. 45-46; ROSENAUER, Otto. *O chudobníctve so zvláštnym zreteľom na právny stav na Slovensku a Podkarpatskej Rusi (Poverty policy with special regard for the legal situation in Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia)*. Bratislava : own publication, 1935, p. 16-19.

7 For more details on the problem of right of residence in the system of social care see the study and the literature cited in it: DUDEKOVÁ, Gabriela. Právo alebo milosrdenstvo? Domovská príslušnosť ako základný princíp sociálnej starostlivosti v Uhorsku. (Right or charity? Domicile as a basic principle of social care in the Kingdom of Hungary.) In KOVÁČ, Dušan a kol. *Sondy do slovenských dejín v dlhom 19. storočí*. Bratislava : Historický ústav SAV, 2013, p. 196-213. ISBN 9788097154011.

8 SACHBE, Christoph – TENNSTEDT, Florian. *Geschichte der Armenfürsorge in Deutschland*. Band 1. 2. Auflage. Berlin; Köln : Kohlhammer 1998, p. 30 etc. ISBN 103170152904.

to work. Beggars with no apparent bodily affliction were seen as a criminal element that needed to be re-educated.

The principles of the substantial reform of poor relief carried out under the influence of the Reformation in German towns became the model for the organization of poverty policy in the Habsburg Monarchy, but in practice they were only partially applied. While in the German environment, poor relief was still the responsibility of the autonomous municipalities,⁹ Joseph II attempted to centralize both religious and municipal charity under state control. His recommendation to establish a network of so-called parish poor institutes (Pfararmeninstitut) represented the first attempt to systemize and centralize poor relief in the Habsburg Monarchy under state supervision. The combination of the network of poor institutes with reorganization of the Church's parish system was intended to secure not only an improvement of poverty policy, but also of control and discipline in the country.¹⁰ In a court decree from 1782, Joseph II recommended that a so-called Love thy Neighbour Society¹¹ should be established in every parish, according to the example of the institution established by Count Jan Buquoy in his south Bohemian estate. As an association of representatives of the Church and the local administration, the parish poor institute was intended to become the directing body for the central collection and distribution of charity in the whole territory of the parish. The pre-conditions for its successful operation were the principles of a new system of poverty policy: prohibition of begging, control and registration of beggars, their categorization into justified and unjustified, and on this basis granting of support to the local "honourable" poor or the deportation of "foreign" beggars and placing of unjustified applicants or detained vagrants in so-called workhouses (*Correktions-Haus*).¹² The basis was supposed to distinguish the "real" poor "who became incapable of work because of an unfortunate event, bodily affliction or old age", from "the lazy beggars, who do not want to work because of laziness, although they could".¹³ The attempt to centralize care for the poor in this form was not successfully put into practice to the planned extent. The institutions promoted by Joseph II were established in Cis-Leithania from 1783, for example, in Vienna, Graz and Linz, but in Hungary they were introduced only to a very limited extent. Here, the monarch recommended and later decreed the establishment of poor institutes only in the larger towns or royal boroughs, but they appeared only in some, including Pressburg-Bratislava, Kežmarok and Trnava in the territory of today's Slovakia.¹⁴ In spite of its only partial success,

9 KRECH. Armengesetzgebung in Deutschland. In *Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften*. Band 1. 2. Auflage. Jena : G. Fischer, 1898, p. 1076-1091; WEINHOLD, Rudolf. Armen- und Spitalverpflegung als Element städtischer Ernährungspolitik. Dargestellt an Dresdner Material des 17. bis 19. Jahrhunderts. In *Volkskunde in Sachsen*, 1999, year 7, Studien 2, p. 73-88, here 73-74. ISSN 14307537.

10 BRUCKMÜLLER, ref. 3, p. 235.

11 In the original "Vereinigung aus Liebe des Nächsten". In practice it had the simplified name "Armeninstitut" or "Pfararmeninstitut".

12 PETRÁŇOVÁ, Alena. Venkovská chudina evidovaná v buquoyském „zaopatřovacím“ zřízení v druhé polovině 18. století (The rural poor recorded in a Buquoy type "provision" institution in the second half of the 18th century). In *Jihočeský sborník historický*, 1961, year 30, p. 114-134.

13 *Abhandlung über das Armen-Institut in der königlichen Freistadt Késmark*. Leutschau : J. Werthmüller, 1818, p. 7.

14 LINZBAUER, Franciscus Xav. *Codex sanitario-medicinalis Hungarie, III/I*. Budae : Typis Caesaro-

the project of parish poor institutes and the organization of social policy according to the new principles are regarded as the first stage of organized state social policy in the territory of the Habsburg Monarchy.¹⁵ As a result of the ineffective implementation of the reforms of Joseph II in the Kingdom of Hungary, the difference in the organization and effectiveness of poverty policy compared to Cis-Leithania deepened, and this persisted in the following periods, practically until the dissolution of the Monarchy.¹⁶

Further measures concerning beggars were codified according to Joseph II's penal code from 1787 and can be described as conditional charity with a constant threat of repression. Ability to work became the decisive distinguishing criterion when assessing eligibility for social assistance. On the basis of contemporary moral criteria and ideas about the causes of poverty, the physically and mentally disabled, children, old people and widows were considered "worthy" of assistance. On the other hand, beggars capable of work were suspected of criminal tendencies, so the authorities were advised to expel them or put them in workhouses for preventive reasons. Towns carried out raids and made lists of beggars. The majority of them were then expelled from the town's territory, in spite of the fact that many of them came to the town to look for work. This new attitude to poverty expressed in the state decrees was in conflict with the traditional perceptions of poverty and charity. The blunt tone and strictness of the regulations was not universally acceptable to the public. Strict anti-beggar decrees were often avoided and moderated in judicial practice. Theft because of need was judged and punished more benevolently than other criminal offences. Poverty and efforts to find work were regarded as mitigating circumstances.¹⁷ Ideas about poverty in its medieval sacral understanding were deeply rooted in the mentality of the people, especially in the countryside, and even into the 20th century.

Health care was part of social care for the poor in practice and in contemporary legislation, or they often overlapped. The oldest types of institution were universal in character: they provided social and health care at the same time. Towns and rural municipalities were obliged to provide poor old and sick people with medical care already from 1723. The task of providing free treatment to the poor was entrusted to county doctors, who had to be employed by the county authorities according to a decree from 1752. The official county or town doctor played the key role in care for the poor according to the

Regiae Scientiarum Universitatis, 1853, p. 380; *Nachricht über das auf unterkommende allerhöchste Verordnung in der königl. Freistadt Preßburg, bis 23. November inlebendes Jahres einzuführende Armen Institut und Bruderschaft, unter dem Titel: Vereinigung aus thätiger Liebe des Nächsten*. Archiv mesta Bratislavy (City Archives of Bratislava, hereinafter AMB), Mesto Bratislava, V. spisy sociálno-dobročinné, (City of Bratislava V, social and charitable documents) carton (hereinafter c.) 2154.

15 JANÁK, ref. 4, 1970, p. 93-96; KUŠNIRÁKOVÁ, Ingrid. *Piave fundationes. Zbožné fundácie a ich význam pre rozvoj uhorskej spoločnosti v ranom novoveku (Pious foundations and their importance for the development of Hungarian society in early Modern times)*. Bratislava : Historický ústav SAV, 2009, p. 156. ISBN 9788097006051.

16 For more details: DUDEKOVÁ, Právo alebo milosrdenstvo, (Right or charity), ref. 7, p. 201-202; ZIMMERMANN, Susan. *Divide, provide and rule. An integrative history of poverty policy, social policy, and social reform in Hungary under the Habsburg Monarchy*. Budapest : Central European University Press, 2011, p. 8-9. ISBN 9786155053191.

17 AMMERER, Gerhard. *Aufgeklärtes Recht, Rechtspraxis und Rechtsbrecher - Spurensuche nach einer historischen Kriminologie in Österreich*. In AMMERER - HAAS, ref. 5, p. 109-111.

system of centralized health care, anchored in the health order *Generale normativum in re sanitatis* of the Habsburg Monarchy from 1770. However, the counties fulfilled this social and health care function inadequately. The posts of county doctors were still not filled in some counties in the first half of the 19th century.¹⁸

Industrialization brought a substantial change in the problem of poverty, in terms of its extent, quality and the understanding of it. In the Kingdom of Hungary, this happened especially in the 19th century. With the development of industry, the problem of begging became ever more urgent, and it was connected with the problem of unemployment. People from the countryside, who came to the towns for work, found themselves outside the traditional social safety net. Employment in towns opened to them advantageous possibilities, but frequent market fluctuations meant the constant threat of loss of work, especially for unqualified people. Such mass vulnerability of large groups in the population meant a serious problem of unprecedented proportions. While traditional social care was essentially able to integrate the poor, this so-called new poverty could not be dealt with by the old methods. Social dependence and the problem of unemployment were still considered according to the old familiar schemes, according to the principle that people who do not work do not deserve help.

Social reformers “discovered” that the problem of pauperization and begging was a result of industrialization only around 1900. Understanding of the problem of unemployment underwent a complex development from fatalism, through liberal views placing the emphasis on people’s own “responsibility for poverty” through their lack of ability, laziness or criminal tendencies, to its modern definition, according to which the main cause of poverty is unemployment, closely connected with the functioning of the market economy.¹⁹

The reform of traditional forms of poverty policy proved to be essential, especially in industrial centres, where the problem of socially dependent people increased as a result of unemployment. Cities, that perceived the arrival of poor and threatened groups in their territories as pressure and a potential burden on their budget, defended themselves by not granting the new arrivals the status of legal residence. Lack of understanding of the problem of unemployment or its interpretation as voluntary laziness, marginalized a large category of people. According to the existing legislation, people, who could not prove they had sufficient resources to support themselves, had to be escorted back to their home municipalities.²⁰ The migration of people for work and the associated social

18 SINKULOVÁ, Ludmila. *Dějiny československého lékařství. II. díl od roku 1740 do 1848 (The history of Czechoslovak medicine. Part II, 1740 – 1848)*. Praha : SPN, 1965, p. 114-115; HAHN, Géza. *A magyar egészségügy története (The history of Hungarian healthcare)*. Budapest : Medicina, 1960, p.19; BOKESOVÁ-UHEROVÁ, Mária. *Dejiny zdravotníctva na Slovensku (The history of health care in Slovakia)*. Martin : Osveta, 1989, p. 44-45. ISBN 8021700041.

19 TOPALOV, Christian. A munkanélküliség föltalálása és századforduló szociálpolitikái (The invention of unemployment and social policies at the turn of century). In LÉDERER, Pál - TENCZER, Tamás - ULICSKA, László (eds.). *„A tettetésnek minden mesterségeiben járatosok...“ Koldusok, csavargók, veszélyeztetett gyermekek a modernkori Magyarországon („Skillfull in every form of deception“.. Beggars, vagrants, endangered children in modern Hungary)*. Budapest : Új mandátum, 1998, p. 298-325, here p. 298-315. ISBN 9637476792.

20 For further details see: DUDEKOVÁ, Právo alebo milosrdenstvo, ref. 7, p. 208-213; DUDEKOVÁ,

problems also became reasons and stimuli for the reorganization and reform of poverty policy in Pressburg.

The tradition of public social care in Pressburg and attempts at its centralization

The forms and principles of the system of poor relief in the urban environment developed from the above mentioned principles of organization of care for the poor and other special groups of people in the state. As in other towns in Hungary, one of the oldest institutions was the town hospital, originally combined with a poorhouse. The town took over administration of it from the Church in 1397.²¹ The second largest and oldest was the town old people's home, the so-called Lazaret, founded in the 16th century and enlarged in 1777 – 1778 with the support of Maria Theresa to serve as an institution that cared for the old, foundlings and the mentally ill.²² The successive changes in the administration and organization of activity of these two oldest institutions in Pressburg were direct expressions of the reorganizations and changes of principles in social care through the centuries. A specific feature of social care organization in Pressburg was the fact emphasized by later authors of the history of the city and its social and medical facilities, namely the extraordinarily well developed network of social and medical institutions and other types of social care in comparison with other towns in Hungary.²³ Recent research has come to similar conclusions. In the 17th and 18th centuries Pressburg had a well developed network of charitable institutions in comparison with the majority of towns in the Kingdom of Hungary. They provided poor relief to various categories of people, who depended on public support, whether in the so-called closed, institutional or the open form of distribution of financial or natural benefits.

As a result of its position as the capital of Hungary in the 18th century, it became the seat of various charitable institutions serving the whole kingdom.²⁴ This fact undoubtedly

Gabriela. Od charity k systému štátnej sociálnej politiky (From charity to a systematic state social policy). In DUDEKOVÁ, Gabriela. *Juraj Schulpe a sociálna politika v Uhorsku na prelome 19. a 20. storočia. (Juraj Schulpe and social policy in Hungary around 1900)*. Dissertation. Bratislava : Faculty of Philosophy of Comenius University, 2001.

- 21 VÁMOSSY, István. *A pozsonyi katolikus polgári ápoló intézet. Fennállásának ötszáz évfordulója alkalmából (The Pressburg Catholic Civil Nursing Institute. On the occasion of its five hundred anniversary)*. Pozsony : Az Intézet kiadványa, 1898, p. 21, 48. At the end of the 19th century, the institution appealed to its 500 year tradition, as the subtitle of the cited publication shows.
- 22 KANKA, Károly. Adatok Pozsony városának orvosi helyrajzásához (Data concerning the topography of the city of Pressburg). In POZSONY és környéke. *A magyar orvosok és természetvizsgálók 1856 évben Pozsonyban tartott XI. nagy-gyűlésén emlékéül. (Pressburg and its surroundings. Commemorating the XI General Meeting of Hungarian doctors and natural scientists in Pressburg in 1856)*. Pozsony : Wigand, 1865, p.199-246.
- 23 PÁVAY-VAJNA, Gábor. Egészségügy (Healthcare). In *Pozsony vármegye. Pozsony sz. kir. város, Nagyszombat, Bazin, Modor és Szentgyörgy r. t. városok*. (Edícia Magyarország vármegyéi és városai. Ed. Borovszky Samu). (Pressburg county. Royal Borough of Pressburg and town-council cities of Tyrnau/Trnava, Modor/Modra and Svätý Jur). (Series: Counties and cities of Hungary). Budapest : Apollo, undated [1904], p. 372-393; PÁVAI-VAJNA, Gábor. *Pozsony sz. kir. város közegészségügyének fejlődése 1856 – 1906-ig. (Development of Healthcare in the free royal city Pressburg from 1856 to 1906)*. Pozsony : Pozsonyi Orvos-Természettudományi Egyesület, 1907.
- 24 KUŠNIRÁKOVÁ, Ingrid. Vplyv konfesijného rozdelenia spoločnosti na systém sociálnej starostli-

flowed from the strengthening of the status of Pressburg during the occupation of Hungary and Budapest by the Ottoman Empire. As a result some of the central institutions of Hungary moved to Pressburg, which fulfilled some of the functions of capital city and became the political and social centre of the kingdom from 1536 until the end of the 18th century. The decline in the importance of Pressburg after the removal of the central Hungarian institutions at the end of the 18th century to Buda, and the further weakening of its central position in the country in the first half of the 19th century with the end of its position as coronation town and seat of the Hungarian Parliament, was accompanied by the departure of a large part of the political and social elite. However, the existing institutional basis for social care was not seriously disturbed.

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In the first third of the 19th century, town charitable societies, which brought new forms of care for the poor, began to be established in Pressburg. Apart from societies to support the poor, there were so-called societies to eliminate begging. A movement propagated by Countess Theresa of Brunswick to provide day-care for children of pre-school age attracted a great response. Women's charitable societies were created in towns according to this example. They established and ran children's day-care facilities. By the late 1820s and 1830s, such women's charitable societies existed in Banská Bystrica (since 1829), Pressburg and Trnava (1832), Košice (1838) and Prešov. As in other Hungarian towns, they often had wider so-called general charitable aims. For example, the Košice society not only had the aim of establishing and running child-care facilities, but also of "support for the poor" in general.²⁵ A society with the same aim appeared in Pressburg under the name Small Children's Protection Society.²⁶ Its committee: chairman, deputy chairmen, doctors, treasurer and so on, was made up of men, but women were also involved in the actual work, both as carers and so-called inspectors responsible for the everyday running of the institution or protectors (so-called Schutz-Damen). According to its statutes,²⁷ the organization had the official name Society for the Care of Orphans (*Waisen-Versorgungs-Anstalt*), and it was originally founded by members of the Society to Support the Good and Useful (*Verein zur Beförderung des Guten und Nützlichen*), which originated in 1830 on the initiative of Countess Theresa of Brunswick. Later, it was also known by the name of Society for Establishing and Running the Local Small Children's Care Facilities (*Verein zur Errichtung und Erhaltung des hiesigen Klein-*

vosti v Bratislave v období 17. – 18. storočia. (The influence of the confessional division of society on the system of social care in Bratislava during the 17th and 18th centuries). In *Történeti Tanulmányok 15, Acta Universitatis Debreceniensis Series Historica 59*, 2007 [published 2009], p. 141-151. ISSN 12174602; KUŠNIRÁKOVÁ, Ingrid. Mecenáši, dobrodinci a patróni. Komemoratívna kultúra uhorských spoločenských elit v Prešporoku raného novoveku (Patrons and benefactors. The commemorative culture of the Hungarian social elites in Early Modern Pressburg). In DUDEKOVÁ et al. *Medzi provinciou a metropolou*, ref. 1, p. 67-82, especially 78-82.

25 STUBENRAUCH, Moritz. *Statistische Darstellung des Vereinswesens im Kaiserthume Österreich*. Wien :1857, p. 85.

26 "Kleinkinderbewahranstalt (Kleinkinderbewahrverein)". STUBENRAUCH, ref. 25, p. 24.

27 Plan der Statuten. In BALLUS, Paul. *Geschichte der Entstehung und Gründung des Waisenhauses in der k. freien Krönungstadt Preßburg*. Preßburg : Ludwig Weber, 1833, p. 34-41.

kinder-Bewahranstalten) because it also established and ran an orphanage and two child-care facilities in the territory of the town.²⁸

On the basis of our research, we can divide the reform of social care in Pressburg in the long 19th century into three basic stages:

1. The above mentioned attempts of Joseph II at centralization of poor relief and their results;
2. Reorganization in the 1830s reacted to the socio-economic crisis and attempted to centralize and increase the effectiveness of poverty policy based on the cooperation of municipal authorities and civil bodies;
3. An effort to place social care into a system of communal social policy around 1900. This stage was characterized by a wide network of religious, civil and municipal institutions with substantial participation by self-help societies. However, the entry of the state into financing and organizing social care for selected categories of people was a substantial change in this period.

The motivation for the efforts to centralize the activities of municipal, religious and civil charitable poor relief organizations was to reduce spending and limit the possibilities for abusing social assistance. Critics of the situation existing in the first third of the 19th century argued that because of inadequate records of the benefit claimants and weak coordination of the various charitable organizations, beggars allegedly received assistance from several organizations at the same time. In the course of the 19th century, the oldest types of institute and foundation in Pressburg were adapted to new conditions requiring differentiated and ever more specialized care. The town, as a political – administrative unit and basic organizational component of the social care system in Hungary, administered its own institutions and supervised non-municipal institutions.

While the rural municipality with a small population fulfilled its duty to care for the poor using simple and easily controllable forms, the organization of poor relief in large towns developed into a relatively complicated system. Apart from a director, every municipal social institution in 19th century Pressburg had an administrative committee subordinate to the municipal authorities. The town authorities gradually created whole specialized departments, responsible for supervision of institutions, care for orphans and other forms of social care. Apart from this, various institutions were administered by the local religious communities – Catholic, Lutheran and Jewish.

The reorganization and systemization of poor relief carried out in Pressburg in the first third of the 19th century was based on cooperation between the voluntary civil associations and the town authorities with the aim of making spending more effective, or centralizing and more effectively targeting social assistance based on daily protection and supervision. The town authorities subsidized societies and institutions by means of finance and provision of premises, while also supervising their administration and property. For example, they provided the above mentioned Society for the Care of Orphans with a building for an orphanage and administered the finances of the orphanage.

28 Plan der Statuten, ref. 27, especially Beilage I, p. 17.

Contributions to the town budget for this purpose were committed to enabling the society to run the orphanage and child care facilities.²⁹

The central feature of the new system for managing municipal poverty policy was the establishment of a central body under the name Society for Care for the Poor (*Armenversorgungsverein*, 1835), which centrally directed the activity of various social institutions and societies in the territory of the town and took over the administration of the financially exhausted town poorhouse.³⁰ The central society was headed by a presidium, which essentially had a representative character. It met once a year. The functions were honorary, with ecclesiastical figures, aristocrats and local officials holding positions on the board. The executive committee, which met once a month, carried out direct co-ordination of social care. Other special commissions entrusted with running specific social facilities were subordinate to it. Specifically, these were the commissions of the municipal workhouse (divided into forced and voluntary parts) and the poorhouse called the Lazaret, in which orphans were also placed at this time. Another commission for direct granting of support to the poor provided an open form of poor relief. It received applications for support, decided on them and directly granted assistance at weekly intervals. As the central society stated, the reorganization of communal social care not only aimed to reduce poverty and street begging. It especially emphasized that without centralization “into one directing unit” some existing facilities would have to be completely dissolved because of inadequate finance.

The question of finance was solved by centrally obtained contributions as was assumed in the system of “parish poor institutes”. However, in contrast to it, the town was authorized to collect contributions in the form of additions to tax, depending on the amount of tax or rent on houses.³¹ However, the regular transfer of financial resources was secured especially by an effective system of collecting contributions, by which two “collectors of alms” regularly visited all the households in their district to collect contributions, for which they issued confirmations. An essential part of the centralized system of municipal poverty policy was the town “doctor of the poor”, who treated the socially dependent inhabitants of the town, free, which meant at the expense of the town.

This reorganization of communal social care for poor in Pressburg succeeded in increasing the number of supported people and monitoring of them. After four years, the new system was able to secure care for 45 foundlings and 182 adult inmates of the Lazaret, while direct gifts of produce supported almost 350 people a year. The municipal workhouse had 11 voluntary inmates at this time and 35 people sentenced to forced labour.³²

29 BALLUS, ref. 27.

30 According to the statistics, three civil societies concerned with care for the poor existed at this time. Apart from the above mentioned organization, there was also the Catholic Charitable Society (Katholischer Wohltätigkeitsverein, founded in 1824) and the Catholic Society for Care for the Poor (Katholischer Armenversorgungsverein, 1836). STUBENRAUCH, ref. 25, p.84-85.

31 The so-called Zinskreutzer, bérkrajczár, see: KANKA, ref. 22, p. 224.

32 *Vierter Jahresbericht die in der königlichen Frei- und Krönungsstadt Preßburg zu stande gebrachte Abschaffung der Gassen- und Strassenbettelei, den Zustand des damit in Verbindungen gebrachten Arbeitshauses, des Armeninstituts, der Verwaltung des städtischen Lazareths und die aus dessen Fond verpflegten Findel- und Waisenkinder. Für den Zeitabschnitt vom 1. Nov. 1838 bis 31. Okt. 1839.* b.m.r.

However, the successful functioning of the new system was disturbed by problems caused by the growth of poverty and increased migration of people to Pressburg. The report of the central society for 1845 stated that the building of railways was bringing an influx of a great number of foreigners, over whom the local offices could not achieve the necessary supervision. This central office of poverty policy regarded the building of the railways as a turning point in its activity because they allegedly led to the town receiving a “*much larger number of people without work. If they do not find work and feel short of food, they turn to begging and then to the Lazaret. These, together with the vagabonds who loathe work, represent an unambiguous burden for society, but they are still not unnecessary rubbish, who can be thrown overboard if they are a burden. They need to be looked after and if possible integrated into society*”.³³ Even before this, in 1843, the society bitterly stated that “*although Pressburg did enough for its poor, the number of homeless can be compared with the numbers in such places as Paris, Holland, London and Liverpool*”.³⁴

It also emphasized that the town had to pay disproportionately increased amounts from its own resources, in spite of the fact that up to two thirds of the beggars were people, who came to Pressburg from Moravia or from other counties of Hungary. The town strove to cope with this new burden, so the number of inmates of institutions and people receiving support increased. In 1843, the number of people receiving weekly financial support in the open form of poor relief did not exceed 400, there were 12 people in the forced labour part of the workhouse, more than 70 in its voluntary part and 70 in the local poorhouse, making a total of more than 550 people. However, only three years later, more than 1,200 people were housed only in the local poorhouse – the Lazaret, and only 250 of them actually came from Pressburg. As a result of the revolutionary events of 1848, the number accommodated in the Lazaret rose to more than 2,000 during the year, and when other categories of supported people were added, the central society was supporting 2,700 people.³⁵

By the end of 1851, the number of people provided with poor relief involving accommodation declined to about 700 people,³⁶ but later the rising trend in the number of supported people continued. Apart from the social institutions already mentioned, Pressburg already had a specialized Institute for the Deaf-Mute. By the beginning of the 1850s, it

33 *Elfter Jahresbericht über die Abschaffung der Gassenbettelei und über den Stand der vom wirkenden Ausschusse des Armenversorgungsvereins verwalteten und unter dem Protectorate Sr. Exc. des hochg. Grafen Franz Zichy d. ä seit Beginn des Vereines gestellten Wohltätigkeitsanstalten zu Pressburg. Zeitraum vom 1. Nov. 1845 bis 31. Octbr. 1846.* Pressburg, without year, p. IV.

34 *Achter Jahresbericht über die in Pressburg erzielte Abstellung der Gassenbettelei. Zeitraum vom 1. November 1842 bis 31. Oktober 1843. Nebst einem kurzgefassten Berichte über die hiesigen Wohltätigkeitsanstalten.* Pressburg : Carl Friedrich Wigand without year, p. IV.

35 *Achter Jahresbericht, ref. 34; Dreizehnter Jahresbericht über die Abschaffung der Gassenbettelei und über den Stand der vom wirkenden Ausschusse des Armenversorgungsvereins verwalteten und unter dem Protectorate Sr. Exc. des hochg. Grafen Franz Zichy d. ä seit Beginn des Vereines gestellten Wohltätigkeitsanstalten zu Pressburg. Zeitraum vom 1. Nov. 1847 bis 31. Octbr. 1848.* Pressburg : Carl Friedrich Wigand without year.

36 *Sechszehnter Jahresbericht über die Abschaffung der Gassenbettelei. Zeitraum vom 1. November 1850 bis 31. Oktober 1851.* Pressburg : Carl Friedrich Wigand, without year.

provided accommodation, food and partly also clothing, but mainly expert education for 8 boys and 8 girls.³⁷

In the 1850s, the Habsburg Monarchy had a relatively dense network of specialized institutions and societies with humanitarian missions. The types and forms of social care represented a relatively well organized system:

a) Open social care for poor, either in the form of provision of financial and natural support, or by providing medical care for the poor through so-called doctors of the poor and midwives especially in the larger towns;

b) Closed, that is institutional forms of public social care in so-called care-giving institutions, namely poorhouses, town hospitals, old people's homes, public hospitals, institutions for the mentally ill, maternity hospitals, orphanages and homes for foundlings;

c) So-called private charity: societies, institutions and actions of civil associations;

d) Various reliefs, for example tax relief, were regarded as part of poverty policy.

This organizational network had a specific form in the Kingdom of Hungary, since various types, especially of institutional facility, which were financed by the state in Cis-Leithania, were absent in Hungary. The author of a contemporary analysis stated that public care for the poor was not organized to such an extent in Hungary as in Cis-Leithania, and for this reason so-called private charity predominated.³⁸

The modernization of poverty policy around 1900 : toward social policy

Strong differentiation and decentralization of poverty policy remained characteristic features in Hungary at the end of the 19th century. In spite of the fact that every municipality was obliged to work out a so-called poverty statute on the method and extent of support for people dependent on municipal support,³⁹ this decree was not observed in practice. Apart from the capital Budapest, there is no known case in the whole Kingdom of Hungary of a town or smaller municipality having its own special "poverty statute" before 1918.⁴⁰ The order to keep records of people who received support was also not fulfilled. These records were supposed to be a basis for coordination of municipal, church and charitable support, and to form a basis for the working out of overall statistics.⁴¹ The Hungarian state attempted to solve the complex situation by financing part of the expenditure itself. From 1898, the newly established State Healthcare Fund began to pay the cost of hospital treatment of poor mothers and patients suffering from infectious diseases (cholera, plague and trachoma). Care for abandoned children aged up to 7 and deficits in the budgets of municipalities and counties for poor relief were also financed from the

37 According to Francová, the society existed from 1836 to 1872, see FRANCOVÁ, Zuzana. Školstvo. (Education.). In *Bratislava*, 1998, year 10, p. 102.

38 STUBENRAUCH, ref. 25, p. 71-72.

39 Decree of the Ministry of the Interior of Hungary no. 51000/ 1898 In CHYZER, Kornél (ed.). *Az egészségügyre vonatkozó törvények és rendeletek gyűjteménye. II. kötet. 1895 – 1900 (Collections of laws and regulations concerning healthcare. Volume II. 1895 – 1900)*. Budapest : Dobrowsky és Franke kiadása, 1900, p. 619 - 623; ROSENAUER, ref. 6, p. 42-46.

40 CSIZMADIA, ref. 4, p. 62-63.

41 FORBÁTH, ref. 6, p. 67.

fund.⁴² The principle of subsidiarity was also observed in this case. The resources of the state fund could be used only if the expenses could not be covered from the resources of the patient, his family, the contributory sickness fund, employer, home municipality or county of legal residence. The entry of the state into this field was a basic turning point in the organization of social care. Partial financing of care for orphans from the state fund represented a first step towards a state welfare system. Complete state takeover of care for so-called abandoned children aged up to 7 was introduced in 1901 by acts nos. VIII/1901 and XXI/1901. The new centralized system, which came into effect on 1 September 1903, comprised a network of state orphanages headed by the Hungarian Royal State Children's Asylum in Budapest. Apart from the state children's asylums, established in 17 towns around the kingdom, children were also placed in the care of foster parents. The so-called children's colony, where foster families looked after groups of children represented another form of care under the state asylums as organizational and supervisory centres.⁴³

However, the overall effectiveness of the system of poverty policy in the Kingdom of Hungary remained rather low. The towns were forced to react to the changes resulting from industrialization and urbanization. Together with the modernization of communal policy, especially the large towns also had to modernize the system of municipal poverty policy. The signs of modernization of social care for the poor in Pressburg around 1900 developed from general trends, including the specialization, professionalization, secularization and bureaucratization of poor relief, its further centralization and rationalization. The entry of the state into some areas of poverty policy represented a significant turning point.

The communal policy of Hungarian towns underwent turbulent changes around 1900. The building of modern infrastructure, namely transport, electrification, the telephone network, water supplies, drains and housing, represented the most visible field. The huge financial resources needed for such investment resulted in permanent financial crisis for municipal budgets, inadequately supported by state subsidies. Therefore, the towns strove to rationalize the administration and financial management, as well as pursuing communalization, which meant the bringing of key new enterprises into municipal possession. Gas, water and energy facilities usually originated as private joint stock companies, but they were bought by the more solvent towns and became communal property.

Around 1900, Pressburg had the status of an important regional centre. The former royal borough, coronation town and seat of the Hungarian Parliament was a provincial or country town at this time. The state administration, key industrial and financial institutions were concentrated in central Hungary around the capital Budapest with its

42 The State Healthcare Fund was established by act no. XXI/1898. It provided loans to municipalities for the development of hospitals. Until then, the state had paid only for the treatment of sexually transmitted diseases and institutional care for the mentally ill. For more details see: 1898. évi Törvényczikk a nyilvános betegápolás költségeinek fedezéséről. In CHYZER, ref. 39, p. 368-372; FORBÁTH, ref. 6, p. 85-88; ROSENAUER, ref. 6, p. 20; HAHN, ref. 18, p. 63-65.

43 KASZÁS, Marianne. Az egyesületi karitáztól az állami gondoskodásig. Szociális gyermekvédelem a századfordulón Budapesten (From society charity to state care. Social children's protection in Budapest around 1900). In *Szociológiai Szemle*, 1994, year 4, no. 1, p. 137. ISSN 1216-2051; FORBÁTH, ref. 6, p. 112.

population of 800 thousand. With more than 65,000 inhabitants, Pressburg had fourth place among the towns of Hungary, which guaranteed it the special status of a county borough⁴⁴, so that from the legislative point of view it was one of the preferred towns with the highest level of self-government. The waves of migration to Pressburg reached their peak in the 1890s,⁴⁵ as did the modernization trends in urbanization, industrialization and the reform of communal politics of the town. In population and degree of industrialization, Pressburg cannot be compared to the Central European metropolises, namely Vienna with its two million people, Budapest and Prague with 400 thousand. Relatively highly industrialized Pressburg with its strong tradition of civic consciousness is difficult to compare with other municipal towns in Hungary, for example with Szeged, an agrarian town although with a population of almost 100,000.

As a result of modernization, the system of communal poverty policy in Pressburg was more specialized than in the previous decades. It offered the possibility of help to a wide range of socially dependent people. The Department for Poverty and Public Charity was mainly responsible for communal social care. It was one of eight expert commissions, the so-called expert commission no. V “*for poverty, philanthropic and health care institutions and affairs*”.⁴⁶ Its responsibilities included administration of the municipal social facilities, charitable foundations, support for the poor and supervision of the upbringing of orphans. The committees of the individual municipal institutions: the Asylum for the Homeless (workhouse), poorhouse named Lazaret, the town kitchen, the so-called people’s kitchen and institute for distributing support to the poor were subject to the commission. The special town Charity Committee had the task of monitoring the social problems of the town and proposing improvements to the town administration and council. A further municipal institution for organizing social care for the poor was one of the five expert divisions, namely no. IV for poverty relief.⁴⁷ Its activity comprised preparation of concrete materials and proposals for the town council, including financial considerations. It discussed these matters with other administrative committees concerned with social care for the poor and with the V expert commission, from which one member also sat in the division. However, the main function of the division was preparation of the “*poverty relief*” budget and supervision of its observance. Although its activity was directed mainly to supervision of the town’s finances and budget, some of its functions duplicated those of the V expert commission. The division formed a mediating body between the administrative committees of the institutions, the V expert commission and the town council. After it was established, the responsibilities and so also the importance of the expert commission were reduced.⁴⁸ One of the oldest components of the town

44 After 1871, a county borough (in Hungarian: törvényhatósági város) was a town or city with its own administration independent of the county in which it was situated.

45 *Magyar statisztikai évkönyv, Új folyam XX. (Hungarian statistical yearbook, New editon XX.)*. Budapest : Kir. Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, 1912, p. 13.

46 “*V. Szakbizottság szegénységi, jótékonyági és egészségügyi intézetek és azok ügyeiben / V. Fachkommission für die Anstalten der Armen-, Wohltätigkeits- u. Gesundheitspflege u. deren Angelegenheiten.*”

47 “*IV. Szegényügyi szakosztály - IV. Abteilung für Armenpflege.*”

48 *Pressburger Wegweiser auf das Gemeinjahr 1889*. Pressburg : without year, p. 31-32; *Organisations-Status der Stadtgemeinde Pressburg*. Pressburg : Druck Carl Angermayer, 1872, p. 12-13; Pozsony sz. kir.

authorities was the Orphans' Office, which supervised the upbringing of orphans and abandoned children in the local orphanage or with foster parents. The Orphans' Office paid the foster parents and guardians and decided on important questions concerned with orphans, for example about adoptions. It also administered the financial resources for their upbringing, which were mostly deposited to earn interest. They included financial resources in the form of endowments, which belonged to individual orphans, but were paid to them only when they reached their majority.⁴⁹

At the beginning of the 20th century, four town doctors and four town midwives worked in Pressburg.⁵⁰ The right of residence in Pressburg was a condition for treatment of the poor without charge, or at the expense of the town to be more precise.⁵¹ The town also fulfilled a duty to bury poor people free of charge. For understandable reasons, this was the only case in which the right of legal residence in the town was not demanded. The town established a special "paupers' cemetery" as one of the nine Pressburg cemeteries.⁵²

The system of communal poverty policy had a protective – repressive character. It gave priority to the interests of the town authorities and security. On one side there were humanitarian aims – to moderate or ideally remove poverty, but on the other side there was the aim of protecting the inhabitants against undesirable elements such as beggars and criminals. The town strove to restrict the inflow of people, who might become dependent on social assistance in future, with strict police regulations. According to these rules, employers had to report the arrival of new employees to the captainate within 24 hours, and owners of houses had to report new tenants within three days.⁵³ The police office, the so-called town captainate, had duties in poverty policy in the city. Apart from monitoring foreigners and immigrants, it had the legal right to issue residence documents and place detained beggars in the poorhouse or workhouse. Unemployed people capable of work, who begged in the town without permission, could be imprisoned in the workhouse for up to 90 days on orders from the police office. People, who could not reliably prove they had work or another source of subsistence, had to be expelled from

város szervezési szabályrendelete (1889). - Organisationsstatut der kön. Freistadt Preßburg. In *Pozsony sz. kir. város közönsége szabályrendeleteinek gyűjteménye. Hivatalos kiadás. - Sammlung der Statuten der kön. Freistadt Pressburg. Aemtlische Ausgabe. III.* Pozsony 1890, p. 28-34.

- 49 *A gyámok és gondnokok jogai és kötelességeiről. Pozsony szab. kir. város árvaszék kivonat az 1877 évi XX. törvény-czikkből. - Über die Rechte und Pflichten der Vormünder und Kuratoren. Waisenstuhl der kön. Freistadt Pozsony.* without year, p. 3-7; For the minutes of the Orphans' Commission see: Pozsony sz. kir. város árvaszéknek ülési jegyzőkönyve 1872 -ik évről ((Protocols of orphan's office in the Royal Borough of Pressburg) – AMB, knihy, sign. 4 year 31 + detto from 1878, sign. 4 year 33.
- 50 The official town doctors also included the police doctor and the chief town doctor, see PÁVAY – VAJNA, Egészségügy (Healthcare), ref. 23, p. 387.
- 51 Szolgálati utasítás a városi kerületi orvosok részére. – Dienstes-Instruction für die städtischen Bezirks-Aerzte. Pozsony 1889, p. 2-8.
- 52 PÁVAY – VAJNA, Egészségügy, ref. 23, p. 392.
- 53 Rendőri bejelentésekre és Pozsonyba érkező külföldiek nyilvántartása vonatkozó szabályrendelet. – Statut über polizeiliche Anmeldungen und Evidenzhaltung der in Pressburg angekommenen Ausländer. In *Pozsony sz. kir. város közönsége szabályrendeleteinek gyűjteménye. Hivatalos kiadás. - Sammlung der Statuten der kön. Freistadt Pressburg. Aemtlische Ausgabe. III.* Pozsony : Angermayer Károly könyvnyomdája, 1890, p. 251-281.

the town and sent back to their home municipality, even if force was required.⁵⁴ In the 1880s, about 3,000 people were expelled from Pressburg each year. However, up to a third of them slipped back to the town as if to an interchange station and 90% of the total number were expelled again. The number of police removals in the 1890s was about 40 every week.⁵⁵

The system of communal social policy also included social security for employees. From the 1880s, the town began to devote attention to securing pensions for employees. Statutes were issued on provision of health care for members of the town police, including their family members, as well as old age pensions for other categories of municipal employees. The principle that official doctors treated municipal employees without charge was generally applied.⁵⁶

The issuing of special decrees on individual fields of communal social policy, as well as the specialization of institutions and facilities, were signs of gradual modernization. The municipal administration was forced to react to the new situation in the town. The growth in the number of socially dependent people as a result of an economic crisis stimulated the establishment of the municipal people's kitchen in 1875. It provided the poor with food every day in the winter months. Intensive industrialization and migration in the 1890s caused a change in the social situation of the population of Pressburg. The town doctors observed in their regular reports that the influx of people from the countryside was causing a housing crisis in the town. They criticized the fact that these "*poor day labourers from the countryside*" moved into old, unhealthy, dirty, dark and overcrowded flats. They complained about the low level of care for pre-school age children. They considered that this was caused by the low level of education, poverty and alcoholism among the lower classes, but also by inadequate municipal finance to moderate these negative phenomena.⁵⁷

The town council and charitable societies began to react more intensively to these problems especially around 1900. The municipal institutions also extended their field of interest to the unemployed. This culminated in the establishment of the municipal labour exchange in 1905. The establishment of a new municipal social welfare commission⁵⁸ in 1906 represented a breakthrough in the modernization of communal social care. Its activity already had an explicitly social-political character. On the basis of "*study of the*

54 POZSONY sz. kir. város szervezési szabályrendelete (1889). – Organisationsstatut der kön. Freistadt Preßburg. In *Ibid.*, p. 78-79.

55 GOTTL, Mór. *Évi jelentés Pozsony sz. kir. város állapotáról 1880 (Annual situation report of the Royal Borough of Pressburg in 1880)*. Pozsony : Angermayer Károly, 1880, p. 17-18; Schubwesen. In *Preßburger Zeitung*, 14 Dec 1897, p. 2. For further details on the organization and practice of expulsions see: DUDEKOVÁ, Právo alebo milosrdenstvo, (Right or charity), ref. 7, p. 209.

56 Rendőri bejelentésekre és Pozsonyba érkező külföldiek nyilvántartása vonatkozó szabályrendelet. – Statut über polizeiliche Anmeldungen und Evidenzhaltung der in Pressburg angekommenen Ausländer. In *Pozsony sz. kir. város közönsége szabályrendeleteinek gyűjteménye. Hivatalos kiadás. - Sammlung der Statuten der kön. Freistadt Pressburg. Aemtliche Ausgabe. III. Pozsony 1890*, p. 251-281.

57 Annual reports of the town doctors, see: AMB, IX, Mestský fyzikát (Healthcare office), 1900 – 1901, c. 2 983.

58 „Jóléti bizottság / Wohlfahrtskommission.“

basic social questions”, it had to prepare proposed solutions for the town council.⁵⁹ To moderate the housing crisis, the town carried out relatively extensive building in comparison with other towns in Hungary. It built 120 urban flats in so-called ten houses and further flats to replace housing destroyed in the fire in the Podhradie part of Pressburg in 1913.

Specialized bodies for the administration of social care institutions existed in the framework of the religious communities of Pressburg. The Evangelical community had four special commissions, each for a specific institutions: the nurses’ home, orphanage, care providers’ institute and institute for providing support. The community also administered a hospital, day-care nursery for children, and provision of food to the poor. It also supervised the Evangelical Church’s charitable societies, including the society to support the orphanage, women’s society, funeral society and missionary circle. Care for the so-called embarrassed poor was organized according to the model of the German Protestant towns. The territory of the town was divided into five parts headed by guardians (Armenvater). After researching the social position of a specific family, they offered proposals for monthly support for poor members of the community. The community supported more than a thousand people in this way in 1912.⁶⁰

The Pressburg Jewish religious community had the most highly developed social care organization. The main declared aim of the Jewish religious community was administration of ritual education and charitable institutions. In contrast to the other religious communities, they also provided help for people who did not belong to their local community. Apart from the ritual funeral society Chevra kadisha and the doctor of the poor, the administration of the religious community also included specialized committees for support for the poor in the old people’s home and outside it, for clothing, equipping brides, supporting the sick and providing kosher food for Jewish patients in the state hospital.

Apart from these, other charitable and self-help societies were administered by the Jewish community. In the contemporary sources we find an emphasis on the high quality of social care of the Jewish minority, in which the social status of need was also considered.⁶¹ The mature Jewish social care resulted from the community’s autonomous position in the town. According to agreements with the town council, the Jewish religious communities, both Orthodox and Neolog, organized and provided social care for their members independently of the municipal authorities. So that the municipal administration would fulfil its obligation to care for all the poor inhabitants of the town, they decided that the town would contribute to financing support for the poor Jews, but the autonomous Jewish religious communities would actually provide the support. From

59 *Pozsony szab. kir. város törvényhatóságának szervezési szabályrendelete (Statute about organization of the Royal Borough of Pressburg)*. Pozsony : Angermayer, 1913, p. 40.

60 EBNER, Gusztáv. Szegényügy (Poor-relief). In SCHMIDT, K. József et. al. *A pozsonyi ág. hitv. ev. egyházközség története. II. rész. Az egyházközség belső élete és intézményei*. Pozsony : F. K. Wigand, 1906, p. 457-482; *A pozsonyi ág. hitv. evanj. egyházközség évi érestitője az 1912 évről. – Jahres-Bericht der evangelischen Kirchengemeinde A. B. zu Pozsony über das Jahr 1912*. Pozsony 1913.

61 KANKA, ref. 22, p. 225; GOLD, Hugo. *Die Juden und die Judengemeinde Bratislava im Vergangenheit und Gegenwart*. Brünn : Jüdischer Buchverlag, 1932; p. 7-8.

the 1870s, Pressburg town council regularly concluded such agreements for three year periods. According to these agreements, the municipal poverty relief fund paid the Orthodox Jewish community 2,000 crowns and the reformed (Neolog or congress) community 500 crowns in regular monthly instalments. The town authorities had declared that it would follow the principle of “*equal treatment in support of the Christian and Jewish poor*”. The Jewish religious communities had to prove that they really used the financial resources for their intended purposes.⁶²

The mainly Roman Catholic religion of the people of Pressburg was reflected in the cooperation of the municipal administration with the Catholic religious orders, which provided care services in the institutions administered by the municipal authorities or by Catholic societies. From the nine hospitals, two were administered by the Catholic Church, one by the town, two by societies (one of them Catholic, the other of joint Catholic – Evangelical character), two by the state, one by the Evangelical Church and one by the Jewish religious community.

Apart from 9 hospitals, Pressburg had 26 social care institutions in 1905 mainly providing poor relief. A quarter (26%) were administered by the town, a similar proportion were run by civil societies and 20% by the Jewish religious communities. The state institutions had the largest capacity and number of beneficiaries, with 40% of the total capacity in Pressburg and 50% of the total number receiving care, but the municipal and civil society facilities together almost equalled them, with a capacity of 37%. The town acquired a further four social institutions by 1910, two of them administered by the municipal authorities. This increased the share of communal social care to 28% compared to 23% for civil societies and 18% for the Jewish community. If we consider that the majority of the communal facilities considered themselves Catholic or Christian in character, the high percentage of Jewish social facilities (19%) stands out, although the number of beds (10%) corresponded to the proportion of Israelites in the population of Pressburg.⁶³ These data show greater differentiation and specialization of social care in the framework of the Jewish religious community. This comes further into the foreground, if we trace the activities of the charitable and self-help societies.

Self-help societies, which significantly supplemented the existing social safety net, had an important place in the social care of the period. Self-help associations, which obtained their financial resources from regular contributions by the members, were able to provide financial assistance in the event of death, illness or unemployment, but also social assistance in the form of goods or services, such as visits to the sick, organization of funerals or provision of food, directly to members or to their family members. In the absence of a state social security system, self-help societies were the only way to secure

62 GOTTLE, ref. 55, p. 8-9; For agreements between the town and the Jewish religious communities see: AMB, XI, year 1880, c. 2828, document no. 24 + year 1882, c. 2832, document no 28.

63 The calculations derive from the following works: PÁVAI-VAJNA, *Pozsony szab. kir. város*, ref. 23; ORTVAY, Tivadar. *Pozsony város utcái és terei. A város története utca- és térnevekben (Streets and squares of Pressburg city. History of the city in the street's and square's names)*. Pozsony 1905 [Reprint Budapest 1991], especially p. 580-583; AMB, social and charitable documents, year 1903, c. 2154; *Pozsonyi utmutató 1905. – Pressburger Wegweiser für das Jahr 1905*. Pozsony : Angermayer [1905]; *Pozsonyi utmutató 1910. – Pressburger Wegweiser für Pozsony und Umgebung auf das Jahr 1910*. Pozsony : Angermayer [1910].

guarantees that necessities would be provided in problematic crisis situations in the life of a person. Sometimes they also granted help to people, who were not direct members of the association. In the case of self-help societies, a decisive factor was professional position or social status, sometimes combined with confessional allegiance.⁶⁴ However, the professional self-help societies in principle bridged the ethnic and confessional differences between their members. Charitable societies were traditionally highly represented among the associations. According to statistics, they formed 20 – 25 % of all the associations in Pressburg at the end of the 19th century.⁶⁵ However, if we add the self-help societies, their proportion rises to more than 40%.⁶⁶ However, the statistics from this period for the whole of Hungary did not include charitable societies, which existed within the organizational framework of individual churches and were subject to the church authorities. Charity was also provided by other societies, for example, by those concerned with education.⁶⁷

The sources point to the variety of the social life of the town from the points of confession, ethnic origin and social status. The confessional composition of the population of Pressburg was stable during the whole second half of the 19th century: three-quarters were Roman Catholic, about 12% Evangelicals of the Augsburg Confession and around 10% Jewish. Members of other churches: Greek Catholic, Reformed or Calvinist and Orthodox contributed to the heterogeneity, but they formed only tiny percentages of the total population. The multi-cultural character of the population was also expressed in the differentiation of charitable societies. From the 55 charitable and self-help societies recorded in Pressburg in 1905, about half were Jewish. Nine societies had an explicitly inter-confessional character, while 12 mainly professional and self-help societies functioned without confessional designations.

These two groups that were not directly tied to membership of particular confessions represented more than a third of all the charitable associations. The Catholic societies were in third place with almost 10%. In the course of a few years, the total number of registered societies increased by a quarter to a total of 69. The proportion of non- or inter-confessional societies rose to half of all the existing charitable societies. The Jewish societies, which had been the most numerous, declined into second place with 20%.⁶⁸ This development caused by secularization and the growth of the socialist movement, was an early sign of a tendency to abandon religious identities in favour of socio-professional and political identity, although charitable activity remained an important part of social care in the later period.

64 For example, the Society of Catholic Journeymen, the Support Society of the Royal Catholic Gymnasium, the Health Care and Funeral Society of the Builders and Masons of St. Rochus, the Support Society of Christian Tradesmen and others operated in Pressburg.

65 MANNOVÁ, Elena. Dobročinné spolky a konštruovanie kolektívnych identít (Charitable Societies and the Construction of Collective Identities). In MANNOVÁ, Elena – CSAKY, Moritz (eds.). *Kolektívne identity v strednej Európe v období moderny*. Bratislava : Academic Electronic Press, 1999, p. 197-216, especially 202-203. ISBN 808888036X.

66 *Pozsonyi utmutató 1910*, ref. 63; Die Vereine Pressburgs. In *Preßburger Zeitung*, 5 Sept. 1895, p. 2.

67 MANNOVÁ, Charitable Societies, ref. 65, p. 202-203.

68 Calculated from the sources in ref. 63.

The official sources of the time give a relatively favourable picture of co-existence in multi-cultural Pressburg at the turn of the century, and we can suppose that tolerance prevailed precisely in areas with a humanitarian aim. However, areas of friction existed under the calm surface. The author of a history of the Evangelical Church mentions several conflict situations between Evangelicals and Catholics in Pressburg. The change of the inter-confessional character of the town hospital to purely Catholic at the beginning of the 19th century led to the establishment of a separate Evangelical hospital. The same author complained about a similar situation in the case of the municipal and society orphanage, which received orphans in the proportions two-thirds Catholic and one third Evangelical. At the beginning of the 1890s, he speaks of “definite Catholicizing efforts” to which Evangelical orphans in the orphanage were exposed, so that they had to be moved to the Evangelical deaconesses’ institute. As a result, the Evangelicals used the opportunity provided by the income from the endowments of Samuel Royko from 1900. Part of the money was assigned to care for 12 Evangelical orphans from Pressburg. An agreement between the Catholic and Evangelical communities from 1892 secured the transfer of 12 thousand crowns a year for this aim, so that the Evangelical community could independently care for 31 orphans. While the Evangelical author mentions these events as associated with conflict, in the official press we find only a brief statement about the conclusion of an agreement between the two sides, alleged because the Evangelicals had established their own orphanage.⁶⁹ In this case, it was not only a confessional, but also an ethnic dispute. As well as being “re-Catholicized”, the Štefánia Orphanage was Magyarized. The languages of communication had traditionally been German and Hungarian,⁷⁰ but at the end of the 1880s, the patron of the society that administered the orphanage, Baroness Jeszenak considered it appropriate to introduce the state language to the institution, so they appointed a Hungarian teacher.⁷¹ According to other sources it happened at the direct request of the town authorities.⁷² According to the new statutes from 1896, people in the institution had to communicate only in Hungarian, and “*inmates of German origin either had to leave or be Magyarized*”. At the same time, an elementary school was opened at the orphanage, with its lessons entirely in Hungarian.⁷³

There was not much conflict with the Jewish religious community in the field of social care, because it administered this activity entirely for itself. However, there was differentiation within the community after 1869, when the Jewish religious community

69 EBNER, ref. 60; Im Stefania Waisenhaus. In *Preßburger Zeitung*, 3 May 1892 p. 3-4.

70 *Achter Jahresbericht*, ref. 34.

71 KEMÉNY, Ludwig. *Hundert Jahre der Wohltätigkeit gewidmet 1830 – 1930. Rückblick auf die Vergangenheit des Preßburger Wohltätigen Frauenvereins*. Bratislava; Preßburg : Wigand, 1930, p. 12.

72 MANNOVÁ, Elena. Transformácia identity bratislavských Nemcov v 19. storočí (The transformation of the identity of the Bratislava Germans in the 19th century). In *Historický časopis*, 1995, year 43, no. 3, p. 446. ISSN 00182575.

73 *Az 1831. éven alapított és 1885. évi május hó 20-dika óta Stefánia főhercegnő és özvegy-trónörökösné Ő cs. és kir. Fenségének legfőbb védnöksége alatt álló pozsonyi Stefánia árvaház 1896. évi kezeléséről szóló hatvanhatodik számú jelentése. – Sechszundsechziger Verwaltungsbericht und Rechnungs-Ausweis des im Jahre 1831 gegründeten, seit 20. Mai 1885 unter dem obersten Schutze Ihrer k. u. k. Hoheit, der durchlauchtigsten Frau Erzherzogin und Kronprinzessin-Witwe Stefanie stehenden Stefanie-Waisenhaus in Pressburg über das Jahr 1896*. Pozsony : Angermayer without year, p. 2.

in Hungary split into Orthodox, Neolog and Status Quo Ante parts. In Pressburg, the Neolog community was established in 1872.⁷⁴ Fragmentation also happened in the field of social care, although it appears that the differences of view were most successfully overcome in this field. Observance of different religious rites led to differentiation and the origin of new associations. Independent Neolog societies, which formed an essential part of the religious communities, were formed immediately in 1872. These were the Chevra kadisha funeral brotherhood, Ozer dalim society to support the poor members of the community and the Hachnosas Kalah, which secured wedding equipment for poor brides. A women's society was formed at the same time. Five societies, representing almost a fifth of the 27 Jewish charitable societies existing in 1905, remained common to the Orthodox and Neolog communities. Where the property of societies was concerned, the Orthodox with 600,000 crowns had about ten times more capital than the Neologs. The property of the societies common to both communities was four times larger than that of the purely Neolog societies.⁷⁵

Open conflicts between the Jewish communities concerning social care did not happen. For example, the women's societies in Pressburg received contributions from Jewish communities in other places.⁷⁶ However, different views on the observance of Orthodox rules caused delays in the establishment of the Mensa students' dining room in the Pressburg yeshiva.⁷⁷ Conflicts between the Orthodox and Neologs appeared to a much larger extent on the level of the whole state, where there was also a dispute over responsibilities in the field of social care. For example, this happened in case of four orphans from the Orthodox environment of Upper Hungary, who were placed in the care of Christians for several months rather than being placed in the orphanage in Budapest, which was run by the Neologs.⁷⁸ A further example is the dispute over the division of the bequest to the Jewish community of Budapest from the estate of Albert Rothschild, who "clearly had no idea of the Orthodox – Neolog dualism" in Hungary. The money was sent to the address of the Neolog community, which asked the Orthodox to provide a list of people, who should receive support. However, the Orthodox community asked for an appropriate sum of money, arguing that it administered its own affairs. The obstinacy of both sides ended to the disadvantage of the Orthodox community – it received nothing. As the newspaper stated, this was entirely correct because "every honourable Orthodox must recognize that Orthodox hunger cannot be satisfied with Neolog money".⁷⁹

However, in general it is possible to state that the relations between the charitable societies and institutions were helpful and non-confrontational with cooperation prevailing. Some activities were organized by societies jointly, and they shared premises and halls. Societies and endowments often crossed confessional dividing lines. The most important examples are Humanitas, Habermann's endowment, Samuel Royko's endow-

74 GOLD, ref. 61, p. 134.

75 Calculated according to data in sources cited in ref. 63.

76 Ort. isr. Frauenverein Pozsony. In *Ungarländische Jüdische Zeitung*, 27 March 1911, no. 6, p. 10, Jeschibawesen. In *ibid.*, p. 10.

77 Jeschibawesen, ref. 76, p. 9-10.

78 Eher christlich, als neolog. In *Ungarländische Jüdische Zeitung*, 27 March 1911, no. 6, p. 10.

79 Ortodoxe und neologe Armut. In *Ungarländische Jüdische Zeitung*, 27 March 1911, no. 6, p. 10-11.

ment, Schreiber's endowment, Jiringer's endowment and Katarina Schifbeck's endowment. On the other hand, Török's endowment remained exclusively Catholic for a long time.⁸⁰

Disputes over responsibilities occurred more frequently between the municipal authorities and the state. By bringing care of orphans up to 7 years old under state control, the state intervened in the legal powers of the town. The municipal authorities protested that the Pressburg orphanage was not included in the network of state orphanages (asylums). The orphans from Pressburg had to be sent for state care in other, purely Hungarian towns and villages, which provoked ethnic disputes. However, the most criticized aspect was the removal of children from their family and home environment. Orphans, but also children from incomplete or poor families (so called "abandoned children") were placed in asylums or family colonies in a strange environment. This broke their relations with their families and original cultural – linguistic environments.⁸¹ This practice was connected with the aim of the Hungarian state of bringing up children in a patriotic ethnic Hungarian or Magyar spirit. The state deliberately built asylums in the regions of central Hungary with a purely Hungarian population.⁸² Although this aim of state care for children was formulated very generally in the legislation, it appeared in journalism of the time as a promotional slogan.⁸³ Criticism of such patriotic education was formulated mainly by representatives of the non-dominant nations in the Kingdom of Hungary.⁸⁴ This practice was also criticized by the German speaking inhabitants of Pressburg. The municipal authorities were not allowed by the government to turn the town orphanage into a state asylum, which led to the closure of this municipal facility and the relocation

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- 80 HEYBL, Imre. Pozsony szab. kir. város kezelése és felügyelete alatt álló alapok és alapítványainak kimutatása 1885. végével. – Ausweis der unter der Verwaltung und Oberaufsicht der kön. Freistadt Pressburg stehender Stiftungen und Fonde mit Ende 1885. In *Pozsony szab. kir. város zárszámadása és vagyonejtára 1885 évről. – Schluss-Rechnung und Vermögens-Inventar der königl. Freistadt Pressburg für das Verwaltungsjahr 1885. Pozsony : Angermayer, 1886, p. 81-122; Jelentése a "Schifbeck Katalin" alapítványi gondozó testületnek 1894. évi november 3-tól 1896. évi dec. 31-ig terjedő működéséről. – Bericht des Curatoriums der "Katharina Schifbeck-Stiftung" über die Verwaltung des Stiftungsvermögens vom 3. November 1894 bis 31. Dezember 1896. Pozsony – Pressburg 1897; A „Humanitas“ jótékonyág egyesület alapszabályai. – Statuten des Wohltätigkeits-Vereines „Humanitas“. Pozsony 1882; AMB, XI, year 1880, c. 2828, document no. 25: accounts of Schreiber's endowment.*
- 81 FORBÁTH, ref. 6, p. 109, 112; RUFFY, Pál. Az állami gyermekvédelem (The state children's protection). Budapest 1914, reprint In LÉDERER – TENCZER – ULICSKA, ref. 19, p. 291.
- 82 In the territory of Slovakia, there were state asylums only in Košice and Rimavská Sobota, see THIRRING, Gusztáv. *A magyar városok statisztikai évkönyve (The Statistical yearbook of Hungarian towns)*. Budapest : Budapest Székesfőváros nyomdája, 1912, p. 553-554.
- 83 For example, an article from 1904 reacted to demands that children should be returned from the state asylums to their home communities, with the recommendation that "orphanages should be directed in this field by that idea that there are still not enough of us Magyars and we must increase in number also by this method". SZANA, Sándor – GYŐRBÍRÓ, Jenő. Az árvaszék ügyvitele az elhagyott gyermek védelme körül (*Administration of the orphan's office concerning abandoned children's protection*). In LÉDERER – TENCZER – ULICSKA, ref. 19, p. 282.
- 84 A series of angry protests were provoked by the removal of abandoned children from central Slovakia to southern Hungary after the cholera epidemic of 1874, as well as in 1887-1888 and 1892, see BOKES, František (ed.). *Dokumenty k slovenskému národnému hnutiu 1848 – 1914 (Documents from the Slovak national movement 1848 – 1914)*, Vol. III. Bratislava : Vydavateľstvo SAV, 1972, documents no. 323, 329, 341-343.

of the orphans outside Pressburg. They pointed to the Magyarizing aim of state childcare “*that non-Magyar (idegenajku) children will be brought up as pure Magyars*”.⁸⁵

On one side, the introduction of state care for children was a progressive measure, which was also positively perceived abroad, but by pursuing centralization and deliberate patriotic education, it was condemned to fail, especially in regions with ethnically mixed populations. The entry of the state into financing of this field with support for local societies and socially dependent families could have been a more successful socio-political measure. Research into the sources from Pressburg also shows this. When financial resources from the State Healthcare Fund opened new possibilities in 1898, there was an increase in the number of applications for acceptance of children into foster care because of severe poverty in families. Children were taken into the care of the state or municipality on the basis of the definition of so-called abandonment. Apart from orphans and semi-orphans, this included children from socially dependent families.⁸⁶ In Pressburg acceptance of children into the orphanage or foster care was often requested by widows, widowers or single mothers with the justification that they did not have enough resources to support these children.⁸⁷ For example, in 1901 a mother justified her request for the acceptance of 3 children, two of them non-marital, with the statement that “*because of them, she cannot enter into service and work*”. On the basis of an analysis of the applications for the acceptance of children into foster care at the expense of the State Healthcare Fund in Pressburg from 1900 to 1901, we came to the conclusion that the great majority of applicants were parents without partners, either widows, widowers or unmarried mothers. From more than 50 children, there were only 4 complete orphans, while in 12 cases unmarried mothers asked for their children to be taken into care. In some cases there was clearly an attempt to gain money for childcare, since a member of the family such as the mother’s sister, or another member of the household applied to be the foster parent. However, grandparents could not have a claim to payments for foster care.⁸⁸

Effectiveness and limits of the social care system

The data obtained so far shows that social care in Pressburg was relatively mature, high quality and well organized, just as was the level of health care and medicine.⁸⁹

85 Az iparfejlesztés és állami gyermekmenhelyek (Industrial development and state children’s asylums). In *Pozsonyvárosi Közlöny*, 1907, year 2, no. 5, p. 2.

86 The definition of “abandonment” according to acts no. XX/1877 and XXI/1901 followed the following principle: “*It is necessary to declare the following abandoned: unpropertied children aged less than 15 years, who have no relations responsible for their support and up bringing and have no relations, benefactors, charitable institutions or societies adequately supporting and bringing them up*”, see RO-SENAUER, ref. 6, p. 59. Decree no. 50.000 from 1899 also included children of parents, who “*are not able to look after their children because of sickness, hospital treatment, residence in a mental hospital or imprisonment*”, see Szabályrendelet a hét éven alóli elhagyott gyermekek gondozásáról (Regulation about care of abandoned children under seven years). In CHYZER, ref. 39, p. 604.

87 AMB, X, year 1892, cr. 2842: The case of acceptance of a child into the Isabella Children’s Home: the application of a widower for the acceptance of one of his 4 children.

88 AMB, IX, Mestský fyzikát (Healthcare office), Spisy (Documents), year 1900-1901, c. F 2983.

89 For more details see: FALISOVÁ, Anna - DUDEKOVÁ, Gabriela. Úroveň zdravotníctva ako znak veľkomesta. Plusy a mínusy zdravotníckej starostlivosti v Prešporku / Bratislave. (The level of health care as the attribute of a large city. Pluses and minuses of health care in Pressburg / Bratislava.). In DUDEKOVÁ

Social care was modernized from the 1830s and especially in the 1880s and 1890s in connection with the overall modernization of the town. Its features were:

1. The growth of civil activities and gradual secularization of social care, in the 1890s especially the growth in the number of professional and workers' self-help societies.

2. Specialized institutions and societies.

3. Gradual professionalization of social care – with the appointment of qualified officials to originally honorary positions in the municipal social commission as well as professionally trained people to the social institutions.

4. The formation of a communal social policy, a growing effort by the town to solve social problems more comprehensively and react quickly and effectively to current problems. As in other industrial centres, an orientation to new problem groups, especially to the workers, who brought the problems of unemployment and a housing crisis to Pressburg, was characteristic. The town began to develop an active policy in this area especially at the beginning of the 20th century, by facilitating the search for work, constructing flats for workers and establishing a special social commission.

Compared to other towns in Hungary, Pressburg had favourable financial resources for the provision of poverty policy in the town because it had substantial financial capital in its poverty relief funds and endowments. In 1890, the charitable funds and endowments had capital amounting to 1.5 million crowns. In 1905, 42 endowments administered property of 3.6 million crowns and in 1910 the capital had grown to almost 5 million. The Evangelical community also had substantial property deposited in endowments amounting to 4.7 million crowns in 1912, and it planned to use a quarter of a million crowns from this for social care in the next year. However, since the endowments were fixed and only the annual interest from them could be used, the town had only 5-6% of this sum actually available.

Apart from this, the administration of endowments was time consuming and organizationally demanding. The administrative costs were relatively high because of their fragmentation. Therefore, the town undertook centralization and streamlining of the organization of social care and the administration of financial resources. Already from the 1880s, the town complained about the ever increasing cost of poverty policy forming only part of the enormous expenses of the town, which were spent on the construction of a modern urban infrastructure. According to a preliminary report for 1911, the town was 15 million crowns in debt from a loan and spending of more than 8 million crowns was planned for 1911.⁹⁰

Although contemporaries mentioned a high level of poverty policy in Pressburg in comparison with other Hungarian towns, as is shown by the society and municipal statistics from 1913, the spending of the town on public social care varied around 2-3% of

et al. *Medzi provinciou a metropolou*, ref. 1, p. 143-160.

90 *Pozsony szab. kir. város költségelőirányzata 1890, 1906, 1911 évre. – Präliminar der königlichen Freistadt Pozsony pro 1890, 1905, 1915. Pozsony 1890; 1906; 1911; A pozsonyi ág. hitv. evangj. egyházközség évi értesítője az 1912 évről. / Jahres-Bericht der evangelischen Kirchengemeinde A. B. zu Pozsony über das Jahr 1912. Pozsony 1913.*

total spending.⁹¹ The cost to the municipal authorities of social care apart from education represented about 2.5% of the annual budget, which placed Pressburg together with Timișoara immediately after Budapest. In the same year, the towns of Hungary spent 2.2 – 2.4 % of their total annual spending on social care or about 55-58 hellers for each inhabitant. Although some towns had more finance, with Pressburg, for example, spending almost double the average, in comparison with the systematic social care of Western European, especially German town, it was only negligible support.⁹² Pressburg did not differ from Budapest and other Hungarian towns in these proportions of spending and was definitely backward in this respect compared to Vienna. At this time, Vienna spent a total of 11% of the city budget on care for the poor.⁹³

The capacity and number of social and health institutions in Pressburg increased. In 1905, Pressburg had 9 hospitals with more than a thousand beds and almost 13 thousand patients. By 1910 the number of beds had increased by 25% and the number of patients by about 70%. However, it is necessary to state that although Pressburg provided some social services to a higher standard than usual at the time, for example, free surgeries for poor children, a distribution point for free milk or regular sending of poor people for spa treatment at Piešťany, or the unique solution of the problem of workers' housing,⁹⁴ a large proportion of the socially dependent people remained outside the social safety net. The reason was not only a lack of financial resources and contemporary prejudices about poverty, but also the utilitarian interests of the providers of social assistance. The obstacles to wider modernization also included the state interventions in the direction of limiting the autonomy of Hungarian towns, which led in the end to weakening of the effectiveness of communal politics.

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In summary we can state that the differentiated communal social care system in Pressburg, organized by various components of society in the progression: family, religious community, public charity, societies, political community, state, contributed to a substantial raising of the quality of assistance for the needy. The setting of strict criteria for the granting of assistance defined its exact limits, so that, as with state social policy in

91 The value of the spending of the Pressburg municipal authorities from charitable funds on social care in 1910 was more than 2 million crowns. From this amount, 25% went to support social and charitable facilities, 4% to care for abandoned children aged over 7 and 4% to other support. 20% of the resources was used for further capitalization, see: *Magyarország városaink háztartása az 1910 évben. Magyar statisztikai közlemények. Új sorozat, 58. kötet (Budget estimates of Hungarian towns in 1910. Hungarian statistical reports, New edition, Volume 58)*. Budapest 1916, p. 266-267.

92 ÁGOSTON, Péter. A szegényügy (Poor-relief). In *Városi szemle*, 1910, year 3, no. 11, p. 806-807.

93 MELINZ, Gerhard – ZIMMERMANN, Susan. Die aktive Stadt. Kommunale Politik zur Gestaltung städtischer Lebensbedingungen in Budapest, Prag und Wien (1867 – 1914). In MELINZ, Gerhard – ZIMMERMANN, Susan (Hrsg.). *Wien – Prag – Budapest. Blütezeit der Habsburgermetropolen. Urbanisierung, Kommunalpolitik, gesellschaftliche Konflikte (1867 – 1918)*. Wien : Promedia, 1996, p. 158-159. ISBN 3853711014.

94 The Hungarian historian Gyáni evaluates the construction of municipal flats for workers in Pressburg in 1902 as unique in the territory of the Kingdom of Hungary, see: GYÁNI, Gábor. Lakáshelyzet és otthon-kultúra a munkásság körében (Situation of housing and housing culture among workers). In *Századok*, 1990, year 124, no. 3-4, p. 375. ISSN 00398098.

general, a significant proportion of people were excluded from this assistance. The conditions for granting of social assistance were not limited only to membership of specific confessional or ethnic groups. The founders and administrators of institutions tightened up the selection of “recipients” by setting further conditions. For example, to obtain a grant at the Evangelical Lyceum in Pressburg, it was originally enough to be a member of the Evangelical Church or of the nobility. The purpose of the endowment was originally formulated very broadly: for the needs of the school. However, from the middle of the 19th century, the conditions a student had to fulfil were supplemented with ethnic identity (mostly Magyar), place of legal residence, social status (poor) and grants began to be specified according to subject studied. Criteria such as good success and exemplary behaviour emphasized deservingness.⁹⁵ Such an accumulation of conditions had the aim of better targeting and ensuring that it was worth providing assistance, but in the end, it made this assistance much less accessible to the wider public, and this sometimes led to a form of elitism.

The effectiveness of communal social care in Pressburg was directly connected with the level of the poverty policy and social policy in the Kingdom of Hungary, which was problematic in this period. The basic principles on which the poverty policy in Hungary was based, namely right of domicile, subsidiarity, categorization of people on the basis of moral criteria and stereotypes, were not adequate for the new social problems of a modernizing society. Attempts to change them, for example, by widening the possibilities for receipt, changing the definition of right of legal residence or extending care to new categories of people, contributed to moderate improvement, but whole groups of socially dependent people remained without social assistance. Proposals to improve and reform the existing system started from practice abroad, but also from the laboratory for new measures represented by a large town endeavouring to establish its own communal social policy.

The proposals of Hungarian communal politicians especially demanded more state participation in the field of poverty or social policy. They proposed further centralization and coordination, since they regarded fragmentation and the notorious lack of finance as the greatest deficiencies of the existing system. They saw the way forward in connecting or unifying official care provided by the municipal, county and state authorities with private charity from civil groups. They considered that the advantages of the latter were its more immediate, targeted and individual approach to the needy, as well as their positive moral influence.⁹⁶ The situation during the First World War influenced the intensification of state intervention in the life of society. At this time further proposals appeared that the state should take over the cost of institutionalized social care, while the open form should remain the financial and organizational responsibility of the municipalities of Hungary.⁹⁷

95 MARKUSOVSKÝ, Sámuel. Az iskola (The school). In SCHMIDT et al., ref. 60, p. 409-423.

96 PÁLOS, Ödön. A hatósági szegénygondozás és a magánjótékonyág együttműködésének kapcsolatának szervezése (The organization of cooperation between official poor-relief and private charity). In *Városi Szemle*, 1915, year 8, no. 1, p. 65-68.

97 PÁLOS, Ödön. A szegénygondozás reformja a háború után (Reform of poor-relief after war). In *Városi Szemle*, 1917, year 10, no. 6, p. 350-351.

The level of poverty policy and social policy in Hungary was characterized by weak effectiveness and inaccessibility for wide groups in the population. When evaluating the overall effectiveness of the system, it is necessary to emphasize that during the long 19th century it meant a combination of essential social assistance with repressive measures. The measures of the Hungarian state to moderate poverty did not go beyond the framework of solving the social question by repression. Growth in the number of unemployed “vagrants” only strengthened the political will to impose repression. This was most significantly expressed in the demands for the reintroduction of the compulsory workhouse, which still appeared around 1900. In spite of sharp criticism, this led to the passing of the Hungarian act on so-called dangerous idlers number XXI from 1913, which reintroduced the practices of forced labour and the workhouse.⁹⁸

In contrast to the state system, the system of communal social care in Pressburg was more differentiated and more specialized. The social assistance provided by various types of facility, whether administered by the municipal authorities, charitable civil societies, religious communities, administrators of endowments or individuals, was more controllable and in the end more effective. Precisely the reorganized systems of poverty policy of the towns became the model for reform on the state level. Experts recommended the so-called Elberfeld system, introduced by the town of Elberfeld in 1852 as a model for Hungary. It started from the basic idea that for open poor relief, the territory of a town had to be divided into several smaller, more easily controllable parts, in which voluntary workers would have contact with the supported people almost daily. The centralization of records and supervision by the municipal authorities would ensure the effective use of resources. However, by about 1900, people in Hungary were already noticing the advantages of the Strasbourg system, which replaced it. In contrast to Elberfeld, Strasbourg employed paid, trained social workers as well as volunteers.⁹⁹

The system of communal poverty policy in Pressburg combined elements of the Elberfeld system such as division into districts and personal control of volunteer workers with features of the Strasbourg system, in which municipal personnel carried out social work and supervision as a result of specialization and professionalization. The signs of modernization around 1900 were gradual secularization, specialization, professionalization and rationalization, as well as taking over of some segments by the state.

These trends also appeared in the gradual modification of the criteria applied when granting social assistance. The social situation and status of the claimant remained decisive, but always in combination with other criteria. After domicile, the most important factor was confessional identity of the needy person, but as a result of secularization, the number of non-confessional institutions in the town was increasing. So-called pri-

98 1913. évi XXI. törvénycikk a közveszélyes munkakerülőkről (Law article No. XXI from 1913 about public danger from shirkers). In *1000 – 2003 ezer év*. Accessible on the internet: ><http://www.1000ev.hu/index.php?a=3¶m=7217>< For contemporary commentary on the act see: PAP, Géza. Törvény (1913. évi XXI. törvénycikk) a közveszélyes munkakerülőkről (Law article (No. XXI from 1913) about public danger from shirkers). In *A nemzetközi egyesület magyar osztályának közleményei*, 1913, year 2, no. 1. Published in LÉDERER – TENCZER – ULICSKA, ref. 19, p. 209-219.

99 FORBÁTH ref. 6, p. 25 etc., 167 etc.; PÁLÓS, Károly. *Szegénység, szegélygondozás (Poverty, poor-relief)*. Szombathely : a szerző kiadása; Martineum könyvnyomda, 1934, p. 35-40.

vate or civil charity proved to be most effective only in cooperation with the municipal authorities. This trend was already perceptible in Pressburg in the 1830s. The system of communal social policy was developed only around 1900, when the self-help trade union societies became part of the wider network of institutions and social care societies, and the state began to pay part of the expenses of specific groups of people.

Not only the private or society charity was marked by the stereotypes of the time about poverty. Those who criticized the charitable activities of societies and individuals at the time mentioned this fact as a negative feature. Apart from organizational fragmentation and lack of coordination, they criticized the effort of patrons to gain cheap popularity and the humiliating nature of the practical charity: “*There is scarcely a country where charity has such a humiliating form as among us. [...] Private charity does not always derive from sympathy, the stimuli for it are not always unselfish, splendid gifts are often conscious expressions of feelings of superiority.*”¹⁰⁰

Charity was often not motivated only by assistance to neighbours, but by presentation of social position and an effort to gain social prestige. The recipient was expected to behave in a humble way, to show gratitude and accept social inequality. Therefore charitable societies liked to aim at the obvious groups: children, impoverished burghers and “honourable widows”.¹⁰¹ Charity was part of the behaviour expected from the nobility and burghers, by means of which the founders of institutions, patrons, regular donors and more or less active members of charitable associations incorporated themselves into the local social elite.

Membership of many charitable or other civil societies became a symbol of status and prestige.¹⁰² From a certain level of social status, charitable activity was a condition for acceptance in civil society. It was also a condition for further social advancement in the political and economic fields. Charity and the provision of social care in general involved social control and disciplining not only of the recipients, but also of the donors. The distance of the donor from the recipient symbolized their position in the social hierarchy and was an expression of the acceptance of this inequality.¹⁰³

The main motivation was the maintenance of social peace. Research into the organization of poverty policy in the long 19th century – whether on the local or state levels – has shown that the contemporary norms and stereotypes about poverty were decisive for the assessment of social dependence not only in societies, but also in the setting of criteria in the system of communal and state social policy. They had equal influence on the legislators, who defined the criteria for social dependence not on the basis of the

100 FORBÁTH, ref. 6, p. 44, 50.

101 Imitation of aristocratic models of behaviour and social pressure from the civil community played an important role in the provision of charity, see MANNOVÁ, Charitable Societies, ref. 65, p. 208-210.

102 MAREŠ, Petr. *Sociologie nerovnosti a chudoby (The sociology of inequality and poverty)*. Praha : Sociologické nakladatelství, 1999, p. 34. ISBN 8085850613.

103 SCHULZ, Andreas. Mäzenatentum und Wohltätigkeit – Ausdruckformen bürgerlichen Gemeinsinns in der Neuzeit. In KOCKA, Jürgen – FREY, Manuel (Hrsg.). *Bürgerkultur und Mäzenatentum im 19. Jahrhundert*. Berlin : Bostelmann & Siebenhaar Verlag Edition Fannei & Walz 1998, p. 241-253. ISBN 3927574457.

social situation of the needy, but according to current political needs, moral prejudices and contemporary stereotypes about the causes of poverty.¹⁰⁴

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SYSTEM DER SOZIALFÜRSORGE IN BRATISLAVA IM 19. JAHRHUNDERT UND SEINE MODERNISIERUNG AN DER WENDE VOM 19. ZUM 20. JAHRHUNDERT

GABRIELA DUDEKOVÁ

Das Niveau und der Ausmaß der kommunalen Sozialfürsorge in Bratislava/ Pressburg wurden durch die Unzulänglichkeit und niedrige Qualität der Sozialfürsorge im Rahmen der Sozialpolitik von Ungarn limitiert. Die Komparation mit Cisleithanien zeigt einen markanten Unterschied im Ausmaß der Beteiligung vom Staat im Rahmen der Dürftigkeit, beziehungsweise des Systems der Sozialfürsorge und Sozialpolitik. Während in Cisleithanien die Reformen von Joseph II. den Beitritt vom Staat in die Organisation und Finanzierung der Sozialfürsorge und die Gründung der staatlichen Anstalten bedeuteten, in Ungarn wurden diese Reformen nur minimal umgesetzt. Bis zum Untergang der Habsburger Monarchie blieb die heimische Gemeinde organisatorisch und finanziell die Haupteinheit der Fürsorge um die sozialschwachen Personen in Ungarn. Die kommunale Sozialpolitik in den großen Städten in Ungarn bekam somit die Form einer Alternative zum staatlichen System der Sozialfürsorge, die Impulse für die Reformen auf der Staatsebene gab. Die Grundsätze der Sozialfürsorge in Ungarn (unzulängliche Staatsbeteiligung, Prinzip der heimischen Zugehörigkeit und Subsidiarität, Kategorisierung der Armen) entsprachen nicht den sozialwirtschaftlichen Veränderungen infolge der Industrialisierung und Modernisierung der Gesellschaft im 19. Jahrhundert. Gemeinsam mit den anhaltenden Stereotypen über die Armut und ihren Ursachen stellten sie die größten Schwächen des unwirksamen Systems der Sozialpolitik in Ungarn dar.

Trotz den genannten Einschränkungen stellte das System der Sozialfürsorge in Pressburg ein stark differenziertes Netz von sozialen, sozialmedizinischen und Wohlfahrtsorganisationen dar, die eine spezielle Fürsorge für eine relativ breite Skala sozialschwachen Menschen gewährten. Die Organisatoren (Subjekte) waren die Stadtverwaltung, verschiedene Bürgerinitiativen und Vereine, wobei als wichtiger Verwalter der Sozialinstitutionen in der Stadt weiterhin die Kirche blieb, die eine soziale Unterstützung innerhalb ihrer Kirchengemeinden (katholischen, protestantischen, jüdischen oder neologischen) gewährte. In der ethnisch und religiös differenzierten Stadt leisteten die Wohlfahrts- und Sozialeinrichtungen Hilfe in erster Linie innerhalb der eigenen Gemeinde, es gab jedoch Einrichtungen, deren Ziel war, diese Unterschiede zu überschreiten.

Der Modernisierungsprozess der kommunalen Sozialfürsorge in Pressburg im 19. Jahrhundert wurde durch eine allmähliche Säkularisierung, Rationalisierung, Bürokratisierung, Spezialisierung, Professionalisierung und Humanisierung und seit der Wende vom 19. zum 20. Jahrhundert auch eine teilweise Verstaatlichung der existierenden Institutionen charakterisiert. Dieser Prozess verlief

104 For further details see the chapter and citations of literature: DUDEKOVÁ, Gabriela. Der „barmherzige Wohltäter“ und der „bedürftige Arme“. Stereotypen der Armut und Wohltätigkeit im 19. und am Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts. In HAHN, Hans Henning – MANNOVÁ, Elena (Hrsg.). *Nationale Wahrnehmungen und ihre Stereotypisierung. Beiträge zur historischen Stereotypenforschung*. Frankfurt am Main; Berlin; Bern; Bruxelles; New York; Oxford; Wien : Peter Lang, 2007, p. 81-108. ISBN 9783631504451.

in drei Etappen: 1. Reformen von Joseph II. am Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts, 2. Zentralisierung und Systematisierung unter der Führung der Stadtverwaltung in den 30er Jahren des 19. Jahrhunderts, 3. Gestaltung vom System der kommunalen Sozialpolitik an der Wende vom 19. zum 20. Jahrhundert und das Bemühen um Verstaatlichung einigen ihrer Segmente. Der Beitritt vom Staat bedeutete einerseits Verbesserung der Finanzierung und Wirksamkeit der Sozialfürsorge, andererseits kam es aber zum Streit um die Kompetenzen mit der Stadt, zum Beispiel bei den Bemühungen des Staates die Assimilationspolitik im Rahmen der verstaatlichten Fürsorge um die verlassenen Kinder zu betreiben. Die kommunale Sozialpolitik in Pressburg gehörte zwar am Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts zu den höchstentwickelten innerhalb von Ungarn, auch was den Umfang der kommunalen Ausgaben für die Sozialfürsorge betrifft (mit dem Anteil von zirka 2,5 % des Stadtbudgets war sie auf dem 2. Platz gleich hinter Budapest), blieb sie jedoch im Vergleich mit den Städten in Cisleithanien weit zurück.

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THE RE-MILITARIZATION OF THE RHINELAND ON 7 MARCH 1936: A QUESTION OF FRONTIERS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (ALSO) IN CENTRAL EUROPE

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FERENČUHOVÁ, Bohumila. The Re-Militarization of the Rhineland on 7 March 1936: A Question of Frontiers and International Security (also) in Central Europe. *Historický časopis*, 2015, 63, 5, pp. 877-899, Bratislava.

The entry of 30,000 German soldiers into the demilitarized Rhineland was a violation of the Treaty of Versailles and of the Locarno agreements signed under the aegis of the League of Nations in 1925. The latter were understood as giving some degree of correction to Versailles. They included the Rhine Pact, which internationally guaranteed the inviolability of the French – German and French – Belgian frontiers, and of the demilitarized Rhineland. Locarno could not be unilaterally renounced. Therefore Hitler resorted to force, while the Western powers gave priority to diplomacy and an effort to prove that the Locarno agreements had not lost their legal force. Slovak historiography has not devoted much attention to the Rhineland crisis, although it had an unfortunate impact on the fate of Czechoslovakia and the whole of Central Europe. The study is directed mainly towards French policy. On the basis of research in the diplomatic and military archives, it considers the problem of the struggle between force and law. Law suffered a defeat in Europe in 1936.

Rhineland Crisis 1936. Frontiers. Collective security. Central Europe.

From the point of view of frontiers in Western Europe, nothing extraordinary happened on 7 March 1936. At first sight it, it seemed that in Central Europe and especially in Slovakia the event would not arouse much disturbance. Adolf Hitler had unilaterally renounced the Locarno agreement and sent 30,000 troops into a demilitarized zone, but they had not crossed the frontier of the German Reich or encountered armed opposition. German soldiers marched along the Rhine with brass bands. They had been doing compulsory military service already for a year, in spite of the prohibition of a regular army by the Treaty of Versailles. The French General Staff held the view that general mobilization would be enough to intimidate Hitler, but it did not happen.¹

Why was the French reaction to the flagrant German violation of the obligations signed not only at Versailles, but also freely agreed at Locarno, so timid? I attempt to seek an answer to this question on the basis of published French diplomatic documents,²

1 BERSTEIN, Serge – MILZA, Pierre. *Histoire de l'Europe contemporaine. Le XXe siècle de 1919 à nos jours*. Paris : Hatier 1992, p. 106-107. ISBN 9782218049774.

2 *Documents diplomatiques français 1932-1939* (hereinafter DDF) IIème série, tome 1 (1^{er} janvier – 31 mars 1936). Paris : Imprimerie nationale 1963; DDF, IIème série, tome 2, (1 avril – 18 juillet 1936). Paris:

Czechoslovak diplomatic documents,³ and archive materials of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (AMAE), especially the papers of René Massigli, at that time deputy director of the political department at the Quai d'Orsay. Study of the French military archives in the Château de Vincennes (SHAT) and the abundant historical literature based on them also contributed to clarifying the problem. I return to the theme in spite of the fact that the crisis of 7 March 1936 in its international context was studied in detail by Robert Kvaček in an excellent study from 1963,⁴ and as a chapter in valuable and still fundamental monographs devoted to inter-war Europe.⁵ Yugoslav and Rumanian historians also devoted attention to this problem in the period from the 1960s to 1980s.⁶ From recent Czech historical literature we will mention an extensive chapter in Jindřich Dejmek's biography of Kamil Krofta.⁷ In French historiography, the tone was set for a long time by Jean-Baptiste Duroselle's evaluation of the Rhineland crisis. He saw it as the result of a decadent period in French history and of over-estimation of the military strength and armaments of Germany at the time Hitler decided to renew the sovereignty of the Reich over the Rhineland.⁸ In the second volume of the latest account of the history of French diplomacy, Georges-Henri Soutou mentions the Rhineland crisis only briefly, observing that the French approach can be understood only on the basis of the "obsession with collective security", which dominated French foreign policy in the period 1924 – 1939.⁹

This study aims to explain first of all French policy during the Rhineland crisis and its impact on France's Central European allies. The first part concentrates on the period before 7 March 1936 and on the French reaction in the first days after the fait accompli,

Imprimerie nationale 1964.

- 3 *Dokumenty československé zahraniční politiky. Československá zahraniční politika v roce 1936. Svazek 1. (1. leden – 31. srpen 1936). (Documents of Czechoslovak foreign policy. Czechoslovak foreign policy in 1936. Volume 1. (1 January – 31 August 1936).)* Ed. Jindřich Dejmek. Praha : Ústav mezinárodních vztahů, Univerzita Karlova v Praze – nakladatelství Karolinum; Historický ústav Akademie věd ČR, 2003, (hereinafter DEJMEK, DČSZP 1936). ISBN 9788024607979.
- 4 KVAČEK, Robert. Německá likvidace demilitarizovaného porýnského pásma 7. března 1936. (The German liquidation of the Rhineland demilitarized zone on 7 March 1936.). In *Československý časopis historický*, 1963, year 11, p. 306-330. ISSN 00456187.
- 5 KVAČEK, Robert. *Nad Evropou zataženo. Československo a Evropa 1933-1937*. Praha : Svoboda, 1963, p. 208-236.
- 6 AVRAMOVSKI, Živko. Rýnská krize r. 1936 a Jugoslávie (The Rhineland crisis of 1936 and Yugoslavia.). In *Slovanský přehled*, 1969, year 55, no. 4, p. 234-291; IORDACHE, Nicolae. L'épisode rhénan. In *La Petite Entente et l'Europe*. Genève : Institut universitaire de hautes études internationales, 1977, p. 262-267; VINAVER, Vuk. Sedmi mart 1936 – u senci abisinske galame Hitler udara po Francuskoj (Seventh March 1936 – during the Abyssinia crisis, Hitler strikes at France). In *Jugoslavija i Francuska*. Beograd : Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1985, p. 310-313.
- 7 DEJMEK, Jindřich. Obsazení Porýní, jeho důsledky a československá diplomacie (březen – léto 1936). (The occupation of the Rhineland, its results and Czechoslovak diplomacy (March – summer 1936).). In *Historik v čele diplomacie Kamil Krofta*. Praha : Karolinum, 1998, p. 23-37. ISBN 8071845930.
- 8 DUROSELLE, Jean-Baptiste. Chapitre V. Le Drame rhénan (janvier – juin 1936.). In *Décadence 1932-1936*. Paris : Imprimerie nationale, 1979, p. 153-179.
- 9 ALLAIN, Jean-Claude – GUILLEN, Pierre – SOUTOU, Georges-Henri – THEISS, Laurent – VAÏSSE, Maurice. *Histoire de la diplomatie française II. De 1815 à nos jours*. Paris : Editions Perrin, 2007, p. 334-335. ISBN 978-2262027353.

the second on its reception in the eastern part of Central Europe, and the third outlines the attempt to overcome the crisis by diplomatic means on the international level.

The demilitarized zone in the Rhineland had been one of France's main concerns since the signing of the peace treaty after the First World War. Although France was victorious in the war, it felt uncertain. Clemenceau called this feeling *Grandeur et misère d'une victoire*.¹⁰ It suffered huge loss of life, devastation of its territory and serious economic damage. It feared German revenge and wanted to secure itself by moving the frontier to the Rhine as well as by disarmament of Germany. The USA and Great Britain compensated for their rejection of the Rhine frontier by working out an agreement to give immediate military assistance to France if it was attacked by Germany. This treaty bound both great powers and when the US Senate eventually did not ratify the peace treaties after the First World War, France also lost this guarantee. However, articles 42 – 44 of the Treaty of Versailles, concerning establishment of the Rhineland demilitarized zone, remained valid. The status of the zone was based on 42 and 43 of the treaty, according to which the left bank of the Rhine and 50 km wide strip on the right bank had to be demilitarized. There could be no military fortifications and military exercises could not take place in it. As a result of experience of German invasion during the First World War and the Franco – Prussian War of 1870, France regarded this situation as an important element in the security of its own repeatedly devastated territory. To some extent it was also about the security of Germany's eastern neighbours, especially Czechoslovakia and Poland. Since it was an important question connected with preserving peace in Europe, the League of Nations also had to be concerned with the demilitarization of the Rhineland. During discussions of the Geneva Protocol on 27 September 1924, the Council of the League of Nations decided that every nation forced to disarm and establish demilitarized zones, would have to submit to international supervision, which would monitor whether it was proceeding in accordance with the peace treaty. However, since the Geneva Protocol was not ratified, this initiative also remained on the level of an attempt.

The rules concerning the Rhineland received extraordinary attention from French diplomacy during the negotiations that ended with the signing of various international agreements at Locarno. From March 1925, the Supreme Defence Council of France demanded the introduction of permanent international supervision of the Rhineland. The efforts of French foreign policy in the talks, struck against opposition by Germany and rejection by Great Britain.¹¹ Immediately on the basis of the agreements signed at Locarno and their coming into force, the League of Nations placed articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles under the special protection of the Council of the League.¹² According to article 4 of the Treaty of mutual guarantee between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain and Italy – Rhine Pact – each of the parties to the agreement had the right to directly inform the Council of the League of Nations in the event of violation of articles 42 and 43.

10 CLEMENCEAU, Georges. *Grandeur et misère d'une victoire*. Paris : Plon, 1930.

11 Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères Paris (hereinafter AMAE), f. PA AP 217, René Massigli, vol. 7, fol. 123.

12 Ref. 11, folio 80.

Defeated Germany wished to revise all the peace treaties signed after the First World. First of all, it succeeded in negotiating the early evacuation of the occupied zone in the Rhineland,¹³ temporarily respecting the rules that applied in the demilitarized zone. After Germany was accepted as a member of the League of Nations, it participated in disarmament conferences and did everything to ensure that it was granted the right to equality in the field of armaments. The German conservative and nationalist right represented by Chancellor Gustav Stresemann planned to revise the peace treaties. At Locarno, their efforts were mainly directed towards the east.

Geneva immediately noticed the results of Hitler coming to power in 1933. Already in October 1933, the anti-Semitic legislation in Germany came onto the programme of the General Assembly of the League of Nations.¹⁴ The committee that prepared the resolution decided that it was necessary to defend the German Jews. Hitler sharply rejected this and three days after the discussion of this matter, on 14 October 1933 he announced in a speech on radio that Germany intended not only to abandon the disarmament conference, but also the League of Nations as a whole.¹⁵ The attempted Nazi putsch in Austria and the murder of Chancellor Engelbert Dolfuss strengthened the fears of the Locarno powers that Germany would violate the status of the Rhineland demilitarized zone. During the preparations for the Stresa conference of 12 April 1935, the French foreign minister Pierre Laval pointed out this possibility to his British and Italian colleagues Anthony Eden and Fulvio Suvich. He emphasized the seriousness of such an action, since according to articles 43 and 44 of the Treaty of Versailles any violation of the status of the demilitarized zone and especially “*the maintaining and accumulating of armed forces*” in the zone defined in article 42 of the Treaty of Versailles “*whether permanently or temporarily*” (article 43) would “*be a hostile act against the signatories of the treaty*”. It would mean that Germany would have to be regarded as a deliberate violator of the peace (article 44).¹⁶

As an analysis from the Quai d’Orsay stated, French foreign policy emphasized that “*according to the intension of the authors of the treaty, violation of the Rhineland zone*

13 For further details on the temporary occupied zones in the Rhineland and British policy see: SOUTKUP, Jaromír. *Britové v Porýní. Britská okupace Kolínského zóny v letech 1918-1926 (The British in the Rhineland. British occupation of the Cologne region, 1918-1926)*. Praha : Filozofická fakulta Univerzity Karlovy, 2011. ISBN 9788073083656; the reactions of Poland and Czechoslovakia to the early evacuation of the occupied zones in the Rhineland were analysed and compared by WANDYCYZ, Piotr F. *The Twilight of the French Eastern Alliances 1926-1936. French-Czechoslovak-Polish relations from Locarno to the remilitarization of Rhineland*. Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1988, p. 106-169. ISBN 9780691055282.

14 Société des Nations, Séances plénières, 11 Oct 1933, p. 88.

15 FINK, Carole. *Defending the Rights of Others. The Great Powers, the Jews and International Minority Protection, 1878 – 1938*. Cambridge; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 332-335. ISBN 9780521029940; FERENČUHOVÁ, Bohumila. 1938: de la protection internationale des minorités aux solutions radicales. In *La Tchécoslovaquie sismographe de l’Europe au XX e siècle*. Publié sous la direction d’Antoine Marès. Paris : Institut d’ études slaves, 2009, p. 90. ISBN 9782720404573.

16 Article 44: «*Au cas où l’Allemagne contreviendrait, de quelque manière que ce soit, aux dispositions des articles 42 et 43, elle serait considérée comme commettant un acte hostile vis-à-vis des puissances signataires du présent traité et comme cherchant à troubler la paix du monde.*» <http://mjp.univ-perp.fr/traites/1919versailles3.htm#3>.

had to constitute a casus belli". Therefore, violation of the demilitarization of the Rhineland was not regarded at Locarno as a French – German or German – Belgian problem, which could be solved with the help of arbitration agreements and peaceful procedures. As a result France did everything to ensure that all violations of the demilitarized zone were included in the general Rhine Pact, which imposed treaty obligations on France, Great Britain, Belgium, Italy and Germany. In this case the signatories had to act on the basis of article 4 of the Rhine Pact. After a violation of the status of the zone, the matter had to be submitted immediately to the Council of the League of Nations, which would have to state that there had been a violation of the demilitarized zone. In that case, the signatories of the Locarno agreement would immediately have to come to the aid of the power against which the act was aimed.¹⁷ In addition, article 4 assumed the possibility of an extremely rapid response in the case of a "*flagrant violation*". In that case, every party to the agreement had to provide assistance without waiting for the decision of the Council, as soon as they realized that "*an unprovoked act of aggression*" had occurred and this situation required "*immediate action*".¹⁸

At this time, Italy felt injured by the renewal of compulsory military service in Germany and it was part of the Stresa front, which decided to support the French memorandum on violation of the Treaty of Versailles, and after mutual agreement submitted it in Geneva. At Stresa, Britain, France and Italy agreed to call a conference of the states interested in the security of Austria, the Danube region and Eastern Europe. They also wanted to continue talks with Germany about armaments, and motivate it not to continue the policy of unilaterally renouncing clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. France wanted to achieve a united approach by the guarantors of Locarno and prevent the remilitarization of the Rhineland. However, the representative of Great Britain declared that his government was not prepared to undertake a policy of sanctions.¹⁹

Before the signing of the Franco – Soviet Pact on 2 May 1935, France still did not expect any spectacular action by Hitler's Germany. It expected more hidden activities, especially infiltration of the zone by paramilitary forces. It strove to prepare the ground with the British and Italian representatives at the League of Nations, so that they could use the standard approach in this case. After obtaining sufficient evidence of violation of articles 42-44 by Germany, France felt obliged to inform the Council of the League of Nations and appeal to it to officially recognize the violations. It wanted to force Germany to step back and cancel its measures.²⁰

Germany protested against the signing of the Franco – Soviet Pact in an official note from 25 May 1935, which was submitted to the French government on 1 June. The note stated that the treaty between Paris and Moscow was incompatible with the Rhine Pact and that Germany felt threatened by the Franco – Soviet "military alliance". France discussed the matter with the other signatories of the Rhine Pact – Italy, Great Britain and Belgium – and obtained their support. The reply emphasized that the German inter-

17 AMAE, F. René Massigli, vol. 7, fol. 129-130.

18 Ref. 17, fol. 130.

19 IORDACHE, L'épisode rhénan, ref. 6, p. 240-241.

20 AMAE, PA AP 217, René Massigli, vol. 7, folio 131.

pretation was not justified, and that extraordinary care had been taken to ensure the full compatibility of the Franco – Soviet Pact on mutual assistance with the Locarno Rhine Pact on one side and the League of Nations Pact on the other. France underlined that the mechanism of its treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia, signed before Locarno, were the same as the mechanism of the treaty with the USSR. They all had a defensive character. The treaty on mutual assistance with the USSR was the result of the French effort to extend application of the principles of collective security to the east. According to the French note, Germany would also benefit from such a policy.²¹

In his biography of Hitler, Ian Kershaw states that the remilitarization of the Rhineland “*would have held an honoured place in the priorities of any nationalist government to the degree that it renewed the sovereignty of Germany over territory that nobody had denied was German*”.²² It represented an important step on the road to rearmament of the country, something very popular among the public. Since the disagreements between the Locarno powers were growing, Hitler could choose the most favourable moment to act. On 18 June 1935, he succeeded in signing a naval pact with Great Britain. At the cost of an agreement on tonnage (65% for the British, 35% for the Germans) “*Great Britain also drove a nail into the coffin of the Treaty of Versailles, while also breaking up the Stresa front*”.²³ The outbreak of the Abyssinian crisis and Anglo – Italian disagreements in the eastern Mediterranean further raised Hitler’s chances of success in the Rhineland.

From January 1936, the intelligence services and embassies in Britain, Germany and Belgium warned the French government of the intention of Germany to act. However, responsible figures did not expect such a rapid *fait accompli* and prepared for more diplomatic talks. The Quai d’Orsay, which also received information from the minister for war and the general staff of the army, prepared its own reservations concerning the increased number of members of the German police (*Landespolizei*) in the zone, got ready to protest against work on areas resembling large airfields and other suspicious activities in Germany.²⁴ The French soldiers were waiting for political decisions from the government. According to a statement by the minister for national defence General Maurin, these activities already gave France “*the right to occupy the demilitarized zone, but, at the same time, it was informed that it would be disadvantageous to use this right*”.²⁵ However, according to the view of the diplomats, Maurin’s view was erroneous. On the contrary, they came to the conclusion that “*France does not have any right to reoccupy the Rhineland at this time. The Treaty of Locarno determines the procedure according to which it is necessary to proceed in the event of violation of the zone, that is to turn to the Council of the League of Nations without the precedent of immediate action of a military character if it should become unavoidable*.”²⁶ The Quai d’Orsay undertook to decide the dilemma of whether France should limit itself to calling for action from the Council of

21 AMAE, Z -284-6, Pacte de sécurité, vol. 298, fol. 42-43.

22 KERSHAW, Ian. *Hitler. Essai sur le charisme en politique*. Paris: Gallimard, 1995, p. 207. ISBN 9782070740918.

23 KERSHAW, ref. 22, 205.

24 AMAE, René Massigli, vol. 7, fol. 140 -141.

25 Ref. 24, observations sur la lettre de la Guerre No 216 du 17 février 1936, fol. 157.

26 Ref. 24.

the League of Nations, or should take an initiative that would “*deter the enemy or force him to step back*”.²⁷

Pierre-Etienne Flandin, minister of foreign Affairs in Albert Sarraut’s government, submitted a question to the Council of Ministers on 27 February 1936. The government decided that France would not undertake any isolated action, but would act only in agreement with the other signatories of Locarno. A week before the entry of German troops into the Rhineland demilitarized zone, the French government decided that in the even of a flagrant violation of articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles, it would immediately contact the British, Belgian and Italian governments to agree joint action on application of the Pact of the League of Nations and the Locarno agreements. At the same time, it would submit the matter to the Council of the League of Nations. Even before clarification of the position of the Locarno guarantee powers, the French government reserved the right to undertake preparatory military measures for collective action, which would be approved by the Council of the League of Nations and the Locarno guarantors.²⁸

Flandin informed Belgium about these plans on the same day by the diplomatic route, and two days later also the British secretary of state Anthony Eden in a personal conversation in Geneva.²⁹ He informed Eden mainly about the military measures he wanted to undertake with Britain and Italy to defend Belgium, which was also directly concerned with the remilitarization of the Rhineland.³⁰

At the same time, the French government considered the need to ratify the Franco – Soviet Pact on mutual assistance, which Hitler had condemned as incompatible with the Rhine Pact on 25 May and 1 June 1935. Therefore, Prime Minister Albert Sarraut, who took up his position at the end of January 1936, was informed by the diplomats before submitting the treaty to the Chamber of Deputies and Senate. They also enquired about the German view. On 22 February, the French ambassador André François-Poncet asked the German deputy minister of foreign affairs Bernhard W. von Bülow how his country would receive the ratification of the Franco-Soviet treaty by both chambers of parliament. The answer was evasive: “*The German government has still not decided, but then he added, we obviously cannot let this ratification happen and say nothing about it.*”³¹ According to François-Poncet, it did not appear that Bernhard W. von Bülow had any doubts about whether the French parliament would ratify the treaty.

Although some German politicians, soldiers and diplomats hesitated, Hitler was undoubtedly preparing to send troops into the demilitarized zone.³² Waiting for the most favourable moment, he courted France by means of pro-German circle such as the *France-Germany* friendship society, which was concentrated around Otto Abetz and journalists close to him. On 21 February 1936, Hitler gave an interview to Bertrand de Jouvenel,

27 Ref. 24, fol. 158.

28 Ref. 24, vol. 7, fol. 159.

29 Ref. 24, fol. 160.

30 Ref. 28, fol. 164-179.

31 AMAE, Grande Bretagne, Z-284-6, vol. 298, fol. 24. «*le gouvernement allemand n’avait pas encore pris de décision à ce sujet, mais, ajoutait-il, nous ne pouvons évidemment laisser passer cette ratification sans rien dire.*»

32 For details: KVAČEK, Německá likvidace..., ref. 4, p. 306-330.

son of an old friend of M.R. Štefánek, Claire Boas de Jouvenel. He wanted to publish it in *Paris-Soir*, which appeared in editions of 2,200,000 copies according to its publication information. The chief editor rejected the article, so it appeared in *Paris-Midi* (100,000 copies) on 29 February. Thus, it did not appear before, but only two days after the Franco–Soviet treaty was ratified by the Chamber of Deputies. Hitler presented himself in the interview as a pacifist distancing himself from his publication *Mein Kampf*, which he presented as the work of an indignant, unjustly convicted prisoner. He stated: “*The best way I can excuse Mein Kampf in France is the fact that I am putting all my strength into achieving Franco – German agreement.*”³³ François-Poncet used the opportunity, and on 2 March he asked Hitler to clarify the situation in a personal conversation. Hitler seemed to him to be “*nervous, uncertain and reserved*”, the visit by François-Poncet “*disturbed, bothered and burdened him. It was not part of the game*”.³⁴ After ratification of the Franco – Soviet Pact in the Chamber of Deputies, François-Poncet was really amazed by expressions of “*how the Führer remained unshakable, categorical and furious in his hostility to Russia and to the Franco – Soviet Pact. His associates surpass him in violent language, and the Nazis accuse us everyday with faces showing both seriousness and outrage, that we have done something in which they see real sacrilege*”.³⁵ On 2 March Hitler repeated that “*the Franco – Russian Pact is conceived so that France and Russia can have the possibility to attack Germany on some pretext provoked by them, regardless of the views of the Council of the League of Nations and the provisions of the Locarno agreements*”.³⁶ At the same time, he avoided giving a clear answer to the question of whether France had to choose between Berlin and Moscow, and give up trying to have good relations both with the USSR and the Reich. Although François-Poncet was a supporter of good relations with Germany, he had no illusions: Germany had set the cancellation or at least moderation of the clauses that demilitarized the left bank of the Rhine as its task for 1936.

The French government took into account all the warnings and intimidation as well as Hitler’s apparently friendly interview, and in spite of this, it decided to submit the Franco – Soviet treaty to the Senate for ratification. On 4 March Sarraut explained to the Senate Commission for Foreign Affairs the serious consequences of not ratifying the treaty. Other countries would interpret this as meaning that France had abandoned the policy of collective security and international solidarity as embodied by the League of Nations. This treaty was also vitally important for France itself, which could not “*deliver the world to the rule of the strongest. All our agreements are based on this principle: with Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, all our supports, England, Italy, Turkey, all the sympathies that still benefit us, all our friendships. At a moment when England is developing in a direction we have long desired, we cannot take a different decision. Not ratifying would give Germany an indication of weakness on our side and provide an*

33 DARD, Olivier. *Bertrand de Jouvenel*. Paris : Perrin, 2008, s. 119. ISBN 9782262029166.

34 AMAE, Grande Bretagne, Z-284-6, vol. 298, fol. 6.

35 Ref. 34, fol. 7.

36 Ref. 34, fol. 8.

argument to those who want to resort to force. In particular, it would place Czechoslovakia in an especially difficult and dangerous situation”.³⁷ [emphasized by B. F.]

In harmony with the analysis of the Quai d’Orsay, ratification of the Franco – Soviet Pact did not form an obstacle in the search for possible ways to improve relations with Germany on the basis of collective security. France would no longer demand that Germany should enter a prepared system, but wanted to talk again with the aim of finding the possibility of a new more general pact. If we do not take into account the fact that French foreign policy in spring 1936 was still pursuing the illusion of collective security, we will not be able to understand the events that followed Hitler’s violent action.

On the morning of Saturday 7 March, 30,000 Wehrmacht troops penetrated into the Rhineland and established themselves in Aachen, Trier and Saarbrücken. The Minister of Foreign Affairs von Neurath gradually announced this fact to diplomats from the signatories of Locarno starting at 10.00 AM. He started with the Italian ambassador, to whom he also said that if Germany returned to the League of Nations, it would not support oil sanctions against Italy, which were then being considered. The Italian ambassador took the entry of the German army into the Rhineland into account without any comments. Then Neurath received the British ambassador, who told him that he considered the situation to be even more serious than on 16 March 1935, when Hitler had announced the re-introduction of compulsory military service and the building of ships and aircraft, which meant the revival of naval and air forces, all prohibited under the Treaty of Versailles. Next the French ambassador came and protested. The Belgian chargé d’Affaires came last.³⁸ In spite of the fact that Hitler had more than once repeated to François-Poncet, for example, as recently as 1 January 1936,³⁹ that he had no intention of casting doubt on the agreements from 1925, on 7 March Germany renounced the Locarno agreement. The second part of the German memorandum, which the German ambassador submitted to the Quai d’Orsay at the same time, contained an offer to negotiate a new pact, which would be based on absolute equality of rights. The Rhine zone had to be demilitarized on both sides of the frontiers with France and Belgium, which would affect already constructed French fortifications. The memorandum promised certain “new guarantees”, such as an air pact and the return of Germany to the League of Nations,⁴⁰ which Germany conceived mainly with the aim of pacifying British public opinion.⁴¹

37 AMAE, AMAE, Grande Bretagne, Z-284-6, vol. 298, fol. 40. «livrer le monde à la règle du plus fort. C’est sur ce principe que sont fondées toutes nos ententes, Belgique, Tchécoslovaquie, Pologne, Roumanie, tous nos appuis, Angleterre, Italie, Turquie, toutes les sympathies dont nous bénéficions plus loin encore, toutes nos amitiés. Ce n’est pas au moment où l’Angleterre poursuit une évolution si longtemps désirée que nous pouvons prendre une décision contraire. Ne pas ratifier, c’est également donner à l’Allemagne le sentiment d’un fléchissement de notre part et fournir un argument à ceux qui seraient portés à recourir à la force. Ce serait spécialement laisser la Tchécoslovaquie dans une situation morale particulièrement pénible et dangereuse.»

38 KVAČEK, Německá likvidace ..., ref. 4, p. 316.

39 AMAE, AMAE, Grande Bretagne, Z-284-6, vol. 298, télégramme à l’arrivée no 3-5, conversation between François-Poncet and Hitler.

40 AMAE, AMAE, Grande Bretagne, Z-284-6, vol. 298, fol. 143.

41 Ref. 40, tel. from François-Poncet, no 722, Berlin 7. March 1936, fol. 162.

The leadership of the French government concerned itself with the German memorandum immediately on the morning of 7 March. Prime Minister Albert Sarraut, Minister of Foreign Affairs Pierre-Etienne Flandin, Minister of Defence General Maurin, Minister of Post and Telecommunications George Mandel and General Gamelin head of the General Staff of the Army and deputy chairman of the Supreme Military Council were present.⁴² Gamelin was a long-term supporter of a defensive strategy in the west and of the construction of fortifications such as the Maginot Line. In his view, a military conflict would begin in Central Europe and should be drawn out to tie up the majority of the German armed forces. In April 1935 he supported signing the Franco – Soviet Pact and counted especially on the anti-German position of Italy. In particular, he wished for cooperation between Italy and the Little Entente to prevent an Anschluss. He was already convinced that the opportunity for a preventive war had been lost.⁴³ In 1936 the Stresa Front no longer existed and the position of Italy as a guarantor of Locarno was uncertain.

The meeting of various members of the French government on the morning of 7 March 1936 decided to inform the Council of the League of Nations about the German entry into the Rhineland. The participants also agreed that it was essential for the Minister of Foreign Affairs to consult the diplomats of the Locarno signatories in the afternoon. A further government meeting was held at 18.00 at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁴⁴ After Sarraut's evening meeting with the President of the Republic, the whole government met in the Élysée Palace on 8 March.

On the afternoon of 7 March, German radio already broadcast Hitler's speech to the Reichstag lasting an hour and a half, in which he blamed the Treaty of Versailles for everything bad in Europe and pointed to the great effort, which the Reich was undertaking without reservations to achieve an agreement with France. His further target was Bolshevism, which, in his view, threatened peace and European civilization. The French Prime Minister Albert Sarraut also chose radio for his reply: The French were not willing to leave Strasbourg exposed to the fire of German artillery.⁴⁵

Long before the *fait accompli*, France considered the situation clear from the legal point of view. It was not possible to unilaterally renounce the Locarno agreement: "*Article 8 explicitly states that it will remain valid until the Council of the League of Nations, at the request of one the signatories, states by a two-thirds majority that the League of Nations grants the parties to the agreement sufficient guarantees.*"⁴⁶ France originally proposed to Germany that the question of the legal compatibility of the Franco – Soviet

42 AMAE, Grande Bretagne, Z-284-6, vol. 298, fol. 263.

43 Service historique de l'Armée de terre Paris-Vincennes (S.H.A.T.), 5 N 579 – 1-2 bis, letter from Gamelin to the Minister of Defence 4 April 1935, secret.

44 The Czechoslovak ambassador in France Štefan Osuský informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about this in a telegram delivered at 19.50 and deciphered at 20.20. In DEJMEK, DČSZP 1936, doc. 89, ref. 3, p. 219.

45 DUREAU, Elisabeth. *Edouard Daladier 1884 – 1970*. Paris : Fayard, 1993, p. 165, ISBN 9782213027265; DELPORTE, Christian. *La IIIe République 1919-1940. De Poincaré à Paul Reynaud*. Paris : Pygmalion; Gérard Watelet, 1998, p. 300-301. ISBN 9782857045588.

46 AMAE, Grande Bretagne, Z-284-6, vol. 298, fol. 28.

and Rhine pacts should be submitted to the international court in the Hague. Germany realized that it had little chance of a verdict favourable to its interpretation and it did not pursue this possibility. In relation to the obligations voluntarily accepted in the Rhine Pact, Germany's *fait accompli* represented a hostile act against all the signatories. How would this be dealt with? Would there be any political and military consequences?

France sounded out the views of British, Belgian and Italian diplomats before the entry of the German armed forces into the demilitarized zone. On 6 March 1936, Belgium confirmed its commitment to the Rhine Pact and announced that it was prepared to maintain contacts between the general staffs of the two countries in accordance with the military agreement signed on 7 September 1920. In this way, Belgium declared that it was prepared to fulfil the obligations flowing from the Rhine Pact and to begin to prepare technical conditions, which, however, "*did not necessarily create any obligation of a political nature concerning the organization of national defence for one party to the treaty or another*".⁴⁷ However, on 7 March at 18.00, Van Zeeland declared to Jules Laroche that "*in harmony the preceding information, he will adopt the same position as France and Britain towards the new violation of the treaty by Germany*".⁴⁸ Zeeland conceded to the wishes of France as formulated by Flandin, and after an evening meeting of the Belgian government, both governments jointly turned to the League of Nations, using article 4 of the Rhine Pact.⁴⁹ The British government put on the brakes. The possibility of an aviation pact and other proposals from Hitler were attractive to Anthony Eden. He told the British ambassador in Paris George Clerk to warn the French government that it should not adopt "*any unagreed measures, and especially it should not decide on any military measures, which could have lasting effects, without prior consultation with the British government*".⁵⁰ In a conversation with the French ambassador Corbin in London, Eden was a little more diplomatic. Afterwards, Corbin reported to Flandin that "*he considers the German initiative aiming at a fait accompli to be 'regrettable'. Germany had broken the treaty after repeatedly confirming its validity. He [Eden – B. F.] told me that when he received the memorandum he very clearly declared this to Mr. Von Hoesch. He holds the view that the seriousness of the situation makes it desirable that no action, which would irreversibly effect the future, should be taken until the interested governments, especially the French and British governments, had consulted with each other. Since I [Corbin – B. F.] asked him for clarification, he declared that naturally he could not prevent the French government undertaking any measures it considered useful for its security*".⁵¹ Eden also informed Corbin that the British government would meet and adopt a definitive position only on Monday, so that he would go to the planned meeting with Flandin in Geneva later, and so their essential mutual consultation would have to wait. It was clear that Great Britain did not want to go down the path of resistance.

47 Official letter from Van Zeeland delivered to Jules Laroche on 6 March 1936, ref. 46, fol. 78.

48 Telegram from Laroche from Brussels, Affaires étrangères No. 191-194, le 7 mars 1936 à 18 h 08, ref. 46, fol. 179.

49 Ref. 46, fol. 181.

50 KVAČEK, Německá likvidace..., ref. 4, p. 319.

51 Telegram by Corbin from London, 7 March 1936 at 16.52, delivered at 17.59. AMAE, Grande Bretagne, vol. 298, fol. 188-189.

Italy, the third guarantor of the Rhine Pact delayed answering until Suvich the Italian ambassador in Germany had discussed the matter with Benito Mussolini. The French ambassador in Rome Chambrun waited until 23.00, but it did not come on 7 March at all.⁵²

The USSR was not officially addressed at this stage of the crisis, but its representative Potemkin confidentially promised Flandin that they would support France in the League of Nations. On the question of whether or not the USSR agreed with the submission of the Franco – Soviet treaty for assessment in the Hague, he answered positively, but he conditioned agreement on ratification of the treaty in the Senate. The ratification in the Senate happened on 12 March.

After its second 7 March meeting, at 23.00 the French government issued a declaration to the press and gave information about it in a circular telegram to 30 French representative offices in the world. It stated that the issue of French – German reconciliation cannot be based on the renunciation of a freely agreed treaty, concluded by its authors precisely with the aim of preparing this reconciliation. They also announced that apart from other measures, they had contacted the other Locarno signatories, so that they could jointly oppose the unilateral renunciation of the treaty. Jointly with Belgium, they had already informed the Council of the League of Nations about the issue.⁵³

The government meeting of 8 March 1936, chaired by President Lebrun, planned an energetic reaction to the German *fait accompli* and gave instructions to the general staff for partial mobilization of the French army with the aim of military intervention. However, military men, who participated in the government meeting, namely the Ministry of National Defence Maurin, Minister for the Navy Piétri and Minister of the Air Force Déat, were restrained and did not want to risk war against Germany.⁵⁴ They stated that success in the Rhineland could be achieved only with the help of general mobilization. In the end, the government decided on a military alert in regions near the frontier, and to call a meeting of representatives of all the guarantors of the Rhine Pact in Paris on 9 March to decide on joint action.

On 7 March, French diplomacy already wanted to find out the position of friendly states that were not signatories of the Rhine Pact, but were linked with France by guarantee treaties signed at the same time in Locarno, namely Poland and Czechoslovakia. In 1921, Poland and France signed a political treaty supplemented by a secret military convention and it was still valid. Czechoslovakia signed a treaty of alliance and friendship with France on 25 January 1924. This was followed by a secret exchange of letters between Raymond Poincaré and Edvard Beneš on cooperation between the general staffs of the two countries. During the Locarno period, France also concluded treaties with two other members of the Little Entente: Rumania and Yugoslavia. From 1933 the Little Entente was linked by the Organizational Pact, which enabled it to show its weight in European politics. What would these states do to defend their interests threatened by the *fait accompli* of 7 March?

52 Telegrams by Chambrun from Rome, 7 March 1936 at 18.30 and No. 267 at 23.00, ref. 51, folio 197-198.

53 AMAE, Z 284-6, Pacte de sécurité, Grande Bretagne vol. 298, fol. 213.

54 KVAČEK, Německá likvidace ..., ref. 4, p. 319.

Apart from France, the issue concerned first of all Czechoslovakia. According to the memorandum, which the German diplomatic representatives presented on 7 March at the same time in Paris, Warsaw, London, Rome, Brussels and Prague: “*France replied to the friendly offers, which Germany constantly repeated, and to its peaceful assurances, by violating the Rhine Pact with a military alliance with the USSR, directed only against Germany. With this, the Locarno Rhine Pact lost its legal meaning and practically ceased to exist. As a result of this, Germany no longer considered itself bound by this invalid pact. The government must now confront an entirely new situation, which arose from the signing of this alliance, a situation further exacerbated by the fact that the Franco – Soviet treaty had its counterpart in a treaty of alliance, presented in an entirely parallel way between Czechoslovakia and the USSR* [emphasized by B. F.]. *In the interest of the natural right of a people [Volk – B. F.] to secure its frontiers and maintain the possibility of defending them, the German government has today renewed the full and unlimited sovereignty of the Reich in the Rhineland demilitarized zone.*”⁵⁵

There is a deliberately inexact interpretation here, but according to Germany, Czechoslovakia is accused of committing the same crime as France. The French chargé d'affaires Monicault turned directly to the President of the Republic Edvard Beneš, who assured him that Czechoslovakia would follow France, if it drew consequences from Hitler's action.

According to Beneš this case had a direct connection with the Franco – Czechoslovak guarantee treaty signed at Locarno.⁵⁶ Where Poland was concerned, ambassador Noël, invited to meet Colonel Beck immediately on 7 March, warned him of the seriousness of the situation. After consultation with President Mościcki and General Rydz-Śmigły, Beck declared that if conflict broke out, Poland would be faithful to the conditions of the alliance and would fulfil its obligations without hesitation.⁵⁷

In spite of these official replies, the position of both diplomatic services was ambivalent. On 7 March, Flandin already proposed to Osuský the urgent calling of a meeting of the Little Entente, which would express its opposition to the entry of the German armed forces into the Rhineland. This might have a favourable influence on British policy.⁵⁸ The Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs Kamil Krofta agreed and proposed to Rumania and Yugoslavia that they should hold an extraordinary meeting, which could be held in Ljubljana, since Yugoslavia was chairing the Little Entente at the time.⁵⁹ Rumanian diplomacy headed by the active Nicolae Titulescu accepted the proposal. According to telephone information from the Rumanian diplomat Cesianu in Paris, the French government headed by the President of the Republic had decided that the French response would not remain platonic, since it had already turned to Geneva and decided to

55 AMAE, Z 284-6, Pacte de sécurité, Grande Bretagne vol. 298, fol. 220, translation of the German memorandum into French.

56 *Documents diplomatiques français, II série* (désormais DDF), 1936-1939, vol. 1, doc. 366 ; DČSZP 1936, p. 227.

57 KVAČEK, ref. 5, p. 229.

58 Telegram from Š. Osuský 8 March 1936 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague at 00h 10 minutes, DČSZP 1936, doc. 90, p. 220.

59 DEJMEK, ref. 7, p. 32.

concentrate armed forces on the frontier. Titulescu, who was negotiating a treaty of mutual assistance with the USSR, contacted the representative of allied Poland in Bucharest Arciszewski and asked him to choose rationally on which side his country would stand in the event of a general conflict. He compared strengths and supposed that the winners would be France, Great Britain, the USSR and the United States, which would enter the war because of Japan. According to Titulescu, Italy would be neutral in the worst case, because it could not afford Germany gaining control of Trieste. Germany and its possible allies, namely Poland and Hungary, would be defeated. The Rumanian generals held the view that Czechoslovakia would not be in a position to support Rumania against Hungary, because the whole of its army would be used against Germany. Arciszewski allegedly replied that fears were superfluous, because *“there will be no fire from this smoke”*, but Titulescu did not agree.⁶⁰ The Polish press expressed various views: the Iskra press agency published a pro-German declaration, which considered France mainly responsible because of its pro-Soviet policy. This view was presented to German diplomats as the official view of Poland. Other articles stated that Poland had not signed the Rhine Pact and so had no reason to regret that Locarno had collapsed.⁶¹

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Yugoslavia showed the greatest restraint towards Flandin's proposal to call an extraordinary meeting of the Little Entente and express a firm position on the remilitarization of the Rhineland. It had been drawing closer to Germany on an economic basis. After its participation in economic sanctions against Italy, Germany became Yugoslavia's main trading partner and owed it considerable sums. Yugoslavia especially feared economic sanctions that the League of Nations could impose on its commercial partner, which had a constantly growing importance to its economy. Even before replying to Krofta, Premier Stojadinović informed Germany that Yugoslavia wished to solve the problem of the remilitarization of the Rhineland by peaceful means. Therefore he gave an evasive reply to Czechoslovakia. In principle he accepted the proposal to call an extraordinary meeting of the Little Entente, but he also stated that it was necessary to wait until the position of the powers became clearer in London. At the same time, he sent instructions to the Yugoslav representative at the Council of the League of Nations Božidar Purič, to move the date of the Little Entente meeting. He also had to reject the idea of holding it in London, at the same place and time as the session of the Council of the League of Nations. The press communiqué, in which the Little Entente adopted a joint position on the Rhineland crisis, was a result of urging by Beneš.⁶² Yugoslavia promised France military assistance only in the event of a direct German attack on its territory, but not if France attacked Germany for breaking the Locarno treaty and to achieve a return to the situation before the remilitarization of the Rhineland. This position, which Yugoslavia discussed with Turkey and

60 DEJMEK, DČSZP 1936, telegram from Jan Šeba to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague, 8 March 1936, doc. 93, ref. 3, p. 222.

61 KVAČEK, ref. 5, p. 229; SLÁVIK, Juraj. *Moja pamät' - živá kniha. Moje poslanie vo Varšave 1936-1937* (*My memory - a living book. My mission in Warsaw 1936-1937*). Ed. Jan Němeček in cooperation with Andrzej Essen and Jan Kuklík. Bratislava: Veda, 2010, p. 174-179. ISBN 9788022411080.

62 AVRAMOVSKEI, "Rýnská krize r. 1936..." ref. 6, p. 234-291.

Greece, brought it close to the British position.⁶³ Therefore, in this case the unity of the Little Entente was not affected and Purić privately cast doubt on Titulescu's declaration, which he was preparing to present in the name of the Little Entente at the session of the Council of the League of Nations in London.⁶⁴

On 9 March Krofta sent out instructions concerning the Rhineland crisis to all the Czechoslovak representative offices. Czechoslovak foreign policy was also still very cautious: From the legal point of view, the Czechoslovaks were against any unilateral renunciation of a treaty and especially of the Rhine Pact, which was signed on the basis of the free will of all the participants, but at the same time, they did not want to "provoke Germany". Czechoslovakia was waiting for the decision of France and would do everything in support of Franco – British unity of action. It approved the decision to submit the matter to the Council of the League of Nations. Ratification of the Franco – Soviet treaty on mutual assistance was only an excuse for Hitler, because he had been preparing to remilitarize the Rhineland for a long time. Czechoslovakia considered it important that Germany agreed with the Czechoslovak – French Guarantee Treaty and that Germany had no territorial claims on Czechoslovakia. It still regarded "*collective security and the entente of Britain, Belgium and France, the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente, Soviet Russia and if willing also Italy as the only guarantee of peace*".⁶⁵ Czechoslovakia did not want to push anybody into negotiations, but it was prepared for these negotiations and expected that the Council of the League of Nations would give priority to economic sanctions against Germany, rather than to military operations by the Locarno signatories.

Krofta also immediately took an interest in new German proposals concerning a security pact. On 12 March, he had the Rumanian ambassador in Germany ask about it. Neurath explained to him that it concerned all the neighbours of Germany including Czechoslovakia, Austria and Denmark. He stated that the renunciation of Locarno concerned only the Rhine Pact, which Germany considered no longer in existence. In contrast to this, Germany's arbitration agreements with Poland, Czechoslovakia and Belgium were allegedly still valid. Neurath stated that if Hitler's project was accepted as a whole, Germany was prepared to return to the League of Nations.⁶⁶

The Little Entente assembled only for its regular meeting in May 1936 at Belgrade. The remilitarization of the Rhineland was mentioned in the official communiqué only in sixth place among the eight points discussed: "*On the questions of the Rhineland, the Italian – Ethiopian conflict and economic sanctions against Italy, the permanent council decided that the three states of the Little Entente had to follow France and England. If an agreement is not implemented, each of the states of the Little Entente reserves the freedom to act in accordance with what it considers most advantageous for its interests,*

63 AVRAMOVSKI, "Rýnská krize r. 1936..." ref. 6, p. 297.

64 VINAVER, Vuk. *Jugoslavija i Francuska između dva rata*. Beograd : Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1985, ref. 6, p. 312-313.

65 DEJMEK, DČSZP 1936, telegraphic instructions from Minister of Foreign Affairs Krofta to all representatives 9 March 1936, at 12h 50, doc. 95, ref. 3, p. 226-227.

66 DEJMEK, DČSZP 1936, dispatch from the Czechoslovak ambassador in Germany Vojtěch Mastný 12 March 1936, doc. 107, ref. 3, p. 238-239.

naturally in the framework of the Pact of the Little Entente and after agreement with the other members of the Little Entente."⁶⁷

The French government wanted to proceed in the framework of the League of Nations. It was justifiably convinced that the remilitarization of the Rhineland was part of a German policy of "equal rights", pursued deliberately and without hesitation since 1930.⁶⁸ The damage to French security as it had been defined in 1919 appeared less serious than the casting of doubt on basic principles of the whole of international life, and failure to respect voluntarily negotiated treaties. France wanted to respond to the unilateral renunciation of Locarno with a statement from the other signatories that in their view the treaty was not dead and they would still respect the obligations it contained in their mutual relations. France did not trust Hitler's proposal to talk about a new system of Western security, which seemed attractive to Great Britain. France did not want to talk to Germany until the *status quo ante* was restored. The plan for what to do next was based on the conviction that the Council of the League of Nations, to which the issue was submitted on the basis of article 4 of the Treaty of Locarno, would have to state that article 43 of the Treaty of Versailles had been violated. This would allow France and Belgium to turn "to Great Britain and Italy and remind them that according to article 4 section 2 of the Treaty of Locarno, each of them is obliged 'to grant them military, economic or diplomatic assistance'".⁶⁹ France wanted to get the Council to advise the members of the League of Nations to apply economic pressure against Germany in harmony with the resolution from April 1935. To achieve this, France was willing to reduce its demand for military assistance from London.⁷⁰

A complete plan was prepared at a meeting of Locarno signatories. It started with the working out and publication of a joint declaration that they continued to mutually guarantee benefits flowing from the Treaty of Locarno, and that the guarantee in the treaty had been changed unilaterally. It was also planned that the signatories of the joint declaration would reject any talks with Hitler until he withdrew his troops from the Rhineland. There was a further proposal to sign agreements on air cooperation and/or bilateral air pacts from which Germany would naturally be excluded. The agreements would include the establishment of British air bases in France and Belgium. France considered it desirable that the first measures, for example, closure of ports to German commercial shipping, should be adopted on the basis of agreement between the Locarno powers even before the session of the Council of the League of Nations. In the event of interruption of transport communication with Germany by France, Belgium should proceed similarly.⁷¹

At first, the French government was convinced that Germany would retreat without much difficulty when it was convinced that France was not alone and had the support of the Locarno guarantee powers. However, it was disappointed in precisely this expectation. The French plan was rejected at a meeting of French, British and Italian repre-

67 DEJMEK, DČSZP 1936, Procès –verbal de la session ordinaire du Conseil permanent de la Petite Entente, tenue à Beograd les 6, 7 et 8 mai 1936, doc. 210, ref. 3, p. 405.

68 AMAE, PA AP 217, René Massigli vol. 7, f. 189.

69 AMAE, René Massigli vol. 7, 8 March 1936, f. 180.

70 Ref. 68, f. 180.

71 Ref. 68, f. 181.

sentatives in Paris on 9 March. First of all, the organization of military cooperation was postponed. Especially Halifax fought against the idea of a military response from France. Eden declared that he was surprised that France took the matter so seriously.⁷² The French argument about the loss of position of the West in Central and Balkan Europe, in the Baltic region, Scandinavia and Turkey in favour of Hitler after his victory in the Rhineland, played no role in London.⁷³

The Council of the League of Nations met for an extraordinary session on 14 March in St. James's Palace, London, chaired by Stanley Bruce. Apart from the delegates of the Locarno powers (Flandin, Van Zeeland, Eden, Dino Grandi), several foreign ministers and future foreign ministers were present. The Little Entente was represented in the Council by Nicolae Titulescu, Poland by Józef Beck, the USSR by Maxim Litvinov and Turkey by Rüstü Aras. There were also delegates from Denmark, Spain, Portugal, Australia and three Latin American countries – Argentina, Chile and Ecuador. According to F.P. Walters, Deputy Secretary General of the League of Nations, who later wrote its history: *“According to the Treaty of Locarno, violation of the demilitarized zone was considered a direct attack on the territories of France and Belgium. If France and Belgium judged that a flagrant violation had happened, they could undertake immediate military action, they could appeal to the guarantors Great Britain and Italy to help them, and only when they had done all this, could they turn to the Council of the League of Nations so that it could approve or not approve of their actions.”*⁷⁴

The analysis by the Quai d'Orsay cited above was not so unambiguous. France could not act with full decisiveness at the given moment. Historians often point to the weakness of the French government, which was concentrating first of all on parliamentary elections due in a few weeks. They describe French society afflicted by four years of economic crisis, divided and isolated.⁷⁵ In his *Mémoires*, General De Gaulle blamed especially the soldiers and their defensive strategy. In particular, France lacked a professional army and modern military equipment such as armoured vehicles, bomber and fighter aircraft, and military ships. *“If there had been even part of a specialized corps with fast armoured vehicles and personnel prepared to strike within hours, the natural force of things would have directed it to the Rhine. [...] Hitler would certainly have retreated. Building up armaments was only beginning and the forces were not in a state to deal with a general conflict. [...] In such a game, it is possible to suddenly lose everything or win everything. [...] French diplomacy could gain principled condemnation of Hitler from the League of Nations, but it was only a gesture and words against a fait accompli.”*⁷⁶ However, according to present day knowledge, we can state that the possible support for France, which De Gaulle saw coming from Czechoslovakia, Poland and Belgium,⁷⁷ was not so clear in

72 KVAČEK, Německá likvidace..., ref. 4, p. 321.

73 AMAE, René Massigli vol. 7, fol. 189-190.

74 WALTERS, F. P. *A History of the League of Nations*, vol. 2. Oxford University Press 1952, p. 693.

75 DELPORTE, ref. 45, p. 119.

76 DE GAULLE, Charles. *Mémoires*. Paris : Gallimard, Editions de la Pléiade, 2000, p. 22. ISBN 9782070115839.

77 *“Since our allies, the Poles, Czechs and Belgians, were prepared to support us and the English were committed in advance, Hitler would certainly have retreated.”* DE GAULLE, ref. 76, p. 22.

1936. Extraordinary damage was already done in 1925 at Locarno by dividing security into primary West European and secondary East European.

French diplomacy suffered an unimaginable defeat, when immediately after the speeches by Flandin and Zeeland, the Council of the League of Nations decided to invite Germany to London. The other politicians could express their views on this problem while waiting for the arrival of Ribbentrop. On 17 March M. Litvinov made a speech in which he criticized the policies of the German Nazis and appealed to the Council to decide on serious measures. He stated that Hitler's new projects could not be taken seriously, because he had usurped the freedom to tear up any treaty that did not suit him. Apart from this it was not possible to adopt collective measures against those, who violate international obligations. Titulescu, speaking in the name of the Little Entente, demanded strict measures, and underlined that in the opposite case, the League of Nations would discredit itself by failing to observe legal principles, which the majority of countries trusted until then.⁷⁸ If the unilateral cancellation of treaties was accepted, it would mean the end of the policy of collective security and of the League of Nations itself.⁷⁹ Grandi declared his support for peace in Europe and reproached the League of Nations for its position on the Italian – Ethiopian conflict. The Chilean representative did not want to say whether the Rhine Pact had been violated until the verdict came from the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Hague. Beck stated that Germany had violated Locarno, but he did not forget to add that Poland had never ratified this treaty. He also unfavourably mentioned the Franco – Soviet Pact.⁸⁰

On 19 March, the Council decided on the text of a document to be sent to all members of the League of Nations.⁸¹ It stated that Germany had committed “*an offence against article 43 of the Treaty of Versailles [...] and had unilaterally violated the Treaty of Locarno on the solution of disputes*”. The League of Nations took into account that the Locarno powers still felt bound by their obligations and guarantees, and that they had to order their general staffs to establish contact for the preparation of technical conditions concerned with what they must do in the event of an unprovoked attack. The agreed document also included an appeal to Germany to submit the argument about the incompatibility between the Franco – Soviet Pact on mutual assistance and the Treaty of Locarno to the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague, and bind itself to accept the verdict.⁸² The Locarno powers and the League of Nations also appealed to the German government to stop sending troops and military material into the Rhineland zone and not to start constructing fortifications. They proposed international monitoring of the zone and especially of the frontiers between France and Germany and France and Belgium. At the same time, however, the Locarno powers and actually the whole League of Nations reacted to Hitler's new plan and invited Germany to participate in talks on

78 CAMPUS, Eliza. *The Little Entente and the Balkan Alliance*. Bucuresti : Editura Academiei, 1978, p. 110.

79 IORDACHE, L'épisode rhénan, ref. 6, p. 264-265.

80 WALTERS, ref. 74, p. 696-697.

81 SND, doc. C.141. 80. 1936.

82 Ref. 81.

revision of the status of the Rhineland and on the mutual assistance pacts opened by all the signatories of Locarno.⁸³

Ribbentrop repeated Hitler's main arguments at the session of the Council of the League of Nations in London. The German written replies from 24 and 31 March also included some new elements. Germany accepted almost nothing from the agreement of the Locarno powers reached on 19 March. Germany no longer justified the remilitarization of the Rhineland by repeating the argument about the Franco – Soviet mutual assistance treaty, and the matter was never submitted to the Hague. This time Germany emphasized that it did not regard the limitation of its sovereignty over the Rhineland as one of President Wilson's Fourteen Points. It allegedly got into the Treaty of Locarno as a result of the invasion of the Ruhr in 1923, but Germany had never voluntarily agreed to the demilitarization of the Rhineland. Instead of pacts on mutual assistance, Germany proposed non-aggression treaties with its eastern neighbours, which would leave its hands free and put the weaker countries at its mercy.⁸⁴

The French government immediately informed London that the German reply was unsatisfactory, and France opposed continuation of the talks. It also stated that it considered the return of Germany to the League of Nations undesirable, because it would be equivalent to recognizing the *fait accompli*. However, the British government took the opposite view. In its view, the effort to reach an understanding could not be considered finished. France wanted to explain its position better, so on 8 April it published two documents: *A critical memorandum on the German proposals* from 31 March, and *A great peace plan*, which aimed to strengthen general security in the European framework.⁸⁵

The Locarno powers assessed the French plan in Geneva on 10 April and again stated that all the possibilities for a peaceful solution had not been exhausted. They decided to submit the German and French plans to the Council of the League of Nations. Great Britain prepared a long questionnaire and sent it to Germany on 6 May 1936. It included the following and some other questions: Can the German government be definitively bound by a treaty? Will it not in future claim that it was not in a position to conclude a really binding treaty at this time? Does it intend to respect the existing territorial and political state of Europe until changes are agreed on the basis of free negotiations? Would it accept that the non-aggression treaties it proposes can be supplemented by agreements on mutual assistance?

Germany never answered these questions, although the British government appealed to it again on 25 May. At that time, Germany was already hurriedly constructing fortifications in the Rhineland. This was a further offence, this time against articles 43 and 44 of the Treaty of Versailles. France knew exactly where Germany was heading with its tactics: It wanted to create in the Rhineland a military situation that would seriously hinder any French intervention in the event that the Reich used force in Central and Eastern Europe. Some French diplomats stated their priorities: "*At the same time, the Locarno powers should take care not to compromise their own interests because of this*

83 Ref. 81; DEJMEK, DČSZP 1936, ref. 3, p. 269; *Zahraniční politika*, 1936, p. 298-300.

84 AMAE, Massigli, vol. 7, f. 203 and 216.

85 Ref. 84, fol. 235-236.

or that country. The Rhine Pact was a western pact, the demilitarization of the Rhineland was initially conceived mainly in the interest of France and Belgium. We should have the motivation and the right to settle the questions of greater importance to us without useless consultations."⁸⁶

France considered that the most important thing for itself was British military assistance and cooperation between general staffs, as was promised under certain conditions in an exchange of letters between Eden and the French ambassador Corbin on 1 April 1936.⁸⁷

* * *

What was the policy on solving the Rhineland crisis of the French Popular Front government, formed after the parliamentary elections of 26 April and 3 May 1936? A conference of the three countries that signed the Rhine Pact was held in London on 23 July 1936. Great Britain was represented by Baldwin, Eden, Halifax, Vansittart, Sargent and Strang; Belgium by van Zeeland, Spaak, Cartier van Zuglen and Lansheere; France by Yvon Delbos, Corbin, Léger, Massigli and de Margerie. They were dissatisfied because the four month truce, which Hitler had promised, would soon end. He had not replied to the British questionnaire, perhaps he was preparing a new strike for 1 August, when the Berlin Olympic Games were going to begin. The statesmen and diplomats talked about the proposed communiqué prepared in advance by the Foreign Office. After several amendments, by which Eden and especially Halifax wanted to show consideration for the "absent powers" (Italy and Germany), Delbos took the floor with a statement that *"it is delicate to exclude (from the talks) Czechoslovakia and Poland, since they were associated with the Locarno agreements"*.⁸⁸

Then the London conference agreed that the first task should be *"to negotiate a new agreement that would replace the Rhine Pact from Locarno and settle on the basis of all the interested states the situation, which arose from the German initiative of 7 March"*. Concerning French worries about Germany's eastern neighbours and the possibilities to maintain obligations towards Poland and Czechoslovakia flowing from article 16 of the Pact of the League of Nations, the communiqué stated in general terms that *"the representatives of the three powers envisage extending the field of discussion, to facilitate, with the cooperation of the other interested powers, the general regulation of the problems that need to be solved for the peace of Europe"*.⁸⁹

86 Ref. 84, fol. 277. *«En même temps, les Puissances locarniennes doivent avoir le souci de ne pas compromettre, à cause de tel ou tel pays, les intérêts qui leur sont propres. Le pacte rhénan était un Pacte occidental ; la démilitarisation de la Rhénanie était initialement conçue surtout dans l'intérêt de la France et de la Belgique ; nous devons avoir le souci et nous avons le droit de régler, sans consultation inutile, les questions qui nous importent davantage.»*

87 Ref. 84, fol. 223-227.

88 Ref. 84, fol. 307-309. *«qu'il est délicat d'exclure la Tchécoslovaquie et la Pologne, alors qu'elles ont été associées aux Accords de Locarno.»*

89 *«les représentants des Trois puissances, en ce qui les concerne, envisagent en conséquence l'extension éventuelle du champ de la discussion de manière à faciliter, avec la collaboration des autres puissances intéressés, le règlement général des problèmes dont la solution leur apparaît essentiel pour la paix de l'Europe.»* Ref. 84, fol. 311.

The afternoon session was held with the participation of the new French Prime Minister Léon Blum. He acknowledged in a passionate speech that the French government was extraordinarily disturbed by the general state of Europe, which had suffered a whole series of severe shocks, while the reactions were generally getting weaker. In his view, the situation was entirely different to that at the time of the Locarno talks, where all were striving to build a permanent guarantee of peace. France agreed that everything should be done to obtain satisfactory guarantees from Germany, but he himself "*felt deep inside that a Franco – German settlement, even one guaranteed by Great Britain and Italy, would not be enough to remove all danger of war in Europe*".⁹⁰ A general settlement remained essential for Blum, but nothing changed the fact that France agreed to invite Hitler's Germany to talk about a new western Locarno.

Compared to France, Britain took a different view of the solution of the general problems of Europe. It made concessions to Germany at the expense of the weaker and its view less cultured states of Central Europe. For example, Duff Cooper, the deputy secretary of state for war at the time of the Rhineland crisis, later took a critical view of Great Britain's and his own position. In the light of further developments, he recognized that Great Britain and France should have taken a firm position and conditioned any further talks on the withdrawal of German troops from the Rhineland. Hitler would have had to capitulate and would never have gained so much prestige among his countrymen. Cooper explained the retreat of the West by the pacifism of the public, the reluctance even to consider armed conflict, and the general attitude of the public towards the peace treaties. Hitler talked about the Versailles dictat, a peace treaty between the victors and vanquished, but Germany had still signed it. At Locarno it had an equal negotiating position. There was much criticism of the Treaty of Versailles in the USA and in Great Britain. Especially in Great Britain, even today people do not realize that according to Cooper, the Treaty of Versailles was magnanimous to Germany because it did nothing to ensure that Germany fulfilled the financial obligations flowing from it. The peace treaties aimed to put into practice President Wilson's ideals of the self-determination of nations and "*enabled the German nation to become the most powerful nation in Europe after 16 years*".⁹¹

From the point of view of France and Central Europe, the concession to Hitler in the Rhineland was forerunner of Munich.

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90 Ref. 84, fol. 315.

91 COOPER, Duff. *Au delà de l'oubli (Old men forget not)*. Traduit de l'anglais. Paris : Gallimard, 1967, p. 223-224.

REMILITARISATION DER RHEINZONE AM 7. MÄRZ 1936 : DIE FRAGE DER GRENZEN UND DER INTERNATIONALEN SICHERHEIT (AUCH) IN MITTELEUROPA

BOHUMILA FERENČUHOVÁ

Slowakische Historiographie widmete keine größere Aufmerksamkeit der Rheinkrise am 7. März 1936. Hitler erneuerte scheinbar „nur“ die Souveränität des Deutschen Reiches auf dem eigenen Gebiet und es handelte sich um keine Aggression gegen die Grenzen von Frankreich und Belgien, die durch den Rheinpakt garantiert wurden. Er testete so die Wirksamkeit des Gleichgewichts der Kräfte in Europa, das durch die, im Oktober 1925 in Locarno unterschriebene Verträge eingeführt wurde, sowie die Wirksamkeit dort unterschriebener Verträge zwischen Frankreich und Tschechoslowakei und zwischen Frankreich und Polen. Die Tragweite der Rheinkrise für den gesamten östlichen Teil Mitteleuropas wird nur selten reflektiert. In Locarno sowie im Rheinland ging es Deutschland vor allen um die Straffreiheit bei der Expansion Richtung Osten.

Die Studie konzentriert sich vor allem auf die Politik der französischen Regierung und analysiert ihren Entscheidungsprozess vor, während und nach der Rheinkrise. Der 7. März kam nicht unerwartet. Frankreich war sich bewusst, dass nach der Einführung der allgemeinen Wehrpflicht in Deutschland, kommt auch der Versuch, die entmilitarisierte Zone im Rheinland abzuschaffen. Bereits eine Woche vor dem Ereignis beschloss die französische Regierung, dass sie sich im Falle der flagranten Verletzung der Artikel 42 und 43 des Friedensvertrages von Versailles unverzüglich mit der englischen, belgischen und italienischen Regierung verbindet, um das gemeinsame Vorgehen zur Geltendmachung des Paktes des Völkerbundes und der Verträge von Locarno zu vereinbaren und gleichzeitig legt sie die Sache dem Völkerbundrat vor. Zugleich erwägte sie, ob sie den französisch-sowjetischen Beistandsvertrag dem Parlament zur Ratifizierung vorlegen wird, zu dem das Reich Vorbehalte hatte. Sie protestierte ausdrücklich auch gegen den tschechoslowakisch-sowjetischen Vertrag. Frankreich entschied sich, auf der Politik kollektiver Sicherheit und internationaler Solidarität zu beharren und weiterhin verließ sich auf den Völkerbund. Der Grund für die Ratifizierung war auch das solidere Vorgehen gegenüber der Tschechoslowakei, die die französische Regierung nicht einer „besonders schwierigen und gefährlichen moralischen Situation“ aussetzen wollte.

In dem zweiten Teil der Studie richtet sich die Aufmerksamkeit auf die unmittelbare Reaktion der französischen Regierung auf Hitlers *fait accompli*. Die Verhandlungen mit Belgien, das durch die militante Aktion des Reiches direkt betroffen war, führten zur gemeinsamen Benachrichtigung des Völkerbundes über das Delikt gegen das Rheinpakt bereits am Abend des 7. März. Die defensive militärische Strategie Frankreichs einerseits und sehr zurückhaltendes Verhalten von Großbritannien, das diplomatische Verhandlungen vor einer militärischen Aktion bevorzugte andererseits, machten die Fortsetzung entscheidender Politik unmöglich. Obendrein auch die Kleine Entente gewährte Frankreich nicht die geforderte gemeinsame moralische Unterstützung.

Im dritten Teil widmet sich die Studie der Verhandlungen der Mächte von Locarno in Paris und des Völkerbundesrates in London. Der Völkerbundrat stellte zwar fest, dass die Verträge von Locarno weiterhin gültig sind und die Signatäre sie weiter einhalten werden, aber ansonsten war seine Einstellung ein Versagen. Überwiegend war die Meinung der britischen Politik, die bereit war, mit Deutschland über seine „Friedenspläne“ zu verhandeln. Frankreich war erfolglos, als diese Verhandlungen mit dem Rückzug der deutschen Truppen aus dem Rheinland, der ehemaligen entmilitarisierten Zone, bedingte. Sein Argument über den Positionsverlust des Westen in Mitteleuropa und auf dem Balkan, in Baltikum, Skandinavien und in der Türkei zugunsten von Hitler nach seinem Sieg im Rheinland, spielte in London keine Rolle. Für das Wichtigste hielt

Frankreich die militärische Hilfe von England und die Zusammenarbeit der Generalstäbe, die unter bestimmten Bedingungen in dem Briefwechsel zwischen A. Eden und dem französischen Botschafter Corbin am 1. April 1936 zugesagt wurde. Bei der Londoner Konferenz am 22. und 23. Juli 1936 setzten sich die Vertreter der neuen französischen Regierung der Volksfront wieder für die Einladung der Tschechoslowakei und Polen zu den Verhandlungen über „neues Locarno“ ein, aber ebenso wie Briand im Jahr 1925, gaben sie wieder auf. Frankreich stimmt der Einladung von Hitlers Deutschland zu und in der allgemein gefährlichen Situation trennt wieder die Sicherheit in Westeuropa von der Sicherheit in Osteuropa voneinander.

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MICHAL SCHVARC - ĽUDOVÍT HALLON - PETER MIČKO

PRACOVALI V TRETEJ RÍŠI

Štúdie a dokumenty k náboru a nasadeniu pracovných síl
zo Slovenska v nacistickom Nemecku v rokoch 1938 - 1945



VEDA

Bratislava 2015

IDEAS, REALITY AND THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT OF THE SOCIAL STATE IN THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC OF 1939 – 1945

EUDOVÍT HALLON – MICHAL SCHVARC

HALLON, Eudovít – SCHVARC, Michal. Ideas, reality and the international context of the social state in the Slovak Republic of 1939-1945. *Historický časopis*, 2015, 63, 5, pp. 901-937, Bratislava.

The conservative forces in the Slovak society of the first half of the 20th century sought models in Christian solidarity and the corporate state, which would replace parliamentarism of the Western type. The ideas could be put into practice after the seizure of power in autumn 1938 and especially after Slovakia became independent in March 1939. However, the ally of independent Slovakia, Nazi Germany rejected the corporate state. Therefore, the idea of Christian solidarity was replaced with the idea of Slovak national socialism and plans for a corporate social system for the Slovak working community according to the German model. The regime of the Slovak Republic of 1939 – 1945 attempted to put the new principles of the social state into economic and social practice. However, the implementation of the ideas of the time about a social state and the political system of Slovakia stopped half way.

Christianity. Solidarity. Encyclicals. Socialism. Nationalism. Parliamentarism. Political system. Trade unions. State. Regulation. Measures.

The theory and practice of the social programmes of the Slovak Republic of 1939 – 1945 has been a relatively frequent subject of discussion by the Slovak historical community as well as publicists and Slovak society in general. However, scientific works directed exclusively to this theme have appeared only sporadically. The Marxist historiography of the 1950s and 1960s already began to devote some attention to the questions of the social system and social position of the population in the conditions of the Slovak state after 1938. For example, Pavol Hoffmann, Adela Hornová, Martin Vietor and others published works about the social ideology of the ruling Hlinka's Slovak People's Party and the social situation in the Slovak state.¹ Ján Pleva, Miloš Tichý and Zdenka Holotíková concerned themselves with the ideas of Christian solidarity and the history of Christian trade unions.² Jozef Faltus and Václav Průcha, Ľubomír Lipták and some other

1 HOFFMANN, Pavol. Sociálno-ekonomická ideológia Ľudákov (The socio-economic ideology of the Ľudáks). In *Ekonomický časopis* (EČ), 1957, year 5, p. 284-308. ISSN 0013-3035; HORNOVÁ, Adela. O hmotnom postavení pracujúcich za Slovenského štátu (On the material position of working people in the Slovak state). In EČ, 1960, year 8, p. 61-64.

2 PLEVA, Ján – TICHÝ, Miloš. *Kresťanské odbory na Slovensku (Christian trade unions in Slovakia)*. Bratislava : Práca, 1967; HOLOTÍKOVÁ, Zdenka. K činnosti a ideológii Ľudáckych odborov na Slovensku v radoch slovenskej robotníckej triedy 1921 – 1945 (On the activity and ideology of the Ľudák trade unions in Slovakia in the ranks of the Slovak working class 1921 – 1945). In *Historický časopis* (herein-

historians evaluated the social development in this period in the context of works on economic and social history.³ During the period of Normalization, this problem was on the margin of interest of Slovak historiography. Ladislav Suško, Ivan Kamenec and Anton Hrnko touched it in context.⁴ The socio-economic development of the Slovak Republic of 1939 – 1945 again came into the foreground after 1989. Slovak exile historians, some members of the older and of the coming generation of historians produced uncritical and apologetic views of the social reality of the Slovak state, the role of the Christian trade unions and the ideology of Christian solidarity. As examples, it is possible to mention the works of Milan Stanislav Ďurica or the former leader of the Christian trade unions Rudolf Čavojský.⁵ More objective, but also controversial works, either monothematic or in the context of evaluations of the questions of the Christian social movement, Christian social teaching, the social system, social development of the Slovak state and the socio-economic connections of the Holocaust by authors of the older and middle generations such as Milan Katuninec, Eduard Nižňanský, I. Kamenec, Ľ. Lipták, Dušan Kováč, Katarína Hradská, Miroslav Fabricius and younger historians such as Juraj Benko, Igor Baka, Michal Schvarc, Róbert Letz, Marek Syrný, Miroslav Sabol, Ondrej Podolec, Martin Lacko, Ján Hlavinka, Peter Sokolovič, Peter Mička and others, gradually appeared from the end of the 1990s.⁶

after HČ), 1961, year 9, p. 50-67. ISSN 0018-2575; VIETOR, Martin. Príspevok k objasneniu fašistického charakteru tzv. slovenského štátu (A contribution to clarifying the fascist character of the so-called Slovak state). In HČ, 1960, year 8, p. 482-508. ISSN 0018-2575.

- 3 See, for example: FALTUS, Jozef – PRŮCHA, Václav. *Prehľad hospodárskeho vývoja na Slovensku v rokoch 1918 – 1945 (A review of economic development in Slovakia in the period 1918 – 1945)*. Bratislava : Vydavateľstvo politickej literatúry, 1969; LIPTÁK, Lubomír. Politický režim na Slovensku v rokoch 1939 – 1945 (The political regime in Slovakia in the period 1938 – 1945). In *Slovenské národné povstanie roku 1944*. Bratislava : Vydavateľstvo SAV, 1965, p. 20-49; LIPTÁK, Lubomír. Prípravy a priebeh salzburských rokovaní roku 1940 medzi predstaviteľmi Nemecka a slovenského štátu (Preparation and course of the Salzburg talks of 1940 between the representatives of Germany and the Slovak state). In HČ, 1965, year 13, p. 329-364. ISSN 0018-2575.
- 4 See, for example: KAMENEC, Ivan. Snem Slovenskej republiky a jeho postoj k problému židovského obyvateľstva na Slovensku (The Parliament of the Slovak Republic and its position on the problem of the Jewish inhabitants of Slovakia). In HČ, 1969, year 17, p. 329-362. ISSN 0018-2575; SUŠKO, Ladislav. Počiatky hospodárskej exploatacie Slovenska nacizmom (marec 1939 – august 1940). (The beginnings of the economic exploitation of Slovakia by the Nazis (March 1939 – August 1940)). In *Československý časopis historický*, 1977, year 25, p. 682-714; HRNKO, Anton. Fašizácia slovenského štátu do leta 1940 (The fascistization of the Slovak state up to summer 1940) In HČ, 1985, year 33, p. 529-552. ISSN 0018-2575.
- 5 See, for example: ČAVOJSKÝ, Rudolf. *Spomienky kresťanského odborára (Memories of a Christian trade unionist)*. Bratislava : Lúč, 1996; ĎURICA, Milan Stanislav. *Slovenská republika 1939 – 1945. Vznik a trvanie prvého slovenského štátu 20. storočia (The Slovak Republic 1939 – 1945. The origin and duration of the first 20th century Slovak state)*. Bratislava : Lúč, 1999. ISBN 807114262X.
- 6 See, for example: KAMENEC, Ivan. *Po stopách tragédie*. Bratislava : Archa, 1991. ISBN 8071150150. English translation: *On the Trail of Tragedy. The Holocaust in Slovakia*. Bratislava : Hajko & Hajková for Interel, 2007. ISBN 9788088700685; KAMENEC, Ivan. Politický systém a režim Slovenského štátu v rokoch 1939 – 1945 (The political system and regime of the Slovak State in the period 1939 – 1945). In *Slovensko v rokoch druhej svetovej vojny*. Bratislava : Predsedníctvo SNR, 1991, p. 13-23; NIŽŇANSKÝ, Eduard (ed.). *Holokaust na Slovensku 1 až 7 (The Holocaust in Slovakia 1-7)*. Bratislava 2001 – 2005 (edition of sources); LIPTÁK, Lubomír. Geopolitické predstavy o Slovensku počas druhej svetovej voj-

It is possible to state that the idea and practice of the social state in the conditions of the Slovak Republic of 1939 – 1945 developed on three basic levels, namely ideological, economic policy and social policy. The ideological level started from the long-term development of ideas about a socially just socio-economic system in the thinking and political ideas of representatives of Hlinka's Slovak People's Party (HSPP). These ideas began to form in the period of the origin of the People's Party before 1914, on the basis of the principles of Christian solidarity according to the principles of Pope Leo XIII's encyclical *Rerum novarum* from 1891. In accordance with the main postulates of the encyclical, the conservative representatives of the People's Party headed by Andrej Hlinka sought a middle way between liberalism and the socialist movement in Christian teaching. The origin of the Slovak People's Party was closely connected with the publication of the encyclical, which stimulated the formation in the Kingdom of Hungary of a conservative Christian social movement represented by the Christian People's Party (Néppárt). This political orientation, representing the interests of the high clergy and the landed aristocracy of Hungary placed itself in the conservative current of the international spectrum of political movements with a Christian social orientation. It strongly opposed the secularization of social life in Hungary, for example, the demand for reform of the so-called church-policy laws. It was against the growing influence of financial and industrial capital, which received general support from the industrialization policy of

ny, ich vplyv na režim a odboj (Geo-political ideas about Slovakia during the Second World War, their influence on the regime and resistance). In GLETTTER, Monika – LIPTAK, Lubomír – MIŠÍKOVÁ, Alena. *Nacionálno-socialistický systém vlády. Říšska župa Sudety. Protektorát Čechy a Morava. Slovensko*. Bratislava : AEPRESS, 2002, p. 213-226. ISBN 8088880521; KATUNINEC, Milan. *Kresťanské odbory v spolupráci a konfrontácii s komunistickými odbormi (Christian trade unions in cooperation and confrontation with communist trade unions)*. In ŠUCHOVÁ, Xénia (ed.). *Ludáci a komunisti : Súperi? Spojenci? Protivníci?* Prešov : Universum, 2006, p. 76-82. ISBN 808904638X; BENKO, Juraj. *Socialistická ideológia v konfrontácii s religióznym slovenským prostredím v prvej štvrtine 20. storočia (Politizácia kresťanskej tradície a sakralizácia socialistickej vízie) (The socialist ideology in confrontation with the religious Slovak environment in the first quarter of the 20th century (Politicization of the Christian tradition and sacralization of the socialist vision))*. In ŠUCHOVÁ, Xénia (ed.). *Ludáci a komunisti : Súperi? Spojenci? Protivníci?* Prešov : Universum, 2006, p. 12-19. ISBN 808904638X; BAKA, Igor. *Politický systém a režim Slovenskej republiky 1939 – 1940 (The political system and regime of the Slovak Republic 1939 – 1940)*. Bratislava : Vojenský historický ústav, 2010. ISBN 9788096937592; SABOL, Miroslav. *Až na dno blahobytu (Hojnosť alebo chudoba slovenských rodín v Slovenskej republike 1939 – 1945) (To the bottom of well-being (Abundance or poverty of Slovak families in the Slovak Republic 1939 – 1945))*. In SOKOLOVIČ, Peter (ed.). *Život v Slovenskej republike. Slovenská republika 1939 – 1945 očami mladých historikov IX*. Bratislava : Ústav pamäti národa, 2010, p. 384-386. ISBN 9788089335374; PODOLEC, Ondrej. *K niektorým prvkom prvej slovenskej ústavy a ich reálnej aplikácii v politickom systéme štátu. (On some elements of the first Slovak constitution and their real application in the political system of the state)*. In LACKO, Martin (ed.). *Slovenská republika 1939 – 1945 očami mladých historikov. Zborník príspevkov z prvého sympózia Katedry histórie FF UCM Trnava*. Trnava : UCM Trnava, Filozofická fakulta, 2002, p. 11-31. ISBN 8089034381; SCHVARC, Michal – HALLON, Eudovít – MIČKO, Peter. *Podoby nemecko-slovenského „ochranného priateľstva“. Dokumenty k náboru a nasadeniu slovenských pracovných síl do Nemeckej ríše v rokoch 1939 – 1945 (The forms of German – Slovak “protective friendship”. Documents on the recruitment and employment of Slovak workers in the German Reich in the period 1939 – 1945)*. Bratislava : Prodama, 2012. ISBN 9788097030261; MIČKO, Peter. *Pracovné, sociálne a kultúrne podmienky slovenských robotníkov v Nemeckej ríši v rokoch 1939 – 1945 (Employment, social and cultural conditions of Slovak workers in the German Reich in the period 1939 – 1945)*. In HČ, 2009, year 57, p. 659-678. ISSN 00182575.

the Hungarian government. It tried to address the broad masses of the population, especially the religious peasantry, but also the ever more numerous working class, using the basic theses of the encyclical *Rerum novarum* on the social reconciliation of capital and labour according to the principles of Christian solidarity and social teaching. The Slovak branch of the Hungarian Christian social movement initially carried on its political struggle in cooperation with the Néppárt in the whole state. However, basic disputes on national political questions led to it becoming independent with the establishment of the Slovak People's Party (Slovenská ľudová strana), which formed the conservative wing of the Slovak national movement. It opposed the liberal and social democrat currents in Slovak politics and developed its own variant of Christian social teaching with Slovak national colours. Since its structures were made up of representatives of the lower clergy and rural intelligentsia, it was close to the reformist wing of the international Christian social camp.⁷

In the inter-war years, the idea of social justice according to the principles of Christian solidarity received an entirely new dimension and new stimuli in the policy of the People's Party, now already Hlinka's Slovak People's Party (HSPP). It was combined with criticism of the economic problems of Slovakia, which the People's Party interpreted as results of the liberal economic policy of the Czech bourgeoisie and government economic circles in Prague. It was also closely connected with the political struggle against the whole spectrum of socialist parties, especially against the Communist Party and its ideas on solving the socio-economic problems. The long-term stagnation of industrialization in Slovakia resulted in a difficult social situation, which was further deepened by the economic crises at the beginning of the 1920s and beginning of the 1930s. Therefore, the social question became a key instrument in the ideological struggle on the political scene of inter-war Slovakia. The People's Party found causal connections of social problems in the economic policies of the Prague government, in the selfish pragmatic approach of the banks and companies of the Czech Lands towards the business sphere in Slovakia, in the ideology and economic practices of Czech liberalism, in the inadequacies of the democratic political system, or in the harmful activities of Czech officials and representatives of the intelligentsia, who dominated the leading positions in the state administration, as well as the economic and social life of Slovakia, especially in the 1920s. The struggle against the ills of capitalism and the democratic system was substantially sharpened in the ideology of the People's Party after 1918, and was closely connected with ever more radical anti-Czech views. Thus, social problems overlapped with national political questions. The critical views of the People's Party on the Czech

7 On this problem, see, for example: BUTVIN, Jozef. Hlasisti, vznik klerikálneho a maloagrárneho hnutia v rokoch 1898 – 1904 (The Hlasists, origin of the clerical and small agrarian movement in the period 1898 – 1904). In *HČ*, 1983, year 31, p. 727-748. ISSN 0018-2575; POTEMRA, Michal. K vývinu slovenskej politiky v rokoch 1901 – 1914 (On the development of Slovak politics in the period 1901 – 1914). In *HČ*, 1979, year 27, p. 49-111. ISSN 0018-2575; KOVÁČ, Dušan. Politická dráha Andreja Hlinku do roku 1918 (The political career of Andrej Hlinka up to 1918). In *Andrej Hlinka a jeho miesto v dejinách. Zborník prednášok z vedeckého sympózia. Bratislava 20. 9. 1991*. Eds. Štefan Borovský, Dagmar Veliká. Bratislava : DaVeL, 1991, p. 42-56. ISBN 8090093108; HOLEC, Roman. *Tragédia v Černej a slovenská spoločnosť (The Černová tragedy and Slovak society)*. Martin : Vydavateľstvo Matice slovenskej, 1997. ISBN 8070904364.

bourgeoisie and the government's economic policies were almost the same as the rhetoric of the Slovak communists. However, the People's Party still found the starting point for solving the social situation in Christian social teaching and it rejected the class war.⁸

New stimuli for the solution of social problems came from various European countries in the inter-war period, including the Soviet Union. The People's Party naturally could not accept the view of the Soviet Bolsheviks that the negative features of capitalism could be removed by its liquidation. The programmes for building a corporate political system, which came from Italy in the 1920s and after 1930 also from Portugal, Spain and especially neighbouring Austria, where a clerical Christian – social party very similar in political profile to HSPD took power, were stimulating for the leading representatives of the party.⁹ The conservative leaders of the People's Party, headed by A. Hlinka, working in the conditions of democratic parliamentarism of inter-war Czechoslovakia, had a cautious position in relation to the authoritarian elements of the corporate system in these European countries of this period, and they unambiguously distanced themselves especially from the national socialism of Nazi Germany. However, the idea of a corporate social system unambiguously fitted in with the ideology of Christian solidarity, which HSPD supported. The authoritarian dimension of the corporate system also attracted sympathy from the representatives of the radical wing of the People's Party, such as Vojtech Tuka and later Ferdinand Ďurčanský and Alexander Mach. The new Papal encyclical of Pius XI *Quadragesimo anno* from 1931, which updated the principles of Christian solidarity in the conditions of the inter-war period and the great economic crisis, legalized and clearly defined the idea of a corporate system in relation to democratic parliamentarism. The leadership of the People's Party unambiguously supported the idea of a corporate system according to the interpretation of the new encyclical. However, the demand for an immediate transition to a corporate state remained on the programme of the day only in the period of the dismantling of the political system of the inter-war Czechoslovak Republic around the turn of the years 1938 – 1939.¹⁰

The works of the Viennese philosopher, sociologist and economist Othmar Spann also became important sources for the conception of a corporate state in the inter-war

8 On this problem see, for example: BARTLOVÁ, Alena. *Andrej Hlinka*. Bratislava : Obzor, 1991. ISBN 8021502045; DANIŠ, Vladimír. K organizačnému a štruktúrálnemu vývoju HSPD v období Československej republiky (On the organizational and structural development of HSPD in the period of the Czechoslovak Republic). In *Studia historica Nitriensia*, 1997, year 6, p. 9-25; BARTLOVÁ, Alena. Návrhy slovenských politických strán na zmenu štátoprávneho usporiadania ČSR v rokoch 1918 – 1935 a zapojenie HSPD do vládnej koalície 1927 – 1929 (The proposals of Slovak political parties to change the constitutional organization of the Czechoslovak Republic in the period 1918 – 1935 and the inclusion of HSPD in the coalition government of 1927 – 1929). In BYSTRICKÝ, Valerián – ZEMKO, Milan (eds.). *Slovensko v Československu 1918 – 1939*. Bratislava : Veda, 2004, p. 123-164. ISBN 802240795X; *Pokusy o politický a osobný profil Jozefa Tiso, Zborník materiálov z vedeckého sympózia Častá – Papiernička, 5. – 6. mája 1992 (Attempts at a political and personal profile of Jozef Tiso, Volume of materials from the scientific symposium at Častá – Papiernička, 5-6 May 1992)*. Editors Valerián Bystrický, Štefan Fano. Bratislava : Slovak Academic Press, 1992. ISBN 8090044158.

9 For more details see: KATUNINEC, Milan. Charakter rakúskych a slovenských kresťanských odborov v prvej polovici 20. storočia (The character of Austrian and Slovak Christian trade unions in the first half of the 20th century). In *HČ*, 2007, year 55, p. 699-720.

10 BENKO, ref. 6, p. 12-19.

period. They initially addressed mainly the supporters of the radical wing of HSPP. According to the theories of O. Spann, who started from Plato and J.G. Fichte, the spiritual existence of every individual had meaning only as part of a particular community. Spann gave the community priority over the individual. Society had to be divided into units, which he named *Gemeinschafts* or *Lebenskreise*. He distinguished between religious-philosophical, cultural-spiritual, economic and state *Lebenskreise*. He defined a cultural-spiritual *Lebenskreis* in an ideally structured society, as a full community capable of firm organization. He saw the state as the highest community. It determined not only the direction of foreign and internal policy, but also possessed control of the other communities subordinate to it. However, the state could intervene in the independence of the other communities only in isolated cases, when the highest interest required it, since the communities had relatively wide autonomy of decision making in their professional fields guaranteed to them.¹¹ On the basis of his teaching, Spann regarded as his model the medieval universal Catholic Empire as a unit representing an effective opposite to liberalism and Marxism.¹²

With his automatic scorning of democracy, liberalism and Marxism, Spann's ideas interested many ultra-conservative currents from the right end of the European political spectrum. The Italian Fascists, Austrian Heimwehr, Salazar's Portugal and partly also the National Socialists in Germany gradually began to adopt and modify them. Spann's universalism and concept of the corporate state also found a positive response among some of the young rightist Sudeten German intelligentsia, in Slovakia among representatives of the younger generation of HSPP grouped around the journal *Nástup* (Arrival), as well as in Hungary, in Codreanu's Legion of the Archangel Michael in Rumania, in Rivera's Spain and even in Atatürk's Turkey.

Hitler's National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) initially took a generally positive view of Spann's theories. Spann's universalism was close to National Socialism in various programmatic points. Opposition to democracy, individualism and the spread of Marxism, combined with suppression of personal freedom, subordination of the individual to the national or state organism, and a hierarchical society constructed according to the leadership principle formed an area of intersection between the two ideological currents. However, the similarity ended there. Spann rejected racism, anti-Semitism and the social-Darwinist thesis of the constant struggle for existence. By appealing to Plato and German idealism, he declared allegiance to the principles of humanity. His conception of a decentralized corporate state was also in sharp conflict with the idea of a centralized totalitarian state as propagated by the National Socialists.¹³ However, none of

11 LUH, Andreas. *Der Deutsche Turnverband in der Ersten Tschechoslowakischen Republik: vom völkischen Vereinsbetrieb zur volkspolitischen Bewegung*. Mnichov : Oldenbourg Verlag, 1988, p. 233-234. ISBN 3486544314.

12 SMELSER, Roland M. *Das Sudetenproblem und das Dritte Reich 1933 – 1938. Von der Volkstumspolitik zur nationalsozialistischen Außenpolitik*. Mnichov : Oldenbourg Verlag, 1980, p. 59; also GEBEL, Ralf. „Heim ins Reich!“ *Konrad Henlein und der Reichsgau Sudetenland (1938 – 1945)*. Munich : Oldenbourg Verlag, 1999, p. 31. ISBN 3486560182.

13 HOENSCH, Jörg Konrad. Othmar Spann, Kameradschaftsbund a Sudetoněmecká vlastenecká fronta (Othmar Spann, the Kameradschaftsbund and the Sudeten German Patriotic Front). In *Dějiny a součas-*

this changed the undemocratic essence of “Spannism” and its limited ability to prevent the transition from a corporate system to a totalitarian form of government. The Austrian constitution from the turn of April and May 1934, adopted after the installation of the authoritarian regime of Engelbert Dollfuss, and codifying the principles of the corporate state, started precisely from the ideological conceptions of O. Spann. The Austrian political system of the second half of the 1930s was also a great inspiration for the ideologues of Christian solidarity in the People’s Party in Slovakia.

In practical politics, HSPP expressed its commitment to Christian solidarity during the inter-war period mainly by building up Christian trade unions. The everyday struggle for limited social demands by wage labourers against employers gave the Christian trade union movement a relatively radical character and led in some circumstances to a joint approach with the trade union organizations of the leftist parties. To a large extent, the Christian trade unions developed autonomously in relation to the conservative leaders of HSPP, and so represented a sort of working class current in the political life of the People’s Party. Their leading personalities rejected Italian Fascism and German National Socialism much more convincingly than the leading representatives of HSPP. However, they found the removal of antagonisms between labour and capital in social reconciliation and application of the principles of Christian social teaching. Their propaganda appealed especially to the deep religious feelings of the majority of the Slovak population. In spite of this, they found relatively little response among the wage labourers. They had to struggle with the propaganda of their main competitor, the Communist Party, which avoided the religious question for tactical reasons and compared the communist movement to the movement of the first Christians. From the international point of view, the Slovak Christian trade unions formed part of the Christian socialist movement. However, on the basis of the main postulates of the encyclical *Quadragesimo anno*, the Slovak Christian trade unionists gave up the adjective “socialist”, in spite of the fact that they had regularly used it in the 1920s to designate their political orientation. Like the leadership of HSPP, the Christian trade unionists cooperated with the Czechoslovak Christian social People’s Party in the first years of the existence of Czechoslovakia. However, the pro-government policy of the Czechoslovak People’s Party and the national aspect in the political and trade union movements of the Slovak People’s Party led to a gradual break down in cooperation. The unambiguous orientation of the Slovak Christian trade unions towards employees and workers of Slovak nationality significantly narrowed the range of activity of their membership base. A further limiting factor was the fact that the Christian trade unions of the People’s Party formed part of the Catholic political movement, which discouraged the less numerous, but influential Evangelical community in Slovakia. The efforts of the People’s Party at the beginning of the 1920s to create a joint trade union organization with the Evangelical Slovak National Party under the name Christian National Protective Union ended in failure. From 1923, the People’s Party organized wage labourers into the Association of Slovak Trade Union Organizations, which included various trade unions, especially from the ranks of state employees. However, especially the Christian Social Trade Union Association of Workers proved able to attract a wider

nost, 1999, year 21, no. 5, p. 32; LUH, ref. 11, p. 238.

membership base in everyday social struggles. It was formally a member of the Association of Trade Union Organizations, but its position was autonomous and it had deeper real influence. Rudolf Čavojský became the leading personality in the Christian trade unions. František Slameň and Ján Mora were other important figures in the movement. The Christian trade unions gained a wider membership base especially among railway workers and in the textile industry. They had about 26 to 45.5 thousand members in the 1930s. An independent Christian Social Party of the Hungarian minority and a Slovak branch of the Czechoslovak People's Party led by the Slovak politician Martin Mičura also operated in Slovakia during the inter-war years.¹⁴

The idea of a social state based on principles of Christian solidarity was expressed in the ideology and political programme of the Slovak People's Party in the final period of the existence of Czechoslovakia, mainly in the form of demands to replace the antagonism between social groups or classes with Christian love and harmony, to limit the competitive struggle on the capitalist market, to defend smaller producers against pressure from big capital, to strengthen the role of the state in the economy, to speed up the construction of infrastructure, to regulate prices, to set a fair wage for workers, to complete land reform, and to reduce the debts of the peasant farmers. With this conceptual programme for building a social state, HSPP entered the period of the break up of Czechoslovakia around the turn of the years 1938 – 1939, when it became the only governing state party under the name Party of Slovak National Unity. After the installation of an authoritarian regime led by HSPP, favourable conditions arose for the faster development of ideas about the Slovak form of a corporate state according to the instructions of the encyclical *Quadragesimo anno*, but also on the basis of stimuli from Italian syndicalism and the corporate systems in other authoritarian regimes of the 1930s. The contours of the new social system became more concrete after the origin of the independent Slovak state. One of the main and closest programme aims of the emerging regime was an immediate transition to a corporate system, according to the principles of Christian solidarity as laid down in the constitution of the new state from 21 July 1939. In the brief period from the origin of the state on 14 March 1939 to the adoption of the constitution, the HSPP ideologues compiled from varied sources a concrete idea of a Slovak corporate state.¹⁵

The conceptual sources, aims and content of the corporate system were justified and explained by one of the leading representatives of the People's Party and deputy speaker of the Slovak Parliament Karol Mederly in an extensive programme article on the prepared constitution in the main newspaper of HSPP, *Slovák*. After the constitution was adopted, he evaluated its key provision in another extensive article, and he summarized his views in a separate brochure. The author pointed to the fact that the aim of the new state was to establish a harmonious social system and solve the burning social questions,

14 KATUNINEC, ref. 6, p. 76-82; RÁKOSNÍK, Jakub. Limity pôsobení ľudáckého odborového hnutia ve 30. letech (The limits on the activity of the Ludák trade union movement in the 1930s). In ŠUCHOVÁ, Xénia (ed.). *Ludáci a komunisti : Súperi? Spojenci? Protivníci?* Prešov : Universum, 2006, p. 88-92. ISBN 808904638X. For more details see: PLEVA – TICHÝ, ref. 2.

15 HOFFMANN, ref. 1, p. 284-308.

but in the framework of an authoritarian regime. In the first article, he still recognized in principle the value of democracy and parliamentarism, but he also emphasized that just as in Ancient Greece, democratic regimes alternated with tyranny, a transition from democratic systems to autocratic regimes was occurring in the contemporary world of the first half of the 20th century. Mederly understood an authoritarian regime as the rule of natural authorities, which allegedly most suited the natural personalities and nature of the Slovak nation. The new political system, anchored in the future constitution, was supposed to preserve the personal freedom of the individual and universal right of people to vote, but they would elect by means of a plebiscite, a group of legislators selected in advance by a government body of a qualitatively authoritarian character. This government body would be composed mainly of dozens of the most important authorities of the nation, appointed by the ruling state-party and corporate bodies. The State Council had to carry out the task of this body of a new type. It was established in 1940 on the basis of the constitution, but its powers were unclear. It represented a sort of intermediate level between the government and parliament. Its function was to protect the moral principles of Christian teaching against the mistakes of state institutions and corporations. It symbolized a turning away from parliamentarism with an electoral system based on the quantitative share of the votes given to individual parties, and towards a higher qualitative character of electoral and political system of an authoritarian regime. The consideration of K. Mederly strikingly resembled the elections with a single list of candidates of the National Front under the communist regime after 1948. In reality, no elections to the legislative body were held during the existence of the Slovak Republic of 1939 – 1945.¹⁶

In the second article about the mission of the constitution, K. Mederly already decisively rejected democracy and parliamentarism as a system without possibilities for future development. The parliamentary struggle between various political parties was associated with the idea of the class war forced by Marxist theories. In spite of the fact that HSPP developed its structures in the parliamentary system of the inter-war Czechoslovak Republic, the further existence of parliamentarism with various parties allegedly had no further meaning. In the period of democratic politics, the People's Party led the struggle for national – state interests, which it had already triumphantly defended, so further political struggle against HSPP as the state-party would mean the nation struggling against itself.¹⁷ Thus, according to K. Mederly, the multi-party parliamentary system was just as harmful as class war, and had to be replaced by a harmoniously organized national – corporate society. The author specifically stated: *“In the former republic, discord, quarrelling and fragmentation into parties and classes, showed us how a state can be destroyed... Partisanship and class war have to be a warning lesson. We are not free to allow it any longer in our nation. It is necessary to create indivisibility of interest, harmony and*

16 MEDERLY, Karol. Zásadné smernice slovenskej ústavy (The basic provisions of the Slovak constitution). In *Slovák*, 7 June 1939, year 21, p. 3-4; See also the publication: MEDERLY, Karol. *Ústava Slovenskej republiky a jej zásadné smernice (The Constitution of the Slovak Republic and its basic provisions)*. Bratislava : [s. n.], 1939.

17 MEDERLY, Karol. Vyberme to čo je dobré a prispôsobme duši a potrebám slovenského ľudu (Let us take what is good and adapt it to the soul and needs of the Slovak people). In *Slovák*, 23 July 1939, year 21, p. 2.

mutual agreement between all groups, all organizations and a harmonious community of just understanding. It must be built on two basic pillars: the Christian world view and nationalism. In this way, we will achieve a firm ground of Christian and national solidarity as a basic condition for the Slovak state..."¹⁸ In the interpretation of K. Mederly and other leading ideologues of HSPP, democracy had to be replaced by a social system based on Christian and national principles. The two foundation stones of the new system were inter-connected and stood directly on Holy Scripture and the Ten Commandments. Mederly specifically stated that: "*Slovak nationalism is naturally connected with the religious-moral foundation of Christianity...*"¹⁹ By the one-sided emphasis on the Slovak nation and the Christian principle, the ideologues of the People's Party excluded other ethnic groups and religious communities from the harmonious community of the new state from the beginning.

A further basic pillar of the emerging social system was supposed to be precisely the social principle, derived from the principles of Christian solidarity and Christian social teaching, according to the content of the encyclicals *Rerum novarum* and *Quadragesimo anno*. Mederly considered the parliamentary system of liberal democracy incapable of further development mainly because it could not remove social problems. The solution of social questions was possible only after the liquidation of this obsolete system in a harmonious corporate system: "*Political freedom, based on democracy was not enough to solve all the questions of human society... especially the social questions... to raise the cultural level of the people... to make them not only politically... but also... socially free... cannot be politically proclaimed... it must develop naturally... in harmonious co-operation. Solidarity has to serve this cooperation...*"²⁰ K. Mederly identified the main postulates of the social programme of the new state according to the content of the Papal encyclicals.

The programme essentially corresponded to the demands of HSPP before 1938. Where the social problem was concerned, the constitution had to interpret the provisions that: "*... the state has the right and duty to legally direct and regulate economic and social life on the highest level by the following means:*

- 1) *To introduce balance between employment, capital and labour;*
- 2) *To protect the national economy against parasitic exploitation of trade, industry or agriculture incompatible with the higher social interests and ethical principles of the national community;*
- 3) *To achieve the lowest prices and highest wages compatible with just reward for production with improvement of technique and credit;*
- 4) *To introduce appropriate measures to improve the population, defend and support the family and the part of the national community that has emigrated.*

The state has to support private business activity and by excluding uncontrolled competition enable mutual cooperation between all components of the national community.

18 MEDERLY, ref. 16, Zásadné smernice, p. 3.

19 MEDERLY, ref. 16, Zásadné smernice, p. 3.

20 MEDERLY, ref. 17, p. 2.

Private ownership is inviolable and can be limited only by law..., but its use is limited by the need for social cooperation..."²¹

Apart from the repeatedly stated aim of social harmony, the social programme included the need to defend the family, which again related to the content of the encyclicals. The idea of the new social system also included the part of the national community living outside Slovakia, it was not limited to the territory of the state, but was understood in substantially wider terms. The writer recognized the natural inviolable right of private ownership, but in the name of the whole regime, he left open the possibility of its limitation by law or in situations when not clearly specified principles of social co-existence required it. This was clearly directed towards the possible limitation of the property rights of the Jewish community. K. Mederly derived the conception of the corporate system as one of the key means of solving social problems directly from the provisions of the encyclical *Quadagesimo anno*, which, in his view, needed no further enlargement. However, he contradicted himself to some extent, when he demanded a special form of the corporate system corresponding to the specific conditions of Slovak society. He expressed this view as follows: *"Thus the basis of the corporate system, which must play an important role in our economic life, is given to us by the highest authority of the Church. It is only necessary for us to apply it to Slovak conditions. We cannot take the number of corporate groups and their organizations blindly according to a foreign model, but must create them according to the special, distinctively Slovak situation..."*²² In the end, the author, in the name of the regime of the time, stated that they did not need to imitate anybody on the question of the social system, because the only real source for solving social problems was Christian religious teachings.

The programme of constructing a corporate state on the principles of Christian solidarity was anchored in the Constitution of the Slovak Republic from 21 July 1939. The existing internally antagonistic structure had to be replaced by a harmonious system of six corporate groups, divided according to productive activity, namely: agriculture, trade and self-employment, finance and insurance, free professions, public employees and educators. Disputes between employers and employees had to be overcome within the individual corporate groups, and they were supposed to achieve common economic and social aims with mutual support. Paragraph 62 of the constitution concretely described the activities of the corporate groups as follows: *"The corporate groups are concerned with the economic, social and cultural interests of their members, especially with increasing their productivity and standard of living, regulating working conditions, reconciling and directing interests between the corporate groups, between producers and consumers and solving any disputes between employers and employees..."*²³ The corporate groups were planned as self-governing units, representing a decentralized, autonomous element of the authoritarian regime. However, the functionaries had to be politically organized,

21 MEDERLY, ref. 16, Zásadné smernice, p. 3-4.

22 MEDERLY, ref. 16, Zásadné smernice, p. 4.

23 Paragraf č. 62 Ústavného zákona zo dňa 21. 7. 1940 o Ústave Slovenskej republiky, č. 185 (Paragraph 62 of the Constitutional Statute from 21 July 1940 on the Constitution of the Slovak Republic no. 185). In *Slovenský zákonník*, year 1939, part 41 from 31 July 1939, p. 381.

which meant they had to be members of HSPP. In spite of being anchored in the constitution, it was a rather vague system, which could be interpreted in various ways by individual ideologues and representatives of the regime. However, the main idea remained an attempt to avoid the difficulties of capitalism and find a way between liberal democratic parliamentarism and the Marxist totalitarian system applied in the Soviet Union.

The government planned to put the corporate system into practice in several stages after its principles were enacted by legislation. The first stage would be applying the principles of the corporate system in the structures and life of the trade union organizations. A proposed government decree with force of law on the obligatory organization of employees for the preparation of the corporate system was published on 12 December 1939 as an instrument of this aim. The decree assumed that all employed persons would be obliged to be members of the state trade union organizations.²⁴ The only officially authorized trade union organization in this period was the former inter-war Association of Slovak Christian Trade Union Organizations composed of five associations for different sectors. This was a result of the strengthening of the authoritarian regime during the period of autonomy and in the first period of the existence of the Slovak state. The Christian social trade union movement experienced the greatest expansion in its whole existence. However, the leaders of the Christian trade unions did not guess that it was the “swan song” of the history of their movement. The liquidation of the political parties with the exception of HSPP in autumn 1938 was accompanied by the dissolution of the majority of trade union organizations or their centralization into united corporations. The head of the autonomous government Jozef Tiso entrusted the leading representative of the Christian trade unions Rudolf Čavojský with working out a conception for the further development of the trade unions. According to his proposal, the trade unions had to be merged into one central organization “*with a Slovak and Christian orientation*”. For this reasons, all the trade union organizations of non-Slovak or non-Christian character or with their headquarters outside Slovakia had to be dissolved, while the others would join the one central organization. This process was accelerated after March 1939. Since the ideological character and organizational structure of the Association of Slovak Christian Trade Union Organizations corresponded to ideas about constructing a corporate system, the Christian trade unions initially had the support of the government leaders of the new state. The competing trade unions were dissolved and the only possibility for an employee was to join the Christian trade unions. Therefore, the membership of the workers’ trade union of the Slovak Christian Social Trade Union Association grew rapidly and by the middle of 1941 it reached 135 thousand members organized into 1,064 local groups. However, the Christian socialists also began to feel increasingly under pressure from the authoritarian regime.²⁵ Paragraph 87 of the constitution in practice limited the right to strike. The proposed government decree from 21 December 1939, which bound employees to unreservedly accept the results of wage negotiations with the employers, had a similar aim. At the same time, the structure of the trade union organization had to be adapted to the planned corporate system. The trade union organizations, economic cor-

24 For a more detailed analysis of the decree see: BAKA, ref. 6, p. 185.

25 KATUNINEC, ref. 6, p. 83-86.

porations and the business sphere also had clear reservations towards the proposals. The large companies, banks and institutions had long-term relationship with their employees anchored in employment regulations and approval of the proposals would disturb the whole of this tried and tested system. President J. Tiso himself cast doubt on the proposed decree, especially on the question of obligatory membership and deduction of membership contributions directly from wages, so completion of the proposal was delayed.²⁶

The hectically prepared act on the corporate system, submitted at the beginning of January 1940, had a similar fate. The proposed legislation with the official title *Act on the organization, activities and legal powers of corporate bodies and supervision over them*, was extensive and its dozens of paragraphs had the ambition to cover all aspects of the new social system. With regard to the composition of the corporate bodies and obligatory membership of them, it started from the text of the constitution. However, it explicitly stated the position on the membership of foreign citizens and Jews. They had to join the appropriate corporate body on reaching the age of 18, but without claim to the active or passive right to vote. The act represented the new system as a very complexly structured system. With the exception of the corporation for public employees and educators, the individual corporate groups would be divided into associations of employers and employees. These associations would be formed at all levels of the state administration, and they would be grouped into central unions of corporate associations for employers and employees. The central body of a corporate group would be a congress and directing organs of the corporate council, created on individual levels of the territorial administration, and comprising a presidium and body of delegates, in which the employers and employees would be represented in equal numbers. The delegates had to be members of HSPP aged at least 30. The top of the corporate hierarchy would be the Supreme Corporate Council, composed of a presidium and body of representatives comprising the representatives of the central bodies of the individual corporate organizations with equal numbers of employees and employers. The Supreme Corporate Council would be headed by a president of the corporate bodies appointed by the head of state, and two vice-presidents elected by the council of representatives. The activities of the individual corporate bodies had to be coordinated by inter-corporate bodies. Special provisions of the act defined the autonomous decentralized position of the corporate bodies in relation to the state and its authoritarian regime. The state was supposed to only supervise the carrying out of the tasks granted to the corporate organizations by the act. However, in the event of violation of the law, any corporate institution could be dissolved. Ordinary disputes and violations of corporate discipline would be solved by corporate courts, and legislation was planned to codify their structure. The main source of finance for the corporate groups would be membership fees deducted from the pay of employees. These provisions understandably provoked opposition, as did the aim of integrating the trade unions and economic corporations into the corporate system.²⁷

The proposed act became a target of criticism from various positions. The President's Office also had reservation, since it saw the division of the corporate institutions into em-

26 BAKA, ref. 6, p. 185-186.

27 For a more detailed analysis of the act see: BAKA, ref. 6, p. 187-188.

ployees' and employers' associations as a basis for class war. Individual ministries, state institutions and economic organizations, especially the chambers for industry, commerce and the professions, which saw the possibility of their own liquidation in the prepared system, gradually joined the wave of criticism. The excessively branched structure of the corporate organizations was criticized because it appeared to be financially demanding and bureaucratic. The critics supposed that problems with interest groups and corruption would soon appear between and within the corporate bodies. The putting of the whole system into practice in the foreseeable future without adequate and many-sided preparation, as well as in wartime, was considered unrealistic. This proposed act was also put aside for further consideration at an indefinite time.²⁸

In the given situation, preparation of the corporate system was again put on the level of theoretical considerations. One of them was published by Michal Salatňay, a senior lecturer at the Slovak University in the daily newspaper *Slovák* in May 1940, a few months after submission of the proposed legislation. He directed special attention to the self-administering dimension of the proposed corporate system and its social aspects. Precisely the decentralizing element would distinguish this programme from similar systems in other countries. The author described the relationship of the corporate organizations to the state as follows: *"A corporate organization is a natural and special society within the state... What characterizes a corporate organization is precisely its freedom or some degree of autonomy in pursuing its corporate interests. By taking care of corporate interests, it relieves but does not weaken the state, it decentralizes state power... It is a sort of connective tissue between the corporate group and the state... For achievement of this purpose both the state and the corporate group need their own administration... Therefore, the corporate groups and their functions must have a regulated relationship with the state... To secure the functions of the individual corporate groups and the state, as well as to create the coordination of the strengths of these two components, is precisely the role of the corporate organizations..."*²⁹

The author also clearly defined the specifics of the corporate system in comparison with Italian syndicalism. According to the HSPP theorists, the corporate system had to be substantially more democratic, since it recognized the equality of the employers, technical intelligentsia and ordinary workers as members of one big family. Salatňay concretely stated: *"In contrast to syndicates – and this is its advantage – the corporate system includes not only the employees (workers) or only the employers. It includes the employers, engineers, technicians and ordinary workers... The corporate system does not associate people according to their place in the labour market, but according to what type of work they do. Employers, managers, other experts and ordinary workers cooperate in the same work, so that by pursuing a common aim, they form one family, where all are brothers, who understand and respect mutual rights and duties, so that they covered the necessities of life..."*³⁰

28 BAKA, ref. 6, p. 189-190.

29 SALATŇAY, Michal. Stavovské zriadenie 1. časť (The corporate system Part 1). In *Slovák*, 8 May 1940, year 22, p. 4.

30 SALATŇAY, ref. 29, p. 4.

In the economic field, the individual corporate organizations had the role of directing the mutual, proportional development of production and consumption, which would avoid excessive accumulation of products or their shortage. The corporate organizations would also defend common corporate interests, especially against competition from foreign capital and the labour of immigrants, foreigners and various parasites. One of the main tasks in the political sphere was protection and application of the rights of all members of the corporate organizations in the structures of political power and administration. The corporate organizations also had the task of entering parliament, where their activities based on the principles of Christian solidarity would replace the antagonistic struggle of political parties and individualism of liberal parliamentarism. In the social field, the author systematically listed the strategic tasks, stating that the corporate organizations would: “1. determine the length of working time, 2. work for women and children in industry and trade, 3. the conditions for training, 4. the conditions of work for wages, 5. supervision of work, 6. organize or supervise the organization of social insurance, corporate education and other assisting activities. In short, they would decide about all questions concerned with the common good of the corporate organizations...”³¹

In reality, the programme of introducing a corporate system had already been sidelined by this time. The criticism from the economic or professional corporations was sharp, but did not affect the ideological foundations of Christian solidarity. The attack on the ideological principles of the corporate system came from the side of the radical national socialist wing of the ruling regime and especially from the representatives of the German ethnic group in Slovakia and the government of Nazi Germany. A sharp dispute behind the scenes of the new regime between the moderate conservative and radical wings deepened from the summer of 1939. The leading radical Vojtech Tuka expressed an unambiguously negative view of the corporate system at a meeting with the leader of the Slovak Germans Franz Karmasin in autumn 1939. Tuka described the system as the work of a group of parish priests. In spite of the fact that a supplement to the act on the corporate system formally guaranteed the rights of minorities, the German ethnic group feared that the new social system would disturb its integrity. The leading figures of the German minority, headed by F. Karmasin saw the corporate system as an obstacle to their far-reaching ambitions in the territory of Slovakia.³² However, Germany undertook the main attack against the corporate system and its ideological principles. In April 1940, the German ambassador in Bratislava Hans Bernard sent a report to the Foreign Office in Berlin, expressing the unambiguous position that the Slovak state as a close ally of Nazi Germany could not continue to be directed by the ideology of political Catholicism and it could not be allowed to construct a corporate system on the ideological basis of the encyclical *Quadragesimo anno* in the same spirit as the corporate system in the regime of the chief enemy of the Nazis E. Dollfuss and his successor Kurt Schuschnigg in 1930s

31 SALATŇAY, ref. 29, p. 4.

32 For further details see: SCHVARC, Michal. Pozícia Karmasinovej Deutsche Partei vo vnútropolitckej kríze na jar a v lete 1940 (The position of Karmasin's Deutsche Partei in the internal political crisis of spring and summer 1940). In PEKÁR, Martin – PAVLOVIČ, Richard (eds.). *Slovensko medzi 14. marcom a salzburskými rokovaniami. Acta Facultatis Philosophicae Universitatis Prešovensis, Historický zborník 9 (AFPhUP 187/269)*. Prešov : Universum, 2007, p. 80. ISBN 9788080686697.

Austria. At the same time, he pointed to the danger of the corporate system for the further development of the German ethnic group, and to the interventions of the new system in the economic life and rights of economic corporations among which German companies had an important place. The gradual take over of the Slovak company sphere by German capital and its representatives in this period meant a further substantial obstacle to putting the corporate system into practice.³³

The German rejection of the whole corporate state project was closely connected with the deepening negative relationship of the Nazi regime to the ideological conceptions of O. Spann. The NSDAP regarded his teachings as unwanted competition. There was already a visible mutual estrangement in the mid 1930s. Adolf Hitler's actions against "Spannism" included the dissolution of the Institute for the Corporate State System in Düsseldorf, which was headed by Spann's pupil Walter Heinrich.³⁴ In 1936, the head of the Deutsche Arbeitsfront (DAF) and organizational head of the NSDAP Robert Ley issued a decree by which the party distanced itself from Spann's teachings. The national socialist theorists began to very emphatically point out the differences between the two schools.³⁵ Spann and his supporters were put on the wanted list of the Security Service (Sicherheitsdienst – SD) of the Reichs leader of the SS headed by the feared Reinhard Heydrich. The ideologically defined SD pursued the case against "Der Spann-Kreis" to its absolute conclusion. The Viennese professor and his adherents were designated as enemies endeavouring to create a "ring of Catholic powers with the aim of blockading and spiritually isolating Germany".³⁶ The noose around Spann dangerously tightened. The Gestapo arrested him already on the day of the Austrian Anschluss.³⁷

Heydrich was not satisfied with silencing Spann. He proceeded with the same ruthlessness against Spann's supporters in Austria, and later in the German Reich county of the Sudetenland, the Protectorate and Slovakia. The head of the SD took up the position of "chief enemy of corporate division"³⁸ and his obsession with the spread of "Spannism" grew to paranoid dimensions. He saw it as a dangerous ideological opponent of

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- 33 Správa nemeckého vyslanca v Bratislave H. Bernarda na Zahraničný úrad z 1. 4. 1940 ohľadne nemeckého postoja k slovenskému zákonu o stavovskom zriadení (Report from the German ambassador in Bratislava H. Bernard to the Foreign Office from 1 April 1940 regarding the German attitude to the Slovak legislation on the corporate system). In NIŽŇANSKÝ, Eduard (ed.). *Slovensko-nemecké vzťahy v dokumentoch I. Od Mníchova k vojne proti ZSSR*. Bratislava : Universum, 2009, Document no. 278, p. 758-762. ISBN 9788089046614; See also: KOVÁČ, Dušan. *Nemecko a nemecká menšina na Slovensku (1871 – 1945)*. (Germany and the German minority in Slovakia (1871 – 1945)). Bratislava : Veda, 1991. ISBN 8022401552.
- 34 ZIMMERMANN, Volker. *Sudetští Němci v nacistickém státě. Politika a nálada obyvatelstva v říšské župě Sudety (1938 – 1945)* (*The Sudeten Germans in the Nazi state. Politics and the mood of the population in the Sudeten Reichs county (1938 – 1945)*). Praha : Prostor, 2001, p. 41-42. ISBN 8072600559. ISBN 8072033905.
- 35 HRUŠKA, Emil. *Sudetoněmecké kapitoly (Sudeten German chapters)*. Praha : BMSS-Start, 2008, p. 81. ISBN 9788086140400.
- 36 Bundesarchiv (hereinafter BArch) Berlin, f. R 58 (Reichssicherheitshauptamt)/8033. Report: "Der Spann-Kreis. Gefahren und Auswirkungen" from the end of August 1938.
- 37 LUH, ref. 11, p. 237.
- 38 ZIMMERMANN, ref. 34, p. 201.

the “national socialist world view not only in Germany itself, but also in the countries bordering on Germany”.³⁹ In the struggle to limit the influence of Spann’s universalism, he did not hesitate to use any means. The Reich leader of the SS Heinrich Himmler identified with Heydrich’s view, and through him with great probability also Hitler. In these circumstances, it was pure illusion that a corporate system could be introduced in Slovakia, a country created as a product of German expansionist policy.

The intervention of Berlin against the act on a corporate system in 1940 was an inevitable result of this ideological struggle. However, the intervention had a longer-term complex development. Apart from the leadership of the German minority, Reich German institutions, government offices, party and security institutions participated in it. They included the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle (VoMi), Foreign Office, SD, NSDAP and Institut für Grenz und Auslandstudien headed by the ethnologist Karl Christian Loesch. All the interested offices adopted the critical position of Karmasin’s DP towards the prepared corporate system, although with small nuances. The SD repeatedly showed strong ideological prejudice, when it saw the effort of the Vatican to impose on J. Tiso the principles of the encyclical of Pius XI *Quadragesimo anno* behind the legislative activity of the Slovak government.⁴⁰ In the end, its reports did not play a key role in Berlin’s decision. The report of the German Embassy in Bratislava set the tone. It was supported and supplemented by a crushing expert report from the Institut für Grenz- und Auslandstudien.

The diplomatic representatives of the Reich began to devote more attention to the Slovak plans to introduce the corporate system only after persistent demands from the Deutsche Partei. They realized only as an additional factor that the prepared legislation not only threatened the position of the German “Volksgruppe” in Slovakia, but also the vital interests of the Third Reich itself. It was not only a matter of reservations about ideological principles. Especially the political prestige of Germany as the “defender” of the Slovak Republic and fear of possible limitation of influence on the running of the Slovak economy or from the problems of its incorporation into the national socialist large-space economy.⁴¹ The embassy directed sharper criticism especially against § 4 of the definitive text of the proposed legislation, which concerned the membership of foreign citizens. Its text would have prevented citizens of the German Reich active in Slovakia from applying their legal claims.⁴² Berlin could not accept this in any circumstances, so the embassy proposed direct intervention without any regard for the formal observance of Slovak sovereignty.⁴³ However, respecting the advice of legal experts, delaying tactics

39 BArch Berlin, f. R 43-II(Reichskanzlei – Neue Reichskanzlei)/399, Bl. 28-31. Heydrich’s report H. Lamers from the end of August 1938.

40 BArch Berlin, f. R 70 Slowakei/19, Bl. 70-71. Urbantke’s report from 22 November 1939.

41 KAISER, Johann. *Die Politik des Dritten Reiches gegenüber der Slowakei 1939 – 1945. Ein Beitrag zur Erforschung der nationalsozialistischen Satellitenpolitik in Südosteuropa*. Dissertation. Bochum : Ruhr-Universität, 1969, p. 189-190.

42 The controversial § 4 had the following text: “Persons without Slovak citizenship and persons according to § 1 of government decree no. 63/1939 Sl. z., who are resident in the territory of the Slovak Republic and work in professions falling within the corporate system, are obliged to become members of corporations on starting work, but without corporate rights.”

43 NIŽŇANSKÝ, ref. 33, p. 760.

were chosen.⁴⁴ The embassy abandoned its original intention on instructions from the Foreign Office.

The decision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Reich was influenced to a relevant degree by the assessments of the above mentioned Institut für Grenz- und Auslandsstudien. The author of this hitherto unknown document already stated the erroneous nature of the prepared legislation in the introduction. He accused it of lack of conception and did not forget to emphasize the inappropriateness of the conditions for its practical implementation in Slovak conditions: *“A corporate system is only possible when the social structure of a nation and state have clear outlines and the process of social stratification is complete. However, this is not the case in Slovakia and in the whole south-east, where it is only beginning... Such an act, which is really tailored to the measurements of one nation, in this case the Slovaks, cannot be applied to ethnic groups and racial splinters (Jews and Gypsies). Apart from the process of social stratification, another process is also occurring: the process of change of nationality. Like the planned creation of a national catastrophe, the introduction of the corporate system would prevent it.”*⁴⁵ As the quotation shows, when conceiving the report, the author was not considering only the level of Slovak – German relations, but also the wider context of national socialist “Volkstumspolitik”. Slovakia, as a future part of the core space of the German Reich, was expected to have the function of an open gate for German expansion and Germanizing projects in Central – Eastern and South-Eastern Europe.

Further parts of the assessment are devoted to a detailed analysis of individual provisions of the proposed legislation. The author points to the negative impact of the legal norm on the running of public life, to its unconstitutional nature, to the harmful consequences for the German minority, to the significant limitation of German influence on internal political development, to its ideological starting points (rejection of Spannism), the inadequate elimination of Jewish membership of the individual corporate bodies or the useless fragmentation of the economic strength of the “protected” state. In the conclusion, he rejected the adoption of the legislation for five basic reasons: 1. for the objective reason that in his view, the act did not correspond to the sociological characteristics of the German minority, 2. for the ideological reasons of the application of Spann’s conception of the corporate state, 3. from the economic point of view, 4. for legal reasons (conflict with §§ 91-95 guaranteeing the rights of the German minority) and finally 5. for foreign policy reasons, because he saw the act as incompatible with the text of the treaty of protection from March 1939.⁴⁶ The expert report from the Institute für Grenz- und Auslandsstudien meant the swan song of the proposed act on the corporate system.

The position of the German Embassy was a clear stimulus to kill off the whole programme of introducing the corporate system. The long-term development of ideas on a

44 Politisches Archiv Auswärtigen Amtes Berlin (hereinafter PA AA), f. Gesandtschaft Preßburg, Paket 69, R 3 Nr. 1, Bd. 1. Report from the Foreign Office to the embassy in Bratislava from 13 August 1940.

45 PA AA, f. Gesandtschaft Preßburg, Paket 69, R 3 Nr. 1, Bd. 1. Assessment by the Institut für Grenz- und Auslandsstudien of the proposed legislation on the corporate system.

46 PA AA, f. Gesandtschaft Preßburg, Paket 69, R 3 Nr. 1, Bd. 1. Assessment by the Institut für Grenz- und Auslandsstudien of the proposed legislation on the corporate system.

social system based on Christian solidarity, which had accompanied the formation of the Christian social movement and political Catholicism in Slovakia since around 1900, was suddenly interrupted under political-ideological pressure from the government circles of Nazi Germany. A large proportion of the ideologues and the majority of the political representatives of the Slovak state substantially changed their views on the question of social organization in the summer of 1940, when the national socialist orientation of the regime was established at the Salzburg talks under personal pressure from Adolf Hitler. In this way, the radical wing of the ruling group led by V. Tuka and Alexander Mach strengthened its position in the political structure of the Slovak Republic. The adherents of the radical wing had long supported the solution of various questions associated with building the regime according to the model of Nazi Germany. They also sympathized with the ideology of national socialism, but on the verbal level they gave priority to the Slovak version of the corporate system until the summer of 1940. The suddenly changed political conditions, created under pressure from Germany gave them the possibility to openly accept the radical form of national socialism. The ideologues of the corporate system coming especially from the ranks of the conservative or moderate wing of the regime, could only passively watch how quickly their plans for a new social order were dissolved, after being built up with difficulty over a long period. Thus, the idea of a corporate system was definitively buried in the condition of Slovakia.

Tuka publicly declared the need to construct the socio-economic system on the principles of national socialism already in the period of the Salzburg talks between Hitler and Tiso in July – August 1940. At a government organized demonstration of German – Slovak friendship in Bratislava at the end of July 1940, he presented precisely the transfer of the idea of national socialism into the Slovak conceptual and social environment as one of the main benefits of cooperation with the German Reich. He described the Salzburg talks as a turning point in the history of the Slovak nation with far-reaching international importance, when he declared: *“During these days, the eyes of the whole world were directed towards Salzburg... For us Slovaks, Salzburg means a new golden age, because through it we are entering the era, when national socialism according to the German model will prevail in Slovakia. What is this national socialism? There is a very simple answer. It is impossible to live here without work. Each person must do his work and be decently rewarded for it. National socialism means unity, it means discipline, it means joy from work. A new era is beginning today in Slovakia, in which we will consistently build national socialism with all our energy...”*⁴⁷ In spite of V. Tuka’s claim that the essence of national socialism is entirely clear, his explanation was vague and without content, especially in comparison with the theoretical analyses of the time about the corporate system. Therefore, the regime’s ideologues and theorists again had to get to work to explain the role of national socialism in the conditions of Slovakia. However, Tuka did not forget to define national socialism in relation to the communist ideology and its interpretation of the term socialism. He approached the evaluation of the ideology of the Soviet Union

47 Slobodné Slovensko si vytvorí v novej ére blaženú prítomnosť. Reč predsedu vlády a ministra zahraničných vecí Dr. Vojtecha Tuku (A free Slovakia is created in the new era of the blessed present. Speech by the prime minister and foreign minister Dr. Vojtech Tuka). In *Slovák*, 1 August 1940, year 22, p. 1.

carefully, in relation to the Slovak – Soviet cooperation of the time: *“I also have serious words of warning for those who succumb to communist agitation... We let every nation save itself in its own way. If the Russians seek salvation in a particular social system, let them do it. However, Slovakia will never come under its influence. Slovakia will always belong to the economic sphere, where German national socialism prevails...”*⁴⁸

In the following months, the new group of theorists and ideologues, including various members of the clergy sought possible ways to harmonize the idea of Christian solidarity as propagated until then, with German national socialism, which rejected all the expressions of Christian humanism. M. Salatňay was one of the ideologues, who understood the new orientation of social theory very quickly. In spite of the fact that in spring 1940 he was still long-windedly analysing the corporate system as the only social system based on Christian solidarity and the only one really appropriate for the conditions of Slovakia, by September 1940, he was already searching for parallels between national socialism and the Papal encyclicals in articles on the pages of the newspaper *Slovák*.⁴⁹ Similarly, the Catholic priest, prelate and member of parliament Ján Ferenčík found natural links between national socialism and Christian teaching. In October 1940, in the daily newspaper *Slovák*, he answered the question that was undoubtedly being asked by many priests: *“What should be the attitude of a Catholic priest to this Slovak national socialism? An immediate answer: Positive. It is not necessary to pull away from Slovak national socialism, but to fill it with the spirit of Christ, with active love of the nation and its state...”*⁵⁰ Supportive initiatives also came from below, from the ranks of the lower clergy. For example, the priests of the Diocese of Nitra adopted a resolution declaring unambiguous support for national socialism at a meeting in Belluša at the beginning of October 1940. Meetings with a similar intention were also held by priests in other regions of Slovakia.⁵¹ A positive attitude to national socialism was also held by President Jozef Tiso, who had struggled against the term socialism all his life. He declared: *“I am no longer afraid of the word socialism... It has ceased to be internationalist and has become nationalist... It has ceased to be materialist and began to cultivate the spiritual...”*⁵²

Štefan Polakovič, a senior lecturer at the Slovak University considered and justified the convergence of national socialism with Christian social teaching in an independent theoretical and propagandist monograph. In his interpretation, national socialism started from the same foundations as the Slovak version of the corporate system, namely from Christian teaching and the national idea. The aim was a harmoniously organized national community. The theorists of the corporate system had already worked on this conception. However, this concept had to be completed and enriched with new stimuli from German national socialism. In contrast to the previous interpretations of the HSPP

48 Ref. 47, p. 1.

49 POLAKOVIČ, Štefan. *Slovenský národný socializmus: ideové poznámky (Slovak national socialism: conceptual notes)*. Bratislava : Generálny sekretariát HSLS, 1941, p. 17.

50 FERENČÍK, Ján. Sme za národný socializmus (We support national socialism). In *Slovák*, 24 October 1940, year 22, p. 1.

51 POLAKOVIČ, ref. 49, p. 17.

52 HOFFMANN, ref. 1, p. 306.

ideologists, who rejected national socialism, Š. Polakovič regarded the social system of Nazi Germany to be a generally valid model for the whole of the so-called New Europe. It only had to be adapted to national specifics. *“Although components of many other world views have become attached to German national socialism in ways that can only be understood in the German context..., the original character of national socialism is given by the effort to achieve social justice for the whole nation. From this point of view, national socialism can be understood as a world movement, which, alone, is capable of settling socially disturbed Europe and protecting it from the destructive extremes of the capitalist economic system and communism... From this social point of view, socialism is an export article and the inevitable system that every nation must accept...”*⁵³ Apart from adaptation to national specifics, the application of German national socialism in the conditions of Slovakia meant especially its harmonization with the principles of Christianity. Š. Polakovič found no problem or contradiction in the given direction. In harmony with the declarations of V. Tuka, he saw a sort of dialectical unity between the idea of national socialism and the national-social effort of A. Hlinka. *“Dr. Tuka declared that the essence of Slovak national socialism lay in the fact that its spirit is the spirit of Hlinka, only the method is Hitlerite...”*⁵⁴ From this claim, the author derived the characteristics of Slovak national socialism. *“However, Hlinka’s spirit is the Christian spirit. This means that Slovak society will adapt national socialism to its spiritual conditions, given mainly by the Christian tradition of our nation. As a result, Slovak national socialism is a world view linked with and sustained by the Christian world view. In particular, this means the spirit of the pure Gospel in its unfalsified form...”*⁵⁵

The idea of national socialism was closely connected with plans for a new organization of the political and social system. The theorists of the Slovak form of national socialism also intended to follow the example of Nazi Germany in this area. They demanded extensive changes to the constitution and the introduction of the leader principle to the running of the state, according to the German model, as was done in 1942 by the Act on HSPP. Polakovič saw the close connection of national socialism with the leader principle, which he presented as the most appropriate replacement for the “obsolete” system of liberal parliamentarism. *“The leader principle is the main characteristic of national socialism. With this principle, national socialism reacts against the parliamentary running of the state as supported by democratic liberalism... The essence of the leader principle is that the state is headed by a Leader and not a dictator. The Leader is the unlimited representative of the nation, and so the nation follows the Leader...”*⁵⁶ According to Š. Polakovič, application of the leader principle and national socialism required substantial changes to the constitution, because the political system of the Slovak state allegedly still included too many remnants of parliamentarism. He demanded the replacement of the republican system with a state for the whole nation, a national community, which gave government power to the Leader as head of the state-party and government. The Leader

53 POLAKOVIČ, ref. 49, p. 16.

54 POLAKOVIČ, ref. 49, p. 21.

55 POLAKOVIČ, ref. 49, p. 21.

56 POLAKOVIČ, ref. 49, p. 30-31.

had to appoint the members of the government according to his own considerations. Parliament would be replaced by the Supreme Chamber, composed of representatives of interest organizations appointed by the state-party. The Supreme Chamber would not approve laws, but only propose them.

Similar visions and plans for a political system without the “atavism” of parliamentarism were produced by other representatives and ideologues of the Slovak state. Some of them, including the secretary of Matica Slovenská Stanislav Mečiar or the leading figures of the radicals A. Mach, gave the Slovak version of national socialism ever more radical forms. However, the leader principle was only partially applied on the legislative level and in practice, by means of appropriate constitutional changes according to the ideas of Š. Polakovič. During 1941, government theorists formulated a new social system starting from a Slovak interpretation of national socialism. The stimuli again came from Nazi Germany. The result was the system of a Slovak Working Community based on the principle of national unity in the framework of the structures of HSPP, just as the DAF (German Workers’ Front) operated in the framework of the German state-party, the NSDAP. The main principles and structure of the community were codified by a special law from 6 May 1942. The community comprised four interest associations, divided according to type of productive activity and employment, namely the Agricultural Association, Association for Industry, Small Business and Finance, Association of Members of the Free Professions, and the Association of State and Public Employees. As in the case of the corporate system, membership of an interest association was obligatory for all members of the Slovak nation, who supported themselves by work or drew pensions. Obligatory membership also applied to the unemployed. Employees had to join their employer’s association. However, in contrast to the corporate system, the decentralizing element and the self-administering functions of the employers’ associations were lost. The associations, acting as legal persons, had to be firm components of the structures of HSPP and their main purpose was to support the economic and social aims of the state-party. The Slovak Working Community fulfilled the role of a unifying organization for the whole system of associations. It represented the associations outwardly and supervised their activity. It was headed by a chairman, appointed by the chairman of HSPP. Every association was directed by an organizational statute, approved by the narrower leadership of HSPP on the proposal of the chairman of community. They could be divided into trade union or other not clearly specified organizational units. All members of the community had to pay membership fees, usually amounting to 0.5% of income. Violations of the legal provisions on the structure of the community by members and functionaries of the associations or by employers were sanctioned by financial or other penalties according to precisely defined rules.⁵⁷

Against the background of the formation of government projects for fundamental changes in the social system, the development of the Christian social trade union movement continued. However, the power political changes in the government in the middle of 1940 brought a sudden fall to the Christian trade unions. The representatives of the na-

57 Zákon č. 70 zo dňa 6. 5. 1942 o Slovenskej pracujúcej pospolitosti. (Act no. 70 from 6 May 1942 on the Slovak Working Community.) In *Slovenský zákonník*, year 1942, p. 508-510.

tional socialist wing of the regime rejected the existence of trade unions because they did not fall within the ideological conception of their social experiment. They also remembered the unfavourable declarations of the leading Christian trade unionists on the subject of German national socialism. The Christian trade unionists persisted with their views even after Slovak national socialism became the official ideology of the government. The leadership of HSPP, which had propagated and organized the social – Christian trade union movement for decades, dissolved all trade union organizations in Slovakia by a resolution of its smaller committee from 4 September 1941. In this period, this already meant only the structure of the Christian trade unions. The activities of the Slovak Social Christian Trade Union Association were taken over by a new corporation: the Association of Catholic Workers, which belonged to the system of interest associations in the framework of the Slovak Working Community. The leaders of the dissolved Christian trade unions received new functions. However, they were already only tolerated by the regime, and they increasingly sympathized with the resistance.⁵⁸

Apart from visions and ideas about changes to the social system, the regime of the Slovak state also formulated a concrete programme of social measures already from the first period of its existence. The programme started essentially from Christian social teaching and Christian solidarity between employees and employers. The government submitted one of the versions of its social programme to parliament in the form of a government resolution at the end of November 1939. The programme was presented and supported by the new Prime Minister V. Tuka, who had taken over the position after the previous Premier J. Tiso was elected president of the republic. In accordance with the idea of social harmony, the programme promised to remove the antagonism between labour and capital. This key aim had to be achieved by means of control of retail prices, limitation of price rises and the demand for just wages from employers. In earlier months of 1939, the government had already introduced partial measures against rising prices with the application of various sanctions including imprisonment. However, the expected growth of inflation against the background of military conflict demanded systematic anti-inflationary measures, which the prime minister promised for the future. Introduction of the so-called family wage was supposed to contribute to just rewards for labour. Its role lay in the fact that, apart from qualifications and performance, the employer was supposed to take into account the social position of the employee, namely his family status and number of children, when setting his wage. Social relations would be taken into consideration by means of allowances for wives and children. Financial resources for these allowances would come from the so-called equalization fund, which would receive larger contributions from employers with a high proportion of single and childless employees than the national average. However, V. Tuka understood the raising of wages as a prospective plan for when the young state threatened by inflation had achieved economic stability. In the economic situation of the time, pressure on wages, especially by means of mass strikes, could start an inflationary spiral. Therefore, Tuka allegedly agreed a temporary moratorium on the wage struggle with the representatives of the workers. He promised that when economic conditions allowed, he would place himself at the head

58 KATUNINEC, ref. 6, p. 83-86.

of the struggle for higher wages. In reality, strikes were outlawed. Apart from the already mentioned family wage, support and protection for the family had other important forms in the government's social programme. Since protection of the family had a key role in Christian social teaching, the majority of social measures were basically directed towards strengthening the position of the family in the state and nation, and raising the population curve, obviously within the Slovak national community. In this context, the regime emphasized the role of women – mothers as guardians of the family hearth, which corresponded to the understanding of the mission of mothers in Nazi Germany. The construction of a public health service was expected to contribute to the support for the family and the whole nation. The government allegedly prepared a three year plan for its systematic construction. The representatives of government circles realized that faster economic development was a pre-condition for the satisfaction of social needs. They planned to achieve it especially by legislative and financial support for a wave of development in industry and for growth of tourism. V. Tuka also saw the sending of workers to the Greater German Reich as an important instrument for increasing employment. In spite of the negative aspects of dividing workers from their families, he regarded this cooperation with Germany as a strategic task until the end of the war. They prepared the whole government social programme in the spirit of the slogan “Smiling Slovakia”. Later, the system of concrete social measures was so designated. V. Tuka saw the economic and social future of Slovakia as the construction of an “eastern Switzerland”.⁵⁹

The concrete results of the theoretical and ideological constructions of the new order in society and its social functions in the Slovak Republic of 1939 – 1945 corresponded to the international and internal conditions of the time against the background of the global military conflict. The government of the Slovak state had only a short time to put its conception of the social state into economic and social practice. At the same time, various theoretical constructs already proved to be fictional and unrealizable even in embryo. Building of a socially oriented system was really manifested especially in strengthening of the role of the state in the economy and the adoption of social measures of a systematic or partial character. In spite of the effort invested by the ideological front of the ruling regime, the programmes to make fundamental changes to the social system actually brought the most modest results. The programme to establish the Slovak Working Community achieved only modest results, although the government invested considerable financial and human resources in starting the activities of the individual interest associations. In the second half of 1942, the government developed a promotional public information campaign among the widest range of the population with the aim of informing people about the conceptual and socio-economic aims of the working community constructed according to the principles of national socialism. The promotional campaign was organized by the Public Information Centre of the Ministry of Education

59 Starostlivosť vlády o pracujúci ľud. Predseda vlády dr. Tuka prehovoril dnes v sneme Slovenskej republiky (The government's care for working people. Prime Minister Dr. Tuka spoke today in the Slovak Parliament). In *Slovák*, 1 December 1939, year 21, p. 1-2; Usmievavé Slovensko. Dokončenie reči predsedu vlády dr. Vojtech Tuku na konci debaty o vládnom vyhlásení (Smiling Slovakia. Completion of the speech by Prime Minister Dr. Vojtech Tuka at the end of the debate on the government declaration). In *Slovák*, 2 December 1939, year 21, p. 3-4.

and National Information of the Slovak Republic with the help of district and local information commissions in all the districts and municipalities of Slovakia. They organized cycles of promotional lectures at meetings in individual municipalities, at which they presented questionnaires, in which local activists recorded the answers of the inhabitants to questions of an economic, social, cultural and ideological character, connected with the future activities of the interest associations.⁶⁰

The true picture of the development of the promotional campaign was presented at the end of 1942 by one of the regime ideologues Jozef Magala. He evaluated in detail using statistics and words, the reaction of the people and the questionnaire answers concerned with the preparations for the activity of the Agricultural Association, which had to include the largest part of the population, since about 60% of the economically active inhabitants of Slovakia worked in agriculture. He published his data as the central secretary of the Agricultural Association in the economic periodical *Hospodárska obroda* (Economic Renewal). The views of the small farmers were evaluated according to the most varied criteria. One of the most important was the number of participants in promotional lectures in relation to the total population of the municipality and district. The data shows that about 10% of the inhabitants of the individual districts attended the lectures. The total number of participants reached 170 thousand, which represented 6.4% of the population of the Slovak state. The questionnaire was sent to all 2,657 municipalities, and it was sent back from 992, which meant replies from 37.5% of the municipalities. The replies to individual types of question were also expressed statistically. The government representatives needed to find out what the ordinary people expected from the new social organization.⁶¹ Jozef Magala admitted that the majority of small farmers had no clear idea about the purpose of the working community and their attitude to government aims was indifferent. In more backward regions, they saw the Agricultural Association as a state corporation, from which they expected only some material assistance. Magala concretely stated: “*What do our small farmers expect from the Association? A great many municipalities did not give a definite and united answer to this question. They did not state concrete demands, but only general, rather unconsidered statements that they expect some help from the Association...*”⁶² The more aware small farmers of the economically productive areas had an interest in technical assistance and technological advice. There was also more interest here in the ideological aims and organizational structure of the Agricultural Association. However, the majority of farmers demanded from their association mainly support for higher prices for agricultural products. The legally established principle of obligatory membership of the interest associations and especially the introduction of obligatory membership fees evoked universal disgust and rejection.

60 MAGALA, Jozef. Poslanie Pôdohospodárskeho združenia v očiach slovenského roľníctva (Pokračovanie). (The mission of the Agricultural Association in the eyes of Slovak small farmers (Continuation)). In *Hospodárska obroda*, 1942, year 2, no. 11, p. 258-259.

61 MAGALA, ref. 60, p. 259-263.

62 MAGALA, Jozef. Poslanie Pôdohospodárskeho združenia v očiach slovenského roľníctva (Dokončenie). (The mission of the Agricultural Association in the eyes of Slovak small farmers (Conclusion)). In *Hospodárska obroda*, 1942, year 2, no. 12, p. 308.

The evaluation of the lecture action stated: “*Obligatory membership and the associated compulsory payment of membership fees very much disturbed the small farmer and working class communities. When the listeners learnt from the first lecture that every small farmer, agricultural or forestry worker or official would have to be a member of the AA [Agricultural Association – Ľ. H.], they usually did not come to the second lecture, and in many municipalities, they lost interest in the AA, only from learning that they would have to pay membership fees...*”⁶³ The author evaluating the analyses also stated that in regions where the agrarian party had more influence before 1939 and in regions with a predominance of Evangelicals, such as Myjava, Martin and Liptovský Mikuláš, the responses to the promotion of the interest associations were minimal. After the information campaign, the central administration of the Agricultural Association began to establish local branches and other organizational components. The other interest associations proceeded in a similar way. However, in the succeeding years 1943 and 1944, the positive influence of the wartime boom gradually declined, while failures of supply and other problems multiplied. The interest of the population in government projects was reduced by this. The regime of the Slovak state had to solve the questions of its own existence and the programme of creating the Slovak Working Community was sidelined.

The national economists and regime ideologues of the time regarded deepening of the role of the state in the economy as one of the main pre-conditions for social development. They understood direct interventions of the state in the economy as an important attribute of the formation of the social state. This corresponded to a significant degree to the economic programme of Nazi Germany, as well as to the ideology of the communist movement. For example, the secretary of the Agricultural Association Jozef Kosorin expressed his view on the question of state intervention in the economy, as follows in *Hospodárska obroda*: “*The socialization of effort is expressed in various ways..., for example, in a system of direct and targeted state interventions in the sphere of private business. The state intervenes officially and powerfully, in a general and coercive way in all sectors of business. The impulse and aim of this intervention is to achieve the objective, general interests of the nation... tendencies towards one-nation politics and economics most frequently go together hand in hand. We see this, for example, in the cases of Soviet Russia... Italy, Germany, Portugal...*”⁶⁴ The Slovak state strengthened its positions in the economy by building up a system of state monopoly corporations, legislative measures to support industrialization and individual sectors of the economy, as well as by means of direct state investment, especially in infrastructure and agriculture.

The state monopoly corporations, either from the 1930s or newly established, were instruments for control of the economy. State regulation penetrated into the sphere of price setting, employment and wage policies, into trade, agriculture and industry. In the years 1940 – 1942, the state progressed from partial interventions to a comprehensive system of directing the whole economy. Institutions such as the Prices Office and the Central Labour Office were established. They had an important role in the social field.

63 MAGALA, ref. 62, p. 309.

64 KOSORIN, Jozef. Tendencia k ľudovosti (The tendency to be close to the people). In *Hospodárska obroda*, 1942, year 2, no. 11, p. 255.

The Prices Office monitored the development of wholesale and retail prices, which the state divided into directed and free. The control of retail prices was part of the government campaign to protect the consumer and his “just wages” by creating balance between the levels of prices and wages. The Labour Office was supposed to be an instrument for the systematic and targeted raising of employment. The most extensive state monopoly interventions were in agriculture. The Grain Company for Slovakia gained a key position here. It was established by government decree no. 46 from April 1939 as the successor to the Czechoslovak Grain Company of the inter-war period. At first it only directed and mediated the trade in and distribution of cereals, dairy products and some other agricultural products with the main aim of influencing the development of prices. The monopoly purchasing of grain at fixed prices was done by several joint stock companies and cooperative enterprises, which acted as representatives of the Grain Company. In the sphere of animal products, only foreign trade was subject to a monopoly at first. However, as a result of supply problems in 1941 the monopoly was extended to the domestic market in animal products by means of the Slovak Agricultural Union for Trade in Economic Animals and Animal Products, known as Slovpol for short. Trade in milk, dairy products, bryndza cheese and some crops was controlled by monopoly syndicates. In industry, state bodies directed especially the sphere of distribution and use of raw materials. Later they also directly intervened in production programmes and business activities of individual companies. Works subject directly to German military command according to the inter-state treaty from January 1940 were under constant state supervision.⁶⁵ Deepening of the military conflict during 1941 and 1942 resulted in the development of the state monopoly system in direction of the economy growing into the construction of a war economy according to the model of Nazi Germany. Institutional development of the central direction of the economy culminated in 1942 with establishment of the Supreme Supply Office (SSO), which combined the Prices Office with the Centre for Control of Agricultural Production. In the following years, the SSO had a key position in directing the whole structure of the economy.⁶⁶

Government economic circles made a considerable effort to create favourable legislative conditions to accelerate economic development, especially by reviving industrialization. To demonstrate their deviation from the economic liberalism of the inter-war Czechoslovak Republic, measures were adopted according to the model of the industrialization policy of the former Kingdom of Hungary. This meant especially acts no. 299 and 307 from 1940 on support for industry and tax relief. The legislation copied some provisions of the Hungarian industrialization act of 1907. They provided discounts on

65 Verejná správa, vojnové hospodárstvo a právny poriadok. (The public administration, war economy and legal order). In *Slovenský priemysel* (SP), 1941, p. 42-45; Regulované hospodárstvo a zásobovacia politika (The regulated economy and supply policy). In SP, 1942, p. 97-100; FALTUS –PRŮCHA, ref. 3, p. 524-525, 350-355.

66 For further details on the formation of the war economy in Slovakia see: BRIŠKA, Rudolf. *Vojnové hospodárstvo. (War economy)*. Bratislava : Slovenské pôdohospodárske združenie, 1942; HALLON, Eudovít. *Prechod k vojnovému hospodárstvu na Slovensku v roku 1942 (The transition to a war economy in Slovakia in 1942)*. In UHRÍN, Marian a kol. *Slovensko v roku 1942. Politika – armáda – spoločnosť*. Banská Bystrica : Múzeum SNP, 2013, p. 170-189. ISBN 9788089514243.

railway transport costs and customs duties, as well as state subsidies to cover amortization and interest on investment loans. Tax reliefs were conditional on the use of the saved resources for new investment or for social purposes beneficial to employees, which contributed to an improved social situation in productive companies. The government also adopted other motivating measures, especially the possibility of large write offs from older and new investments.⁶⁷

Especially the construction of infrastructure represented a successful aspect of the economic development of the Slovak Republic with considerable influence on the quality of life of the population. By means of large investments, the Slovak state completed or further developed projects from the 1930s. In rail transport, the inter-war project to construct a line on the very technically demanding route from Martin to Banská Bystrica was successfully completed. The rail transport problems caused by the loss of territory in the south to Hungary were relatively quickly solved. A new line from Prešov to Strážske was built in this period. The Slovak state constructed a total of 83 km of new railway lines. The cost, together with the cost of reconstructing existing railways, reached 1.514 billion Ks by 1943.⁶⁸ Development of the road network progressed with the construction of high quality state roads started in the second half of the 1930s. However, the geographical orientation of the main roads had to be adapted to the strategic aims of Germany. A total of 280 km of state roads was built in the period 1939 – 1943 at a cost of 0.805 billion Ks. The proportion of roads with hard surfaces to the total extent of the road network grew in this period from 13% to 28%. Faster development of bus transport was a positive phenomenon. For example, in 1942 buses transported 8.3 million passengers on routes with a length of 1,829 km.⁶⁹ The development of energy infrastructure made a great step forward. The starting point, created in the previous period was extraordinarily favourable. Only the loss of the resources and networks in the lost territories represented a serious problem. Construction of the Váh cascade with two steps of the hydro-electric power station at Ilava and Dubnica nad Váhom was a visible result. Work on the Orava reservoir began at the same time. A total of 535 million Ks was spent on hydraulic engineering and regulation of the main rivers in the period 1939 – 1943. Electrification progressed from a regional to a national phase of development after merging of the five regional electricity companies to form the unified Slovak Power Stations joint stock company in 1942, with a decisive shareholding in the hands of the state. It was one of the first national electrification companies in the world. The production of electricity in Slovakia grew by 71% in the period 1938 – 1943. It was used especially for lighting, heating, cooking and transport.⁷⁰ Expansion and modernization of the telephone network

67 Zákon č. 299. (Act no. 299). In *Slovenský zákonník*, year 1940; Zákon č. 307. (Act no. 307). In *Slovenský zákonník*, year 1940.

68 Železničné stavby (Railway construction). In SP, 1943, p. 86-87.

69 Cestné práce za Slovenskej republiky (Work on roads in the Slovak Republic). In *Skúsenosti pri stavani ciest na Slovensku*. Bratislava : Slovenská technická univerzita, 1943, p. 31; Autopreprava Slovenských železníc. (Road transport of the Slovak railways). In SP, 1943, p. 85-86; Cesty. In SP, 1943, p. 91-92.

70 VÁVRA, Ján. Päť rokov sústavnej elektrizácie Slovenska 1939 – 1943 (Five years of systematic electrification of Slovakia 1939 – 1943). Bratislava 1944; Vodné stavby (Hydraulic engineering). In SP, 1943, p. 87-88; For more details on the development of electrification see: SABOL, Miroslav. *Elektrifikácia*

was substantially accelerated by construction of automated exchanges and underground instead of above ground cables.

Legislative and financial support for agriculture, which employed and sustained the majority of the population, had decisive importance for economic development and for raising the standard of living in Slovakia. After the loss of the most fertile southern territories, the state adopted effective legislative measures to extend the area of cultivated soil. The measures aimed especially to complete the long-term slow processes, which developed countries had achieved already in the 17th – 19th centuries, such as the transition from three field to rotating agriculture and the ploughing of fallow land. They also aimed to accelerate improvement of the soil and consolidation, which meant the integration of smaller plots into larger units. By act no. 172 from July 1940, the government authorities decreed the abolition of the three field system of agriculture, and by prohibiting the use of fallow land as pasture, they initiated its cultivation. Further legislative steps by the government motivated and created financial resources for the cultivation of pastures and the production of valuable feed crops. The state authorities also attempted to use legislative interventions to secure increased intensity of agricultural production and its orientation towards the required crops. Act no. 42 from March 1942 directly imposed an obligation to regularly cultivate the soil and produce cereals. It even enabled the taking away of badly cultivated land and its temporary granting to other farmers.⁷¹

An act from March 1942, adopted under number 49, aimed to bring systematic changes in the development of intensification. On the basis of this act, the state supported increased agricultural production with investments to a value of 100 million Ks. The financial resources of this action were carefully directed to individual intensification factors. Establishment of centres for purification of seed corn was accelerated. Their number increased by 168 in the period 1939 – 1943. Support for the purification centres enabled the improvement of new varieties of bread grains and maize suitable for cultivation in higher hill country. Only in 1942, large purchases of high quality seed corn helped supply about 122 thousand small farmers with seed corn from which they produced about 33 thousand tonnes of cereals. The small farmers also received state help in the form of cheap allocations of seeds for potatoes, oil producing crops, technical crops and especially maize. These and other measures made a substantial contribution to enabling Slovakia to replace a large part of the output of the more demanding crops, grown until 1938 in the lost southern territories. Especially bread grains and maize were involved. Subsidies from the 100 million ks (Slovak crowns) improvement project were also directed towards the intensification of animal production, but to a smaller extent. Purchases of high quality cattle for breeding from various European countries were especially important. However, the high quality cattle were assigned mainly to productive large scale farmers. Financial resources for modernization of their facilities for animal production such as stables, muckheaps, silage and urine pits represented a great contribution for small

v hospodárskom a spoločenskom živote Slovenska 1938 – 1948 (Electrification in the economic and social life of Slovakia 1938 – 1948). Bratislava : Prodama, 2010. ISBN 9788089396078.

71 Zákon č. 171. (Act no. 171.). In *Slovenský zákonník*, year 1940; Zákon č. 4. (Act no. 4.). In *Slovenský zákonník*, year 1942.

farmers. This modernization also helped to raise the overall cultural level of life in the farm yards. The state also provided allocations of high quality animal feed. The technical level of agriculture improved. Subsidies covered 25-50% of the cost of buying mechanical equipment for about 13 thousand small farmers. The programme of intensification was coordinated with a three year Slovak – German plan for cooperation in agriculture. The German side provided much expert assistance and technical know-how.⁷²

The regime planned to introduce substantial social changes in the Slovak countryside by completing the land reform from the inter-war period and removing its negative factors. A new act on land reform, numbered 46, was adopted in February 1940. It gave the state the right to buy agricultural properties from owners with more than 50 ha, but only with their agreement. Forced purchase was possible in the case of agricultural properties of Jews and land that had not been cultivated for a long time. The state could also impose forced purchase or even expropriation of agricultural properties on political representatives of the former Czechoslovak Republic, who allegedly obtained the land unjustifiably, especially by means of so-called residual estates. The state originally promised to sell a total of 1,619 thousand ha of land, 39% of it agricultural and the rest forest. The interested parties were expected to obtain the largest share by purchase from Aryan owners or by revision of the inter-war land reform, and a smaller share by purchase from foreign citizens and Jews. The main aim was to create prospering middle sized Slovak owned farms with areas of more than 15 ha, which could not be divided in future, according to the German model of so-called hereditary farms. However, new legislative measures from 1941 changed the character of the land reform to the Aryanization of Jewish land by means of nationalization followed by sale to Slovak or other Aryan owners. A small proportion of the distributed land came into the possession of opponents of the regime. According to the data on post-war restitution of the property of Jews and political opponents, the state provided only 45.5 thousand ha of Jewish and confiscated land for division and sale. About 22,500 small farmers, landowners and other applicants participated in its division. However, most of the land was assigned to small farmers in plots with an average size of 1 ha, as in the reform of the inter-war years. Ideas about modern middle sized farms were fulfilled only to some degree. Only 50 indivisible hereditary farms with areas of up to 20 ha were established, as well as 632 new properties with an average area of 8.4 ha created by voluntary sale of Jewish land. Forty four large properties, assigned to exponents of the regime and family members of government representatives, underwent changes of ownership. We can assess from this that the influence of land reform on social relations in the Slovak agricultural countryside was only marginal.⁷³

The regime of the Slovak Republic was able to gain the support of thousands of ordinary citizens with concrete measures in the social field. Until about the end of 1943, various social programmes were successfully implemented thanks to economic growth.

72 Zákon č. 49. (Act no. 49.). In *Slovenský zákonník*, year 1942; BAUCH, Vlastislav. *Poľnohospodárstvo za Slovenského štátu (Agriculture in the Slovak state)*. Bratislava : Slovenské vydavateľstvo politickej literatúry, 1958, p. 70-72.

73 Zákon č. 46. (Act no. 46.). In *Slovenský zákonník*, year 1940; Pozemková reforma (Land reform). In SP, 1940, p. 62-63; BAUCH, ref. 72, p. 28-49; CAMEL, Samuel. *Slovenská dedina (1938 – 1944)*. (*The Slovak village (1938-1944)*). Bratislava: SAP, 1995, p. 36, 47, 49-51. ISBN 8085665638.

The concrete results included especially the elimination of unemployment – the chronic malady of the inter-war period. New possibilities for application and economic activity were created for all groups in the population with the exception of the Jewish community and the Czech minority, which was forcibly expelled already in the first period of the existence of the regime. The wartime boom raised employment in industry by about 50%.⁷⁴ Further employment opportunities were provided by Germany or the German Reich, where people from the whole of Slovakia went voluntarily, attracted by the prospect of a relatively high income. They worked especially in industry and agriculture, but also in some other sectors of the economy. Women worked as assistants in homes. They found employment in various parts of the German Reich. Many people worked in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia in longer term or seasonal jobs. Work in the frontier regions of Moravia and Silesia was a frequent phenomenon. According to various sources and estimates, the number of people who worked in Germany at some time during the existence of the Slovak state, was about 140 – 200 thousand. The contractual basis for the sending of workers to Germany initially continued that set by agreements from the inter-war years. However, the key framework for the systematic outflow of workers to the Reich was set only by the German – Slovak agreements of 8 December 1939. The contractual conditions also set the rules for the payment of workers. In reality, the German side only paid the part of the income paid in the territory of the Reich. The Slovak National Bank paid part of the wage in Slovakia, but the Germans did not send the money. During their stay in the Reich, Slovak citizens were subject to German social legislation, which meant that they were supposed to have the same working conditions as German workers. However, the position of Slovak workers usually did not correspond to this. The regime of the Slovak state regularly monitored the activities of the Slovak citizens in Germany and evaluated them with sociological methods. It also cared for the cultural and spiritual well-being of the workers in their free time with the help of professional cultural workers and clergy, who were sent to Germany. Understandably, this activity had a strong ideological dimension.⁷⁵

The Slovak intelligentsia also found new opportunities after 1938. Forcible expulsion of people of Czech nationality freed almost 20 thousand jobs for state employees, officials, engineers, doctors, teachers, officers, artists and other members of the intelligentsia. The deportation of the Jews in 1942 freed thousands more jobs for professionals, workers and other categories of employees. Employees of Jewish origin were gradually dismissed already in the preceding period. Aryanization of the business property of the Jews expanded and strengthened the ranks of the self-employed and small and middle sized businesses of Slovak nationality. The number of Slovak self-employed people and businessmen increased by about 2,200 as a result of the Aryanization of small and middle sized Jewish businesses. The liquidation of about ten thousand other small Jewish businesses freed Slovak businesses from competition and increased their opportunities.⁷⁶

74 Stav jednotlivých odvetví slovenského priemyslu (The state of individual sectors of Slovak industry). In SP, 1943, p. 22-49; FALTUS – PRŮCHA, ref. 3, p. 531.

75 MIČKO, ref. 6, p. 659-678.

76 RYCHLÍK, Jan. K otázke postavenia českého obyvateľstva na Slovensku v rokoch 1938 – 1945 (On the

Apart from new job opportunities, the wartime boom brought rapid increases of nominal wages. According to the statistical data of the time, the average monthly wage in the economy and tertiary sphere increased by about 97% in the period 1938 – 1944. At the same time, however, the cost of living or inflation rose sharply, especially from the end of 1943. It is possible to judge from comparison of the development of indices and their analysis by various historians that the real increase of wages compared to the pre-war situation in the whole of Slovakia happened only in 1941 and 1942 with an increase of about 4-9%. Qualified industrial workers received an average monthly wage of 800 – 900 Ks in 1943. However, various additional payments, especially for performance, overtime, hazardous working conditions or clothing, were usually added to the basic wage.⁷⁷ Officials of important institutions and prospering economic entities received additional payments for housing, functional payments, expenses for travel connected with work, separation allowances for work away from home, contributions to depreciation of clothing during work with office technology, payments for linguistic knowledge and so on. With the advance of inflation and rising prices, a new phenomenon appeared – high price assistance by means of a one-off amount or regular payments. Employees in the productive and tertiary sectors received them on the basis of agreements of the pro-regime trade unions and works committees with the employers. Basic wages and payments had to be approved by the Central Office of Labour and from 1942 by the Supreme Supply Office. There were significant differences between basic wages and payments. For example, the average monthly wage of an official at the end of 1943 was about 1,240 Ks, but his average monthly pay was about 2,400 Ks. Unqualified workers in the economy and the tertiary sphere, especially agricultural workers had substantially worse wage conditions. The social position of the agricultural proletariat improved only partially in comparison with the dismal situation in the inter-war years. Their average monthly wage was about 250 – 300 Ks, which represented the minimum required for existence in conditions of rising prices. The low wage income of agricultural workers could be improved only by payments in kind. Women were a discriminated group of employees, especially in production and to some degree in the tertiary sphere. Their average wages in industry and agriculture reached only about 50% of the wages of male employees. Jewish employees found themselves in a special position. From autumn 1940, legislation imposed a wage ceiling of 1,500 Ks on them.⁷⁸ Great differences of income existed bet-

question of the position of the Czech inhabitants of Slovakia in the period 1938 – 1945). In HČ, 1989, year 37, p. 403-410; ZUDOVÁ – LEŠKOVÁ, Zlatica. Postavenie Čechov v Slovenskej republike 1939 – 1944 (*The position of the Czechs in the Slovak Republic 1939 – 1944*). In *Historie a vojenství*, 1991, year 11, p. 48-76; HALLON, Ľudovít. Arizácia na Slovenska 1939 – 1945 (Aryanization in Slovakia 1939 – 1945). In *Acta Oeconomica Pragensia*, 2007, year 15, no. 7, p. 148-160. ISSN 0572-3043.

- 77 Archív Národnej banky Slovenska (Archive of the National Bank of Slovakia hereinafter ANBS), f. Správy Odboru pre výskum konjunktúry (Reports of the Department for Research on Prosperity, herein after Správy OVK), c. 309. Ceny a životné náklady (Prices and the cost of living). In *Slovenské hospodárstvo v prvom polroku 1944. Správy Ústavu pre výskum hospodárstva*. Bratislava 1944, p. 25-30, 80-88; HORNOVÁ, ref. 1, p. 50-53.
- 78 HOLEC, Roman – HALLON, Ľudovít. *Tatra banka v zrkadle dejín (The Tatra Bank in the mirror of history)*. Bratislava : AEPRESS, 2007, p. 245-249. ISBN 9788088880776; ANBS, f. Správy OVK, c. 309. Ceny a životné náklady (Prices and the cost of living). In *Slovenské hospodárstvo v prvom polroku 1944*.

ween different sectors of the economy and between different regions of the country. High wage levels existed in engineering, chemical and other works of the military – industrial complex, and from the regional point of view in the developed areas of south-western and north-western Slovakia. Lower wages were paid, for example, to workers in the textile and light industries. Lower wages also prevailed in the eastern and southern regions of the Slovak state. At the same time, average prices were higher in the economically backward east and south of the country with their thinner commercial network than in western Slovakia.

One time as well as systemic social measures contributed to the popularity of the new regime. One of the most important measures of a systemic character in the social field was the introduction of family benefits for unsupported children from 1940. A pre-condition for obtaining family benefits was membership of a social insurance scheme. The measure also covered wider groups of insured workers. After working at least 60 work shifts, they had a claim to a monthly payment of 10 – 40 Ks for one child. The size of the payment depended on the number of shifts worked. Family benefits represented the implementation of one of the key points of the government's social programme, namely the introduction of a so-called family wage taking into account the family status of the worker. Employees of more important companies, banks and institutions could receive substantially higher payments for their children in the framework of social insurance in pension funds. For example, the pension fund of the largest financial institution, the Tatra Bank paid 200 – 300 Ks for a child of an employee. Family recreation with contributions from trade union organizations and works committees became a normal part of the life of employees in the period 1939 – 1944. Employees' organizations or employers provided financial resources to cover part of the cost of family recreation. Such actions usually formed part of propagandist campaigns such as "Smiling Slovakia" or "Joy from work" in the spirit of the German movement "Kraft und Freude". Other systemic measures of the regime included the partial extension of paid holidays to allow employees to rest and relax. The number of days of paid holiday could reach a considerable number, depending on professional position and number of years worked. For example, officials could have from 10 to 42 days of holiday in a year.⁷⁹ Some important one-time social actions of the regime also had a positive influence. They included a project to build family houses for workers with state assistance. The government also distributed five thousand free sets of items necessary to babies to working class families, and paid for recreation for dozens of children from the socially weakest families. The state party built up its own social department, which organized an annual "Winter Aid" for the socially weakest groups by means of financial contributions and collections of clothes and food. From 1940, the state deducted money for this purpose, amounting to 1-2% directly from the pay of state employees. The Hlinka Guard, party organizations and representatives of the state administration and local government were gradually included in the Winter Aid scheme. The

Správy Ústavu pre výskum hospodárstva. Bratislava 1944, p. 25-30, 80-88.

79 MÚTŇANSKÝ, Eudovít. *Slovenská sociálna výstavba: cesta do nového európskeho sociálneho poriadku (Slovak social construction: the path to a new European social order)*. Bratislava : S.I. : s.n. 1944, p. 12-22; HOLEC – HALLON, ref. 78, p. 250-252; FALTUS – PRŮCHA, ref. 3, p. 541-542.

contributions were directed towards clothing and feeding activities. Later, beautification activities in towns and villages using resources from Winter Aid were also considered. The activities of HSPP in cooperation with the general building cooperative had a significant impact on the systematic construction of housing and cultural facilities. On the company level, the possibility of writing off socially useful investment from the tax base contributed to the spreading of social measures. For example, this possibility motivated the management of numerous companies to establish about 145 works canteens, as well as to construct social facilities and modern bathrooms, changing rooms, company housing, sports facilities and swimming pools, pre-school facilities for children and company recreation centres. For example, in 1941, company investment for social purposes reached about 62 million Ks. Various companies controlled by German capital were notable for their high level of social conditions for their employees. For example, Dynamite-Nobel of Bratislava had a complete relaxation centre with various sports facilities including tennis courts, swimming pools and a sauna, the first in Slovakia, constructed in a large area of their complex. The sports facilities served their purpose through the whole second half of the 20th century.⁸⁰ These steps helped to improve the social position of a large part of the population and they were maintained after the dissolution of the Slovak Republic. However, it is necessary to realize that in spite of the partial changes in economic structure, independent small farmers remained the most numerous group in Slovak society and they stood aside from the majority of the new social measures.

Changes in the overall system of social, pension, health and accident insurance also happened after 1938. The system continued to build on the successful results from the inter-war period. The regional branches of the two largest social insurance companies in the former Czechoslovakia: the Central Social Insurance Company (Ústredná sociálna poisťovňa) and the General Pension Institute (Všeobecný penzijný ústav) with their clients were separated and made into independent institutions for the territory of the Slovak state. Together with the Slovak part of the system of health insurance companies, they operated according to the principles developed during the inter-war period. They struggled with lack of finance and shortage of clients, but they continued to function without more serious problems. A more important result of the division of the Central Social Insurance Company was the creation of two independent scales of contribution rates and two different scales of social payments: for the Czech Lands and for Slovakia. The amounts in the scales for Slovakia were an average of 11% lower.⁸¹

The reverse side of the socio-economic position of the working population in the conditions of the Slovak state was the loss of various basic rights. The regime abolished the inter-war structure of democratic trade union organizations and deprived employees of the right to strike and to conclude collective agreements with their employers. The system of Christian trade unions was also destroyed in 1941. It was exceptional for a group of workers to dare to openly put forward wage and other demands by means of

80 MÚTŇANSKÝ, ref. 79, p. 12-22; ČEČETKA, Juraj. Sociálna služba (Social service). In *Gardista*, 5 Nov. 1940, roč. 2, p. 1; HORNOVÁ, ref. 1, p. 59-60; SABOL, ref. 6, p. 387-388; BAKA, ref. 6, p. 177-178.

81 HALLON, Eudovít. Pod ochranou zákonov (Under protection of the law). In *História*, 2003, year 3, no. 6, p. 28. ISSN 1335-8316.

strikes or other more radical methods, as happened in the cases of the Handlová miners in 1940 or the employees of the Žilina textile factory in 1943.⁸²

The most tragic chapter in the social development of the Slovak state was the fate of the Jewish community, which originally had about 89 thousand members. The introduction of anti-Jewish legislation deprived them of all types of property including personal possessions. Jewish property was taken by the state and then granted in various forms of Aryanization. Together with their property, the Jews gradually lost their civil rights and freedoms. By the end of 1941 they became a socially dependent pauperized mass of people without rights, which meant a great social burden for the state. The regime was able to solve the given situation by deporting the Jews after agreement with the government leaders of Nazi Germany, and by concentrating them in labour camps in Slovakia. The government and parliament initially decided on the first possibility. After the deportation of 58 thousand members of the Jewish community to extermination camps, a decision was taken in autumn 1942 to stop the transports and concentrate the remaining Jews in labour camps at Sereď, Nováky and Vyhne. A further eight thousand “economically important” Jews worked in various sectors of the economy in constantly worsening conditions. In the labour camps, the Jews saved their basic existence and by means of self-administration and slave labour, they secured the basic necessities of life, including school attendance and pre-school facilities. However, whole families lived here under armed guard and without the possibility to leave the camp. The Slovak National Uprising in August 1944 brought them freedom, but after the occupation of Slovakia by German units, the majority of them became the target of a second wave of deportations.⁸³

Under the influence of escalation of the military conflict, the supply situation also worsened for the majority of the population. In spite of the fact that supplies to the market were more regular than in the neighbouring countries, the range of goods in short supply gradually widened. At first, cracks appeared especially in the supply of luxury and imported goods, but approximately from the middle of 1940, shortages began to appear in the market for domestic industrial goods and then in the sphere of the basic necessities of life. Loss of the southern territories with the most fertile soil resulted in permanent tension in supplies of higher quality varieties of grain, flour and fats. A temporary fall in the supply of flour and other basic foods occurred already in the first phases of

82 KATUNINEC, ref. 6, p. 83-86.

83 For more details see e.g.: NIŽŇANSKÝ, Eduard – HLAVINKA, Ján (eds.). *Arizácie. Acta historica Posoniensia XI, Judaica Et Holocaustica 1*. Bratislava : Stimul, 2010. ISBN 9788089236862; NIŽŇANSKÝ, Eduard – KAMENEC, Ivan – BAKA, Igor. *Holokaust na Slovensku 5. Židovské pracovné tábory a strediská na Slovensku v rokoch 1938 – 1944. Dokumenty (The Holocaust in Slovakia 5. Jewish labour camps and centres in Slovakia in the period 1938 – 1944. Documents)*. Zvolen : Klemo, 2004. ISBN 809686629X; NIŽŇANSKÝ, Eduard. *Holokaust na Slovensku 6. Deportácie v roku 1942. Dokumenty (The Holocaust in Slovakia 6. The deportations of 1942. Documents)*. Zvolen : Klemo, 2005. ISBN 8096924230; HLAVINKA, Ján – NIŽŇANSKÝ, Eduard. *Pracovný a koncentračný tábor v Sereďi (The labour and concentration camp at Sereď)*. Bratislava : Dokumentačné centrum holokaustu, 2009. ISBN 9788096985739; ZAVACKÁ, Katarína. *Protizidovské zákonodarstvo slovenského štátu (Anti-Jewish legislation of the Slovak state)*. In *Tragédia slovenských Židov. Materiály z medzinárodného sympózia Banská Bystrica 25. – 27. marca 1992*. Ed. Dezider Tóth. Banská Bystrica : DATEI, 1992. ISBN 8085306042; HALLON, ref. 76, p. 148-160.

the war with the Soviet Union. The black market grew in direct proportion to the supply problems. People had to pay substantially higher prices on the black market than in legal shops with state controlled and later also regulated prices. Government economic circles were faced with the dilemma of how to secure regular supplies of basic necessities for the population, while avoiding an unpopular rationing system, which most of the countries of Europe were introducing. In the end, they found a compromise in the form of so-called purchase books introduced from 1940. At first, these were used to regulate the sales of basic foods, especially meat, sugar, bread, flour and fat, of which there were shortages. Later, the government extended its regulation to cover industrial products such as shoes, tyres and various raw materials and fuels, namely wood, coal, coke and petrol.

The regime also controlled supplies with other measures of an administrative character. For example, it gave the police the power to directly enter homes and intervene against excessive hoarding of supplies. They introduced obligatory austerity recipes for the production of bread, baked products, dairy products, beer and smoked meat. Supplies of some kinds of food to restaurants were banned because of shortages of raw materials. Difficulties with supplies of food and other basic necessities were further deepened by the fulfilment of obligations to Germany, which had priority in importing agricultural products and fuels. Other state measures with a negative impact on the population included the introduction of universal labour obligations for citizens aged 18 to 60, so-called labour service in the army or the setting of maximum wages.⁸⁴

At first the regime gave, but later it was forced to take away. The list of goods in the purchase books was ever longer. Citizens gradually realized that their wages were growing more slowly than prices in the shops, not to speak of the black market. Worsening of the social situation, especially from the end of 1943, gradually eroded confidence in the regime and dissatisfaction spread among the people. This development, together with other factors, such as the alliance with Nazi Germany, strengthening of the repressive character of the authoritarian regime and persecution of the Jews, brought an ever larger number of people into the sphere of passive resistance or active struggle. The aims of socio-economic development and far reaching changes in the social system in the conditions of the regime of the Slovak Republic of 1939 – 1945 started from the ideology of political Catholicism and from the theoretical vision of Christian social teaching. However, from the programme aims developed over a long period by HSPP only strengthening of the role of the state in the economy and a collection of social measures of systemic and partial character were successfully put into practice during its period as the state-party in close cooperation with Germany. The main aim of establishing a corporate system based on principles of Christian solidarity proved to be illusory in the domestic and international circumstances of the time. The system of the Slovak Working Community, based on the ideology of national socialism enforced by Germany and the radical forces in domestic politics, remained on the threshold of social practice in spite of efforts to achieve its implementation. Part of the socio-economic programme was implemented successfully, mainly thanks to the favourable influence of the wartime boom and by means of some

84 SABOL, ref. 6, p. 384-386; HORNOVÁ, ref. 1, p. 61-64.

legislative measures. Deepening of the military conflict complicated socio-economic development and various social programmes were stopped half way.

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
VORSTELLUNGEN, REALITÄT UND DER INTERNATIONALE KONTEXT DES SOZIALSTAATES IN DER SLOWAKISCHEN REPUBLIK 1939 – 1945

EUDOVÍT HALLON – MICHAL SCHVARC

Die konservativen Kräfte in der slowakischen Gesellschaft der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts, die sich um die Volkspartei gruppierten, suchten nach Vorbildern in dem christlichen Solidarismus laut den päpstlichen Enzykliken, wodurch die Ideologie des Klassenkampfes, die von der linken sozialistischen Bewegung durchgesetzt wurde, ersetzt werden sollte. Sie bildeten auch eigene christliche Gewerkschaften. Sie stellten den Parlamentarismus und das politische System westlicher Art in Frage und planten ihn durch einen klassenlosen Ständestaat zu ersetzen. Diese Absichten konnten sie dann, nach der Machtergreifung im Herbst 1938 auch umsetzen, insbesondere nach der Verselbstständigung der Slowakei und Beginn des autoritativen Regimes im März 1939. Die Idee des Ständestaates wurde auch in der Verfassung der Slowakischen Republik vom Juli 1939 verankert. Der nächste Verbündete der selbstständigen Slowakei, das nazistische Deutschland, lehnte aber die Idee des Ständestaates ab, weil der Ideenträger der Nazismusegner, der österreichische Philosoph O. Spann und das Regierungssystem von E. Dollfuß und K. Schuschnigg in Österreich der 30er Jahren war. Die Idee des christlichen Solidarismus wurde deswegen, mit der Unterstützung von slowakischen Radikalen unter V. Tuka, durch die, vom Philosoph Š. Polakovič ausformulierten Ideologie des slowakischen Nationalsozialismus und die Pläne einer Ständegesellschaft durch das System der Slowakischen Arbeitsgemeinschaft nach dem Vorbild der nazistischen Organisation Deutsche Arbeitsfront (DAF) ersetzt. Das Regierungsregime der Slowakischen Republik 1939 – 1945 versuchte die neuen Grundsätze der Verständnis eines Sozialstaates auch in dem Wirtschafts- und Sozialbereich durch die Verstärkung der Rolle vom Staat in der Wirtschaft umzusetzen, was auch durch den Aufbau der Kriegswirtschaft, sowie die System- und Einmalsozialmaßnahmen, wie das Kindergeld, Verlängerung des bezahlten Urlaubs, Unterstützung der Familienerholungsurlaube usw. unterstützt wurde. Die Umsetzung der damaligen Vorstellungen über den Sozialstaat und das politische System wurde jedoch nicht vollbracht.

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Michal Kšiňan (a kol.)

Komunisti a povstania | Communists and Uprisings

Ritualizácia pripomínania
si protifašistických povstaní
v strednej Európe (1945-1960)

Ritualisation of Remembrance
of the Anti Nazi Uprisings
in Central Europe (1945-1960)

Towarzystwo Słowaków w Polsce 2012

REVIEWS

DANGL, Vojtech – BYSTRICKÝ, Valerián et al. *CHRONOLÓGIA DEJÍN SLOVENSKA A SLOVÁKOV. OD NAJSTARŠÍCH ČIAS PO SÚČASNOSŤ. Dejiny v dátumoch. Dátumy v dejinách. (CHRONOLOGY OF THE HISTORY OF SLOVAKIA AND THE SLOVAKS. FROM EARLIEST TIMES TO THE PRESENT. History in dates. Dates in history.)*. 2 volumes. Bratislava : Veda, 2014. ISBN 9788022413701; 9788022413732.

The need to record historical events in their chronological order has existed in the history of our civilization since Antiquity. Chronicles have always had a strong place in historical literature. Today, in an age of partial syntheses, case studies, micro-views and trans-disciplinary platforms, the need for high quality compendia, elementary handbooks or more comprehensive syntheses is no less urgent. While in the past, a chronicle was usually the work of an educated and determined individual, today the cooperation of a large team is required. This also applies to the *Chronology* reviewed here: several dozen experts from several historical institutions participated in writing it. On one side, we can see this as anchoring the depth, quality and level of consideration of the work, but on the other, we cannot fail to recognize the risk this brings.

In the brief introduction, the authors mention their motivations and aims: *Chronology* is an essential factographic basis for research, and the deepening of historical knowledge demands it. The aim was to provide the expert public with a summary of facts corresponding to the state of historical knowledge. The work would replace older, incomplete, tendentious, selective and sometimes distorted works of this type. The authors aimed especially at the “*maximum possible compactness, while fulfilling the demands placed on the modern study of historical chronology*”. We do not learn more about the approach and methodology of the writers. Neither do we learn about the problems that need to be solved if such a work is to appear. The questions that probably come into the minds of many of those, who pick up the book, about the criteria for selecting events, the filters used and the deeper conceptual and methodological principles of reducing history to a chronological progression, remain a mystery for the reader.

Familiar period milestones give *Chronology* its basic structure, including the division into two volumes. The first contains the period from prehistory to the end of the First World War, while the second covers the period since then. The work ends with the year 2010. The period milestones divide the *Chronology* into chapters. Each has a brief introduction summarizing the characteristics of political, economic, social and cultural development. Individual years form the structure of the chapters as the basic chronological units filled with the “smallest units” of chronology – entries giving information about events. For the period of prehistory, it was understandably impossible to follow this ideal arrangement, so periods described as “around” or “before” became the basic chronological units. The periods of Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages (periods of the Roman Empire, migrations and the Arpád dynasty) contain a combination of these approaches, which facilitates knowledge of these periods. In the earlier periods, entries cover mainly important political events, with economic and occasionally cultural developments appearing less frequently. In later periods, as knowledge deepens, the number of events in individual years increases, with cultural and social data appearing ever more frequently. An impression arises of the alternation of the important and the banal, a degree of lack of balance, which provokes the already mentioned question about methodology, criteria and filters. In places, there is an impression that when nothing

especially important happened in a particular year, it is filled with other less important information, for example about the birth or death of personalities, available sociological information, the publication of books and so on. These problems would not arise, if the compilers had devoted space in the introduction to the methodological and conceptual questions mentioned above. The reader is only vaguely aware of how demanding it is to compile a work in a balanced form. Specialists on various periods and segments of history will notice various other examples of this lack of balance and work not favouring details. For example, information about a censorship decree from 1721 is so over-simplified that it gives the impression that there was no preventive censorship before then. The information on the *Nova Posoniensia* lacks the most important fact that the publication regarded as the first newspaper in Hungary had the important function of supporting modern Latin teaching. Information about publishing and cultural life acts as an inconsistent framework, if “important events” are accompanied by small mistakes: Juraj Rybaj instead of Ribay (p. 303), Samuel Červeňanský instead of Čerňanský (p. 314) and so on.

The content of the second volume of the reviewed *Chronology* is essentially the history of Slovakia and the Slovaks in the 20th century, if we take into account the view of various important historians, that from the point of view of social development and especially its dynamics, the 20th century began only in 1918. This dynamic of social development and its many sided diversification brought with it a great multitude of important historic facts and events, so that especially in comparison with the history of our nation in earlier periods, the problem arises not of the inadequacy of authentic documents testifying to individual historic events, but rather their huge quantity, which demands an extraordinarily great effort to achieve an adequate and proportionate selection. I am convinced that the team of authors has successfully solved this characteristic problem of the most recent history. The most important events from all fields of social development are really placed before us in the text.

A further problem we do not encounter to such an extent in earlier history is the high level of political topicality of many historical events, which leads “historicizing politicians” and “politicizing historians” to evaluate these events from the point of view of various political groups. In the recent past, this led to considerable deformation of the picture of our history. Let us mention only the heroicizing new names for state formations of our early medieval ancestors or the continual effort to idealize and justify the regime of the wartime Slovak Republic of 1939-1945. Chronological handbooks published before 1989 idealized the communist regime in Czechoslovakia and kept quiet about its terrible crimes. In the reviewed publication, the authors have succeeded in evaluating all the facts and events as objectively, critically and impartially as possible, and on a highly professional level. This is the sort of work that only rarely succumbs to the passage of time.

Naturally, everything people do has the factor of imperfection encoded in it. To a significant degree this can be limited by critical comments, if another edition of the publication appears in future. From the point of view of conception of the work, it would have been appropriate to devote a separate chapter to the period 1945 – 1948, although it was a very short period. However, the Second World War was also a brief period of only six years and a special section of the book is devoted to it. From the typological point of view, the period of the so-called people’s democracy was significantly different from both the preceding and succeeding periods, as the author of the brief introduction to the first chapter of the fifth part unwittingly recognizes. He devoted three pages from eight to this problem, although the chapter is concerned with the whole period from 1945 to 1989! From the point of view of clarity of the *Chronology* and easy search for individual dates, it is a pity that all periods do not give the year as well as the day and month. In years with a great number of events, and there are many in this part of the work, it is difficult to identify the year in question.

Some chronological data suffer from the characteristic deformation of scientific workers, namely that they unconsciously assume that all readers are as much experts as they and will understand the meaning of incomplete statements. For example, what is the “Padua Armistice” mentioned on page 561, which came into force on 3 November 1918? Only experts know this. On page 690, the Parliament of the Slovak Republic passed the Act on Interest Organizations. What organizations were involved and what was their relationship to the regime of the wartime Slovak Republic? This should be explained at least briefly. It was necessary to write a little more about Executive Resolution KI from 5 January 1943. It was a document that significantly influenced not only the communist but also the democratic anti-fascist struggle and not only in Slovakia. It is also necessary to consider a certain lack of quantitative balance in the relationship between essential and less essential facts. For example, the Battle of Kursk in July 1943, one of the most important milestones of the Second World War, receives less attention than the establishment of the Slovak Theatre Cooperative in Prešov. The importance of some events should have been more clearly emphasized. For example, in the case of the “2000 word challenge” from the end of June 1968 (p. 879), it was necessary to emphasize that the “civil committees” and various “order formations” mentioned in it, strongly reminded the communists, whether reformist or conservative, of the National Front action committees and People’s Militia, which had significantly contributed to their seizure of power in 1948. Therefore they greatly feared such organizations. In my view, it is also necessary to mention that the declaration of the Warsaw Pact summit on 3 August 1968 in Bratislava is a basic document of the so-called Brezhnev doctrine of the limited sovereignty of countries in the Soviet Bloc. The second part of the reviewed publication also contains some factual errors. For example, the XXII and not the XXI Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was held in October 1961. The secret meeting between L. Brezhnev and G. Husák on 13 April 1969, where Husák accepted all the strict Normalization measures so that he could become first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, was held at Mukačevo Airport and not in Užhorod!

In spite of these mistakes and inaccuracies, which form only fragments of the text, it is possible to boldly declare that this is the work we have long awaited, and it should be an ornament not only to the bookshelves of historians, but of all academic workers in the social sciences and all educated people in Slovakia.

The supplements are an important, successful and practical part of *Chronology*. The genealogical tables and lists of monarchs, county sheriffs, governors, state judges, Popes and anti-popes, ecclesiastical dignitaries and Hungarian governments will be appreciated by all their users, as will the maps and other illustrations. It is worth considering whether an index of themes could have been added to the indexes of names and places. Every work attempting a more comprehensive view of history is important and welcome especially as a help not only for students of history and the general public. It shows that in spite of theoretical trends, time and space remain an important category for knowledge and understanding of development. Without high quality presentation of facts, it is impossible to contribute to syntheses and theoretical approaches. *Chronology of the history of Slovakia and the Slovaks* belongs to the chronicle genre, but is also a modern work that represents the present state of Slovak historiography.

Ivona Kollárová
Stanislav Sikora

KOWALSKÁ, Eva. *NA ĎALEKÝCH CESTÁCH, V CUDŽÍCH KRAJINÁCH. Sociálny, kultúrny a politický rozmer konfesijného exilu z Uhorska v 17. storočí* (*ON DISTANT ROADS, IN FOREIGN LANDS. The Social, Cultural and Political Dimensions of Confessional Exile from Hungary in the 17th Century*). Bratislava : VEDA, publisher of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, 2014, 253 pages. ISBN 9788022413671.

The phenomenon of exile is not a new element in European history: It was already found in the Early Modern period. A multitude of works examining various aspects have been devoted to the problem of exile in both the past and the present. It is possible to mention here that this problem has been one of the most popular themes of Czech historiography with the post-White Mountain (Bílá Hora) exile and of Slovak historiography with the events after the Bratislava trial. Very contrasting black and white views have been characteristic of previous research on this phenomenon. They started from stereotypical schemes of the struggle between progress and reaction, which had to occur between opposing religious institutions. When the larger and stronger beats the weaker, it is supposed that the smaller side had the truth and was essentially the bearer of progress. At the same time, the struggle between progressive and orthodox tendencies also occurred in the framework of each religious orientation. The concept of exile has many forms and specifics, and this was also true in the Early Modern period. In this period, it is very difficult to find a dividing line between the political and religious spheres of the life of society, because they substantially overlapped in many cases. Loyalty to the monarch and the patron also contained a strong religious sub-text, and violation of it brought serious political and legal consequences.

Early Modern Hungary was a typical exile country, which had both an inflow and an outflow of exiles. It was already known in the political writings of the period that some degree of “religious tolerance” existed in Hungary, something often incomprehensible for the foreign public. However, this was not real religious freedom, but more an enforced state, in which, for various reasons, no single group was able to liquidate its opponents. Political writings, especially by Protestants, regarded the Jesuits as the “misfortune” of Hungary. However, the other side condemned the Protestants of Hungary in connection with the Turkish presence, and asked whether it was right and in the interests of religious freedom to combine with the enemies of Christianity. Actions against the Protestant churches of Hungary occurred in roughly this context in the 1670s.

Eva Kowalská has attempted to analyse the complex and many layered problem of exile on four basic levels in a new, untraditional way. Not only the political, but also the religious situation in Europe in the second half of the 17th century was determined by the terms of the Peace of Westphalia, which essentially divided Europe into spheres of influence. To this we can add the situation with the Ottoman Empire, with which there was a 20 year peace treaty. This offered the Habsburg court the possibility to solve the religious situation in Hungary according to the tried and tested methods applied in the Kingdom of Bohemia. The author maps in great detail the situation leading to the wave of exiled Protestant clergy, which had similarities to events in the Kingdom of Bohemia. First of all, the state authorities disturbed the relationship between the clergy and their patrons. It is necessary to agree with the view that when many representatives of the nobility and the towns could not resist the pressure of persecution from the royal court, this inevitably had consequences for the clergy, who could feel betrayed, abandoned and dependent only on themselves, which certainly influenced their psychic and mental state, not only during their trial, but also during imprisonment and exile.

The question of the circumstances of the trial and categorization of the accused is analysed very precisely in the work. In spite of the fact that the trials pursued various aims, they had to be held within the existing legal framework, although it is possible to argue with some views. The author could have included in her work a quantitative, statistical analysis of the number of accused at the special courts, naturally also following the exiles, to give the reader an idea of some proportions. We can get the impression that the Protestant clergy were essentially “liquidated”, but developments in the next period do not confirm this. The part about the participants in the exile story and their classification can be very positively evaluated. In the spectrum of types of religious exiles from Hungary, from *ideologue* to *trouble maker* it would do no harm to use other criteria such as success or failure to apply themselves in the foreign environment, the influence of this on their return and so on. However, we can consider it rather inconsistent to treat the profile of the Jesuit Nicholas Kellio as a *negative hero*. He certainly played role in the judicial process and this was negative from the point of view of the accused and convicted, but he had no significant influence on the position of the clergy in exile. The *trouble maker* can be seen as more a *negative* than a *positive* figure.

The part about the social aspects of exile presents a large amount of new findings and information. In spite of the fact that the exiles did not go to an unknown political, cultural, religious and social environment, but to one where many could complete their university studies, they still had to deal with many complex problems brought to them by life in exile. First of all, their social position was radically changed. Their new environment did not always give them an open and friendly reception. Many of them could not continue their original profession. They often had to support themselves in unfamiliar ways. The author very comprehensively documents this aspect of the life of exiled Protestant clergymen from Hungary in the second half of the 17th century, giving a multitude of examples.

The most valuable part of the work is found in two chapters that are rather inconsistent from the formal point of view: *Quarreling exiles 1* and *Quarreling exiles 2*. It is also possible to place here the preceding chapter: *Pietists and exiles*. These chapters analyse the thoughts and views within the community of exiles. A whole range of positions on the conceptual currents discussed in the countries of exile is presented here. It is also necessary to bear in mind that persecution of a particular religious orientation automatically strengthens the elements of orthodoxy and does not provide much space for the penetration of more modern thinking. This process included discussion of the religious situation in the given country and discussions between the exiles themselves. When analysing these problems, the author had to overcome various obstacles caused by the need to sensitively approach sources produced during the exile and those produced after its end. In our view, the chapter about polemics with the Catholics, sometimes concerned the exiles defending their actions and views not only in relation to the Catholic Church, but especially in relation to their own religious community. The new and interesting findings presented in E. Kowalská’s work on religious exile in the second half of the seventeenth century are a positive contribution to knowledge not only of religious, but also of political and cultural history.

Viliam Čičaj

BYSTRICKÝ, Valerián. *ZAHRANIČNOPOLITICKÉ SÚVISLOSTI VZNIKU SLOVENSKEHO ŠTÁTU 14. MARCA 1939 (THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE ORIGIN OF THE SLOVAK STATE ON 14 MARCH 1939)*. Bratislava : VEDA, publisher of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, 2014, 462 pages. ISBN 9788022413640.

The reviewed publication by the leading Slovak historian V. Bystrický is composed of seven chapters with titles clearly indicating what forms the core of the author's analyses: Foreign policy considerations of the (Czecho)slovak political parties, 1918 – 1938; Nazi Germany and Czecho-Slovakia, 1938 – 1939; Information about the Nazi plans against Czecho-Slovakia; The foreign policy of the central government; The foreign policy activities of the Slovak People's Party; Political parties and international development in the period of autonomy; The Third Reich and the origin of the Slovak state. The individual chapters are divided into sub-chapters with titles more closely defining the problems they examine. There is also a conclusion in which the author briefly points to the changes Slovak society had "*undergone after the formation of the Czechoslovak Republic in its views on the foreign policy problems of the [Czechoslovak] state*" and to "*some degree also on international development*". In correlation with the power-political rise and aspirations of National Socialist Germany, these changes finally conditioned the inclination of the Slovak political scene or its most important components to Germany led by Chancellor Adolf Hitler.

We will look more closely at the content of the individual chapters. The first speaks of the formation of the foreign policy ideas of the Slovak political parties. These ideas were already formed before the First World War. The impulse for such considerations was the conviction of their leading representatives that the position of Slovakia in the Monarchy could change only under pressure from the international situation and a "*favourable international political situation*". It is possible to say that this was a realistic view with regard for the immediate possibilities and the needs of the Slovak national community. After the formation of the Czechoslovak Republic, in which Slovakia became "*part of the Western democratic world with all the consequences flowing from this*", inability to adopt a "*more long-term, consistent and unified position*" on key problems of international development became a typical feature of "*Slovak political groups*". The author of the reviewed publication sees the cause of this situation in the fact that "*national agitation*" was organized on one side by the autonomists from Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, and on the other side by "*supporters of the political orientation which did not consider Slovak autonomy topical*". (p. 19) With some simplification, it is possible to say that this division of the Slovak political scene in relation to international development was a permanent feature of Slovak politics in the period 1918 – 1939. In the author's view, this was a result of the older development in Slovak society, which, among other things, did not demand systematic education of cadres and building up of the institutions necessary for the continual, qualified assessment of foreign policy questions. There is not enough space in a review to devote attention to all the questions analysed by the author in the 65 pages and 16 sub-chapters of the first chapter. In the opinion of the reviewer, the main value of the first chapter lies in its explanations of the positions of the individual political parties in Slovakia on the topical questions of international development and the main factors influencing these positions.

The second chapter is divided into 8 sub-chapters and concentrates mainly on analysis of the attitude of National Socialist Germany towards Czecho-Slovakia in 1938 – 1939, although in some passages, the author returns to the period before the Munich conference. It rejects the view that the interest of Berlin, like that of Budapest and Warsaw, "*in the autonomist demands of the People's Party*" was connected with a positive effort to support "*solution of the Slovak question*". The

background of this interest was mainly an effort to “*discredit the republic*” and “*worsen relations*” within it (p. 83), to weaken its internal solidarity and using deliberate press campaigns to promote the impression that Czechoslovakia contained not only the “*Sudeten German question*” and the “*Slovak question*” but also a whole complex of problems connected “*with the unequal positions of the Hungarian and Polish minorities*”. Among other things, the second chapter answers the question of why the German National Socialists attributed special importance to Slovakia in the process of the deliberate liquidation of Czechoslovakia, and how “*they achieved the elimination of the [potentially competing] Hungarian positions and especially Polish political influence in Slovakia*”. (p. 91)

The third chapter with its 9 sub-chapters includes talk of the “*aggressive intentions of Nazi Germany after the Munich agreement*”. At first “*there was no agreement about the method and direction of Nazi aggression*”. (p. 132) For example, already at the beginning of October 1938, Winston Churchill expressed the view that the Czechoslovak state would only survive a few months “*as an independent unit*”. However, there was no lack of voices casting doubt on this view. They relied mainly on the assumption that Hitler would concentrate his attention first of all on solution of the “*colonial question*”, in which Berlin had continued to take an interest practically from the end of the Paris Peace Conference, and on solution of the problem of the “*Baltic states*” and so on. The author shows that a disinformation campaign deliberately organized by the German propaganda centres played a large part in promoting this erroneous evaluation of the real intentions of Berlin. A large part of the third chapter is concerned with how political circles in Hungary, Poland, Italy, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union reacted to the first phase of Germany’s post-Munich policy towards Czechoslovakia. The chapter ends with an analysis of how the Czecho-Slovak intelligence bodies reacted to the German threat, and what information about Berlin’s plans was available to the Slovak region.

In the 11 sub-chapters of the fourth chapter, the author analyses the changes in the international position of the second republic, which found itself in “*international isolation*” after the signing of the Munich agreement, and soon ceased to be a “*subject of international politics*”. (p. 173) The basic rule for the new ruling structures became respect for the fact that “*we [the Czechs and Slovaks] are dependent on the Germans for favour or disfavour*”, which inevitably resulted from the fact that at the beginning of autumn 1938 Berlin had the opportunity “*achieve its demands [against Prague] not only by diplomatic pressure, but also by threatening to use military force*”. (p. 174) Faced with this reality, the Černín Palace (Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry) and the central government in Prague decided for a policy of “*resignation*” lying in preparedness to “*fulfil all the conditions demanded by Berlin*”, concede to all “*German wishes*” and “*in this way to prove their unambiguous break with the past*”, which meant with the first republic. It is possible to say that after twenty years of existence, the republic found itself at a dead end, from which the only possibility was “*to hold together what remained after Munich and the Vienna Arbitration*”. (p. 179)

Former President Beneš also essentially identified with this position. After going into exile on 5 October 1938, he declared his support for the policy of “*reserve and concessions*” towards Germany and towards Hungary and Poland. In fact there was a substantial difference between Beneš and the Prague politicians lying in the fact that the former president had no doubt that a “*general war*” would break out and correct the situation in the foreseeable future, while the Prague politicians expected the long-term domination of a “*nationally united Germany*”. Although the Slovak autonomous government and the central government in Prague more or less agreed on this subject, they disagreed on various other vitally important issues and these disagreements deepened over time as a result of Prague’s growing distrust of the orientation of the Slovak political leaders. In fact, at a time when the signing of the Munich agreement indicated a serious shift in the balance of power between Great Britain and France on one side and Germany on the other, it could scarcely

be otherwise. After the signing of the Munich agreement, it was vitally important for the post-Munich republic to gain effective guarantees, but for various reasons of a power – political nature it was unrealistic and practically impossible. This is how the message of the fourth chapter of the work can be summarized.

Like the fourth, the fifth chapter also has 11 sub-chapters. It is devoted to the political development in Slovakia after the signing of the Munich agreement, the steps of the supporters of both the radical and moderates wings of Hlinka's Slovak People's Party after Munich in both domestic and foreign policy, V. Tuka's visit to the German Chancellor Adolf Hitler, the relations of autonomous Slovakia with the neighbouring states, and a new question for Slovakia, namely the "*beginnings of Slovak diplomacy*". Essentially, all these activities were more or less connected with the preparedness of HSPP "*to seize power in October 1938*" in Slovakia and take responsibility not only "*for implementing the autonomist programme*", "*but also for other tasks including the search for a new organization of security, ensuring the future of the nation, which found itself at a crossroads, preserving territorial integrity and so on*". (p. 229) It was a matter of more demanding "*ambitions*" that "*had no support in law*". (p. 230) However, it is necessary to add that the reality after Munich reduced this deficit because space was opened to forces, which, under the impact of contemporary circumstances unforeseen "by the law", led to the demand for autonomy, pursued since the beginning of the 1930s, very quickly becoming inadequate and being replaced by the demand for Slovak state independence. In fact, the Slovak political leadership remained, as is logical, tied to "*national tradition*". Otherwise, K. Sidor and Jozef Tiso would not have informed the Polish ambassador in Prague K. Papé at a meeting at the end of September or beginning of October 1938, that "*their aim is the creation of an independent Slovak state under the protection of Poland...*" (p. 243, emphasized by the reviewer).

The five sub-chapters of the sixth chapter are devoted to the views of the political parties in Slovakia on the international developments in the period of autonomy. In the sub-chapter devoted to the People's Party, the author observes that in Slovakia the Munich agreement was understood "*also as opening of the way to achieving the demands of the 20 year struggle for a change in the position of Slovakia in the republic*", and so the mood of the public in Slovakia after Munich was entirely different to that in the Czech Lands. The press contributed to this, as well as populist declarations from HSPP politicians, on the basis which the only correct orientation was "*to the strongest neighbour*", understood as a balance to the orientation to the Western "*democratic*" world. (p. 296) However, this did not result in "*any general pro-German enthusiasm or lasting admiration for the Führer, even after the origin of the Slovak state*". (p. 303) It is possible to deduce from this that the radicals did not succeed in remodelling the public mood exclusively according to their ideas, in spite of the fact that they had the whole of the mass media of the time under their control. However, the People's Party set the tone and the Agrarians, Social Democrats and Nationalists more or less adapted to it. On the question of securing frontiers or defence of the independence of the country they held similar views.

The inclination of the Social Democrats to the "Ludáks" was forced by the circumstances of the time, but it calculated with the view that: "*Ludák autonomy would lose its attraction after a time and the Social Democrats would have a chance to gain power*". (p. 328) Signing of the Vienna Arbitration, by which Slovakia lost part of its territory, had a decisive influence on the decision of the "Agrarians" and other small parties to merge with the People's Party under the extended name: Hlinka's Slovak People's Party – Party of Slovak National Unity. (p. 334) This step was supposed to make Slovakia more able "*to confront external threats*". (p. 334) The factor that helped the Slovak political parties to blunt their mutual disputes in the post-Munich period, was the hegemonic position of Germany in the Danube Basin and actually in the whole of Europe. Recognition or consideration of this reality muffled their natural rivalry and – figuratively speaking – enabled

them to walk in the same direction for some time. The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was banned on 9 October 1938.

In the fifth sub-chapter of the seventh chapter, the author directs his attention to the events and circumstances immediately preceding the declaration of the Slovak state, which led to an attempt by the central government in Prague to solve the situation in Slovakia by military intervention. Although the head of the central government R. Beran hesitated to undertake this extreme solution of some time, he finally agreed because he had been convinced for a long time that *“nothing good can be achieved with J. Tiso”*. (p. 354) The intervention by soldiers and gendarmes in Slovakia, the so-called Homola putsch, happened. It became clear that this step was rejected not only by the active supporters of Slovak independence, but also among members of the former government parties (p. 364) and a large part of Slovak society. This was very useful for Germany, which used the worsening of Czecho – Slovak relations, culminating in the Homola putsch, to intensify the steps leading to the quickest possible destruction of the Czecho-Slovak state. Thus, the “Homola putsch” paradoxically helped Hitler to achieve the aim, which was one of the priorities of the emerging German Reich at the time.

The sub-chapters devoted to the mission of the representative of the German Foreign Ministry Wilhelm Keppler to Bratislava on 12 March 1939 and Jozef Tiso’s journey to Berlin a day later, which created the necessary pre-conditions for the origin of the Slovak state also give interesting factual information about the role of Nazi Germany in the origin of the Slovak state. The concluding sub-chapter deals with events in Bratislava on the day of the declaration of the state.

The reviewed publication is an important contribution to knowledge of the political history of Slovakia at the end of the 1930s, when the power-political situation in Europe, starting in its central part, began to change rapidly in harmony with the strategic interests of National Socialist Germany. The states, that, for whatever reason, stood in the way of the power-political expansion of the emerging German Reich, inevitably became the first victims. This was facilitated by the fact that in the fragmented Europe of “independent states” after the Great War, there was no reliable support from the ranks of the victorious powers, which had decided the territorial arrangement of the “old continent” after November 1918. Great Britain, the typical naval great power, was not such a support and could not be because its interest was concentrated on its colonial empire scattered around the whole world. France with its enormous human and material losses in the war was able to play the role of great power ally of Czechoslovakia only apparently and temporarily, but at the end of September 1938 it was obvious that its possibilities were exhausted. The United States of America signed separate peace treaties with Germany, Austria and Hungary in August 1921, and deliberately distanced itself from developments in Europe by a policy of “isolationism”. The leaders of National Socialist Germany at the end of the 1930s had good reasons to hope that their attempt to change the power-political situation in Central Europe would not encounter any insuperable obstacles. The First Czechoslovak Republic became one of the first victims of this approach. V. Bystrický’s book gives a qualified answer not only to the question of how and why this attempt gained the support of leading representatives of the dominant political force in Slovakia – Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party, but also to various other questions connected with political developments in Slovakia in the period 1918 – 1939.

Pavol Petruf

SLOVENSKO-NEMECKÉ VZŤAHY 1938 – 1941 V DOKUMENTOCH I. Od Mníchova k vojne proti ZSSR (SLOVAK – GERMAN RELATIONS 1938 – 1941 IN DOCUMENTS I. From Munich to the War against the USSR). Eds. Eduard Nižňanský, Jana Tulkisová, Igor Baka, Miloslav Čaplovič, Miroslav Fabricius, Ľudovít Hallon, Dušan Segeš, David Schriffl, Michal Schvarc. Prešov : Spoločnosť PRO HISTORIA in the publisher UNIVERSUM-EU, s.r.o. 2009, 1171 p. ISBN 9788089046614.

SLOVENSKO-NEMECKÉ VZŤAHY 1941 – 1945 V DOKUMENTOCH II. Od vojny proti ZSSR po zánik Slovenskej republiky v roku 1945 (SLOVAK – GERMAN RELATIONS 1941 – 1945 IN DOCUMENTS II. From the War against the USSR to the Dissolution of the Slovak Republic in 1945). Eds. Eduard Nižňanský, Jana Tulkisová, Igor Baka, Miloslav Čaplovič, Miroslav Fabricius, Ľudovít Hallon, David Schriffl, Michal Schvarc. Prešov : Spoločnosť PRO HISTORIA in the publisher UNIVERSUM-EU, s.r.o. 2011, 1093 p. ISBN 9788089046683.

The period of existence of the Slovak State/ Slovak Republic of 1939 – 1945 attracts strong interest from Slovak historians, as their rich publication activity shows. An essential pre-condition both for grasping the internal political situation in Slovakia and for its foreign policy position is understanding of its relations with Germany, which played the key role in the creation of independent Slovakia in March 1939. The connection with the Third Reich was reflected in the subsequent conclusion of the Treaty of Protection with a secret protocol on economic and financial cooperation. Its content clearly shows the dependence of the new state on the needs and in the end on the existence of Nazi Germany. Not only the foreign, but also the military, economic and financial policies of the country had to develop in harmony with German interests.

The two volumes of published documents represent an exceptional contribution in terms of extent and range to the clarification of Slovak – German relations from 1938 to the dissolution of the Slovak Republic, in spite of the fact that it is not the first edition of sources on this theme. Nine leading experts from the field of research into relations between Slovakia and Nazi Germany from the Faculty of Philosophy of Comenius University, the Institute of History of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, Institute of Military History and the Historical Commission of the Austrian Academy of Sciences, cooperated to produce it. Various members of the team of authors (Michal Schvarc and David Schriffl) participated, for example, in the bilingual edition of documents: “The Third Reich” and the origin of the Slovak State I, II (in Slovak, 2008, 2010), devoted to the formation of their relationship in the period from the second half of September 1938 to March 1939 on the basis of sources of German origin. Eduard Nižňanský deepened our knowledge of the so-called solution of the Jewish question in Slovakia using documents from various Nazi German institutions in the framework of the edition: The Holocaust in Slovakia, IV Documents of German origin 1939 – 1945 (in Slovak, 2003). However, the German sources were first made accessible in the form of an edition in the 1960s or 1970s by Vilém Prečan: The Slovak National Uprising. The Germans and Slovakia 1944 (in Slovak). Ladislav Suško published documents in the German language: Das Deutsche Reich und die Slowakische Republik 1938 – 1945 (2008). Milan Ďurica also published on the theme: La Slovacchia e le sue relazioni politiche con la Germania 1938 – 1945 (1964), and it is also necessary to mention Ladislav Deák’s Vienna Award, 2 November 1938. Documents I – III (in Slovak, 2002 – 2005). Various important documents appeared in the framework of the series Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik in the 1950s and 1960s.

The edition of documents concerning Slovak – German relations 1938 – 1945 derives from extensive research carried out in more than 80 collections mainly in foreign archives. They include

especially the Political Archive of the Foreign Office in Berlin, where the compilers examined the Gesandtschaft Pressburg collection, but also the documents from the office of the foreign minister of the Reich, the deputy minister and second deputy minister at the Foreign Office, as well as the embassies of Nazi Germany in the surrounding states. Documents on the activity of the Sicherheitsdienst in Slovakia drew on the R 70 Slowakei collection of the Federal Archive in Berlin. The papers of the Governor of Austria Arthur Seyß-Inquart and the Deutsche Partei collection were researched in the Federal Archive in Koblenz. The authors found further sources in the Military Archive in the Federal Archive at Freiburg, the National Archives of the Czech Republic in Prague (Berlin Foreign Office 1932 – 1945 Collection) and the Alexandrijský Archive in the Slovak National Archives, Bratislava.

The first volume of the edition: *Slovak – German Relations 1938 – 1945 in documents (From Munich to the War against the USSR)* contains 400 documents, while the second, covering the period from the war against the USSR to the dissolution of the Slovak Republic in 1945 includes 340 documents. Thus, the team of authors led by E. Nižňanský accepted the beginning of the war against the USSR, in which the Slovak Republic actively participated, as the dividing line for content and chronology. It can be regarded as the decisive turning point in Nazi policy during the Second World War. By means of political, economic and military documents mainly of German origin, the authors present to the reader the variety of relations between the Slovak state and the Reich, the depth of Slovakia's dependence on Nazi Germany and its position as a German satellite. Although some of the documents were published before, their inclusion in this collection with their full text and Slovak translation is justified. The volumes gain comprehensiveness from this and facilitate the reader's understanding of the development of Slovak – German relations on various levels. However, the huge range of subjects considered by the compilers enforced definite selectivity in the choice of documents. The selection and arrangement of sources in an edition, the criteria and mutual relationships between the documents are the responsibility of the compilers. Even at first sight it is clear that they were faced with an immensely demanding task of selecting the most important documents, which offered the deepest possible insight into the relevant problems. As a result of the huge range covered by the edition, various interesting sources did not get into it, including records of meetings of the German – Slovak Economic Commission. The edition concentrates on the publication of political documents, with less space devoted to economic, military and intelligence materials.

The documents are mostly published with their full German text accompanied by Slovak translations. They are introduced by an abstract with a list and description of all the documents and an introduction in English as well as in Slovak and German. The sources are also accompanied by an apparatus of notes, which number several thousand in each volume as a result of the great number of documents. This hinders rapid orientation, so I think it would be better to provide individual documents with their own apparatus of notes.

I consider the creation of a biographical supplement in German and Slovak very useful. In addition to the index of names, it very much facilitates the reader's orientation in the multitude of Slovak and German personalities of the period.

The proportions of sources in the individual volumes are determined by the most important factors in the development of Slovakia as an ally or satellite of Nazi Germany. For understandable reasons, attention is focused in the first volume on the origin of the independent state, on bilateral negotiations and the conditions for Slovak participation in the invasion of Poland. The volume comprehensively reflects the government crisis in Slovakia in 1940 and the internal political power struggle of the time. The second volume is dominated by documents connected with the actions of the Slovak army in the war against the USSR and with the German occupation of our territory at the time of the Slovak National Uprising. The collection of sources concerned with the

so-called solution of the Jewish question in Slovakia in cooperation with Nazi Germany is also very interesting. The edition also includes information about talks on the employment of Slovak workers in Germany, the placing of German advisers in Slovak government offices and many other questions.

The extensive collection of documents mainly derived from the most varied German institutions offers the expert and lay public the possibility to learn about a multitude of aspects of the development of Slovak-German relations from the beginning of autonomy until the bitter end in 1945. However, with regard to people interested in this period outside the historical community, the edition requires a more extensive introduction to the problems and references to specific published sources, such as were included in some of E. Nižňanský's previous volumes of documents. Such a study is lacking and less than two pages of introduction to the first volume cannot replace it. In spite of this, it is a valuable and high quality edition of documents, which will provide readers with unique study material for many years.

Martina Fiamová

KOVÁČ, Dušan et al. *DEJINY SLOVENSKEJ AKADEMIE VIED. (A HISTORY OF THE SLOVAK ACADEMY OF SCIENCES)*. Bratislava : Veda, vydavateľstvo SAV, 2014, 688 pages + 51 pages of illustrations. ISBN 9788022413169.

The extensive work by a team of authors from the Institute of History of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and the Central Archives of the SAS was prepared in connection with the sixtieth anniversary of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, but provides much more than the usual jubilee publication. The conception of the monograph, which bears signs of the ideas of the scientific editor Dušan Kováč, shows that the ambition of the authors was not only to create a simple chronicle of the development of the academy, but a detailed and critical historical analysis of this development. Although the book has forerunners in the form of various anniversary publications, it is a pioneering work in the sense that, for the first time, the authors have succeeded in conceiving the history of the academy in its full range with an organic connection to the political, cultural, economic and social conditions for its development. The reader has in his hands the first "free" history of the SAS, with the ideological stamp of the preceding totalitarian regime. This naturally has a positive influence on the exact, critical and objective evaluations and conclusions. A closer look at the apparatus of notes or the bibliography and sources shows that is a really original work, written mainly on the basis of the accessible archive materials and for the most recent periods, the methods of oral history and critical analysis of media reports.

The book has two parts in one volume and each of them is further structured into two parts. The first part contains a historical account and analysis, which forms the original author's part of the work. It is divided into chapters on the basis of chronology and content. The second part contains documents and supplements, which give more shape and detail to the picture created by the authors, but also provide a good starting point for further research, so that they are a useful part of the work not only a sort of formal appendix. Photographic material is included in this supplement.

The title of the first part: *The Slovak Academy of Sciences and Slovak Science against the Background of Historical and Social Development*, clearly describes the content and aim of this main part of the work. The first chapter from the pen of Karol Hollý is devoted to the prehistory of the origin of the academy. The author concentrates mainly on the efforts to organize science in

the form of institutions of academic type. The account begins with the first projects and attempts to establish learned societies in the Kingdom of Hungary in the 18th century. This is followed by description and analysis of the initiatives of the Slovak patriotic community in the framework of the Matica Slovenská cultural organization and after its dissolution. The text continues with the institutionalization of scientific research in Slovakia in the inter-war period up to the events connected with the origin of the Slovak state in 1939. Here the author could rely on a whole series of published works, especially those of Ján Tibenský and František Bokes, but especially, when analysing the discourses of Slovak national science around 1900 as well as in the inter-war period, he progressed much further, with a whole series of original findings and conclusions.

The greatest contribution to the first, analytical part of the book comes from Adam Hudek, who succeeded in grasping the problem of the origin and 60 year development of the academy with scientific exactness, extraordinary broadness of view and preparedness of research. Hudek's originality and independence is clearly connected with generational distance and lack of a burden from his own experience as a participant in the events described. At the same time, his balanced criticism also testifies to his professional maturity as a historian. The contribution of Hudek's texts does not lie only in the history of the academy, but also to a considerable extent in his account of the historical development of scientific policy in Slovakia and partly also in Czechoslovakia, which the Czech historical community will also certainly appreciate. Other authors of the first part: Jozef Klačka and Dušan Kováč also connect with this line, as does a brief essay by Ludmila Nemeskürthyová. These are extraordinarily authentic texts, which live in symbiosis with Hudek's interpretation, in spite of the fact that their authenticity also flows from generalizing their own experiences. As a long-term worker and director of the Central Archives of the SAS, as well as being a member of the committee of the Council of the SAS, J. Klačka is one of the most competent and best experts on the history of the academy. As a former member of the Presidium of the SAS, D. Kováč also had the possibility to closely watch the development of the SAS as its scientific secretary and chairman for several periods. This position certainly increased his ability to conceive and compile such a work, but his professional abilities as a recognized historian, as well as the knowledge of an actual participant are clearly embodied in the conception of the whole work and in his own chapter about the rebirth of the academy after 1989. It is noteworthy that D. Kováč as the editor remained decently in the background, but his already mentioned many-sided conception and research on the history of the SAS in its broad social context needs to be regarded as an important input to such an extensive work. His management of the preparation of the monograph with the participation of institutes and other organizations of the SAS is also not without significance.

The second and third chapters of the book, written by A. Hudek, are devoted to the forerunner of the SAS, the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Arts (SASA). It had a short history of only two decades. The division of the account into two chapters is connected with the different conditions for its functioning in Tiso's Slovak Republic and post-war Czechoslovakia. Serious changes of conditions came with another political milestone, the seizure of power by the communists in February 1948, but none of these changes of regime disturbed the continued existence of the SASA. The author informs us about the history of the SASA, especially through the prism of the attitudes of the changing political structures towards the academy. The declaration of the independence of Slovakia on 14 March 1939 also created a new situation from the point of view of the existing, but also lacking Slovak academic institutions. The chapter describes in detail their position in the first stage of the existence of the Slovak state, as well as the specific political motivations and initiatives leading to the origin of the SASA. Among the large amount of detailed information, the legislation establishing the new institution, as well as more exact data on the origin of its first scientific premises are missing, but this may be connected with the absence of the relevant documentation. The author's statements and observations about how the representatives of the SASA

sought their own way and had independent positions even in the conditions of the Ľudák regime, are interesting. There is also a telling account of the views of post-war politicians and scientists, which were reflected in the new legislation on the SASA, as well as on the formation of relations with Czech / Czechoslovak science in the revived Czechoslovakia.

The question of these relations gets a significant emphasis in further chapters in connection with the SAS. The reader may get the impression that the work devotes too much attention to questions of Slovak – Czech relations. Apparently it is not a result of the author over-estimating the problem, but of the fact that the leadership of the SAS devoted or had to devote much energy and attention to this problem. The author of the sub-chapter on relations between the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences (CSAS) and the SAS is J. Klačka in the fifth chapter as co-author with A. Hudek. Part of the third chapter, in which A. Hudek deals with the complex development of the SASA after the February coup, must be regarded as successful and original. This developmental stage included not very successful efforts to build up scientific institutes, solve relations with Matica Slovenská by transferring some of its tasks to the academy, as well as strengthening attempts by the communists to gain ideological control of science. At first, the scientific community was relatively successful in resisting propagandist pressure, but the IX congress of the Communist Party of Slovakia in May 1950 launched a programme of intensive Sovietization of Slovak education and science, which also penetrated into this sphere with its screening. The author also notes the parallel development in Prague, where Nejedlý's programme of creating a CSAS according to the Soviet model destroyed the tradition of the existing and relatively strong Czech scientific institutions. In Slovakia the situation was different. This was connected with the fact that the tradition of conformism to the demands of the state authorities was stronger here, and an effort to build up and widen the research base prevailed in the field of science and research. Therefore, an academy of the Soviet type with research institutes was associated with great expectations. The SASA also took a positive view of the establishment of the CSAS, and its final leadership actively participated in the preparations to establish the SAS. Thus, a specific continuity arose in the development of the SASA and SAS.

J. Klačka writes about the preparations to create the SAS, on the first legislation about the academy, on its initial organizational structure, personnel and premises, in the fourth chapter of the book. He devotes special attention to the initial conceptions for building the SAS, but also the formation of its relationship with the CSAS, in which the Soviet model with a central academy for the whole state and academies in each republic, also appeared appropriate. J. Klačka also points to the fact that some members of the government commission for building up the CSAS wanted to restrict the mission of the SAS to research on "Slovak matters". This would have meant that basic research would be done centrally by the CSAS, which would also take over some existing Slovak institutions. This conception did not prevail, but in relation to the fact that the basic documents did not solve the relationship between the CSAS and SAS very specifically, the Slovak side relatively frequently opened questions of relationship and responsibilities during further stages of development. The authors, and not only in this chapter but also in others, correctly point to the fact that the solution of these questions and sometimes disputes, also had a direct connection with the solution of constitutional issues and relations between the two parts of the state in other fields of social life. The sensitive perception of relationship questions at the SAS was also connected with the inadequacy of the research base in Slovakia. It is necessary to appreciate the effort of the authors to achieve balance, since apart from problems, they also point to a whole series of positive examples of successful, beneficial cooperation between Czech and Slovak institutes of the two academies, which actually prevailed in their symbiosis.

A. Hudek and J. Klačka deal with the first stage in the development of the SAS, namely the period 1953 – 1967, in the fifth chapter. It covers the characteristic contradictory development of the SAS in the conditions of communist totalitarianism, but also its deepening crisis. The ex-

tensive growth of the SAS research institutes against the background of political pressure is one of the places where we find contradiction. Growth was centred in the natural and technical sciences, as was desired in the given structure, but serious problems already emerged in provision of equipment. In spite of relatively high investment, difficulties accompanied the construction of new buildings. The ability of research to satisfy all the needs of society was also questionable, especially at the beginning. The aims of the scientists did not always correspond to the political orders. Problems also occurred in the personnel field, partly because of a lack of experts, but also as a result of cadre purges and an atmosphere of political distrust. Especially the social science institutes suffered from this distrust. A. Hudek deals with their complex situation in a separate sub-chapter. He is also the author of another sub-chapter, which describes the relationship of the SAS to other scientific institutions in Slovakia, including the universities, which also opens a very interesting theme from the point of view of the development of the scientific research base.

A. Hudek systematically analyses and evaluates the presence of the problems of scientific research in party documents. He comes to the conclusion that the absence of a sufficiently stable scientific policy of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the instability of economic relationships also negatively influenced the development of the CSAS and the SAS. The relationship between research and application was also always contradictory, not only from the side of the research institutions, but also because of the unpreparedness of the productive sphere for innovation. Centralizing tendencies intensified in the whole of Czechoslovakia from the first half of the 1960s. These tendencies emphasized the superior position of the CSAS in the system of state research institutions. Principles were worked out for a unified system of scientific research and development institutes, as well as a state plan for research. Some of these tendencies were also reflected in the new legislation of the SAS from 1963, which the authors analyse in detail. J. Klačka considers it especially from the point of view of relations between the CSAS and SAS. It will be interesting to compare these analyses of the relationship with the views of Czech historians, although the authors of the history of the SAS also used the relevant results of Czech historiography.

A separate chapter by A. Hudek is devoted to the participation of the SAS in the reform processes of 1968 – 1969. The connected initiatives of the staff and leadership of the SAS are described here in two lines: 1) as part of the preparation of the new act on the SAS, which was not approved in the end; 2) the direct participation of a whole series of people from the SAS in the political and legislative processes of the time, including the preparation of the federalization. The author points out that during the discussions on the constitutional organization, the views of various social science institutes, especially the Institute of History of the SAS, were particularly important. The federalization of the state opened the theoretical possibility of three academies, joint, Czech and Slovak, but difficulties in the talks delayed a decision, and these bold plans were not implemented in the stifling atmosphere of “Normalization”.

The Normalization period began with personnel changes and purges also in the conditions of the SAS. This led to a deadening of society, as the author A. Hudek puts it. The seventh chapter is devoted to the period 1969 – 1989. Many people solved the situation by emigrating to the West, and, together with screening, this had a significant impact on the state of the academy’s personnel. Screening and the establishment of cadre units afflicted the whole academy and led to strengthening of the presence and influence of the Communist Party not only in personnel policy, but also in amendments to legislation on the academies. The party apparatus also exercised an ideological influence on the shape of research programmes, which was especially sensitive for experts in the social sciences and humanities. The author succeeded in capturing the atmosphere of screenings and Normalization, the various methods of their implementation, from formal application to aggressive screening. Comparison of the course of this process in the individual parts of the republic shows a harsher impact in the Czech Republic, but the pernicious process of capitulation to Normalization

negatively marked the development of the academy at least until the mid 1980s. The result was a slow and tentative reaction to the “Perestroika” proclaimed by Michail Gorbachov, not only in the academy, but in the whole of Czechoslovak society. It is noteworthy that the author also sensitively captures the human dimension of these views and reactions, for example, in connection with the party screenings, in the responses to Charta 77 and so on. The chapter also includes an account by E. Nemeskürthyová of organizational changes in the structure of the SAS, merging of institutes and creation of research centres.

The transformation of the SAS in the years after the Velvet Revolution (1989-1993) is described in another chapter by D. Kováč, who has used statements by former chairmen and other personalities of the SAS on this theme. The most important change after November 1989 was the removal of the legislative and organizational deformations caused by the totalitarian regime and the creation of an autonomous administration of the academy. The author knowledgeably describes the process of the creation of the Council of Scientists of the SAS, which introduced democratic changes and organized the first democratic elections of the presidium of the SAS. As a result of the long interruption of the democratic tradition in Czechoslovakia, the introduction of democratic changes was not simple, but, in spite of this, an amendment to the act on the SAS was successfully worked out and approved as early as January 1990. The chapter also includes a description of the changes of system in the organizational structure and methods of work of the SAS, dissolution of forcibly created centres, introduction of a grant system, evaluation, accreditation and so on. The first post-November leadership and the whole of the SAS at the beginning of the 1990s struggled with various problems, especially with a substantial decline in funding, reduction of the number of staff to about half the level before 1989, and serious attacks on the existence of the academy in the form of proposals to assign its institutes to the universities. The new challenges associated with the division of Czechoslovakia in 1993 were also demanding. The author D. Kováč rightly calls the changes of the period 1989 – 1993 the transformation of the SAS, because the essence of these changes was not only emancipation from the control of the state-party, but also the construction of an autonomous administration and taking over of responsibility for the academy’s destiny, from 1993 also on the international level.

A. Hudek deals with the next, essentially still continuing stage in the development of the SAS, in the ninth chapter. The first years of the independent SAS in the independent state not only involved efforts to gain international acceptance. The international emancipation of the SAS was successful, but the struggle of the academy for an acceptable and especially for a stable budget continues until today. As the author states, economic support for science and research in the Slovak Republic remains lower than in the majority of countries in the developed world, including countries of the former Soviet bloc, which also had to undergo a demanding transformation from totalitarian regimes. He points to the negative influences of Mečiarism on the field of science and research in Slovakia, especially on its possibilities for international integration. He mentions the repeated, politically coloured initiatives of Matica Slovenská aimed at disturbing the integrity of the SAS, but also the solidarity of the scientific community and international support for solving these problems. The entry of the Slovak Republic into NATO and the EU in 2004 significantly increased the possibilities of the SAS in the field of international cooperation. The academy was prepared for this and it took intensive advantage of the opportunities. Various forms of this integration into European science are the subject of further essays, against the background of permanently inadequate domestic support for research, which also causes problems in the field of international cooperation.

The author also informs the readers about domestic cooperation, especially with the universities and particularly solution of the question of doctoral study at the SAS. When tracing the domestic conditions for research, he also devotes attention to the origin of the Slovak Research

and Development Agency (Agentúra na podporu výskumu a vývoja –APVV) and various other domestic programmes to support science and research. He also explains the main principles of the creation of the still valid act on the SAS from 2002. The account ends with a sub-chapter with the title: *New challenges and new problems*. Apart from the continuing weak financial support for science and research, the open problems include the repeatedly emerging tension in relations between the social sciences and humanities on one side and the natural and technical disciplines on the other. The authors also pointed to this tension in the preceding chapters. It is connected with various hangovers and stereotypes in perceptions of “those other” disciplines, and lack of understanding of the role of the social sciences and humanities in the academy. Insensitive, technocratic application of scientometry and forced use of its methods in fields demanding a different type of evaluation also brings tension. There is also a noteworthy summary of the aims of the currently prepared transformation, which should open new legal and economic forms of existence to the institutes of the SAS, close not only to related academies in the neighbouring countries, but also to the standards of the EU.

The second section of the first part of the book is introduced by the title: *The internal development of the Slovak Academy of Sciences*. Its first chapter, concerned with the most important results of the scientific research in the academy, is compiled on the basis of materials worked out by the individual institutes. In spite of the effort of the editor to unify the texts, this part shows some lack of homogeneity, which connects with the varied approaches of the individual institutes to identifying their most important results from up to six decades of work and communicating them in a generally understandable way. It is a rather demanding task to do this in the given limited space, and the justification for the small selection of results can always be doubted. Fulfilling the demand for simple and accessible interpretation of usually extremely complex results is also not an easy task. Clearly, some readers will have the feeling that this history of the academy of sciences devotes little attention to actual science. Such an unfulfilled expectation may arise not only in the chapter with the selection of the most important results, but also in the framework of the general account of the history of the academy.

The other chapters are already mostly documentation and come from the Central Archives of the SAS. I regard this cooperation between the archives and the Institute of History of the SAS as a very valuable contribution, because it enabled an organic and effective combination of two mutually complementary methodological approaches. The chapters are devoted to the themes: management of scientific research in the SAS (Kristína Majerová), scientific education in the SAS († Alexandra Marčeková), international cooperation of the SAS (Lýdia Kamencová), financial, material and personnel provisions of the SAS (Jana Gubášová Baherníková), publishing and patent activities and the activity of scientific societies at the SAS (Júlia Pavlová). Part of the information from the first section of the book is repeated here, but this is not disturbing because of the different approach to interpretation. Some of the chapters in the second part are filled with graphs and tables, which in some cases could appropriately supplement the first, analytical part. For the visible and undoubtedly successful ambition of the monograph to become a source for further research, the inclusion of even more tables and graphs would do no harm. This source function is also effectively achieved by the extensive second part of the book, which comprises a collection of important documents from the history of the SAS, filling about 180 pages. The usefulness of the collection would be improved by cross-references between the analytical part and the documents, or by explanatory notes to the individual documents. Those actively interested in the history of the SAS will welcome the list of sources, bibliography and index of names.


The second section of the second part contains supplements, useful for overview and as starting points for further research. It includes overviews and lists: chairmen of the SAS with short biographies, academics, correspondents and members of the Learned Society of the SAS, members

of the individual presidia of the SAS, members of the committee of the Council of Scientists, later the Council of the SAS, and the scientific college of the SAS. A practical and useful supplement lists the institutes of the SAS with a brief summary of the purpose and basic data for each. A pictorial supplement at the end of the book includes about 250 photographs and other illustrations.

In conclusion, it is impossible to fail to mention and to appreciate the thorough work of the responsible editor Emil Borčín, perhaps expressing his personal relationship to the SAS. The graphic design of the book by Jana Sapáková is also outstanding, as is its whole production by Veda, the publisher of the SAS, which has published the book with the special serial number 4000.

The scientific editor of the book wrote in the introduction: *“The history of the SAS cannot be separated from the history of Slovak society and the history of the state in which it developed. Various events and facts would be incomprehensible without this historical context.”* Precisely research on historical connections and contexts is the strongest aspect of the book, and this enables us to state that the authors have succeeded in their aim: *“... to outline the historical development of the SAS with all its complexity and contradictions”*. I recommend the book not only to those interested in the history of our leading scientific institution, but also to those, who doubt its justification only because it originated in the 1950s according to the Soviet model.

Miroslav Tibor Morovics



SLOVENSKÉ DEJINY V DEJINÁCH EURÓPY

Vybrané kapitoly

Dušan Kováč a kol.


VEDA

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