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ARTICLES

A DIPLOMAT IN THE SERVICE OF THE KINGS OF HUNGARY. THE ACTIVITY OF THE BISHOP OF NITRA ANTONY OF ŠANKOVCE AT THE END OF THE MIDDLE AGES

MIRIAM HLAVAČKOVÁ

HLAVAČKOVÁ, Miriam. A diplomat in the service of the Kings of Hungary. The activity of the Bishop of Nitra Antony of Šankovce at the end of the Middle Ages. *Historický časopis*, 2011, 59, Supplement, pp. 3-24, Bratislava.

The ecclesiastical dignitary Antony of Šankovce (de Sankfalwa) started his diplomatic career as a canon at Oradea (Magnum Varadinum, Nagyvárad, Veľký Varadín, Gross-Wardein). The king entrusted him with ever more demanding diplomatic tasks. Together with the Archbishop of Esztergom Vitéz, he secured the return of the Crown of St. Stephen to Hungary in 1463. He was also sent to the courts of Italian rulers and to France, Poland and Germany. In 1486, King Matthias Corvinus appointed him Provost of Bratislava, and in 1490 Vladislav II made him Bishop of Nitra. Antony of Šankovce fully applied his education in canon law, gained at the University of Padua, in the field of marriage law. In Rome, he had to prove the invalidity of Vladislav's marriage, not only with Beatrix of Aragon, but also with Barbara of Brandenburg. Evidence of Antony's activities survives from the period of his work in Bratislava and Nitra. He was involved in canon law, organizational and pastoral activities. He held a diocesan synod at Nitra in 1494. Its conclusions provide information about the problems of the Catholic Church at the end of the 15th century. He founded an altar of St. Antony in Nitra Cathedral and gave his house in Buda and vineyard on Zobor to support it. Bishop Antony made his last diplomatic journey in 1499 to the Imperial Diet at Worms.

Middle Ages. Diplomacy. Provost of Bratislava. Bishop of Nitra. Matthias Corvinus. Beatrix of Aragon. Vladislav II Jagiello. Diocesan synod at Nitra.

At the beginning of the text *Ambaxiator brevilogus* (1436), its author, the provost and latter Archbishop of Toulouse Bernard de Rosier states that the work of a diplomat is varied and the opportunities for diplomatic missions are growing from day to day.¹ According to this medieval handbook, the work of the diplomat includes: "*honouring the Church and the Imperial Crown, protecting the rights of the kingdom, strengthening obedience and friendship, agreeing peace, removing the possible causes of future unpleasantness,*

1 HRABAR, Vladimír E. (ed.). *De Legatis et Legationibus Tractatus Varii: Bernardi de Rosergio Ambaxiatorum brevilogus (p. 1-28), Hermolai Barbari De officio Legati, Martini Garrati Laudensis De Legatix maxime principum, Ex aliis excerpta qui eadem de re usque ad annum MDCXXV scripserunt*. Dorpati Livonorum : E. Typographeo Mattioseniano, 1905, p. 6.

reprimanding tyrants, making rebels obedient” and so on.² To put it simply, these missions can be divided into two categories: ceremonial and negotiation, for example, with the aim of concluding peace between warring monarchs. Apart from this, the author divides missions into short-term, in the course of which ambassadors present complements or have discussions at a court and then return, and long-term circular missions to various courts in succession. Both types of mission could be combined and overlapped.³

The ambassadors or diplomats in the service of King Matthias Corvinus, in the sources most frequently designated *ambaxiator*, *nuntius* or *orator noster*, were mostly clergy thanks to their university education and knowledge of languages. These ecclesiastical dignitaries fulfilled an important role in the political life of the Kingdom of Hungary. As King Matthias expressed it in a letter to Pope Paul II (30 April 1465): “*The prelates of this kingdom are representatives and leaders of the Church in spiritual matters, but in secular affairs they form the greater part of the state administration.*”⁴ A synonym for the royal council (*consilium*, *senatum*) was “*praelati et barones*”. Two archbishops and fourteen diocesan bishops sat in the royal council in this period.

The prelates in the council also included the provost of Székesfehérvár, the Prior of the Johanites of Vrana in Croatia, and other provosts, who held offices under the king. The king needed prelates not only as diplomats and officials in the administration of the kingdom;⁵ their military forces⁶ and taxable property also had an important role. As a result of frequent travels, the bishops were more or less guests in their sees, and pastoral administration was entrusted to deputies. When making appointments to bishoprics and chapters, the king appealed to his right as the patron of the Church in Hungary, on the basis of which he granted ecclesiastical positions and their associated incomes to his servants, so that he did not burden the royal treasury. In practice it looked as if the king selected a cleric for the office of bishop and “presented” him to the Pope for confirmation. The Pope did not always agree with this procedure and there were written exchanges of views, but in spite of this, the king’s candidate took over the administration of the diocese and its property with the title of *electus* bishop even before he received confirmation from the Pope.⁷ An important and rich bishopric, where diplomats of the

2 HRABAR, ref. 1, p. 6-10; MATTINGLY, Garret. *Renaissance Diplomacy*. London : Jonathan Cape, 1955, p. 30; HAMILTON, Keith – LANGTHORNE, Richard. *The Practice of Diplomacy: its evolution, theory and administration*. London : Routledge, 1995, p. 29-35.

3 MATTINGLY, ref. 2, p. 31.

4 FRAKNÓI, Vilmos. *Mátyás király levelei I. – II.* Budapest : M. Tud. Akad., 2009 (hereinafter: MKL), no. 67; SZOVÁK, Kornél. King and Church, Matthias Corvinus and Religion. In FARBAKY, Péter – SPEKNER, Enikő – SZENDE, Katalin – VÉGH, András (eds.). *Matthias Corvinus, the King: Tradition and Renewal in the Hungarian Royal Court 1458-1490*. Exhibition catalogue. Budapest : Budapest History Museum 2008, p. 393-397.

5 FRAKNÓI, Vilmos. *Mátyás király magyar diplomatái*. In *Századok*, 1898, 32, p. 870-875; FÜGEDI, Erik. A XV. századi magyar püspökök. In *Történelmi Szemle*, 1965, 8, p. 477-498; KALOUS, Antonín. Služba Boskovických u Matyáše Korvína (The service of the Boskovický family under Matthias Corvinus). In *Sborník prací historických XXI. Acta Universitatis Palackianae Olomucensis. Facultas philosophica, Historica*, 2007, 33, p. 83-99.

6 According to the act 1498/20, the ecclesiastical landowners provided 7000 knights, including 4400 from the bishops. KUBINYI, András. *Matthias Corvinus. Die Regierung eines Königreichs in Ostmitteleuropa 1458-1490*. Herne : Tibor Schäfer, 1999, p. 138.

7 FÜGEDI, Erik. *Kolduló, polgárok, nemesek. Tanulmányok a magyar középkorról*. Budapest 1981, p.

King of Hungary alternated was that of Oradea (Magnum Varadinum, Nagyvárad, Vel'ký Varadín, Großwardein) now in Rumania. The creation of a humanist centre had already begun here earlier in the time of John Vitéz, bishop from 1445.⁸ Vitéz helped his nephew John Pannonius to become a canon in the chapter. Pannonius became Bishop of Pécs in 1459, and he began to work beside his uncle in the service of the new King Matthias Corvinus.⁹ The original task of the provost and canons associated in a cathedral chapter was to jointly celebrate church services and assist the bishop in administering his diocese. However, the king increasingly involved the better educated members of chapters, as well as the bishops, in the administration of the Kingdom of Hungary. The diplomat Antony of Šankovce (*de Sankfalwa*, Slovakia) also began his international diplomatic career as a canon of Oradea.

Antony came from a noble family in the county of Gemer. One of his relations received Šankovce in 1421 as a donation from the monarch Sigismund of Luxembourg for service in the war against the Husites.¹⁰ The original heraldic charter granted by King Ladislav V in 1455 to Stephen of Šankovce and his family shows an ape sitting on three hills and holding a letter S. The design makes it one of the most interesting shields granted by Ladislav V.¹¹ Later, this shield was apparently not suitable for the ecclesiastical dignity Antony, who asked Matthias Corvinus to grant him another. A new shield from 1489, also relating to Antony's relations from the Hős family (*Thome Hews*) and Lászai (*de Lazo*), depicts a hand holding three arrows against a blue background. The king rewarded Thomas Hős for his heroism in a battle against the Duke of Moldavia, in which Thomas was seriously injured by three arrows. The new heraldic charter already mentions the 26 years of work by Antony of Šankovce in the service of King Matthias, specifically in successfully obtaining the crown of Hungary, and missions to the Italian rulers, France and Poland.¹² Perhaps we can ask what came before this successful career?

90; ADRIÁNYI, Gabriel. Die Kirchenpolitik des Matthias Corvinus (1458-1490). In *Ungarn Jahrbuch*, 1979, 10, p. 83-92.

- 8 SZAKÁLY, Ferenc. Vitéz János, a politikus és államférfi: Pályavázlat – kérdőjelekkel. In *Vitéz János emlékkönyv, Annales Strigonienses*. Esztergom 1990, p. 9-38.
- 9 KALOUS, Antonín. Čtyři Janové z Varadína (Four Johns from Oradea). In DOLEŽALOVÁ, Eva – NOVOTNÝ, Robert – SOUKUP, Pavel (eds.). *Evropa a Čechy na konci středověku. Sborník příspěvků věnovaných Františku Šmahelovi*. Prague : Filosofia, 2004, p. 270. A selection of the literature on John Pannonius: HUSZTI, József. *Jannus Pannonius*. Pécs 1931; JANKOVITS, László – KECSKEMÉTI, Gábor (eds.). *Janus Pannonius és a humanista irodalmi hagyomány*. Pécs : JPTE, 1998; BARTÓK, István – JANKOVITS, László – KECSKEMÉTI, Gábor (eds.). *Humanista műveltség Pannóniában*. Pécs : Művészetek Háza – PTE, 2000; FABER, Josef (ed.). *Jannus Pannonius: Epigrammata*. Norderstedt : Books on Demand GmbH, 2009; FABER, Josef (ed.). *Jannus Pannonius: Elegiae*. Norderstedt : Books on Demand GmbH, 2009.
- 10 The Hungarian National Archives in Budapest, collection of diplomatic documents: Diplomatikai levéltár (hereinafter DL) 11 041. Nicholas, called Hős (*Hews*), son of the deceased John Hős of Šankovce, received possession of *Sankfalua* in the county of Gemer for service in battle against the Husites for Prague Castle.
- 11 DL 94201 (18 Oct 1455). TAKÁCS, Imre (ed.). *Sigismundus Rex et Imperator. Kunst und Kultur zur Zeit Sigismunds von Luxemburg (1387-1437)*. Katalogbuch Budapest. Luxemburg : Philipp Von Zabern, 2006, p. 417.
- 12 DL 19 599.

In the 1450s Antony attended the Faculty of Liberal Arts at the University of Vienna, where he gained the title of master in 1454.¹³ In the Middle Ages, this faculty was an obligatory preliminary to further study at the so-called higher faculties: medicine, law and theology. Students usually attended it for five years. They began to study at the age of 14-16 and after two years of study they gained the title of bachelor of liberal arts. Although some were satisfied with this title, Antony continued and we learn of his study of law at Padua in the 1470s.¹⁴ His study in Italy could have been assisted by the contacts he made at the court of the Bishop of Oradea John Vitéz from Zredna, when he was a canon in the chapter there. He is also mentioned in this period as a canon of Bács and Vác in this period, and these two prebendaries certainly contributed to financing his expensive study in Italy.¹⁵ Apparently he gained the title of Doctor of Canon Law here, because Matthias Corvinus described him as “*magistrum Antonium, decretorum doctorem, nuntium et cappellanum nostrum*”, but did not state the actual title in the documents.¹⁶

We know about his participation in two diplomatic missions even before the beginning of his study of law. As a young canon of Oradea, he accompanied Bishop John Vitéz to Graz, where they had talks with the Emperor Frederick III about the return of the royal crown, and he reported the result of the talks to the King of Hungary.¹⁷ Frederick III was the guardian of the boy king Ladislav the Posthumous, and from that time he kept the crown of the King of Hungary.¹⁸ The Hungarian magnates attempted to get it back, but without success. Although Matthias Corvinus was elected King of Hungary, he could legitimize his power only by being crowned with the Crown of St. Stephen. The Emperor Frederick was finally satisfied with the Treaty of Wiener Neustadt / Sopron of 1463, by which the King of Hungary granted generous financial compensation of 80,000 gulden and confirmed the succession in the event of his death, in return for the handing over of castles and of the Crown of St. Stephen.¹⁹ Antony apparently proved to be useful in the service of the king, and five years later he was working as notary in the royal chancellery.²⁰

13 SANTIALLER, Leo (ed.). *Die Matrikel der Universität Wien, II. (1451-1518)*. Graz; Köln : Hermann Böhlau Nachfolger, 1959, 21. 35; *Anthonius de Sanchualva (1453), natio Hungarica*, paid a fee of 4 groats. SCHRAUF, Károly. *A Bécsi egyetem magyar nemzetének anyakönyve 1453-tól 1630-ig. IV.* Budapest 1902, p. 92. In 1454 he paid 4 denárs.

14 BÓNIS, György. *A jogtudó értelmiség a Mohács előtti Magyarországon*. Budapest : Akadémiai Kiadó, 1971, p. 237; VERESS, Endre. *A páduai egyetem magyarországi tanulóinak anyakönyve és iratai*. Budapest : Stephaneum, 1915, p. 17 (1478).

15 VERESS, ref. 14, p. 17.

16 MKL II, no. 181.

17 KÖBLÖS, József. *Az egyházi közélet Mátyás és a Jagellók korában*. Budapest : Történettudományi Intézete MTA, 1994, p. 465.

18 DVOŘÁKOVÁ, Daniela – PAPONOVÁ, Mária. *Spomienky Heleny Kottanerovej*. (Memoirs of Helena Kottanerová). Budmerice : Rak, 2008.

19 In spite of the fact that the Hungarian Crown was returned to Hungary already in July 1463, the coronation happened only in the following year, because Matthias was on a campaign against the Turks. The news of the return of the crown reached him on the Bosnian frontier. For Matthias the coronation on 29 March 1464 and the recognition by Frederick III meant recognition of his sovereignty in Hungary. MDE I, no. 163. KALOUS, Antonín. *Matyáš Korvín (1443-1490). Uherský a český král*. České Budějovice : Veduta, 2009, p. 66.

20 DL 16 742 (21 Dec 1468): *nobilis magister Anthonius de Sankfalwa notarius cancellarie*.

The Hungarian royal chancellery is often associated with the development of humanism. It is generally known that Matthias strove to appoint educated people to state offices, so that people with humanist oriented educations were concentrated in the Hungarian chancellery. The situation changed after the conspiracy of magnates headed by the humanists, the Archbishop of Esztergom Vitéz and Bishop of Pécs Pannonius in 1471. They strove to entrust the throne of Hungary to Kazimír, younger son of King Kazimír of Poland. Prince Kazimír claimed the throne of Hungary on the basis of the “*blood line of our predecessor King Sigismund, our grandfather King Albrecht and our uncle Ladislav.*”²¹ Their armies invaded Hungary in autumn 1471,²² but Matthias Corvinus, who had learnt of the conspiracy in time, prevented them gaining control of the country. After this event, the King of Hungary stopped trusting the humanists and no longer appointed them to the highest offices. He made an exception with the humanists, artists and literati associated with the royal court in Budapest, who continued to receive generous patronage.²³ The majority of researchers hold the view that opposition to Matthias’ invasion of Bohemia was the main reason for the conspiracy. However, the royal council supported Matthias in the struggle against the “*Czech heretics*”. During Matthias’ invasion of Moravia, all the decisive elements in Hungarian society stood by him: magnates and prelates, that is the royal council, and the rest of the nobility. The Banderium of the magnates formed a large part of the army he led against the Czechs.²⁴ The stimulus for the conspiracy must be sought more in the fact that to wage war against the Czechs, Matthias also taxed the prelates, which contributed to some of them supporting Vitéz’ conspiracy.²⁵

Since the king sent Antony of Šankovce to Poland in 1472, he apparently did not belong to the ostracized group of humanists and he had not supported the conspiracy. It is also possible to judge from his further activity, that his domain was mainly canon law. Information about the content of Antony’s library might make things clearer, but so far we only know of one early printed work he owned: *Summa Angelica de casibus conscientie* by the lawyer Angelo de Clavasio, printed in Venice in 1487 by Georgius de Rivabenis.²⁶ Antony was sent to Poland in the spring of 1472 with the captain of Belgrade Imrich Nifor, to discuss reconciliation between the kings of Hungary and Poland.²⁷ As the chronicler states, in this year “*there was a warm winter, without snow until Easter;*

21 ESCHENLOER, Peter. *Geschichte der Stadt Breslau*. Ed. Gottlieb Kunisch. II. B. Breslau 1828, p. 247.

22 Ref. 21, s. 246: „Aus Cracau zoge diser Casimirus, und brachte mit sich vor Caschau ueber sechzehntausend Man, und sante am Zoge aus Cracau in Latein dem Koenige Matthiae seinen Entsagebrif, in Deutsch also lautende, den der Erzbischof zu Gran selber hatte gemachet: wan er war gar ein durchleuchter, gross tief gelerter herre und ein Canzler ueber alle andere. Es war seines gleichen wenig zu finden, und warde doch ein Vorraeter seines Erdherren.“

23 The fact that Matthias stopped filling places in the administration with humanists is also confirmed by Viliam Fraknói in an analysis of the letters of King Matthias. MKL, p. 47. In 1472 Archbishop Vitéz died imprisoned in his house. ESCHENLOER, ref. 21, p. 270: “*This summer, on the Saturday before St. Lawrence’s day, the Archbishop of Esztergom died unexpectedly.*”

24 KALOUS, ref. 19, p. 154.

25 For example, the king also appropriated the title that the Archbishop of Esztergom received from the profit of the royal mint.

26 The coat of arms granted to Antony by Matthias Corvinus appears on the title page. BÓNIS, György: *Einflüsse des römischen Rechts in Ungarn*. In *Ius Romanum Medii Aevi V.*, 1964, p. 59.

27 DLUGOSZ, Jan. *Historiae Polonicae liber XIV/2*. Leipzig 1712, p. 568; FRAKNÓI, ref. 5, p. 870.

*being more like spring.*²⁸ The weather had a significant role in the travels of diplomats. They often experienced bad weather, attacks by bandits and difficult terrain during their travels. They most frequently travelled on horses or in wagons, or, where possible, by ship. In February 1460, the old and sick Cardinal Bessarion had to use a sledge when crossing the Alps, because horses could hardly stand on the ice.²⁹ In spite of all their efforts, diplomats could not be sure that the king would refund all the expenses they incurred during their journeys. For example, the Bishop of Veszprém Albert Vetési justified his failure to attend parliament in autumn 1474 with the argument that he had no money for the journey, and the treasurer owed him money for a previous journey. His horses also had to live on something, and they were already very exhausted.³⁰ When we consider the average speed of medieval travel, we must take into account various circumstances that influenced travel. Transport in wagons was slow. Wheels could get broken or wagons could get stuck in wet terrain.³¹ A rider on a horse travelled 30-50 km each day, but if he changed horses, he achieved 200-300 km according to the type of terrain.³² We learn from the reports of Italian diplomats that the journey from Budapest to Oradea lasted six days, so that the traveller progressed 41 km each day.³³ Thus, the average speed of an ambassador can be determined only approximately. It was not uncommon for a diplomat, especially one of advanced age, to become ill during his journey. The above mentioned Bessarion was forced by illness to stay in Vienna in 1461, and likewise in Ravenna, so that he became afraid that he would never reach his destination of Rome.³⁴

Reports of such unpleasant events have not survived in the case of our diplomat. Until his death Antony of Šankovce moved mainly between Hungary and Italy. Contacts with Italy were strengthened when Matthias Corvinus married Beatrix, daughter of the King of Naples in 1476. Apart from Naples, Milan also became an ally of Matthias, and the king strove to use its position against Venice.³⁵ Milan, Venice, Naples and Ferrara had permanent ambassadors at the royal court in Budapest, and Matthias had his representative at the Papal court.³⁶ Contacts with the Holy See were developed especially intensively

28 ESCHENLOER, ref. 21, p. 264.

29 MOHLER, Ludwig. *Kardinal Bessarion als Theologe, Humanist und Staatsmann*. Bd. 1. Paderborn : Schöningh, 1923, p. 294.

30 Hungarian National Archive in Budapest, Collection of Diplomatic Documents: Diplomatikai fényképmásolatok (hereinafter DF) 200 537.

31 DVOŘÁKOVÁ, Daniela. *Kón a člověk v středověku. K spolužití člověka a koňa v Uhorském království*. (Horse and man in the Middle Ages. On the co-existence of man and horse in the Kingdom of Hungary.). Budmerice : Rak, 2007, p. 161-162.

32 The average daily speed of travel at the end of the Middle Ages is considered in DVOŘÁKOVÁ, ref. 31, p. 163-165.

33 KALOUS, Antonín. *Intinerář Jana Filipce (1431-1509)*. In *Acta Universitatis Palackianae Olomucensis, Facultas philosophica, Historica*, 2008, 34, p. 18.

34 MOHLER, ref. 29, p. 302.

35 KALOUS, Antonín. *Italská politika, Matyáš Korvín a České země*. (Italian politics, Matthias Corvinus and the Czech Lands.). In *Husitský Tábor 15*. Tábor 2006, p. 158.

36 *Ibid.*, p. 161.

in the first half of Matthias' reign. The Papacy saw him as a defender against the pagan Turks and the Czech heretics, so it provided considerable financial support.³⁷

We have already mentioned that various disagreements between the king and the prelates led to Matthias beginning to grant offices to "new people". One of them was John Filipec († 1509),³⁸ who was appointed Bishop of Oradea in 1476. From that time, he was active in Matthias' foreign policy, and from 1486 he was privy chancellor of the Hungarian Chancellery and chancellor of the Bohemian Chancellery.³⁹ Antony's journeys also crossed those of Filipec. They were together in Rome, where they were enrolled in the Confraternity of the Holy Spirit in 1482.⁴⁰ The reorganization of the confraternity by Pope Eugenius IV granted it members complete forgiveness of sins at the hour of death, and at confession once in their lives they could ask for absolution from the most serious sins, otherwise granted only by the Pope.⁴¹ In Rome, Antony obtained the Pope's permission to hold two prebendaries at the same time. From Rome, he went to Naples, but we do not know the aim of this diplomatic journey.⁴²

Antony of Šankovce fully applied his training in canon law in the field of matrimonial law. When Matthias lost the slightest hope that Beatrix could bear an heir to the throne, he began to declare his intention of granting the succession to his illegitimate son John Corvinus, who was provided with property and titles.⁴³ To gain an alliance with

37 GUTHMÜLER, Bodo – KÜHLMANN, Wilhelm (eds.). *Europa und die Türken in der Renaissance*. Tübingen : Niemayer, 2000.

38 He became provost of the Chapter of St. Vojtech at Esztergom in 1474 and the following year provost of the Chapter of the Most Holy Trinity at Felhéziv near Budapest. KALOUS, Antonín. Jan Filipec v diplomatických službách Matyáše Korvína. (John Filipec in the diplomatic service of Matthias Corvinus.). In *Časopis Matice moravské*, 2006, 125, p. 3-32. On John Filipec see: MĚŠŤÁNEK, Tomáš. *Biskup Jan Filipec (1431-1509) a středoevropská politika*. (Bishop John Filipec (1431-1509) and Central European politics.). Zlín : Krajská knihovna Františka Bartoše, 2003; GRIEGER, Rudolf. *Filipecz Johann Bischof von Wardein. Diplomat der Könige Matthias und Wladislaw*. Munich : Trofenik, 1982.

39 DL 17 222. MKL I, no. 247, 248. After Matthias' death he gave up all his secular and ecclesiastical offices and withdrew to the Franciscan monastery in Breslau (Wrocław). KALOUS, ref. 9, p. 273.

40 "Ego Antonius de Sankfalva canonicus ecclesie Vacienis de utroque parente de nobili genere procreatus hanc sanctam confaternitatem Sancti Spiritus die vigesima prima juni 1482 intravi, ut indulgentiarum et aliarum, que in bulla desuper confecta continentur, mediante Dei gratia particeps esse mereatur." VÁRSZEGI, Asztrik – ZOMBORI, István (eds.). *Monumenta Vaticana V.I. Liber confraternitatis Sancti Spiritus de urbe. 1446-1523*. Budapest : Metem, 2000, p. 8.

41 The members of the confraternity were enrolled in their own registers. However, at first there were few members because of the high entry fee, and enrollment as a member could only be done personally. This situation changed under Sixtus IV in 1477, when the Pope preserved the privileges of the confraternity, but replaced the entry fee with a voluntary contribution, and enabled people to join through representatives. For details see: CSUKOVITS, Enikő. *Középkori magyar zárandokok*. Budapest : MTA Történettudományi Intézete, 2003.

42 CZAICH, Ádam G. Regesták VII. Ince pápa korából 1484-1492. In *Történelmi Tár*, 1902, p. 511.

43 Matthias also demonstrated the hereditary claim of the Hunyady family to the throne in Vienna, where he triumphantly arrived with his son, although he knew that illegitimate children were not usually accepted on European thrones. ČORNEJ, Petr – BARTLOVÁ, Milena. *Velké dějiny zemí koruny české VI*. (Large history of the Lands of the Czech Crown VI). Prague : Paseka, 2007, p. 466. Hans Ehinger mayor of Ulm called John Corvinus "the Hungarian bastard" in a letter. WIESFLECKER, Hermann – BÖHMER, J. Friedrich (eds.). *Regesta des Kaiserreiches unter Maximilian I. 1493-1519*. Bd. I., 1-2: 1493-1495. Vienna; Köln; Weimar : Böhlau, 1990-1993 (hereinafter RI) RI XIV 1, no. 2 827.

an important Italian family and in an effort to give the succession of his illegitimate son greater legitimacy, he chose as a bride for John, the wealthy Bianca Maria Sforza, sister of Gian Galeazzo Duke of Milan. However, Queen Beatrix had a plan for the future different from that of her husband. After the death of the king, his infertile widow could expect withdrawal from public life, return to Italy or retreat to a monastery. Beatrix was too ambitious to let herself be bound by social conventions, so she went into open opposition to the succession of John Corvinus.⁴⁴ She mobilized all her Italian relations. She would stop at nothing, even forging letters.⁴⁵ She took care to inform Bianca Maria that Prince John was a terrible monster, which led to Bianca deciding that she would rather enter a convent.⁴⁶ The King of Hungary sent Antony of Šankovce to Milan in the summer of 1486 in connection with the marriage between Bianca Maria and John Corvinus.⁴⁷

The Bishop of Oradea John Filipec was originally supposed to go to Milan, but the king needed him in the continuing talks at Jihlava.⁴⁸ Therefore he explained in his letter of 10 June 1486 to Duke Galeazzo of Milan, that he was sending the ambassador Antony to prepare the ground for a marriage contract (“*pro contracte affinitatis*”).⁴⁹ Antony came to Milan on 14 July 1486, and on the next day he apologized for the expected Filipec before the duke and diplomats.⁵⁰ However, in the Jihlava talks, Matthias Corvinus did not succeed in drawing Bohemia into a coalition against the Habsburgs, and the marriage contract did not continue as he had hoped either. Subjugation of the imperial hereditary lands also played an important part in Matthias’ aim of marrying his illegitimate son to Bianca Maria. Duke Ludovico wanted the Habsburgs to grant him Milan as an imperial fief, but the Emperor Frederick III was not inclined to do this, and he attempted to gain the support of the Emperor’s son Maximilian I King of the Romans. Matthias’ patience was tested for a long time, but the wedding by proxy (*per procurationem*) was

44 ZSEMLYE, Anikó. *Beatrix von Aragón (1457-1508): Königin von Ungarn. Politische, höfisch – kulturelle und wirtschaftliche Aspekte ihres Wirkens in Ungarn*. Dissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades der Philosophie. Universität Wien 1999, p. 189.

45 NAGY, Iván – NYÁRY, Albert (eds.). *Magyar diplomáciai emlékek. Mátyás király korából 1458-1490*. Budapest 1877 (hereinafter: MDE) IV, no. 171: “[...] *la Regina fece per Sancto d’Aversa suo Secretario configer alcune lettere in nome del Re ad epso Vescovo, imitando la mano d’uno dei Cancellieri della Measta sua [...]*”.

46 MDE IV, no. 171.

47 GRIEGER, ref. 38, p. 187.

48 John Filipec meanwhile prepared for a meeting between Matthias Corvinus and Vladislav II of Jagiello. However, the situation was complicated by the fact that Matthias stayed in Bratislava because of illness. As a Breslau / Wrocław chronicler recorded, it was dropsy: “*the king’s legs were swollen and the treatment could take 3-4 weeks*”. The talks were postponed until the beginning of September. STENZEL, Gustav A. H. *Scriptores rerum Silesiacarum*, Bd. 14, no. 436.

49 MKL II, no. 181.

50 According to Antony, John Filipec was “*irreplaceable*” and “*initiated into the matters the monarchs discussed*” at the meeting between Vladislav II and Matthias Corvinus in Jihlava. King Matthias considered the election of Maximilian I of Habsburg as King of the Romans to be illegal and invalid because he and King Vladislav II were not invited to the election. For this reason, he proposed the holding of a new election. FRAKNÓI, Wilhelm. König Matthias Corvinus und der deutsche Kaiserthron. In *Ungarische Rundschau für historische und soziale Wissenschaften IV*, 1915, p. 10

finally held on 25 November 1487, with John Filipec as the proxy.⁵¹ As dowry, Matthias promised the Milanese the Duchy of Lower Austria, estates in Silesia and several castle lordships in the Kingdom of Hungary. At this point in the marriage treaty, the title *Dux Austriae* was added to his titles.⁵² In spite of many preparations, agreements and a grand wedding by proxy, Pope Alexander VI annulled the marriage and Bianca became the second wife of Maximilian I of Habsburg in 1493.⁵³

Another country to which Antony travelled from Italy, was France. He was in Paris in the second half of July 1486.⁵⁴ He was there to negotiate an alliance against Maximilian, because France as well as Hungary had an interest in annulling his election as King of the Romans. According to Antony's report from 18 August 1486 addressed to Milan, the alliance between France and Hungary was agreed with mutual satisfaction on 5 August 1486, but the sources are silent about whether this agreement was really implemented.⁵⁵ Antony returned to Hungary with the French ambassador Christoph de Plailly to ratify the treaty with King Matthias.⁵⁶ They returned from Paris at a time of intensive occupation of Lower Austria by Hungarian troops,⁵⁷ and in November they met the King of Hungary near Eggenburg.⁵⁸ The king appointed his faithful servant Antony as provost of Bratislava after the death on 30 September 1486 of the previous provost George of Schönberg, who had worked for many years not only in the service of King Matthias, but also for the Emperor Frederick III. Thus Antony gained a place among the provosts and canons of this chapter, who had been active in the service of the kings of Hungary since the 13th century.⁵⁹ Provost Antony later helped his brother, Master John a canon of Csanád to become a canon in the Chapter of Bratislava as well.⁶⁰

51 KALOUS, ref. 38, p. 11.

52 WIESFLECKER, Hermann. *Österreich im Zeitalter Maximilians I. Die Vereinigung der Länder zum frühmodernen Staat. Der Aufstieg zur Weltmacht*. Munich : Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 1999, p. 346.

53 RI XIV 1, no. 2 795 (Rome, 18 Oct 1493). Pope Alexander VI annulled "*per verba de praesenti*" the concluded but not consummated marriage of John Corvinus son of Matthias Corvinus with Bianca Maria. He could do this without any canonical obstacles.

54 GRIEGER, ref. 38, p. 194.

55 WOLF, Susanne. *Die Doppelregierung Kaiser Friedrichs III. und König Maximilians (1486-1493)*. Köln; Weimar; Vienna : Bohlau, 2005, p. 152. Maximilian did not remain inactive. On 13 December 1486 he concluded an alliance with the dukes of Brittany, Navarre and Orleans.

56 MDE no. 128 (4 Nov 1486): The Ferraran ambassador to Hungary Cesare Valentini describes the French ambassador as a "*persona molto nobile e modesta*". ANGERMEIER, Heinz – SEYBOTH, Reinhard (eds.). *Deutsche Reichstagsakten, Mittlere Reihe (1486-1518)*, 1. Göttingen : Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986, no. 126.

57 At the end of September, the Hungarians captured Laa, at the beginning of October Retz, and at the end of November Eggenburg also succumbed to Hungarian power. SCHOBER, Karl. *Die Eroberung Niederösterreichs durch Matthias Corvinus*. Vienna 1879, p. 270-275.

58 WOLF, ref. 55, p. 152.

59 HLAVAČKOVÁ, Miriam. *Kapitula pri Dóme sv. Martina – intelektuálne centrum Bratislavy v 15. storočí*. (The Chapter of St. Martin's – intellectual centre of Bratislava in the 15th century.). Bratislava : Pro Historia, 2008. On the beginnings of the chapter see: ŠEDIVÝ, Juraj. Die Anfänge des Pressburger Kapitels. In *Acta historica Posoniensis II*. Bratislava 2001, p. 107-117.

60 KNAUZ, Ferdinand. *A pozsonyi káptalannak kézitatai*. Esztergom 1870, p. 49.

The Emperor Frederick III complained to the Archbishop of Mainz Berthold von Henneberg about the plundering and conquest of Lower Austria by Matthias Corvinus:⁶¹ “*The King of Hungary is waging war not only against the Turks and infidels, who attacked the Christians and did great damage, but also against the Christian Emperor – in spite of proofs of favour and friendship and without any real cause*” (3 November 1487).⁶² He also stated that Matthias had sent the provost of Bratislava to him with three demands: to hold a session of the Reichstag, at which the Emperor and Matthias would agree an alliance against the Turks, secondly to allow Matthias and his army to pass through imperial territory to Venice, and thirdly that the Emperor would mediate between the Matthias and the Archbishop of Esztergom.⁶³ Frederick III accepted the first and third demands, but he rejected the second because he did not want “*to wage war against Christians rather than against the Turks*”. In spite of the agreement, Matthias allegedly did not pay the agreed sum for the captured castles, towns and fortresses by the agreed deadline, so “*the Emperor will not feel guilty if other payments are also not made*”. Apart from problematic relations with the Emperor, the constant threat of Turkish aggression⁶⁴ also complicated Matthias’ so far favourable relations with Papacy. There were several causes. The Pope and Matthias’ father in law, the King of Naples came into conflict. Matthias supported his father in law and declared that he would provide troops and money, and would renounce his obedience to the Pope if the Roman Curia combined with the Neapolitan nobility against the government. In 1487, the Papal city of Ancona recognized the sovereignty of the King of Hungary, instead of that of the Pope.⁶⁵ Attempts to gain for Hungary Jem brother of the Turkish Sultan, did not suc-

61 Berthold von Henneberg (1441-1504), statesman and diplomat, reorganized the activity of the Reichsrat and succeeded in separating the institutions of the Empire to a significant degree from the person of the Emperor. WEISS, Joseph. *Berthold von Henneberg. Erzbischof von Mainz (1484-1504)*. Seine kirchenpolitische und kirchliche Stellung. Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1889, p. 17; VOLKMAR, Christoph. *Reform statt Reformation. Die Kirchenpolitik Herzog Georgs von Sachsen 1488-1525*. Tübingen : Mohr Siebeck, 2008; BADER, Karl S. *Ein Staatsmann vom Mittelrhein: Gestalt und Werk des Mainzer Kurfürsten und Erzbischofs Berthold von Henneberg*. Mainz 1955.

62 HOLTZ, Eberhard (ed.). *Die Urkunden und Briefe aus den Archiven und Bibliotheken des Landes Thüringen*. Vienna; Weimar; Köln : Böhlau, 1996 (= Regesten Kaiser Friedrichs III. (1440-1493) nach Archiven und Bibliotheken geordnet. Eds. Heinrich Koller, Paul-Joachim Heinig, Heft 10, no. 553.

63 This concerned Archbishop John Beckensloer, originally from Breslau (Wrocław). He was active in the service of Matthias and after the death of Vitéz, he became Archbishop of Esztergom and chancellor to the king. He had discretely betrayed the conspiracy of John Vitéz and John Pannonius to the king. When he got into a dispute with Matthias, Beckensloer solved the tense situation by fleeing from Hungary with a considerable sum of money to the protection of Frederick III. The Emperor accepted Beckensloer as an adviser and made him Archbishop of Salzburg. Matthias strongly protested against this. Finally, during talks on an armistice in December 1488, he recognized Beckensloer as archbishop. BACHMANN, Adolf. *Die Deutsche Reichsgeschichte im Zeitalter Friedrich III. und Maximilian I.*, II.B. Leipzig 1894, p. 632-634.

64 When attempts at cooperation between the countries directly threatened by the Ottomans failed, Matthias was left with the policy of “*extensive strengthening of the position of Hungarian power:*” RÁSZÓ, Gyula. Die Türkenpolitik Matthias Corvinus. In *Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*, 1986, 32, 1-2. Budapest : Akadémiai Kiadó, p. 32.

65 KALOUS, ref. 35, p. 159.

ceed.⁶⁶ Matthias wanted to confront Turkish expansion with his help. Jem was the loser in a succession struggle with his elder brother the Turkish Sultan Bayazid II, who paid the Pope 40 thousand ducats each year to keep Jem imprisoned in the Papal palace from 1489. Matthias planned that if he could help to put Jem on the Turkish throne, he would claim Serbia, Bosnia and Bulgaria.⁶⁷ Although the diplomats Antony of Šankovce and especially John Filipec strove zealously to get Jem handed over, the Pope and Venice did not allow him to be sent to Hungary.⁶⁸

At the beginning of June 1488, Matthias Corvinus sent Provost Antony as his ambassador to the Pope, but at Bruck an der Leitha in Austria, the Papal legate and Bishop of Ferrara entrusted him with a message to the Duke of Ferrara.⁶⁹ The following years meant for Antony intensive employment as a diplomat and as a canon lawyer. He used his knowledge of rhetoric, skilful tactics and legal dodges against a strong opponent: Beatrix of Aragon, who had been striving to gain the throne of Hungary since the second half of the 1480s.

Matthias turned to his brother in law, the heir to the throne of Naples Duke Alfonso of Calabria, to ask the Aragonese not to support Beatrix in claiming the throne. He sent Antony to the Kingdom of Naples to explain to his father in law Ferrante why disputes had arisen between him and Beatrix. According to the king's wishes, the provost of Bratislava Antony had to present the last part of his declaration orally "*as his own thoughts*".⁷⁰ Antony could choose between the Latin and Italian languages. The king usually employed in his diplomatic relations with Italy, men who knew the Italian language and culture from studies in Italy. The possibility to use a language other than Latin in diplomatic negotiations is stated by Bernard Rosier in his above mentioned work *Ambaxiator brevilogus*, where he says that in greeting speeches and in diplomatic negotiations it was legitimate to use the *lingua vulgaris*, but the diplomat had to be careful to maintain the style and rhetoric on the level of the Latin language and not lower the stylistic level.⁷¹ The Czech ambassadors, who went to meet the Emperor at Linz in 1479 wished for the presence of the Archbishop of Esztergom Beckensloer, who "*understands Czech*".⁷²

66 On the efforts to get Jem to Hungary: MDE III, no. 168, 169, 170, 209.

67 Matthias Corvinus even claimed that he was related to the Turkish Sultan. His grand-mother's sister had allegedly been captured by the Turks and became the wife of the Sultan's grand-father. Matthias also wrote to the Sultan Mehmed that they were related by blood. MKL II, no. 247.

68 GRIEGER, ref. 38, p. 198. MÜLLER, Ralf C. Der umworbene Erbfeind: Habsburgische Diplomatie an der Hohen Pforte vom Regierungsantritt Maximilians I. bis zum Langen Türkenkrieg – ein Entwurf. In KURZ, Marlene – SCHEUTZ, Martin – VOCELKA, Karl – WINKELBAUER, Thomas (eds.). *Das Osmanische Reich und die Habsburgermonarchie*. Vienna; Munich : Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2005, p. 253.

69 OVÁRY, Lipót. *A Magyar Tudományos Akadémia történelmi bizottságának oklevél-másolatai*. I. Budapest : MTA, 1901, no. 149. Either there was a mistake in the original or Ováry incorrectly named the Provost of Bratislava as George of Schönberg, who had died two years before.

70 Antony left Budapest at the beginning of May 1489. He travelled through Ferrara to Naples, where he stayed for about two months. FRAKNÓI, ref. 5, 874.

71 HRABAR, ref. 1, p. 13.

72 MACEK, Josef. *Jagellonský věk v českých zemích 3-4*. (The Jagiellonian age in the Czech Lands 3-4). Prague : Academia, 2002, p. 546. See also BÖMELBURG, Hans J. Die Wahrnehmung des Reichstags in Polen-Litauen. Mitteleuropäische Kommunikationsstrukturen und die polnischen Gesandtschaften

However, Latin was given priority in the case of written agreements concluded during these negotiations.⁷³ Matthias' "political testament", which Antony had to reproduce, is effective testimony of the reasons Matthias gave for the hereditary succession of the Hunyady dynasty and the danger he saw in the possibility of the Hungarian Estates rejecting his son, also in the event of the queen renouncing her claim to the throne. The aging, ever more troubled king complained about Beatrix' intolerable behaviour: "*The queen wishes to be our successor on the throne of Hungary. [...] However, the Hungarian nation would rather perish to the last man than accept the rule of a woman [...] To put it sincerely, the queen is not popular among our people. She has not even tried to gain their sympathy. [...] She does not want to listen to rational arguments, but day and night she disturbs us, demanding not only with pleas but also with tears, lamentation and anger, that we make her our heir. However, nobody knows the nature of the people of Hungary better than we, who have ruled them for so many years.*"⁷⁴ Matthias was aware of the danger of Habsburg succession in Hungary in the person of Frederick III, who is "*totius Regni nostri capitalis hostis*". As he continues: "*it may happen that he will suddenly enter our country, deprive the queen and our son of their property and drive them from the country*".⁷⁵ Therefore he asks his father in law to persuade his daughter to give up her intrigues, agree to the succession of John Corvinus and renounce her claim to the throne.

It is apparent from Beatrix' subsequent behaviour that the mission of Provost Antony brought results. At least outwardly, the queen changed her view on the marriage of John Corvinus to Bianca Sforza. She sent the bride her maternal greetings, which were received with great joy by the court at Milan. Beatrix' cooperation was also appreciated by the king, who gave her jewels worth 8 thousand gulden including a precious cross studded with diamonds as a sign of reconciliation.⁷⁶ It seemed that no obstacles stood in the way of John Corvinus' accession to the throne. On 2 April 1490, his eighteenth birthday was celebrated in the Hofburg in Vienna, and a tournament was held in honour of the future monarch. However, on 6 April 1490 the King of Hungary unexpectedly succumbed to illness, and so he failed to definitively secure the succession for his son. The fears of the king that the Habsburgs might gain the Crown of St. Stephen were later fulfilled.

Vladislav II Jagiello was elected as the new king. However, the struggle of Matthias' widow to rule Hungary did not end. If she could not rule herself, she could become Vladislav's wife and keep the title and power of Queen of Hungary. She blackmailed Vladislav with the threat that she would hand over all the castles and properties of the

zum Reichstag 1486-1613. In LANZINNER, Maximilian – STROHMEYER, Arno (eds.). *Der Reichstag 1486-1613: Kommunikation – Wahrnehmung – Öffentlichkeiten*. Göttingen : Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006, p. 407.

73 HAYE, Thomas. *Lateinische Oralität. Gelehrte Sprache in der mündlichen Kommunikation des hohen und späten Mittelalters*. Berlin : Gruyter, 2005, p. 68. The situation varied, for example, in 1519, when representatives of the Lower Austrian Estates sent to the court of the King of Spain and Emperor Charles V attempted to speak German, they were told by the secretary to the king that they could only speak Latin at court.

74 KOVACHICH, Martius Georgius. *Scriptores rerum Hungaricarum minores*. Bd. I. Budapest 1798, p. 341-350.

75 KOVACHICH, ref. 74.

76 MDE IV, no. 105.

Archbishop of Esztergom to Maximilian, if Vladislav did not marry her.⁷⁷ Under pressure from the Hungarian Estates, Vladislav concluded a formal marriage with the childless Beatrix at Esztergom in October 1490, although Barbara, daughter of the Elector of Brandenburg Albrecht Achilles von Hohenzollern was officially regarded as his wife. The marriage contract had been signed by proxy in 1476. However, a changed political situation had the result that further steps leading to a real marriage were never taken, and Barbara never actually met Vladislav.⁷⁸

One of the main factors in Vladislav's agreement to the forced marriage with Beatrix was her income, including a share in the Kremnica Mint, which he planned to use to finance his struggles against Maximilian and against his brother the Jagiellonian prince John Albrecht.⁷⁹ The Turkish threat constantly increased, especially when the Turks captured Belgrade in 1491. Armies also approached from the west. In autumn 1490, Maximilian's forces pushed the Hungarians out of Austria and in November they plundered Székesfehérvár. Maximilian considered attacking Budapest to gain the Crown of St. Stephen. An unusually harsh winter, lack of money to pay mercenaries and poor discipline among his troops thwarted these plans.⁸⁰ Maximilian gave up the struggle for the throne of Hungary and concluded peace with Vladislav II in Bratislava on 7 November 1491. In this agreement, Vladislav recognized the right of the Habsburgs to inherit the throne of Hungary if he had no heirs. This was identical with the conditions of the peace concluded at Sopron in 1463. In such a case it would be necessary to secure the agreement of the Hungarian Estates.⁸¹ Therefore, it was extremely desirable that Vladislav's marriage should produce an heir.⁸² In this situation, the representatives of the Hungarian Estates urged the king to have his marriage annulled and expel the infertile Beatrix "*from the court and the country*". "*And regarding her majesty, the daughter of the King of Naples [Beatrix], it is said*" as Bartolomej Castiglione informs the Milanese ambassador Maffeo de Treviglio (24 March 1492), "*that all unambiguously cry that they do not want the king to marry her because she is infertile. [...] They demand that he marry a girl, who can have children.*"⁸³ Beatrix turned for help to her native Naples, which sent to Budapest a special message demanding an explanation and observance of the marriage

77 BERZEVICZY, Albert. *Acta vitam Beatricis Reginae Hungariae illustrantia*. Budapest : MTA Könyvkiadóhivatala, 1914, p. 184.

78 NEHRING, Karl. *Matthias Corvinus. Kaiser Friedrich III, und das Reich: zum hunyadisch-habsburgischen Gegensatz im Donauraum*. Munich : R. Oldenbourg, 1975, p. 144.

79 The two brothers concluded a peace agreement on 20 February 1491 in a military camp near Košice and the Polish army left the territory of the Kingdom of Hungary.

80 WIESFLECKER, ref. 52, p. 346.

81 Provost Antony of Bratislava stated that the prelates and barons agreed in parliament that according to the Bratislava agreement of 1491, if the King of Hungary died without an heir, they would accept Maximilian I or his son as monarch. DF 287 351, 17 March 1492 (Budapest).

82 Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv in Vienna, Fund Maximilian , c. I, fol. 72-73. The conclusion of the Bratislava peace agreement was mentioned in numerous reports from ambassadors, e.g. the ambassador of the Spanish monarchs G. Gomez de Fuensalida gave information about events at the imperial court: RI XIV 2, no. 6 363 (7 July 1498). He thought that the King of Hungary should marry again, preferably with Princess Margaret. RI XIV I, 2 850, RI XIV 2, no. 2 790, 3 880, 8 575.

83 BERZEVICZY, Albert. *Aragoniai Beatrix. Okiratok*. (Monumenta Hungariae Historica 39). Budapest : MTA, 1914, p. 232-233.

vow.⁸⁴ These initiatives of the queen, undertaken in an effort to secure her succession, are also mentioned by Bartolomej Castiglione, who had heard that the Provost of Bratislava had to go to Rome in connection with this matter, but he did not leave before Easter. In this period, Antony of Šankovce was not only Provost of Bratislava, but also Bishop of Nitra.⁸⁵ At Antony's request, Vladislav II took under his personal protection the bishopric of Nitra and the church with the relics of the martyrs Sts. Andrew and Benedict.⁸⁶

In October 1492, the king sent Antony Bishop of Nitra to Pope Alexander VI in Rome and King Ferdinand in Naples.⁸⁷ Spicy information about Vladislav's relationship with Beatrix, speculation about whether the marriage had been consummated or not, and about efforts to get both Vladislav's marriages annulled, spread around the courts of Europe, and were reflected in numerous letters between the ambassadors of the interested parties.⁸⁸ The detailed reports of the constant observer Maffeo de Treviglio show that Milanese diplomacy was gradually beginning to work on bringing about the marriage of Bianca to Maximilian I von Habsburg, although the original plans were that she would become the wife of Vladislav and Queen of Hungary.⁸⁹ In May 1492, the Duke of Milan authorized Maffeo de Treviglio to organize the legally valid marriage of Bianca to King Vladislav. It would be done with King Vladislav in person or with the Bishop of Nitra Antony acting as proxy.⁹⁰

In November Antony's arrival in Venice is mentioned by the Venetian merchant Thadeas Vimercati, who stated that the bishop was accommodated at an inn, although lodging for him had been prepared in the monastery of San Giorgio (15 November 1492).⁹¹

84 MACEK, Josef. *Tři ženy krále Vladislava*. (The three wives of King Vladislav.) Praha: Mladá Fronta – Edice Kolumbus, 1991, p. 117.

85 Antony's predecessor Gregory was bishop from 1 Oct 1484 to 5 Aug 1490. Then Antony of Šankovce became bishop. DIÓS, István. *Magyar Katolikus Lexikon, IV*. Budapest 1998, p. 73. MDE IV no. 180 (1490, not more closely dated). Antony of Šankovce went to accept the office of bishop after the death of the previous bishop. Then he immediately travelled to Rome. On the history of the diocese of Nitra in the Middle Ages see: MARSINA, Richard (ed.). *Nitra v slovenských dejinách*. (Nitra in Slovak history.) Martin 2002; MARSINA, Richard. Nitrianske biskupstvo a jeho biskupi od 9. do polovice 13. storočia. (The Diocese of Nitra and its bishops, 9th – mid 13th century.) In *Historický časopis*, 1993, year 41, no. 5-6, p. 529-542; LUKAČKA, Ján. Nitra v období neskorého stredoveku. (Nitra in the late Middle Ages.) In FUSEK, Gabriel – ZEMENE, Marián R. (eds.). *Dejiny Nitry od najstarších čias po súčasnosť*. (A history of Nitra from the earliest times to the present.) Nitra 1998, p. 181.

86 Diocesan Archive of Nitra (hereinafter DA), cap. 1, fasc. 1, no. 12.

87 BONFINI, Antonio. *Rerum ungaricarum decades*: <http://www.bkiado.hu/doku/html/bonfini.html>, 28 May 2009, 5. 2. 120, 5. 3. 120.

88 ÓVÁRY, ref. 69, no. 696 (2 April 1492): Maffeo de Treviglio informed Abbot Jakub de Forli that after mature consideration with Cardinal L. Ascanio Sforza, they hold the view that the Provost of Bratislava Antony had been sent to Rome to deal with a dispensation, and Vladislav would be secretly married to Bianca. ÓVÁRY, ref. 69, no. 172 (22 Jan 1493). Duke L. Sforza in a letter to Vladislav expressed satisfaction that the king was sending the Bishop of Nitra to Rome to deal with his marital affairs, and he started his support on these matters. BERZEVICZY: ref. 83, p. 181, 197, 198.

89 Maffeo de Treviglia wrote to the Bishop of Győr Thomas Bakócz (13 May 1492), that Vladislav agreed to marry Bianca Sforza and would discuss these matters with Antony in Ancona or another Italian city. ÓVÁRY, ref. 69, no. 705, 707.

90 ÓVÁRY, ref. 69, no. 709.

91 Antony's planned journey to Venice is mentioned by Thadeas Vimercati on 14 June 1492. ÓVÁRY: ref.

A week later, Antony left Venice to travel to Rome, which he reached at the beginning of December.⁹² In Rome, he had to prove the invalidity of Vladislav's marriage, not only with Beatrix, but also with Barbara of Brandenburg. However, Beatrix did not hesitate. She also sent from Venice to Rome, a knight from Hungary, accompanied by four men in "Hungarian dress", to thwart the efforts of Bishop Antony.⁹³

On 30 December 1492, King Ferrante wrote to his new ambassador in Hungary Andreas Carafa, about Antony's visit to the Pope. Ferrante referred to information from his ambassador in Rome Francesco de Monti, about secret discussions between Antony and Pope Alexander VI. Bishop Antony allegedly wanted to gain the annulment of the marriage with the following arguments: before the wedding, Vladislav had made a secret declaration that he did not want to marry Beatrix, and was forced to do so only by state interests. He appealed to a formal error in the marriage ceremony, when instead of the word "volo", Vladislav had expressed his consent with the word "ita". Another reason was the queen's infertility and the fact that the marriage had not been consummated. Antony also asked for the annulment of the marriage with Barbara of Brandenburg.⁹⁴ The Papal Consistorium concerned itself with the dispute about Vladislav's marriage on 8 January 1493. Alexander VI and invited cardinals and prelates first heard the arguments of the Bishop of Nitra and then of the Neapolitan defenders.⁹⁵ Bishop Antony of Šankovce wrote out all the arguments in the so-called *Apologia of King Vladislav*, and on the basis of the principles of canon law, he strove to prove that Vladislav's marriage, concluded under pressure and for political reasons, while there were obligations to another woman, was not valid.⁹⁶ Vladislav himself said that he never had the slightest intention of marrying the widow of Matthias Corvinus. He gave some signs of a promise only to satisfy the wishes of the Hungarian Estates, which advised that in a time of war against Polish and Austrian armies, Beatrix should be kept in hope of a wedding as a political tactic. Although he had promised before witnesses to marry the widow, his advisors had emphasized that he would not have to keep this promise enforced by political necessity. It was mainly a matter of getting the marriage desiring and rich widow to provide money for a strong army of mercenaries.⁹⁷ And so the compliant king, under pressure from all sides from the armies of candidates for the Crown of St. Stephen, succumbed to pressure.

69, no. 713, 736.

92 ÓVÁRY, ref. 69, no. 736 (22 Nov 1492). The journey of Antony to Rome was delayed because the Pope was ill. ÓVÁRY, ref. 69, no. 718, (2 July 1492). FRAKNÓI, Vilmos. *Magyarország egyházi és politikai összeköttetései a római szentszékkal a konstanzi zsinattól a mohácsi vészig*. Budapest 1902, p. 251.

93 ÓVÁRY, ref. 69, no. 737 (1 Dec 1492).

94 ÓVÁRY, Lipót. II. Ulászló és Beatrix házassága. In *Századok*, 1890, p. 765 etc.

95 ÓVÁRY, ref. 69, no. 741. BERZEVICZY, ref. 83, p. 285 (9 April 1493): letter from King Vladislav in Budapest to the Pope, in which he confirms that he has received the Pope's breve on the matter of the marriages with Barbara of Brandenburg and Queen Beatrix and refers to the answer that would be presented by his ambassador, the Bishop of Nitra Antony.

96 TRUHLÁŘ, Catalogus I. no. 143 – Epistolae Bouslai de Lobkowitz et Opusculum de miseria humana, f. 98-133: "*Apologia regis Wladislai. Antonio episcopo Nitriensi Wladislai regis oratori [...]*". ROSZNER, B. Ervin. *Régi magyar házassági jog*. Budapest : Franklin-Társulat, 1887, p. 452-462.

97 MACEK, Josef. *Jagellonský věk v českých zemích: 1471-1526. 1-2.* (The Jagiellonian age in the Czech Lands: 1471-1526. 1-2.). Prague : Academia, 2001, p. 211.

On the other hand, according to King Ferrante, his ambassadors in Rome could refute all Antony's claims. Queen Beatrix also provided her counter-arguments on 22 March 1492. She described in detail the king's promises and presented different views on the course of the wedding ceremony.⁹⁸

The King of Naples engaged in his daughter's problems, sending to Hungary A. Carafa with letters of accreditation to the King of Hungary, describing him as "son-in-law and son". In February, the King of Hungary sent the Bishop of Nitra to Naples to report that the king saw the queen as a good sister. He would honour her as a sister, but not as a wife. The King of Naples was unhappy about the way his daughter had been defrauded or deceived, so he decided to send ambassadors to Hungary because, in his view, the Bishop of Nitra did not have sufficient authority.⁹⁹

The efforts of the king and his servants did not fail to provoke a reaction from Beatrix, according to whom the king's representatives lied. She opposed Vladislav's claim that he had not consented to the marriage, with the view that "*What God has joined together, should not be divided by man, even with the use of royal power.*" She enumerated her merits and financial aid to the Kingdom of Hungary.¹⁰⁰ In May 1493, Antony returned from Naples to Rome, where he met the Bishop of Pécs and with Cardinal Ascanio,¹⁰¹ but the Pope gave a definitive verdict on the matrimonial case only in 1500. Vladislav's marriage with Beatrix was declared invalid and he was also freed from the marriage vow he had given to the daughter of the Margrave of Brandenburg Barbara.¹⁰² Thus, Beatrix lost her struggle for the crown of Hungary. She died in Naples in 1508.

There was no longer anything in the way of Vladislav contracting a legal marriage – with the French court lady Anna de Foix in 1502. However, by this time, the place of Antony in his foreign policy had been taken by another Bishop of Nitra, Nicholas of Bácskai.

During his journeys to Rome, Antony gained the title of Apostolic Protonotarius.¹⁰³ In spring 1492, the Kingdom of Hungary was still represented at the Holy See by the Provost of Vasvár Ladislav of Körmend, but at the end of the year he was replaced by Antony of Šankovce.¹⁰⁴ Apart from pilgrims from Hungary, who were growing in number at the end of the 15th century, it is possible to speak of active diplomatic representation of Hungary at the Apostolic See. Antony's relation, the chaplain to King Matthias, Archdeacon of Transylvania and canon John Lászai even became confessor to the Pope in Rome from 1517. He is buried in the church of San Stefano Rotondo.¹⁰⁵ Since Provost Antony was

98 BERZEVICZY, ref. 83, p. 244 (2 July 1492).

99 ÓVÁRY, ref. 69, no. 746 (13 Feb 1493).

100 BERZEVICZY, ref. 83, p. 318-325 (18 Sept 1494).

101 ÓVÁRY, ref. 69, no. 751 (2 May 1493).

102 FRAKNÓI, ref. 92, p. 251.

103 DF 228 281 (1491).

104 KUBINYI, András. Magyarok a késő – középkori Rómában. In *Történelmi Tanulmányok*. Studia Miskolciensia, 3. Miskolc 1999, p. 83-84.

105 MÁLYUSZ, Elemér. *Egyházi társadalom a középkori Magyarországon*. Budapest : Akadémiai Kiadó, 1971, p. 93. Before 1512, John Lászai had a chapel decorated in the Cathedral of St. Michael at Alba Iulia (Gyulafehérvár) with a net vault and ornamentation of Lombard origin in the Renaissance style. ENTZ,

often travelling, the practical running of the Bratislava Chapter was done by his vicar Gašpar Romer († 1517) a native of Bratislava, and the deputy vicar Pankráč Rohrbeck.¹⁰⁶ Evidence survives from periods when Antony stayed in Bratislava or Nitra, showing that he applied his canon law, organizational and pastoral experience. His activities included reconstruction of St. Martin's Collegiate Church in Bratislava and organizing synods.¹⁰⁷ Unfortunately he did not succeed in reversing the unfavourable development of the Istropolitan University, which had been established in 1465/1467. As Provost of Bratislava, he also held the position of its vice-chancellor. The university developed well at first, but after Vitéz' conspiracy, the departure of professors from Vitéz' circle, and especially after the death of the previous provost George of Schönberg, it began to decline.

In October 1488, the Archbishop of Esztergom Hypolitus confirmed the original appointment from 1469 of the Provost of Bratislava as vicar to the archbishop for western Slovakia. At that time, Provost Antony still had the title university vice chancellor,¹⁰⁸ but in 1492 the Istropolitan University is already mentioned as dissolved, as also in a document from Pope Innocent VIII from 1494, where mention of the university is already omitted.¹⁰⁹ When he occupied Vienna, King Matthias gained the university there, so he was no longer interested in the Istropolitan University.

In this period, work was continuing on the Collegiate Church of St. Martin in close cooperation with the people of the city. The city was patron of the church and largely responsible for its construction.¹¹⁰ Burghers and canons contributed to construction of the church with bequests in their wills and by means of indulgences. They took care of the liturgical equipment, vestments and manuscripts, wax and so on. They also participated in financing the new high altar in the choir, which was consecrated in 1497 by Archbishop Thomas Bakócz. According to Gábor Endrődi, the relief of the Nativity of Christ

Géza. *A Gyulafehérvári székesegyház*. Budapest 1958, p. 118, 130; HALMOS, Balázs. *A gyulafehérvári Lázói-kápolna alakhelyes felmérése és kutatásainak eredményei*. In *Műemlékvédelem* XLVII., 2003, p. 120-127; HALMOS, Balázs. Lombard influences in the Renaissance reconstruction of the Lázói Chapel in Gyulafehérvár. In *Bulletin* 2004, p. 11-26.

106 Archív mesta Bratislavy (Archive of the City of Bratislava, hereinafter AMB) no. 4 098. Protokol testamentov mesta Bratislavy (1427 – 1529), sign. 4 n 1: Testament Jána Grasmana (17 Dec 1494), fol. 243r – 244r.

107 The historian Ferdinand Knauz recorded the content of an 83 folio manuscript on disputes between the Provost Nicholas of Šankovce and the Bratislava Chapter in 1506-1508. KNAUZ, ref. 60, p. 72-73. We also learn from the fragmentary remains of the documents that Provost Antony excommunicated Canon Wolfgang dictus Farkas, who refused to return pawned chalices. MÁLYUSZ, ref. 105, p. 146: Provost Antony solved problems with the Trnava prebendaries in 1493.

108 Slovak National Archive (hereinafter: SNA), Súkromný archív Bratislavskej kapituly (Private Archive of the Bratislava Chapter, hereinafter SABK) Cap. A, fasc. 3, Nr. 12.

109 It is possible that the university functioned up to 1488 with lectures by the canons of the Bratislava Chapter or only some of the faculties functioned, but without a reliable source base, these questions cannot be answered. HLAVAČKOVÁ, Miriam. *Univerzita Istropolitana a Kapitula pri Dóme sv. Martina v Bratislave. K právnickej fakulte na Univerzite Istropolitane*. (The Istropolitan University and the Chapter of St. Martin's in Bratislava. On the Law Faculty of the Istropolitan University.). In KRAFL, Pavel (ed.). *Sacri canones servandi sunt. Ius canonicum et status ecclesiae saeculis XIII. – XV*. Prague : Historický ústav AV ČR, 2008, p. 468-479.

110 AMB no. 3 207.

from Hlohovec is a remnant of it.¹¹¹ Provost Antony had stalls for the canons placed in the church. He called woodcarvers from Vienna to make them.¹¹² During his time in Bratislava, Antony had to sit in judgement on an inheritance from the previous Provost George of Schönberg, who founded the Altar of the Holy Cross in St. Martin's Collegiate Church and endowed it with a house in the district below Bratislava Castle, the Hervart vineyard and another vineyard in Vajnory. George's relation, Peter Peltlinger, castelan of Malinovo (Eberhard) Castle did not agree with this.¹¹³ Peltlinger and the Sheriff of Bratislava Imrich Czobor forcibly entered the provost's house, and occupied it and the curia.¹¹⁴ After prolonged judicial proceedings, Provost Antony and his successors gained the right to the house and the Hervart vineyard.¹¹⁵

In 1494 Bishop Antony admonished the burghers of Bratislava not to cause problems for the Bratislava clergy, to observe the Catholic faith and not accept heresy, as some towns in Bohemia had done.¹¹⁶ However, there were disordered relations among the clergy themselves: The Archbishop of Esztergom Hypolitus instructed Antony to intervene against parish priests, who lived with concubines,¹¹⁷ and to carry out visitations of all the priests in his district. The archbishop emphasized that the provost had to use excommunication in extreme cases.¹¹⁸ Pope Innocent VIII confirmed the right of the provost to wear a bishop's insignia during liturgical ceremonies in the territory subject to him from 1469. He was also instructed to deal vigorously with heretics. According to this grant of privileges, the provost could reconsecrate places defiled by heretics, for example, cemeteries. The Pope added one further privilege: the right to grant a 40 day indulgence to participants in a Pontifical Mass celebrated by the provost.¹¹⁹ As Bishop of Nitra,¹²⁰ Antony called a diocesan synod in 1494. Its conclusions inform us about the problems of

111 ENDRÓDI, Gábor. Kapitoly z dejín hlohoveckého reliéfu Narodenia Krista. (Chapters from the history of the Hlohovec relief of the Nativity of Christ.). In *Galéria – Ročenka SNG 2001*, p. 10-11. It is recorded that Matthias' shield and that of his wife Beatrix of Aragon appeared on the retable of the altar. CHAMONIKOLASOVÁ, Kaliopi. Recepcia diela Nicolaus Gerhaerta van Leyden na Slovensku v poslednej tretine 15. storočia. (The reception of the work of Nicolaus Gerhaert van Leyden in Slovakia in the last third of the 15th century.). In BURAN, Dušan (ed.). *Gotika. Dejiny slovenského výtvarného umenia*. Bratislava : Slovart, 2003, p. 377.

112 There was not enough church money for their completion, so the canons sacrificed 16 pounds of denars. KNAUZ, ref. 60, p. 56. These stalls were removed in 1736, when the inscription from their tablet with the date 1497 was copied into the records of the chapter.

113 AMB no. 3 863; SABK, Cap. A, fasc. 7, No. 3 (29 June 1487); SABK, Cap. A, fasc. 7, No. 5 (3 Aug 1487); SABK, Cap. A, fasc. 7, No. 4 (12 Aug 1487). FEKETE NAGY, Antal – BORSA, Iván (eds.). *A Balassa család 1193-1526*. Budapest : MTA Történettudományi Intézet, 1990, no. 439.

114 AMB no. 3 875 (Bratislava 30 Sept 1488).

115 SNA, SABK, Cap. A, fasc. 7, No. 6; SNA, SABK, Cap. A, fasc. 7, No. 2. RIMELY, Carolus. *Capitulum insignis ecclesiae collegiatae Posoniensis*. Pressburg (Bratislava) 1880, p. 132, 231.

116 SNA, SABK, Cap. G, fasc. 3, No. 73.

117 SNA, SABK, Cap. A, fasc. 10, No. 103.

118 SNA, SABK, Cap. A, fasc. 1, No. 5.

119 SNA, SABK, Cap. A, fasc. 1, No. 3 (1490 Rome).

120 In January 1493, Provost Antony paid annates (part of the annual income from a given office) to the Roman Curia, amounting to 43 gulden. KÖRMENDY, József. *Annatae e regno Hungariae provenientes in Archivo secreto Vaticano 1421-1536*. Budapest : Akadémiai Kiadó, 1990, no. 183.

the Catholic Church at the end of the 15th century.¹²¹ The synod solved doctrinal, liturgical and disciplinary questions, especially in connection with the preceding period of the spread of Husitism. The first chapters were concerned with the sacraments, others with discipline of the clergy, prebendaries, Church feast days and religious obligations of the faithful.¹²² The rights of the clergy to leave property in their wills were precisely defined, and priests living with concubines were threatened with strict punishment. Secular business, drunkenness and carrying of weapons – except in life threatening circumstances – were strictly forbidden to priests. Benefice holders, who would not spend more than three months in residence, had to lose their prebendaries. Apart from murder, the sins that could be forgiven only by the general vicar included false oaths, refusal to pay tithes, killing of disabled children and violating episcopal jurisdiction. The disciplinary measures against disobedient priests were especially strict. Being ordained as a priest in Rome without “*litterae dimissoriae*”, a document, which the candidate for ordination had to get from his ordinary, so that he could be ordained in another diocese,¹²³ had to be punished by suspension. An archdeacon had to instruct the priests subordinate to him three times a year about the regulations issued by synods. The synod fixed the minimum ages for getting married at 12 for girls and 14 for boys.¹²⁴

The last demanding journey for which we have written evidence was undertaken by Bishop Antony, now aged about 70, to the Imperial Diet at Worms on the left bank of the Rhine in winter 1499. Canon Peter of Aufsess wrote to his Bishop Laurence of Würzburg on 6 January 1499 that the arrival of the great Hungarian delegation, with 150 horses and 11 wagons headed by Bishop Antony of Nitra and the Sheriff of Temesvár (Timișoara) *Josa de Soom*, was expected the next day. He would write about “*the valuables carried in their wagons and the information that could be learnt from them as soon as he had seen and heard them*”.¹²⁵ On the next day, the canon wrote into the record of the Worms Imperial Diet that Bishop John of Worms had asked for advice from the participants on what they should discuss with the Hungarian representatives and how they should be welcomed. The participants advised him that because of the small number of assembled representatives and especially because the diet was to be transferred at Maximilian’s request to Cologne, they should receive the Hungarian ambassadors in their accommo-

121 STRÁNSKY, Albert. *Dejiny biskupstva Nitrianskeho od najstarších dôb až do konca stredoveku*. (History of the Diocese of Nitra from the earliest times to the end of the Middle Ages.). Nitra : Vyd. Spolku sv. Vojtecha, 1933, p. 171-172. In the territory of a diocese, statutes regulate the relations between the secular and ecclesiastical authorities, giving of the sacraments, topical legal questions and the life of the local Church. On synods in detail see: KRAFL, Pavel. *Synody a statuta Olomoucké diecéze období středověku*. (Synods and statutes of the Diocese of Olomouc in the Middle Ages.). Prague : Historický ústav AV ČR, 2003.

122 ADRIÁNYI, Gabriel. Die ungarischen Synoden. In *Annuaire Historiae Conciliorum*, 1976, 8, p. 548.

123 DL 72 722 – Antony’s letter from 19 Dec 1495 deals with the conditions for priestly ordination in the Middle Ages. He gives details of the procedure for the ordination in Nitra Cathedral of Juraj, son of Andrej Slowak from Veľká Bytča.

124 The decisions of the Nitra diocesan synod were published by the Bishop of Nitra Paul Bornemisza. *Statuta synodaliae ecclesiae Nitriensis anni 1494*. Vienna 1560; STRÁNSKY, ref. 121, p. 175.

125 Canon Aufsess met the Hungarian delegation already on the morning of Friday 4 Jan in Heidelberg, when he left there after the conclusion of discussions. RI XIV 3, 2, no. 12 823.

dation and inform them about the transfer of the Diet.¹²⁶ When the Hungarian ambassadors entered Worms with great ostentation and about 150 horses and wagons, they received no ceremonial welcome. They were only informed by the imperial advisers that the Emperor had ordered the transfer of the Imperial Diet to Cologne, which they had eight days to reach.¹²⁷ On the way to Cologne, Bishop Antony and Sheriff Josa visited the Archbishop of Mainz Berthold von Henneberg, who was described as the “soul” of the imperial negotiations or “father of the reform of the Empire”, because the King of Hungary considered it very important to have discussions with him.¹²⁸ Apart from him, the ambassadors also visited the Papal Legate Leonello Chieregati at the beginning of February.¹²⁹ He wrote about their visit to Pope Alexander VI, and added to his letter a letter from the King of Hungary he had received from them.¹³⁰ Bishop Antony spoke very seriously about the Turkish threat to Hungary and about how he had been authorized by the king to ask for help from the Pope, the Emperor and the German princes. If they refused to help, the King of Hungary would be forced to conclude an agreement with the Turks. The Hungarian ambassadors turned to Chieregati to support their urgent request to the Imperial Diet and German princes. He promised this and expected further instructions from the Pope. Three months later, Chieregati informed the Pope that the Emperor had recruited Hungarian hussars (*ussarones*), who fought like Turks and demanded a gulden from their commander for every enemy head, as well as Czech mercenaries able to make from wagons a fortress defended by cannons. He also explained to the Pope why the Polish ambassador at the diet in Überlingen also represented Hungary. The Emperor asked Antony to stay at the diet and demonstrate support to the uncooperative members of the Schwabian League,¹³¹ but the bishop could not soften his position. He returned to Hungary on the orders of his king. For this reason, the Polish ambassador also represented Hungary.¹³² Chieregati also mentioned a dispute between the ambassadors of Hungary and Spain, which occurred before the departure of the Emperor from Cologne on about 1 April. The Spanish ambassador claimed the first place – before the Hungarian ambassador – at vespers in the cathedral. When the latter complained, the Emperor recognized the right of the Hungarian ambassador, which made the Spanish ambassador complain that “*if he had known this, he would not have come*”. They informed the Spanish ambassador that in the presence of the Emperor, the King of Bohemia and Hun-

126 RI XIV 3, 2, no. 12 825.

127 RI XIV 3, 2, no. 12 826.

128 At the time of the Diet, the Archbishop of Mainz was seriously ill and could not attend. WEISS, ref. 61, p. 54. Servant of the Bishop of Nitra had to obtain a time for an audience with the Archbishop of Mainz: RI XIV 3, 2, no. 12 831. (9 Jan 1499). The archbishop’s invitation to Mainz – RI XIV 3, 2, no. 12 832.

129 FRITSCH, Susanne. Zwischen Papst und König. Der Gesandte Leonello Chieregati (1484-1506) als Spielball päpstlicher Außenpolitik. In DÜNNEBEIL, Sonja – OTTNER, Christine (eds.). *Aussenpolitisches Handeln im 15. Jahrhundert Akteure und Ziele* (Forschungen zur Kaiser- und Papstgeschichte des Mittelalters – Beihefte zu J.F. Böhmer, Regesta Imperii 27). Vienna : Böhlau 2007, p. 227-237.

130 RI XIV 3, 2 no. 12 891 (3 Feb 1499 Cologne)

131 The Schwabian League was a strong military alliance composed of Schwabian noblemen from more than 26 imperial cities in the south-west of the Empire.

132 RI XIV 3, 2, no. 13 278a. On the joint Hungarian and Polish delegations at the diets of 1498 and 1522 see: BÖMELBURG, ref. 72, p. 410-411.

gary, as a Prince of the Empire, had priority over the others, but the Spanish ambassador was not satisfied and “*from then he avoided the Hungarians like an enemy*”.¹³³ It is clear that even diplomats, who had to be masters of the performance of court ceremonies and etiquette, did not always succeed in behaving according to the rules.

In mid December 1500, Vladislav wrote to the Emperor Maximilian that he would send his ambassadors Bishop Antony of Nitra and the chamberlain John Podmanický.¹³⁴ Soon after this, the Provost of Bratislava and Bishop of Nitra died.

In his office of bishop, he ordered investigations of the boundaries of various properties of the bishopric to prevent possible disputes.¹³⁵ He passed judgement on a dispute with the Franciscan Friary of St. Mary about the right to a mill on the river Nitra.¹³⁶ In 1494, Antony gained a property in Horná Kráľová (*Kyraly*) on the basis of a bequest in the will of Peter of Dolná Krupá.¹³⁷ Masses had to be celebrated at the altar of St. Francis in the Cathedral in Nitra Castle for the peaceful coexistence of the inhabitants of neighbouring villages belonging to the Bishopric of Nitra: Horná Kráľová, Močenok (*Mochenok*) and Jarka (*Ireg*). Mass had to be celebrated every Monday at this altar for the dead with a collect (prayer for the day). On Fridays, the Passion of Our Lord had to be remembered with the addition of a collect from the Mass formula *On the Sorrows of the Most Blessed Virgin Mary*. Antony of Šankovce founded an altar in honour of St. Antony in Nitra Cathedral. He endowed it with his stone house in Budapest in All Saints Street opposite the house of the Margrave of Brandenburg, and with a vineyard on Zobor.¹³⁸

The Provost of Bratislava and Bishop of Nitra Antony of Šankovce was undoubtedly an important and many sided personality in the history of the medieval Kingdom of Hungary. He was an expert in canon law, a skilful diplomat sent to various countries, and always a reliable advisor and servant to the kings of Hungary Matthias Corvinus and Vladislav II Jagiello. In spite of the fact that he moved in the highest political circles at European courts and the Papal Curia, the sources also show that he was very concerned with the reform of Church activities in his own country, which culminated in the holding of a synod in the Diocese of Nitra.

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133 RI XIV 3, 2, no. 13 278a. On Maximilian's ambassadors: HOLLEGGGER, Manfred. Anlassgesandtschaften – Ständige Gesandtschaften in der Zeit Maximilians I. In DÜNNEBEIL, Sonja – OTTNER, Christine (eds.). *Aussenpolitisches Handeln im 15. Jahrhundert. Akteure und Ziele* (Forschungen zur Kaiser- und Papstgeschichte des Mittelalters – Beihefte zu J.F. Böhmer, Regesta Imperii 27). Vienna : Böhlau, 2007, p. 214-225.

134 RI XIV 3, 2, no. 14 731.

135 DL 38 869, 90 230. LUKINICH, Imre. *A Podmanini Podmaniczky-család oklevéltára I*. Budapest : MTA, 1937, no. 155, 155a, (village of Dolné Naštice, Skačany 1469). He concerned himself with solving disputes with serfs of the bishopric at Hrnčiarovce (*de Gerencheer*). Esztergom Chapter Archive, Cap. Eccl. 16, f. 7, No. 33.

136 DL 50 597 (1492).

137 DA Nitra, odd. Nitrianske biskupstvo, cap. III., fasc. 2, no. 5.

138 DA Nitra, odd. Nitrianska kapitula, fasc. 28, no. 17.

DIPLOMAT IM DIENSTE DER UNGARISCHEN KÖNIGE
DAS WIRKEN DES NEUTRA-BISCHOFS ANTON VON ŠANKOVCE
GEGEN ENDE DES MITTELALTERS

MIRIAM HLAVAČKOVÁ

Zu Diplomaten im Dienste des ungarischen Königs Matthias Corvinus wurden auf Grund ihrer Universitätsbildung und Sprachkenntnisse vor allem die Geistlichen. Auch Anton von Šankovce (de Sankfalwa) begann seine internationale Karriere als Kanoniker in Großwardein (Oradea). Er wurde vom König mit immer anspruchsvolleren diplomatischen Aufgaben betraut – zusammen mit Vitéz, dem Erzbischof von Gran (Esztergom), machten sich um die Rückkehr der Stephanskrone nach Ungarn zurück (1463) verdient, er wurde auf die Höfe der italienischen Herrschern, nach Frankreich, Polen oder Deutschland gesandt. Im Jahre 1486 wurde er vom König Matthias Corvinus zum Bratislavaer Propst ernannt, im Jahre 1490 von Wladislaw II. zum Bischof von Neutra (Nitra), wobei der König das Neutra-Bistum unter seine besondere Obhut nahm. Seine kanonisch-rechtliche Ausbildung, die er an der Universität in Padua erlangte, setzte Anton von Šankovce im Bereich des Eherechts voll um. Im Rom hatte er zur Aufgabe die Ungültigkeit der Ehe von Wladislaw mit Beatrix von Aragon sowie mit Barbara von Brandenburg zu beweisen. Aus den Zeiten, als sich Anton in Bratislava oder Nitra aufhielt, sind uns Zeugnisse über seine Aktivitäten, wobei er seine kanonisch-rechtliche, organisatorische (der Umbau der Bratislavaer Domkirche, das Veranstalten der Synode) und pastorale Erfahrungen einsetzte, erhalten geblieben. Vom Amt des Bischofs berief er 1494 die Diözesesynode ein, deren Beschlüsse uns über die Probleme in der katholischen Kirche am Ende des 15. Jahrhundert unterrichten. Seine letzte diplomatische Reise unternahm der Bischof Anton im Jahre 1499 zum Reichstag nach Worms. Dort bemühte er sich um die Hilfe des Papstes, des Kaisers und der deutschen Fürsten gegen den sich steigenden Angriffen der Türken. In der Kathedrale in Nitra gründete er den Altar vom heiligen Anton, wofür er sein Haus in Ofen (Buda) und die Weinberge auf Zobor stiftete.

TRIANON RITUALS OR CONSIDERATIONS OF SOME FEATURES OF HUNGARIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY

ROMAN HOLEC

HOLEC, Roman. Trianon rituals or considerations of some features of Hungarian historiography. *Historický časopis*, 2011, 59, Supplement, pp. 25-48, Bratislava.

The study connected with the approaching anniversary of the conclusion of the Treaty of Trianon examines the instrumentalization of this event in part of Hungarian historiography. Biased arguments, the so-called national viewpoint, double standards for the same phenomena, absence of context, lack of perception of preceding developments, demonization of particular personalities and phenomena, uncritical argumentation from the 1910 nationality statistics, which used unreliable methods, accompany this instrumentalization. All this is only part of a rich repertoire. The study comments on the character of the most recent Trianon publications and generalizes about some common features of Hungarian historiography, especially the absence of self-reflection and problems with the analysis of their own historical failures, as well as the tendency of the main stream of Hungarian historiography to ignore these negative trends. They are tacitly accepted without comment or the necessary critical detachment, which gives the impression of agreement. There are more than enough similar negative phenomena in Slovakia, but here they evoke polemics and the majority of professional historians distance themselves from them. Only those, who can express their position and not be silent at home, have the right to look beyond the frontiers and express critical views of the situation in neighbouring countries.

Hungarian historiography. Trianon and its instrumentalization. Absence of self-reflection and distortion of history. Comparison with Slovak historiography.

History and its symbols have an important unifying role for today's tragically divided Hungarian society. Selected historical personalities and events can mobilize and integrate in a way that the three opposing political camps are no longer able to do. As a result, extraordinary attention has traditionally been devoted to history and historical education in Hungary. This attention comes from the political leaders, who find in history, or fill in with history, what is lacking in today's society, frustrated by economic problems and irreconcilable political contradictions. Escape into the past is a traditional and unique resource, which enables politicians to address people with the help of simple ideas also in the present, and to turn their attention outwards, beyond the area of their own Hungarian state. Understandably there are variations in how "they apply the saw" and what consequences they provoke, but the result is a society made "sick by history", in which the great weight of history and pride in its greatness is mixed with traumas from historic defeats or injustices, and especially from the fact that it is very difficult to find a positive way forward from such a history. I speak of a society made "sick by history" in spite

of the fact that interest in history is clearly declining, even in Hungary, and especially among the young. However, it is still on an entirely different level than in Slovakia.¹

Especially the last century made the Hungarians the greatest “losers” in Central Europe. They were traumatized by the fact that one historic defeat followed another, and a whole series of their own historic failures supplemented these defeats. Reflection on their own behaviour, without motivating the origin of feelings of injustice, revenge, “just” correction or the search for apologies, is very rare. In connection with the Holocaust, wild post-war expulsions and atrocities against neighbours, they prefer to speak of the failings of others, and do not admit that these otherwise inexcusable steps were often only a reaction to earlier Hungarian atrocities, aims or tragic measures. Nobody likes to notice what came before individual failings, or they produce unbalanced interpretations, substantially more critical towards others than to themselves. Such a practice of double standards is short-sighted and has fatal consequences in the deformation of social consciousness and historical memory, with the deliberate cultivation of negative stereotypes towards others, while their own mistakes and failures, sometimes the causes of the already mentioned stereotypes, remain on the periphery or are swept under the carpet. It is not surprising that Hungarian history and cupboards are full of skeletons. This means that there are many unsolved and still open problems from the past.

Selectiveness is also characteristic of terminology. What is called aggression in others, is explained in ourselves with various more sophisticated causes, and we prefer to avoid the expression “aggression”. What we call fascism in others, with the added value of all the horrors that accompany it, is euphemistically termed limited democracy or dictatorship in ourselves, because anything sounds better than fascism. If we come out of a possible comparison worse, we prefer not to make the comparison. Such an uncritical and partisan approach, associated with the frequently used expression “Hungarian point of view”, is both unproductive and deforming.

Precisely the ever more frequent occurrence of such phenomena in Hungarian publications, especially in popularizing works aimed at the general public gave me the reason to write these lines. The bearers of these phenomena are not naive amateur historians, but sometimes leading members of the most important historical institutions, or the youngest generation of Hungarian historians, who are only entering the game. I see a difference here between the Hungarian and Slovak extremes.

An example of the above mentioned selective approach is the May 2009 issue of the otherwise high quality and respected historical periodical *Rubicon*. For the first time after more than 60 years (!) qualified historians concerned themselves with events on the Hungarian – Yugoslav frontier in the period 1941 – 1944/45, in particular giving the first account of Hungarian atrocities against Serbian civilians, and at the end of the war, similar acts of revenge by Serbs against Hungarians. Although this issue of *Rubicon* contains an expert text by Judit Pihurik about the failings of the Hungarians with the title *Hideg*

1 HOLEC, Roman. Na čo sú nám dejiny? Aké dejiny potrebujeme? (What is History for? What History do we need?). In *História*, 8 (Bratislava 2008), no. 1, p. 41-44; HOLEC, Roman. Úvod bez záveru alebo úvaha namiesto úvodu. (An Introduction without a Conclusion or Considerations instead of an Introduction.). In *Rozštiepená minulosť. Kapitoly z histórie Slovákov a Maďarov*. Bratislava : Nadácia Terra Cognita, 2008, p. 11-16.

napok (Cold Days), following the only previous, more literary account of the events, written by Tibor Cseres at the beginning of the 1960s,² this article is followed by various texts about the acts of Serbian revenge, characteristically entitled *Még hidegebb napok (Even Colder Days)*,³ apparently to indicate a “qualitative” difference in the mutual killing. Understandably, only Hungarian authors received space to describe all the brutal repression.⁴ This is documented even better by numbers of pages, with 10 devoted to Hungarian crimes and 23 to Serbian failings including ethnic cleansing and the popular theme of the reduction of the number of Hungarians after the Second World War.

It is noteworthy that after decades of silence, this theme was quickly taken up again by the well-known popularizing Hungarian periodical *História* in its Serbian-Hungarian issue from 2010. Under the title *What do we know about the “even colder days”?*, Enikő A. Sajti again expressed himself, and again without the Serbian point of view. In an essay style text, originally produced as a lecture for an event at Subotica in 2009, Ferenc Glatz also dealt with the Serbian-Hungarian atrocities. These two papers place 3,340 dead, including 2,250 Serbs on one side of the scales and 20,000 dead Hungarians on the other, not to mention the fact that Hungarian public opinion accepts a figures of 40,000 victims almost without question. According to Serbian sources, the figure is “only” 5,000. Glatz’s emotive statements, which retain their character also in written form, speak of “Serbian nationalism” and “Hungarian insensitivity”, but in principle, he strives to escape the heritage of collective guilt and mutual accusations and calls for discussion, including about the “cold” and the “even colder” days, because as he rightly comments, a person must be shocked by details of mutual butchery – and historians bravely remain silent.⁵ These are Glatz’s words and it is only possible to agree with them.

A double standard similar to that in the Serbian case, with much silence on one side and the demanded “Hungarian point of view” on the other with speculation and emotions good for massaging public opinion, can be seen in an older issue of *Rubicon* from 2008, devoted to the Slovak Republic from the time of the Second World War. The issue has the expression *The fascist puppet state of Slovakia, 1938 – 1945* already on its title page, although Slovak academic literature with a sufficiently critical attitude to the situation in this state and its political practices does not use it. To put it simply, whatever typology of fascism we take, the totalitarian system of this period in Slovakia does not fulfill its features, but conforms more to the proverbial Slovak variant of “leaky totalitarianism”.

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- 2 PIHURIK, Judit. Hideg napok. Délvidék 1941 – 1944. (The cold Days. Délvidék – South Hungary, 1941 – 1944) In *Rubicon*, 20, no. 5 from May 2009, p. 20-29. The work of T. Cseres was translated into many languages, especially those of the neighbouring countries. In 1978 it was published by the Prague publisher Odeon.
 - 3 SAJTI, Enikő A. Még hidegebb napok. Megtorlás a Délvidéken. (Even colder Days. The Reprisals in Délvidék – South Hungary) In *Rubicon*, 20, no. 5 from May 2009, p. 30-38.
 - 4 Apart from the already mentioned Judit Pihurik and Enikő A. Sajti, there were also contributions from László Gulyás, Lajos Forró, Márton Matuska and László Sebők. Hungarian memoirs are used for the extensive illustration.
 - 5 GLATZ, Ferenc. Szerb-magyar történelmi repertórium. (Serbian-Hungarian historical Enumeration) In *História*, (Budapest), 32, no. 1-2 from January-February 2010, p. 58-61; SAJTI, Enikő A. Mit tudunk a “még hidegebb napok”-ról? (What we know about “the even colder Days”?) In *História*, (Budapest), 32, no. 1-2 from January-February 2010, p. 37-43.

According to István Janek, the Slovak state arose as a product of the “*last stage*” of the disintegration of Czechoslovakia as the “*sick man*” of Central European and the “*first independent Slovak state can be classified as a sort of (clerico-) fascist regime and puppet state of Nazi Germany*”.⁶ While it is possible to identify with the last five words, it is possible to have serious reservations about the first two claims. The individual “stages of disintegration” were not internally conditioned and were not a sign of the “sickness” of the state, which had its faults, but also adequate democratic mechanisms for correcting them, in contrast, for example, to inter-war Hungary. The attempt at a typology in the centre of the idea evokes the Marxist label, lacking only the adjective “so-called”.

On the other hand, it is noteworthy that in Hungarian academic literature, the Horthy regime is not described as fascist. There is a high threshold of sensitivity to such adjectives, and rightly so. However, it is less justified to put it into one group with Czechoslovakia in relation to the Jews. It is nonsense, even if Jiří Kolejka allegedly said it in 1974.⁷ This claim hangs in the air, and is available to experts on inter-war Hungary, a group that did not include Kolejka. It is also admirable how such an idea can persist in the Hungarian environment for more than 35 years! While in one country, the Jews had to live with the consequences of anti-Jewish legislation, then without parallel in Europe, in the other – Czechoslovakia – Jews actively participated in political and economic life. The double standard is, however, a favourite approach to which I will return several more times. Moreover, it is difficult to find a Slovak parallel for Szálasi’s regime.⁸

The account of Slovakia during the war in the above mentioned “Slovak” issue of *Rubicon* includes the Holocaust, the Hlinka Guard and individual personalities. In the case of Tuka, the fact appears that he had already been proved to have cooperated with the Hungarian government, and there are 11 pages (!) about János Eszterházy. That may not be a problem, but it is notable that the Slovak National uprising, as an expression of the fact that the population did not identify with the character of the regime, as a key event for the post-war development of Slovakia and a source of important historical traditions, is mentioned in the text only marginally and in other contexts. There are mistakes even here. Even secondary school textbooks state that the uprising was declared as a reaction

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- 6 JANEK, István. Egy fasiszta bábállam Szlovákia 1938 – 1945 (Slovakia 1938 – 1945. The Fascist Puppet-Regime). In *Rubicon*, 19, no. 4 from April 2008, p. 5. On p. 13 he speaks of the excesses of Tuka and Mach, who supported the “*complete fascistization of the state*” and its subordination to the Germans.
- 7 TÖRÖK, Bálint. Horthy-rendszer. (Kérdések és feleletek a Horthy-rendszerről). (Horthy’s Political System. Questions and Answers about Horthy’s Political System). In *Valóság*, 52, no. 2 from February 2010, p. 53. By the way, the article contains various noteworthy ideas connected with Trianon, going beyond the usual Hungarian stereotypes, for example, the view that “*it was a huge mistake to relate all difficulties to Trianon*”. This conclusion is based on a statement by Pál Teleki from 1938, according to which such political propaganda was not and could not be effective in shaping public opinion in Europe (p. 49). Many present day Hungarian historians clearly still have an entirely opposite view.
- 8 I would like to refer here to the latest work of a young historian describing the character of Szálasi’s regime in detail: KOVÁCS, Zoltán András. *A Szálasi-kormány belügyminisztériuma. Rendvédelem, állambiztonság, közigazgatás a nyilas korszakban*. (The Ministry of the Interior of the Szálasi-Government. Protection Order, State Security and Public Administration in the Nyilas-Period). Máriabesnyő – Gödöllő : Attraktor, 2009. A positive review of this work has been published under the title “*hadihunizmus*” (military Hungarianism): BÉKES, Márton. Hadiyahungarizmus. (Military Hungarianism). In *Századvég*, Új folyam, 53. szám, 2009, 3. p. 175-181.

to the entry of German units into Slovak territory and not because the Red Army reached the frontier of Slovakia in August 1944.⁹ Finally, so that there can be no doubt about Slovak irredentism, which is mentioned more than the uprising, a photograph is reproduced, to show a demand not only for the return of the territories lost after the arbitration, but also for Vác! This theme would also undoubtedly deserve a separate article. Irredentism and Slovakia belong inseparably together!

Separate articles are devoted to the so-called little war and the other “Slovak” themes covered by articles include the events at Balassagyarmat in January 1919, which are already closely connected with the Trianon problem. The author of the article, Árpád Tyekvicska is the greatest expert on these events, so it is a pity that he did not avoid formulations such as describing the retreat of Hungarian units to the determined demarcation line at the end of 1918 as “humiliating”.¹⁰ Should they have fought? Among the other contributions, it is necessary to emphasize solid texts about the development of the Slovak national movement in the Kingdom of Hungary and an objective article about Černová from the pen of the experienced historian László Katus, who clearly did not allow any external circumstances to intervene in his conception. I will return to his first article later.

It is characteristic that while the so-called little war is described in generally neutral terms or rational arguments are sought to explain Hungarian steps, the events connected with crossing of the demarcation line in January 1919 are regarded as acts of aggression with the aim of gaining control of foreign territory. Slovak historians identify with such designations and have no mental problem with critically assessing the efforts of the new state to exploit the weakness of a neighbour, and together with the Rumanians to move the frontiers and enlarge their own territory. Arguments of a strategic, economic, historical, ethnic or other character could always be very pragmatically found.¹¹ However, to deny that the little war was just as much aggression, that is the military occupation of territory, which Hungary had not received in the Vienna Arbitration, and that there was also the possibility to occupy a substantially larger, but ethnically clearly Slovak territory, is again only one of the examples of the double standard and problems with critical evaluation of their own past.¹² The entry of Hungarian units into the territory of

9 JANEK, István. Jozef Tiso. In *Rubicon*, 19, no. 4 from April 2008, p. 11.

10 TYEKVICSKA, Árpád. A legbátrabb város. Civitas Fortunissima. A Csehek kiverése Balassagyarmatról. (The most courageous City. Civitas Fortunissima. The Expulsion of the Czechs from Balassagyarmat) In *Rubicon*, 19, no.4 from April 2008, p. 36. Tyekvicska is the co-author of a high quality publication of sources about these events: BARTHÓ, Zsuzsana – TYEKVICSKA, Árpád. *Civitas Fortissima. A balassagyarmati „csehkiverés” korának forrásai és irodalma*. (Civitas Fortunissima. The Sources and Literature about the Period of Expulsion of the Czechs from Balassagyarmat). Balassagyarmat : Nagy I. Történeti Kör – Nógrád Levéltár, 2000.

11 HOLEC, Roman. Problémy spolupráce Martina Rázusa a Ľudovíta Bazovského. (Problems in the Cooperation between Martin Rázus and Ľudovít Bazovský.). In PEKŇÍK, M. (ed.). *Martin Rázus politik, spisovateľ a cirkevný činiteľ*. Bratislava : ÚPV SAV – Veda, 2008, p. 200; HOLEC, Roman. The Small Person and Large History (The moral Fall of Ľudovít Bazovský). In ENDERLE-BURCEL, G. – KUBŮ, E. – ŠOUŠA, J. – STIEFEL, D. (eds.). „Discourses – Diskurse“. *Essays for Mikuláš Teich & Alice Teichova*. Pelhřimov; Prague; Vienna 2008, p. 192.

12 On this see: JANEK, István. *Szlovák-magyar kapcsolatok 1939 – 1944* (Slovak-Hungarian Relations 1939 – 1944). Pécs : PTE BTK, 2009.

Yugoslavia (Délvidék – the Southern Region) in April 1941 is evaluated with similar evasion. Either no position is stated as in Rubicon or there is a statement that “according to the Hungarian evaluation of the time” Yugoslavia had already ceased to exist and so the treaty of permanent friendship from December 1940 had become irrelevant.¹³ The present evaluation of this “interpretation” is evasively not expressed, but a similar “interpretation” is also used to justify the little war.

The year 2010 brought the ninetieth anniversary of the Treaty of Trianon. Since it is one of the most traumatizing events in 20th century Hungarian history and attempts to revise it are still not foreign to parts of Hungarian society, a strong wave of interest, reminiscences and returns to this milestone could be expected. It was nourished by all the institutionalized and hidden forms of Hungarian nationalism, and since it was also an election year, it was impossible hold any illusions that the politicians would stand aside. Unfortunately, it is necessary to say that the Slovak side also added enough fuel to the Hungarian fire. The two nationalisms helped each other and provided enough stimuli to each other. It is not the aim of this paper to evaluate the present unfortunate political situation for which both sides bear responsibility, but also to see here the double standard, when the Hungarian side does not admit its share of responsibility for certain demonized events, the constant mentions of Slovak extremism and the mapping of various organizations of such a character in Slovakia, but exactly in the spirit of the proverb “not seeing the wood for the trees”, while under-estimating their own problems with similar organizations, the views of which are growing like cancer, leading to unbalancing of Hungarian society and making declarations on the revision of Trianon, that go beyond the frontiers and inevitably make the threatened neighbours nervous.

Some circles in the ranks of Hungarian historians began to develop their activity not only on the eve of the “Trianon Year” but even earlier. The Trianoni Kutató Intézet (Trianon Research Institute) began to operate from the beginning of 2008 under the leadership of Ernő Raffay and Archimédesz Szidiropulosz, and with a very ambitious research programme. Its main result would be a ten volume publication of sources in Hungarian and English on the causes, form and results of Trianon. They have every right to found academic research institutions and no research can be automatically rejected, including research about Trianon, especially when Raffay has stated that they plan to include sources going back as far as the revolutions of 1848/49.¹⁴ The greatest problem with Hungarian interpretations of the individual traumatizing events is the predominantly ahistorical “point” approach. According to this approach, “history begins” with Trianon, the Beneš decrees or another event with a specific date. Little or no attention is paid to events coming before this date. It is as if history was not a process of individual causes and results, as if history did not have the character of continual development and movement, as if history only “hangs” in the air. Such an event taken out of context then appears as an injustice, unprecedented anomaly or logically inexplicable fact, which has a clear perpetrator, always foreign, and a clear victim, always the Hungarians.

13 F. I. [FARKAS, Ildikó]. A Délvidék. (Délvidék, South Hungary). In *História*, 32, no. 1-2 from January – February 2010, p. 38.

14 Megalalkult a Trianon Kutató Intézet (The Trianon Research Institute was established), according to <http://www.szentkoronaradio.com/node/43629>.

In connection with this institute, it is difficult to avoid a bad feeling and not very high expectations, especially if a person leafs through the quarterly periodical *Trianoni Szemle* (*Trianon Revue*). Each issue has more than a hundred large format pages of articles, mostly with a full apparatus of notes, and general appearance suggesting scientific ambitions. However, the individual contributions have a very uneven level. Some, especially from the pens of the young authors, fulfill the strictest criteria, and it is a great pity that they are found on the pages of precisely this periodical. However, many contributions are explicitly amateurish and sometimes you get the impression that the main criterion for publication was to have an unambiguous, understandably negative attitude to Trianon.

According to its own presentation, the aim of the periodical is to publish work, sources, literary accounts, reviews of expert literature, interviews with important domestic and foreign experts, analyses of the position of the ethnic Hungarian minorities in the Carpathian Basin, but certainly not of the minorities in the new post-Trianon Hungary, which were also victims of Trianon. What is more the periodical also analyses the fates of people associated with Trianon, which is the common denominator of all the preceding. Although the rule that everything is connected with everything is used to the point of absurdity, they do not seek the causes leading to Trianon, but everything bad in the Hungarian interpretation is seen and found in connection with Trianon.

For example, we read here about the forcible assimilation of the Hungarians and aggressive minority policies of almost all the neighbours of Hungary or about specific, obviously Hungarian martyrs of the 20th century, as in the above mentioned “even colder days” from the period of Serbian occupation of Hungarian territory. There is a continuing tradition of not giving any connections and context. There are articles here about the invasion of Hungarian territory by the neighbours. Instead of search for the real causes of Trianon, we find constant repetition of various conspiracy theories about the deliberate geopolitical fragmentation of the Central European region with the aim of the power political and economic elimination of this region and weakening of Germany, or about the destructive intentions of the Free Masons. There are also articles by natural scientists emphasizing, from various points of view, the unity of the Carpathian Basin, which, however, intentionally or unintentionally, evokes various political connotations and various ghosts of the past on the pages of such a periodical. In the first four issues we find regular articles by Miklós Duray on various historical themes, to which, however, his political views are stuck like straw onto shoes. This means especially the attempt to return to the beginning of the 20th century before a united nation was divided by force. An honoured place in all issues is occupied by Edvard Beneš, a person constantly demonized by the Hungarian side. Beneš would certainly never have guessed that he would acquire such popularity, evident mainly in the first issue of *Trianoni Szemle* from January – March 2009. While Czech historiography contains constant disputes about his significance, merits, failings and views, in Hungarian historical memory and unfortunately also among historians, he is the personification of all evil and his international influence and possibilities are greatly exaggerated. The Czech “anti-Beneš camp” is often used in the instrumentalization of such views to give an appearance of objectivity and to internationalize apparently only Hungarian views.

Both the above mentioned names – Raffay and Szidiropulosz – are trained historians, but they are almost unaccepted in expert circles. You do not encounter them in serious periodicals or at scientific (I emphasize the word scientific) conferences, but they are sufficiently known and represent relatively familiar types. The first is a synthesis of historian, nationalist and politician, which is actually a notoriously familiar combination in the whole of the Carpathian Basin. The second example confirms a phenomenon familiar from the time of the Monarchy until today: that a foreigner with an adopted identity sometimes becomes a greater nationalist than a person born with that identity. Therefore, it is not necessary to under-estimate and marginalize such activities, especially when the numbers of copies and readers of this periodical greatly exceeds those of other really scientific periodicals. Among the authors, we also find acceptable names and really respected historians such as Gyula Popély¹⁵ or Géza Jeszenszky.¹⁶ Doctoral students, young, promising and talented authors also publish their works on the pages of the *Trianoni Szemle*. It would be nice to write that they are too young and naive, but it is not really necessary to have illusions and history as a science is well known for its tendency to prostitution, so that people sometimes cast doubt on its scientific character.

Another popularizing historical periodical gives an even worse impression and a bitter taste of revived irredentism. It also began to appear from the beginning of 2009, but its periodicity is rather unclear with a frequency of every 2-3 months. The bilateral propagation, forms for subscription to the two periodicals together placed in both, and the name Ernő Raffay allow us to guess a connection or at least closeness of ideas between them. However, its title *Nagy Magyarország* (in translation: *Great Hungary*) is inappropriate to the 21st century, and provokes speculation about the real causes of the extensive “scientific” interest. The quotation marks are appropriate because the title shows clear political motives. The statement of Barna Ábrahám is also inadequate. In connection with terminological differences in the two languages of his time and in another place he stated: “*In everyday use, however, the need is felt to distinguish between the pre-Trianon, actually a multi-ethnic state and the post-Trianon state. Thus, in non-expert language the former Hungaria becomes “historic Hungary”* [történelmi Magyarország in original text – R. H.], and in connection with temperament “*Great Hungary*” [Nagy-Magyarország in

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- 15 The works of Gyula Popély include: *Népfogyatkozás. A csehszlovákiai Magyarság a népszámlálások tükrében 1918 – 1945*. (Decrease of the People. The Hungarians in the Czechoslovakia in the Mirror of Censuses 1918 – 1945). Budapest : Regio, 1991; *Ellenzélben. A felvidéki magyar kisebbség első évei a Csehszlovák Köztársaságban (1918 – 1925)*. (In Opposition. The first Years of the Hungarian Minority in the Czechoslovakia). Bratislava : Kalligram, 1995; *Búcsú a főiskoláktól. A felsőoktatás és a felvidéki magyarság*. (Farewell to the Colleges. The College Education and the Hungarians in Slovakia). Bratislava : Madách – Posenium, 2005; *Erős várunk az iskola. Tanulmányok a szlovákiai magyar oktatásügy problémaköréből (1918 – 1938)*. (The School is our powerful Castle. Papers about the Problems of Hungarian Education in Slovakia, 1918 – 1938) Bratislava : Madách – Posenium, 2005; *Hazatéréstől a hazavesztésig. Magyar oktatásügy és oktatáspolitikai a visszatért Felvidéken (1938 – 1945)*. (From Coming Home to Losing Home. Hungarian Education and Educational Policy in the returned Area of Felvidék, 1938 – 1945) Bratislava : Madách – Posenium, 2006.
- 16 His most important work is: JESZENSZKY, Géza. *Az elveszett presztíz. Magyarország megítélésének megváltozása Nagy-Britanniában (1894 – 1918)*. (Lost Prestige. Change of Consideration of the Kingdom of Hungary in Great Britain, 1894 – 1918). Budapest : Magyar Szemle Könyvek, 1994 (two editions already published).

original text – R. H.] ... ”¹⁷ It may be difficult to accept such an explanation in connection with the name of the periodical, which is based on its expertise and is not concerned only with the historic Kingdom of Hungary. Under Great-Hungary [Nagy-Magyarország in original text – R. H.], Wikipedia understands and designates (without any temperament) the pre-Trianon state, namely the historic Kingdom of Hungary, known as “Uhorsko” in Slovak.

It is noteworthy that the periodical, which takes us back to the times of Jenő Rákosi, Gusztáv Beksics, inter-war irredentism and the anti-Trianon cult, reviving the idea of Great Hungary, does not trouble anybody in Hungary. On the other hand, extraordinary sensitivity towards the neighbours and every possible or impossible insult, all alleged injuries and injustices, is taken as the motto of every issue of all these publications. If research into Trianon and its commemoration really has to be directed to this, it will be an unproductive contribution of some Hungarian historians, who will undoubtedly intimidate with Slovak extremists and nationalism. At the same time, they will cultivate their own values, undoubtedly labelled as historic rights, correction of injustices, patriotism and the return of “their” territories. *Duo cum faciunt idem, not est idem...* (When two do the same, it is not the same...). In this direction I really think there is a qualitative and quantitative difference between the two nationalisms. One either wears a primitive vulgar mask or treats complexes with naive intellectual looking arguments, intended to raise national consciousness, but sometimes arousing ridicule, or doubts about the scientificness of the whole conception of a “great” national history, and unwittingly recalling the well-known Daco-Roman conception of Rumanian history. The second is much more sophisticated, but, in essence, more aggressive and dangerous. With quasi-scientific and emotional arguments, it drums into the Hungarian reader deliberately evoked negative feelings, of self-pity, injustice and the need for revenge against all their aggressive neighbours.

The chief editor of the periodical *Nagy Magyarország* is the young historian Levente Jónás, who explained in his public appearance at the so-called IX. Magyar Sziget Festival in August 2009 and in the introduction to the first issue of the periodical, that it is a conservative periodical for writers mainly from the young generation, who support conservative values in a way not found in the existing publications of this type. The second aim is to give allegedly objective analyses of key events and milestones in Hungarian history, but seen and interpreted from the already mentioned Hungarian point of view. This is not guaranteed by the official historiography with its numerous deformations from the previous decades.¹⁸ What sort of objectivity, impartiality and point of view he has in mind

17 ÁBRAHÁM, Barna. Történelmi csomópontok és folyamatok értelmezése 1100 év kölcsönhatásában (The Consideration of historical Milestones and Processes in 1100-years of mutual Influence). In ILLÉS, Pál Attila (ed.). *Hungaro-szlovakológia*. (Hungarian-Slovakology). (Esztergomi Forrásközpont Sorozat III.). Budapest : Szent István Társulat, 2007, p. 106. In this context it is necessary to point to the recently proliferating cases of the use of the term “Szlovenszko” for the inter-war period and the Slovak state during the Second World War (e.g. articles in the periodical *Pro Minoritate*, 2009 winter). The variability, lack of unity and unclearness of the terms Felvidék, Szlovenszko and Szlovákia certainly deserves attention from the Hungarian side.

18 JÓNÁS, Levente. Útravaló (Good Luck). In *Nagy Magyarország*, 1, no. 1 from June 2009, p. 3. See also: http://www.szentkoronaradio.com/letoltes/2009_08_18_jonaslevente.

is shown clearly by the fact that this young man is well known as a functionary of the extreme right wing movement Jobbik. Impartiality, which excludes every national point of view, not to speak of the nationalist viewpoint, as a guarantee of objectivity is absent from the beginning. Jónás has expressed himself only orally on the title of the periodical, when he appealed to “*Magna Hungaria*” from the distant past. However, anybody who knows the rhetoric and views of Jobbik or reads its texts, must be clear what sort of viewpoint and objectivity is involved. According to them, return before the year 1920 is certainly just, objective and something that corresponds to Hungarian interests.

The content of the periodical *Nagy Magyarország* has traditional and regular themes. We soon find that this repertoire is constantly repeated. The first issue is devoted to Trianon. Civilian paramilitary units in the 20th century, from the so-called “Rongyos Guards” to the present Hungarian Guard, including the story of Balassagyarmat from January 1919 and the “heroic” diversionary activities of the “Rongyos Guards” towards Czecho-Slovakia in the autumn of 1938, were chosen as the central theme of the second. The common denominator of the third is Slovak history.

In the Trianon issue, I would like to draw attention to the characteristic article by Gábor Balogh devoted to R.W. Seton-Watson. The Hungarians do not like this Scot and consider him biased, but how can we describe a text which criticizes the work *Racial Problems in Hungary* in a way that makes it obvious that the author never held the book in his hands, but relies on clearly distorted and inaccurate ideas?¹⁹ If objective science has to look like this, then every scientific discussion will end here. Typically playing down the situation of the non-Magyar nations, in which he sees only “*Jeremiads holding forth on Hungarian oppression*” (the last two words are placed in quotation marks for safety), as well as stating that Černová remained in Scotus’ interpretation only an exaggerated and deformed event, and generalizing for the whole situation of the nationalities, the author approaches the diction of the political elite of the time. As a result, he inevitably cannot understand the degree of alienation from such a state, or the causes of its disintegration. In contrast to Balogh, Jenő Gergely in a source based article on the attitude of the Holy See to the new Hungary, perhaps unwillingly, shows the much more realistic attitude of the Vatican to Central European events than the Hungarians may have expected. However, when the reader comes to the definitely biased article by Attila Druicz he finds all the stereotypes about networks of secret societies headed by the Free Masons, about Russia in the background of the Sarajevo assassination, about the decisive role of the Czarist regime in starting the war and its aggressive pan-Slavist plans, about the manipulator Beneš, until the author ends with populist nonsense about the traitor Károlyi.

On the theme of Trianon, I would like to make three suggestions. If the authors do not want to analyse the causes of the dissatisfaction and alienation of the non-Magyar nations, because they probably cannot find these causes, they should give up the conspiracy theories about Free Masons, global networks of imperialists, the “*destructive activity of world forces*”, the anti-Hungarian intrigues of the Jews or Beneš – themes

19 BALOGH, Gábor. Scotus Viator, a nagy ellenség (Scotus Viator, a great Enemy). In *Nagy Magyarország*, 1, no.1 from June 2009, p. 27.

continually rewashed in the two related periodicals considered here. Instead, they should try to analyse the domestic development in the period preceding Trianon. It is enough to reread the discussions of the political elite in the Hungarian parliament during the war. At the beginning arrogance prevailed, and instead of Tisza's mythologized opposition to the war, the floor of parliament was dominated by self-confident militarist declarations from the politicians, but at the end of the war, the degree of incomprehension of the critical situation and complete detachment of the members of parliament from the real state of things must amaze anybody. A second possibility for research is the formation of aggressive war plans by the Hungarian political elite, including István Tisza. Apart from planned expansion, there were preparations to establish Hungarian administrations in new territories in the event of victory by the Central Powers. Arguments and justifications for the occupation of such undoubtedly "traditional" Hungarian territories as Wallachia, Ukraine, Dalmatia and so on could certainly be found. It would be an appropriate contrast to the more carefully worked out maps of the territorial claims of all the neighbours against the Kingdom of Hungary at the end of the war and later. The analysis of Hungarian expansionist plans would sufficiently prove that Hungary was not a victim, but an aggressive participant in the war, which blinded by the chimera of victory, did not realize that it was not and would not be capable of administering and pacifying extensive new territories. The third possibility is careful reading of the pro-government humorous magazine *Borsszem Jankó*. It is not very funny, because from the beginning it takes the breath away with its self-confidence and arrogance, its mocking of the Entente and conviction that the war will be fast, brief and, above all, victorious. The present day reader already knows how it will turn out, and when he reads anti-Semitic issues, he can understand that Trianon was not the only cause of increased anti-Semitism after the war. It is paradoxical that at the end of the war, the Budapest humorists showed substantially more realism and humility than the members of parliament.

In connection with the second issue, it is necessary to add that the text on the events in Balassagyarmat also reacts to the recent film by the director Gábor Matúz from 2009 with the title *A legbátrabb város (The bravest town)* and the subtitle: *A story about those who wanted to remain Hungaria. Alive or dead*. In spite of a whole pleiad of historians, who contributed to it, the film is actually an unsuccessful whole-evening documentary. It is unsuccessful for two reasons: technique and content. The film contains elementary mistakes, any historian would have pointed out to its creators, and there were more than enough historians involved in the film. The soldiers in it have inappropriate hairstyles and splendid new uniforms with the decorations on the chest. At this time, soldiers returned from the front in wretched condition, dirty, lice-infested and with pride in decorations long forgotten. The questions remained: What were they really fighting for? The members of Czech Sokol also had identical, smart uniforms from the national celebrations of 1928. The Hungarian attack began at 4.00 in the morning, but in the film it looks like midday. The filmmakers made the representative of the new state of Czechoslovakia, Ludovít Bazovský into an arrogant youth, and the thickness of the goulash in January 1919 surpassed that of the time of Kádár's goulash socialism. The mistakes in the commentaries of the historians were even more serious. According to one, the Slovaks were not represented at all in Prague on 28 October 1918. Another admitted the participation

of Šrobár, but heaped on the viewer massive criticism of the attitude of the new state towards the Slovaks. The Czech political scientist Rudolf Kučera²⁰ and the young historian from Brno Miroslav Jeřábek²¹ also presented their critical views of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. Perhaps they did not realize that they were serving as a legitimizing and objectivizing element in the whole “work”. It is true that criticism of Czechoslovak practices was not entirely unjustified, but it was bizarre that it was heard mainly from Hungarian mouths and that the whole truth was not said. Half-truths are the worst manipulations of the viewer. It was necessary to say that in this period, the Slovaks were emerging as a separate modern nation, and that in spite of all its inadequacies, the republic brought immense political, social and cultural progress in the brief twenty years of its existence, especially in comparison with the familiar, sad situation in the old Kingdom of Hungary. In the Czechoslovak Republic, brisk political and society life, education on all levels, participation in economic life and general cultural development awaited the Slovaks. What could the new Hungary offer them? The latest research shows the degree of sincerity of the Hungarian words about the offer of autonomy and the nature of their attitude to the non-Magyars in general.²² Finally, there was no comparison with the situation in pre-war Hungary or inter-war Hungary. There was a tactful silence about all such things so that all disdainful criticism sounded hypocritical and dishonest. No Slovak historian received space in the film, nothing objective about the position of the Slovaks in Czechoslovakia could be expected from Gyula Popély, and Ignác Romsics probably did not even guess what sort of work he was involved in, although this is no excuse.²³ The French historian Paul Gradwohl²⁴ let himself be used for traditional Hungarian claims that the argument about the historic territory of Slovakia stood on feet of clay, because Slovakia had never existed as a separate administrative unit before 1918 and so never had frontiers, which was true. Therefore, according to Gradwohl, there was no legal justification for its occupation by Czechoslovak forces, which was not true. Acceptance of the formation

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- 20 His important works include: KUČERA, Rudolf: *Kapitoly z dějin střední Evropy*. (Chapters from the history of Central Europe.). Prague: Institut pro středevropskou kulturu a politiku, 1992; KUČERA, Rudolf. *Közép-Európa története egy cseh politológus szemével*. (History of Central-Europe from the Point of View of a Czech Political Scientist). Budapest : Korma, 2008 (Gyula Popély provided a postscript to the latter work).
- 21 He came to the attention of the historical community with the work: JEŘÁBEK, Miroslav. *Za silnou střední Evropu. Středoevropské hnutí mezi Budapeští, Vídní a Brnem v letech 1925 – 1939*. (For a strong Central Europe. Central European Movements between Budapest, Vienna and Brno in the period 1925 – 1939.). Brno : Dokořán, 2008.
- 22 MICHELA, Miroslav. *Pod heslom integrity. Slovenská otázka v politike Maďarska 1918 – 1921*. (Under the Slogan of Integrity. The Slovak Question in the Politics of Hungary 1918 – 1921). Bratislava : Kalligram 2009, p.67.
- 23 Ignác Romsics is one of the most notable Hungarian experts on the history of the 20th century, and even a brief summary of his works would overburden this paper. The publisher Kalligram published Slovak translations of his works: *Trianonská mierová zmluva*. (The Peace Treaty of Trianon.). Bratislava 2006; *Parížská mierová zmluva z roku 1947*. (The Paris Peace Treaty of 1947). Bratislava 2008.
- 24 GRADVOHL, Paul: (ed.). *Nouvelles institutions et nouvelles élites. L'enjeu hongrois*. Paris : CIEH, 1995; GRADVOHL, Paul (ed.). *Construction de la mémoire du Xxème siècle en Hongrie ...* Paris : CIEH, 1997; GRADVOHL, Paul (ed.). *Budapest 1956: au prisme des nouvelles sources*. Nanterre : Association de amis de la BDIC, 2006.

of Czechoslovakia by the great powers was already a reality, as was the break up of the historic Kingdom of Hungary. Two entirely new states were emerging, and the frontier between them was not defined. The individual demarcation lines represented attempts at a temporary drawing of the new frontier.

The best thing is that in the Hungarian environment the criterion for the quality of such a film is mainly the degree of its patriotism, or more precisely Hungarian patriotism. What is it? *“Love of the homeland, wish to do something, persistence of consciousness of Hungarian identity in a specific historical situation.”* According to the enthusiastic reviews, Matúz’s film satisfies this criterion.²⁵

The third, Slovak issue of the periodical *Nagy Magyarország* deserves the greatest attention. All the negative stereotypes and mystification applied to the Slovaks are concentrated in it. The already more than noteworthy introduction is in many ways characteristic. It is worth quoting: *“We sincerely acknowledge that we have not prepared this publication in an attempt to achieve Slovak – Hungarian reconciliation. On the one hand, no state agreement, research cooperation or grant ties us to this, so we can allow ourselves the luxury of thinking independently in the framework of individual historical questions. On the other hand, our position is not a forced search for compromise, especially considering that according to our experience, it never meant anything other than endless requests for apologies for all the harm we did to the Slovaks in the last thousand years, or to be more accurate that we did not do. It is necessary to recognize that a large part of Slovak history rests on hypotheses, unjustified conclusions and in some cases nothing more than children’s fairytales. We have in mind how the prepared Hungarian-Slovak history textbook makes full use of the unhistorical expression ‘old Slovaks’. It would not be a problem if it related to the Slovaks in the 18th century, but there is no mention of this.”*²⁶

After such an introduction, the individual articles are not surprising. Zoltán Balassa, according to Wikipedia a Hungarian historian and writer living in Košice, by education actually a chemical engineer, author of the first two, states so much nonsense in connection with the Carpathian Basin at the time of the “taking of the homeland” and in connection with Great Moravia and its representatives, that a 19th century historian loyal to the state would not have done better. This fully corresponds to the literature to which he refers, including the authors of art and nonfiction literature Ladislav Ťažký and Ladislav Zrubec and historian František Bokes who died in 1968!!! In other words, it corresponds to complete ignorance of the results of Slovak historical research. The author draws on ignorant theories about the “old Slovaks” to such an extent that he greatly surpasses their amateurism. For example, he surpasses the much criticized excursion of R. Fico into historiography, by quoting the view of Edvard Beneš on Great Moravia! Several of his statements can be quoted as illustrations: *“The so-called Great Moravian Empire was born only in modern Slovak nationalist historiography... The Slovaks did not exist in that period. They have existed as a modern nation only since the 18th century. Great Mo-*

25 JUHÁSZ, Annamária. A legbátrabb város. (The most courageous City). In *Valóság*, 53, no. 2 from February 2010, p. 114.

26 A tót atyafiak. (The Slovak Fathers). In *Nagy Magyarország*, 1, no. 3 from October 2009, p. 3.

ra via was the state of the Moravians and nobody else."²⁷ His further article: *Where were the Slovaks in the Middle Ages?* is unworthy of serious comment. It is symptomatic that a citizen of Slovakia was used for such an article, although also a chemist and a tourist guide in Košice.²⁸ If the intention of publishing such incompetent articles is to increase knowledge of the Slovaks, it cannot be anything other than a malicious intention. If the intention is to demonstrate freedom of expression and view, then, at the same time, the academic character of the periodical is completely discredited. If the aim is to point out the "fairytale character" of Slovak history, then it was not done better even in the 19th century.

Therefore, a further article on the origin of the modern Slovak nation in the period 1792-1863, to which there can be no substantial objections, is noteworthy. It was written by the talented young Hungarian historian and Slovakist József Demmel.²⁹ However, he should certainly have considered where he sent his text. There are things that simply should not be done in decent society, and a historian is not responsible only for his text, but also for where and to what forum he sends its. Unfortunately J. Demmel has let himself be misused, one does not want to believe that it was his intention, but he has outwardly legitimized the scientific character of this issue, and given it a stamp of reliability in the eyes of the unoriented reader, to all the nonsense contained in it. The anonymous representative of the editors has understandably made skilful use of this in the introduction. The solidity of the content of Demmel's article is already only secondary and insubstantial in this context. The next two articles, by László Gulyás, are concerned with the origin of the Czechoslovak Republic, especially the struggle over its frontier at the Paris Peace Conference, and about the Slovak question in inter-war Czechoslovakia. He is not sparing in his criticism of Prague centralism and Czechoslovakism. An article by Gyula Popély is concerned with the Komárno talks of October 1938. The article *Slovakia in the service of Nazism* by Gábor Balogh provides the possibility of comparison with the already mentioned text in *Rubicon*. In contrast to it, adequate attention is devoted to the Uprising, but it is mentioned in quotation marks, with the claim that it acted as a means of purification by which the Slovaks cleansed their name from blood and from all responsibility for the crimes of Nazism, which was placed on the Germans and Hungarians from infants to the elderly. Their expulsion and the preceding deportation of the Jews almost completely realized the dream of Hlinka and Tiso of an ethnically homogeneous Slovakia.³⁰ The difference between present-day Slovakia and Hungary lies precisely in the word "almost". László Gulyás traces the development from February 1948 to the Velvet Revolution in a further article, while Balázs Kiss deals with

27 BALASSA, Zoltán. A Kárpát-medence a magyar honfoglalásig. (The Carpathian Basin till the Hungarian Conquest) In *Nagy Magyarország*, 1, no. 3 from October 2009, p. 7-8.

28 On this: HOLEC, Roman: Red Light District po slovenský. (Red Light District in Slovak). In *História*, 9, Bratislava 2009, no. 3-4, p. 2.

29 His most important work is: DEMMEL, József. "Egész Szlovákia elfért egy tutajon...". *Tanulmányok a 19. századi Magyarország szlovák történeleméről*. ("The whole of Slovakia fits in one wood raft...." Papers about Slovak History in of 19th century Hungary). Pozsony : Kalligram, 2009.

30 BALOGH, Gábor. Szlovákia a náciizmus szolgálatában (Slovakia in the Service of Nazism). In *Nagy Magyarország*, 1, no. 3 from October 2009, p. 47. The letter "Sz" in the name "Szlovákia" is made for effect from the Nazi swastika.

the period after the independence of Slovakia. Other interesting texts include articles on a capital city without a Slovak past, bloodshed in Bratislava in February 1919, and the origin of the Slovak state shield from the shield of the Kingdom of Hungary. The aim of the text on Matúš Čák as Slovak king was undoubtedly to prove the allegedly fairytale character of Slovak history. It would be interesting to ask in what academic text this nonsense was found.³¹ Zoltán Balassa again attempted to marginalize nationality policy in the period of the Kingdom of Hungary. The senseless Slovak Language Act also received space. It was not necessary to resort to half-truths and biased illustrations to show its full stupidity, as the author Ilona Bodonyi³² demonstrated. This especially applies to religious practices. Mass in the Hungarian language is a normal part of life in southern Slovakia and in Bratislava and Košice, and the Hungarian national anthem at the end is not a rare occurrence. This is undoubtedly stronger evidence than photographs of notices on the doors of churches, especially if they are often in world languages as well as in Slovak. Dozens of photographs with only Hungarian texts could also be collected, but this cannot be expected from Budapest, especially when it does not fit in with the required conception. László Mihályi Molnár wrote a text with the aim of analysing the image of the Hungarians in Slovak history textbooks. His criticisms go beyond the framework of the title, but nothing changes the fact that some of the critical comments are justified. Others are debatable, since it is a matter of textbooks, which must inevitably simplify, or they are clearly inaccurate. I will give at least one example. The fact that István Tisza opposed war in the Council of Ministers in July 1914, although he did not vote against because he simply did not vote, is actually irrelevant in the context of Tisza's personal development and the policy of the Kingdom of Hungary as presented in the textbook. In the end, he agreed to the declaration of war.³³ How does the author want to

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- 31 On this see: MACHO, Peter. Matúš Čák Trenčianský – slovenský kráľ? (Matúš Čák of Trenčín – Slovak King?). In KREKOVIČ, Eduard – MANNOVÁ, Elena – KREKOVIČOVÁ, Eva (eds.). *Mýty naše slovenské*. (Our Slovak myths). Bratislava : AEP, 2005, p. 104-110. In this context, it is impossible to avoid citing the recently published volume of papers from an academic conference about the Székely, held on 2-3 Oct 2009 at the university in Debrecen in the presence of two academics and other respected scientists. The volume with the title that needs no further commentary: TAKÁCS, Péter (ed.). *Csaba királyfi elárvult népe*. (The Orphan People of Prince Csaba) Székely conference 2009, 2-3 October. Debrecen: Erdély-tört. Alapítvány 2009. The naive introduction, as well as the study from the pen of the editor, is a noteworthy and breath-taking “homeland-studies” contribution to the mythologizing of history, unfortunately legitimized by the presence of experts. This is not changed by the fact that, for example, M.G. Hermann's paper is concerned with the Székely's virtual past and the role of historical myth. Dozens of works with full footnotes but a clearly unscientific content, have a similar character. It is not surprising that mythology gets into the textbooks without adequate distinction. For the situation in Slovakia see: HOLEC, ref. 28.
- 32 BODONYI, Ilona. *Idők szorításában. A magyar kisebbség helyzete a szomszédos országokban 1920 és 1938 között*. (Under the Pressure of Time. The Hungarian Minority in the Neighbouring Countries between 1920 and 1938). Szentendre : Kairosz, 2002. We also find her introduction with the characteristic “Hungarian point of view” in the Trianon publication: VECSEKLŐY, József. *Nemzetgyilkossági Kísérlet: Trianon 1919, Párizs*. (Attempt to kill the Nation: Trianon 1919, Paris). Lakitelek : Antológia, 1993.
- 33 For the latest scientific consideration see: BERTÉNYI, Iván. Tisza István és az I. világháború. (István Tisza and the First World War). In ROMSICS, Ignác (ed.). *Mitoszok, legendák, tévhitek a 20. századi magyar történelemről*. (Myths, Legends, Assumptions about Hungarian History in the 20th Century). Budapest : Osiris, 2005, p. 40 etc., especially p. 46. On the other side, the first issue of the second year of the periodical *Trianoni Szemle* from 2010 contained an article by Ernő Raffay about István Tisza, cultivating the Tisza myth in relation to the outbreak of war.

put this in the textbook? The Kingdom of Hungary, including Tisza, actively participated in the war from the beginning, and with the passing months, its taste for new territories and exploitation of the war increased. The justified comments undoubtedly include pointing out the rules for writing the names of Hungarian people. The nonsense here flows not only from non-linguistic criteria, but also from the fact that it only applies to Hungarians. It is regrettable if Slovak textbooks contain similar nonsense, but it is necessary to add that the *Historický časopis* and leading Slovak historians do not consistently respect this norm in their works. On the other hand, similar offences against good manners have proliferated in Hungarian expert literature in recent times. They include use of the Hungarian forms of the names of Slovak towns and villages in foreign language texts, and their use with reference to periods after 1918, without mention of the present official names of these places, as well as Hungarian transcription of names of people, who had nothing in common with the Hungarian environment, except the fact that they were born before 1918. The same applies to people, who signed their names in Latin and lived at a time, when people had no idea of ethnic identity as we understand it. Is there no double standard here? In the end it is not necessary to go further. If the authors happen to use more recent Slovak literature, how is it possible that works published in Bratislava, Košice or Martin are said to have been published in Pozsony, Kassa or Turócszentmárton? Does the principle of using the information given on the title page of the book not apply? Or is this Great Hungary in practice? Finally, it is necessary to consider the article by Balázs Kiss about neo-Nazi organizations in Slovakia. The fact that only experts know about the majority of them does not mean that this current should be under-estimated, not at a time or especially not at a time when well-organized units of the Hungarian Guard are marching along Hungarian streets. However, in the preceding issue, Attila Druz evaded its ideological position and indirectly attempted to historically contextualize the guard as a confirmation of its justification or denial of its exceptional nature. The defence of Magyarodom (against who?) then sounds like an expression of civil responsibility or innocent playing at being soldiers.

The fourth issue of the first year of the periodical *Nagy Magyarország* is devoted to the most important constitutional documents from Hungarian history, from the Golden Bull to the April legislation of 1848, as well as individual constitutional documents. They are supplemented by articles on Romanian themes, for example about the “political adventurer” Bishop Andrei Şaguna, who is regarded as a national hero by Romanians. The pro-Hungarian Romanian patron Manó Gozdsu (Emanuil Gojdu) is placed in contrast to him. The first issue of the second year is devoted to Miklós Horthy and the end of the Second World War. In contrast to Şaguna, Horthy is not described as a “political adventurer”.

Finally, I should mention a fact that is characteristic and traditional for Hungarian interpretations of the nationality question and Trianon. One of the important means of legitimizing all the measures directed towards national homogenization of the state before 1918, was statistical Magyarization with the aim of proving the statistical predominance of the Hungarian ethnic group and justifying steps to strengthen it. This was served by a whole range of methods really or only formally influencing the identities of people. Their real identity often was not considered and the method of collecting data provided wide

space for this. These practices served the self-deception of the political elite of the time, and aimed to balance the rather weak results of unproductive and senseless Magyarization. By the way, these results are now used to trivialize the phenomenon of Magyarization as such, according to the saying “making a virtue from a necessity”. On the other hand, in connection with the statistics, even Hungarian science in its expression of purpose and instrumentalization liked to succumb to the self-deception and illusions of the time and “believe” the statistics and regularly use them in arguments. This concerns especially the most manipulated statistics, those from 1910.³⁴

Hungarian historiography has always shown an almost obsessive enthusiasm for comparing the ethnic composition of the population according to the last census of the old Kingdom of Hungary from 1910, with the first Czechoslovak figures from 1919 or 1921. Almost all publications, even the most reliable, rely on the statistics from 1910 in rare unity when mentioning nationality development. They do so without any commentary. At the same time, Hungarian colleagues are familiar with the aim pursued by the state and statisticians. The nationality statistics had to pursue this aim and they really did pursue it, not only by changing the questions about mother language to allow substantially greater space for subjectivity, but also for pressure from employers, officials and the state. However, what we can agree about over a glass of wine never appears in print. This Janus like approach, with one view presented abroad and the other for domestic needs is not unusual. Even the use of colours on nationality maps has its unwritten rules, and they are still applied in the 21st century. It is certainly no accident that the fourth issue of the periodical *Trianoni Szemle* contained a nationality map of the Kingdom of Hungary on glossy paper, and naturally based on the statistics from 1910.

The view of the historian Péter Hanák was at that time respected in Hungarian historiography regarding the view that the decisive role in the change of nationality structure was played by the modernization process represented outwardly by the formation of civil society, industrialization, urbanization and the construction of transport infrastructure. In other words, the assimilation trends were natural processes accompanying modernization, which confirmed the fact that assimilation trends occurred mainly in the urban and economically developed environment. He later supplemented his previous view and admitted that the spontaneous processes were undoubtedly accelerated by deliberate government measures, especially in the field of education policy.³⁵

Slovak historiography has already presented a whole series of proofs that the growth of the Hungarian or Magyar ethnic group was incompatible with demographic possibilities and was not connected with the processes of industrialization or modernization. Using the example of thirty agricultural villages, Július Mésáros proved that the proportion of Slovaks in their populations declined from 71.4% to 45.4% in the period 1880 – 1910, while the proportion of Hungarians increased from 28.6 to 54.6%. These were villages

34 MÉSÁROŠ, Július. Some Deformations in the Interpretation of Censuses in Recent Magyar-Slovak Controversies. In *Slovaks & Magyars*. Bratislava : MK SR, 1995, p. 63-84.

35 HANÁK, Péter. Magyarország társadalma a századforduló idején. (The Society of the Kingdom of Hungary at the Turn of 19th and 20th Centuries). In *Magyarország története tíz kötetben. 7/1. köt. Magyarország története 1890 – 1918*. (History of Hungary in Ten Volumes). Budapest : Akadémiai kiadó, 1978, p. 414 and 418.

where none of the three factors promoting assimilation applied. Magyarization here was a “result of super-structure factors” or a product of so-called statistical Magyarization. “Magyarization is an extra-economic factor in the assimilation processes”, continued Mészáros, “the long-term effect of which deformed the natural process of mixing of ethnic groups...”³⁶ László Szarka also confirmed the over-rating of economic factors in another Slovak example. In his view, assimilation in the towns in the Slovak environment, that is in regions with mainly Slovak populations, had no chance without assimilation of the Jewish inhabitants. An island created by an inflow of Hungarian businessmen, managers, officials and qualified workers was powerless in the long-term against the influence of the surrounding environment, for example in the case of Liptovský Sv. Mikuláš. The basic law of assimilation is that the surrounding sea eventually swallows up islands. This applied to the Slovak settlements in the Lowlands, the Slovak element in Budapest, and to the industrializing towns, which attracted workers from the surrounding region to swell the ranks of the growing industrial proletariat. Equally, without an effective education policy and other state measures the aim of Magyarization could not be achieved in the longer term.³⁷ State policy can understandably accelerate or slow down the speed of particular processes.

László Katus most recently explained the assimilation trends and the decline in the number of Slovaks by emigration, which is certainly only partly true. At the same time, he rightly states that knowledge of the Hungarian language was a pre-condition for assimilation and change of identity, but this was not the final boundary in statistical Magyarization. He also states that the 548,000 Hungarians or Magyars, who could speak Slovak in 1910 included Magyarized Slovaks. A Slovak historian will say that they were mainly Magyarized Slovaks. However, Slovak and Hungarian historians do not agree on this. Even Katus cannot commit himself on the Hungarian statistics.³⁸

It is noteworthy that all the logical reservations against the 1910 statistics are hypocritically left unmentioned even in footnotes, while they are dredged up and waved against all the non-Hungarian statistics from after 1918. We see a clear double standard.

The diametrically different numbers and sharp decline of the Hungarian or Magyar ethnic group is supposed to demonstrate the distorted, biased and so unreliable character of the census in the Czechoslovak Republic. It is allegedly obvious that various threats were used to reduce the large number of Hungarians found in 1910. The Czechoslovak statistics may also faithfully reflect the violent anti-Hungarian measures of the new regime, which led to the mass flight of Hungarians or to the forced denial of their identity.

36 MÉSÁROŠ, Július. Maďarizácia a asimilácia. (Magyarization and Assimilation). In PODRIMAVSKÝ, Milan – KOVÁČ, Dušan (eds.). *Slovensko na začiatku 20. storočia*. (Slovakia at the Beginning of the 20th Century). Bratislava: Veda, 1999, p. 47. See also: MÉSÁROŠ, ref. 34, p. 82-83.

37 SZARKA, László. Migráció és asszimiláció a szlovák nemzetiségi régióban (Migration and and Assimilation in the Slovak Regions). In *Kutatás módszertan. (Rendi társadalom-polgári társadalom 2.)*. (Methodology of Research. Society of Orders – Bourgeois Society 2.). Gyula: Békés M. Lvt., 1989, p. 476-479.

38 KATUS, László. Az öntudatosodás útja (The Way to Realize Themselves). In *Rubicon*, 20, no. 5 from May 2009, p. 50. The reaction of D. Kováč more than 20 years ago in a review of the work by Péter Hanák is still valid today *Ungarn in der Donaumonarchie. Probleme der bürgerliche Umgestaltung eines Vielvölkerstaates*. Vienna; Munich; Budapest: Verl. für Geschichte und Politik; Oldenburg; Akadémiai Kiadó, 1984. In *Historický časopis*, 35, 1987, no. 2, p. 317.

Everything depends on what the author wants to prove and whether he wants to believe the statistics or not. Such radical changes cannot be explained in any other way. Both conceptions and approaches are deliberately and politically exploited.

However, such comparison must be considered incorrect for various reasons. If the nationality statistics from 1910 are not doubted and are considered entirely reliable, then the 1919 and 1921 censuses are seen as unobjective and distorted. In contrast to the pre-conceived approach, Slovak historiography doubts the reliability of the 1910 statistics, in which the Magyarizing efforts of the state were concentrated, but the Czechoslovak statistics on the ethnic composition of the population are also not considered to be entirely objective as a result of the period in which they were produced. Moreover, the special census of 1919 was originally intended to provide supporting material for determining the Slovak – Hungarian frontier at the peace conference. In reality, in relation to the problems of the time, many “statistical” Hungarians still did not find the courage to freely declare their nationality. Therefore, the 1919 statistics are only valuable for general orientation.³⁹ On the other hand, the statistics from 1919 and 1921 also tell us much. Comparison shows the greatest shift in number of inhabitants from the German and especially the Hungarian nationality to the Jewish nationality. Otherwise, the two sets of figures generally confirm each other.⁴⁰

When mechanically comparing the Hungarian and Czechoslovak censuses, it is often forgotten that the Czechoslovak asked for nationality and distinguished a different range of nationalities. This was an entirely different approach increasing the incompatibility of the statistics. The statistics from 1930 are considered to be really reliable, but when comparing them with the figures from 1910, all the difficulties stated above still apply, especially with regard to the different methodology and the deliberate distortion of the nationality statistics from 1910.

Now let us look without greater analytical demands at the results of two sets of figures that are rather unreliable from the point of view of nationality. We will compare the figures from 1910 and 1921 for Košice, a city traditionally considered Hungarian on the basis of the statistics from 1910.

Table 1. Nationality structure of the population of Košice in 1910 and 1921

	1910	1921	1910	1921
	Absolute numbers		Relative numbers	
Hungarians	33 350	11 206	75,4	21,2
Slovaks	6 574	31 572	14,8	59,7
Germans			7,2	4,0
Jews				10,0
Total	39 924	42 778		

39 ŽUDEĽ, Juraj – OČOVSKÝ, Štefan. Die Entwicklung der Nationalitätenstruktur in der Südslowakei. In *Österreichische Osthefte*, 33, Vienna 1992, no. 2, p. 293-294.

40 TIŠLIAR, Pavol. *Mimoriadne sčítanie ľudu na Slovensku z roku 1919*. (The special census of Slovakia in 1919.). Bratislava : Statis, 2007, p. 103.

The decline of the Hungarians by more than 50% in a statistical period of a little more than 10 years, but actually in a little more than two years, is not natural and can, if you like, be interpreted as a result of the most varied forcible measures in the period 1918-1921 and statistical distortions in 1921, but not in 1910!

Now we will look at the development of the population not only in this brief period, but over a longer time.⁴¹ This makes the last Hungarian statistics look “abnormal”, because of the increase in the proportion of Hungarians by 10-20% in each decade. When we compare the initial situation in 1850 with that in 1921, we see that the difference over this 70 year period is not very large. Perhaps it is correct to ask whether the situation in 1921 is not actually a return to the original ethnic identities with the Germans as the main losers.

Table 2. Nationality structure of the population of Košice, 1850 – 1921

	1850	1880	1890	1900	1910	1921
Hungarians	28,5	39,8	49,9	66,3	75,4	21,2
Slovaks	46,5	40,9	33,6	22,9	14,8	59,7
Germans	15,6	16,7	13,5	8,1	7,2	4,0

In conclusion, I would like in connection with Trianon to place along side each other four publications and five authors, who have expressed three different Hungarian approaches to the Trianon theme and the history of the 20th century as a whole with all its defeats of the Hungarians. The best quality texts are the work of Balázs Ablonczy and Miklós Zeidler, although the second is more concerned with the post-Trianon history of Trianon, the campaign for its revision and the idea of irredentism up to the end of the Second World War.⁴² The already mentioned work of Ignác Romsics, unfortunately with faults in the Slovak translation, and the most recent monograph by Gyula Popély.⁴³ are directly concerned with Trianon. Both show the already mentioned Hungarian point of view, but there is a difference of degree and in the level of scientificness or basic research into sources. It is possible to say of Romsics that although his work can be criticized, it can be discussed on a professional level.⁴⁴ Precisely this example can be used to de-

41 ŠALAMON, Pavol. Demografický vývoj Košíc v rokoch 1848 – 1870. I. (The demographic Development of Košice in the Period 1848 – 1870. I.) In *Slovenská archivistika*, 26 (Bratislava 1991), no. 1, p. 56-77; ŠALAMON, Pavol. Demografický vývoj Košíc v rokoch 1870 – 1918. II. (The demographic Development of Košice in the Period 1870 – 1918. II.) In *Slovenská archivistika*, 26 (Bratislava 1991), no. 2, p. 44-61.

42 ABLONCZY, Balázs. Trianon-problémák (The Problems of Trianon). In *Kommentár*, 2 (Budapest 2007), no. 4, p. 57-67; ABLONCZY, Balázs. Trianon-legendák. (The Legends of Trianon) In ROMSICS, Ignác (ed.). *Mitoszok, legendák, tévhitek a 20. századi magyar történelemről*. Budapest : Osiris, 2005, p. 132-161; ZEIDLER, Miklós. *A revíziós gondolat*. (The Idea of Revision). Pozsony (Bratislava) : Kalligram, 2009. This is a second expanded version of the work originally from 2001.

43 ROMSICS, ref. 23 (2006); POPÉLY, Gyula. *Felvidék 1914 – 1920*. (Felvidék, The Northern Region of Hungary 1914 – 1920). Budapest : Magyar Napló, 2010.

44 HOLEC, Roman. ROMSICS, Ignác. Trianonská mierová zmluva. (The Peace Treaty of Trianon.). Bratislava : Kalligram, 2006, 240 pages. In *Historický časopis*, 55 (2007), no. 2, p. 367-370.

monstrate that in spite of all the deficiencies of Slovak historiography in comparison with Hungary, where history is more mature in terms of theory and personnel, the Slovak historians are mentally and conceptually freer on certain themes. They inadvertently benefit from the frequently criticized fact that the relationship of the Slovaks to their national past is more than half-hearted. Falling under the spell of history or imprisonment in its traps does not threaten here, so social pressure on historians is incomparably less.

Romsics' work also agrees with the dominant trends in Hungarian historiography, by showing that Trianon and its consequences were much more the result of the war and of dictats from the great powers, rather than of the Hungarians' failure and inability to solve the nationality question in multi-national Hungary. Trianon should be a lesson showing that when the politicians are not able to agree, a logical "solution" will still come with the citizens as the "victims". In this case it is the Hungarians, but also Slovak history, even from the end of the 20th century, provides similar examples. Whether such a solution is seen as historically good or bad, the historian still has a duty to describe things accurately.

Therefore, the one step that Romsics still lacks is critical consideration of his own side to a considerably greater extent than is found in his book. If all the nations, or to be more exact their political elites, had regarded the Kingdom of Hungary as their true homeland and their state identity had been as strong as their national identity, and not only on the level of forced loyalty, no pressure from the great powers could have forced them to create their own states. Precisely the fact that the political elites of the individual non-Magyar nations were remarkably united in their alienation from the state and their decision to commit themselves to the uncertain route of the future successor states should lead every historian to the consideration that not everything was in order in the society of the Kingdom of Hungary.

Pointing to the newly formed Czechoslovakia with its multi-national character, although its birth certificate looked entirely different, is legitimate and justified. However, this says nothing about how the historic Kingdom of Hungary was better and why precisely it should have survived, with the same character and systematic assimilation policy. The higher standard of policy towards minorities in the Czechoslovak Republic and the democratic atmosphere showed learning from experience under the Monarchy. It was no accident that Czechoslovakia became a refuge for exiled Hungarian intellectuals. The character of the state and policy towards minorities in post-Trianon Hungary demonstrates that there was no space for learning from or reflecting on their own faults, or it existed only on the periphery or beyond the frontiers, and that was little.

Constant appeals to the 1910 nationality statistics, which were the most manipulated among Hungarian statistics, is a chronic and familiar stereotype, not avoided even by Romsics. He describes the argumentation of the successor states and of Hungary at the peace conference in relation to the division of the historic territory of Hungary. He subjects these positions to criticism, especially in the light of the information available to the individual participants at the time, but he deliberately distorted them in his favour. Unfortunately his approach is not entirely consistent, because critical verification does not apply to the statements and demands presented by the Hungarian political repre-

sentatives. These are left without commentary and they are not subjected to any critical analysis, as should be required in the interests of correctness, balance and objectivity.

Although my view of Romsics's work may appear more than critical, in reality the quality of his work is outstanding compared to that of other works on the same theme. The new publication by Gyula Popély looks from its content like a work written by a Hungarian in the inter-war period. It is not based on research into original sources, and it is written from the beginning with clearly biased aims. The biased character of the work also dictates its content and conception, as in the case of another related publication, to which it vehemently and positively appeals.⁴⁵

Popély does not consider the situation in the pre-war Kingdom of Hungary, and is concerned less with "Felvidék" (Slovakia), than with Czech power political aspirations. He maps them already from the beginning of the 20th century, and in his interpretation, everything, including Trianon, was a result of Czech imperialism, Czech aspirations and the subversive activities of Czech exiles. He speaks of "aggressive" Czech plans and attempts at further territorial gains at the expense of Hungary. In his interpretation, the Slovaks are only mindless puppets and the objects of struggle between their neighbours. According to him, armed self-defence by Hungary could have borne fruit, at least by gaining a plebiscite. He does not take into account the helpless position of Hungary and the pressure from the Entente.

In conclusion, he evaluates Trianon as a permanently destabilizing factor in Central Europe, which is already on the level of *Nagy Magyarország* and the revival of revisionist skeletons, an already mentioned metaphor designating unsolved and still open problems. The final sentences of his text also speak in this spirit of the hopes and expectations of all Hungarian governments and the faith of Hungarian society on both sides of the frontier, that is also in the "torn away" territories, that the "*Hungarian resurrection will come*".⁴⁶ The highly positive review of Popély's work from the pen of his colleague Ernő Raffay in the fifth issue of the periodical *Trianoni Szemle* (2010) is typical of the closed circle of apparently scientific nationalism. It is necessary to wait to see whether a similar approach does not surprise us in the really scientific Hungarian periodicals. Actually it would not be a great surprise.

What can be added? We would like to believe, in contrast to Popély, that we live in the 21st century and that the inhabitants of two neighbouring states are members of the European Union with European values, where resentments from a hundred years ago have no place. We would like to believe that although the phenomena described here are not peripheral features of Hungarian society, genuinely professional historiography has entirely different values, views and scientific intentions. However, the gradual addition of "great names" to such biased activities connected with the anniversary of Trianon, and the ever greater contribution of young historians to their development (it is impossible to say which is worse), evoke fears that the traditional silence of the majority (majority?)

45 SALAMON, Konrád. *Nemzeti önpusztítás 1918 – 1920*. (National Self-Destruction 1918 – 1920). Budapest : Korona, 2001.

46 POPÉLY, ref. 43, p. 375.

of the Hungarian historical community is either an expression of fear of social pressure, which will grow after the last elections in the stifling atmosphere of Hungarian society, or actually of agreement. Again, it is impossible to say which is worse. Precisely the historian should know best that any nationalism, under which we understand also the sort of manipulation of social consciousness and biased efforts to evoke aversions as described above, if not explicit hatred of another nation, is the road to hell. We have the impression that although Slovak historiography has many conceptual, theoretical and research deficiencies in comparison with Hungarian, in at least two spheres we are more advanced. These are consideration and admission of our own failures, and ability to express clear civil and expert views on maladies, radicalization and expressions of nationalism worthy of the 19th century, in the social sphere, in legislation on language and patriotism, and in the expert sphere, where we find talk of “old Slovaks”, Hlinka as “father of the nation” and King Svätopluk as “father of Slovak statehood”.⁴⁷

There are also more than enough similar negative phenomena in Slovakia. Some of them have been mentioned here, although that was not the aim of this article. However, only a person who can express his position and not be silent at home, has the right to look beyond the frontiers and express a critical view of the situation in neighbouring countries. Therefore, these lines were written in the interests of both close and, at the same time, distant historiographies.

TRIANON-RITUALE ODER ABHANDLUNGEN ÜBER EINIGE ERSCHEINUNGEN IN DER UNGARISCHEN GESCHICHTSSCHREIBUNG

ROMAN HOLEC

Die Studie sondiert die Situation in der zeitgenössischen ungarischen Historiographie am Beispiel der dauernd traumatisierenden Problematik von Trianon, besonders im Zusammenhang mit dem 90. Jahrestag im Jahr 2010. Es werden verschiedene Strömungen unter den ungarischen Historikern betrachtet, insbesondere die extremistischen und nationalistischen Einstellungen, die sich immer mehr durchsetzen und die immer mehr Publikationsraum bekommen und dadurch auch bessere Möglichkeiten die öffentliche Meinung beeinflussen zu können. Es geschieht, weil die offizielle Historiographie schweigt und durch ihre Gleichgültigkeit (oder Feigheit) und das Fehlen der grundlegenden bürgerlichen Einstellungen grünes Licht für die rechtsradikalen Kreise gibt.

Die Studie betrachtet auch die Methoden, die in der ungarischen Historiographie heimisch werden und die sich hinter der sogenannten nationalen Optik zu verstecken versuchen. Es handelt sich um zweierlei Maß bei dem Umgang mit der eigenen und fremden Geschichte, wesentlich höheres Maß an Kritik und Ansprüche gegenüber den Anderen und fehlende Selbstreflexion ei-

47 Information in one of the last issues of the *Historický časopis* testifies to how things are improving and the principled position of many Slovak historians is achieving success: KOVÁČ, Dušan. Problém písania mien historických osobností z obdobia uhorských dejín. (The Problem of Writing the Names of historical Personalities from the time of the Kingdom of Hungary.). In *Historický časopis*, 58, 2010, no. 1, p. 135-137.

gener Versagen, die entweder umgegangen oder bagatellisiert werden. Außer Trianon, wo die Verantwortung der eigenen ungarischen Eliten für die Beteiligung am Krieg und für die Niederlage nicht gesehen wird, ist es sichtbar auch beim Umgehen der imperialen Interessen des Landes im Ersten (und in dem Zweiten) Weltkrieg, bei dem Umgang mit den Nationalstatistiken, ungarischen Atrozitäten während des zweiten Weltkriegs u.Ä. Obwohl die in der Studie aufgeführten Beispiele zwar als veraltet vorkommen könnten, wird ihre Aktualität auch durch die ständig neuen Rituale bezüglich Trianon, deren Höhepunkt nicht nur die Verabschiedung des Gesetzes zum Gedenken dieses Jahrestages, sondern auch durch die Herausgabe des Handbuchs für die Lehrer, wie dieses Ereignis in den Schulen gedenkt werden soll, bestätigt.

THE CZECHOSLOVAK NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN THE POLITICS OF THE SLOVAK NATIONAL PARTY, 1919 – 1932

JAROSLAVA ROGUEOVÁ

ROGUEOVÁ, Jaroslava. The Czechoslovak National Democratic Party in the Politics of the Slovak National Party, 1919 – 1932. *Historický časopis*, 2011, 59, Supplement, pp.49-75, Bratislava.

In inter-war Czechoslovakia, the relationship of the Slovaks to the Czech political scene reached a qualitatively new level. An example was the relationship of the autonomist Slovak National Party (Slovenská národná strana) with the Czechoslovak National Democratic Party (Československá národnodemokratická strana), which played the role of a potential ally in its politics, during the period 1919 – 1932. In questions of programme, they were united by the declared need to define Slovakia as a territorial unit, which was associated with the demand for autonomy and the need to solve the Slovak question. However, they were divided by their views on the national character of the Slovaks. The Slovak side spoke of the national individuality of the Slovaks, while the Czech side supported the idea of a united Czechoslovak nation. Their efforts to cooperate culminated in joint participation in the 1929 parliamentary elections and the inclusion of a member from the Slovak National Party in the parliamentary club of the Czech party, which disintegrated in 1932 under the influence of deepening disputes.

Slovak National Party – Slovenská národná strana. Czechoslovak National Democratic Party – Československá národnodemokratická strana. Nationalism. Czechoslovak mutuality. Czechoslovak national unity. The autonomy of Slovakia. National individuality of the Slovaks. Cooperation between Czech and Slovak political groups.

After 1918, not only political relations, but also the political structure, organization, activity and character of the political parties fundamentally changed in Slovakia. Before 1918, the Slovak political groups did not have conditions for the development of party organizational activity, but after the First World War there were basic changes in this direction. The creation of independent parties from existing currents was characteristic of party development, but so was the penetration of Czech parties, which wanted to expand their activities into the eastern part of the republic. Thus, apart from independent Slovak parties, parties active throughout Czechoslovak were formed by combination of Czech and Slovak currents. The party political structure in Slovakia was formed roughly in the first half of the 1920s.

In the course of this process, close contacts arose between Slovak and Czech parties and politicians. An example of this was the relationship between the post-1918 Slovak National Party – Slovenská národná strana (SNP), or more precisely its nationalist wing up to its independence in 1921, with the Czechoslovak National Democratic Party – Československá národnodemokratická strana (CSND) in the period 1919 – 1932. Analysis of their relationship represents an interesting sounding into Czech – Slovak relations and into perceptions of the position of these national or nationally oriented parties on key

national and constitutional questions of the inter-war period. The study traces the milestones in their relationship and in three parts reviews its basic problem areas.

The first milestone is emerging from the origin of the republic, when the Czech party attempted to penetrate into Slovakia, and one of the ways to achieve this was to establish links with a local nationally oriented group. However, National Democracy struck against basic differences of programme here, although it gained the support of some leading members of the SNP for its more moderate programme. The second milestone is the parliamentary elections of 1925, after which there were several attempts at cooperation. Both groups were motivated in this by electoral failure, resulting re-evaluation of political tactics and the wave of nationalism, which gained strength from the mid 1920s. The third milestone is the conclusion of an electoral pact in 1929 and three years of activity of a SNP member in the club of CSND members of parliament. The period was characterized by growing mutual tension, conditioned especially by deepening disputes between the parties on the questions of Slovak and Czech nationalism, but also by the national party becoming closer to the Czech nationally oriented opposition in the first half of the 1930s.

Only occasional mentions of this theme can be found in Slovak historiography, and it has attracted no attention at all in Czech historiography. It was marginally traced by Natália Krajčovičová in the context of the development of the Slovak National Party in the period 1918-1925. Ivan Vlčko mentioned it in connection with the departure of the SNP member from the club of CSND members of parliament. The expert on literature Michal Gáfrik mentioned it in his monograph on Martin Rázus, but also only marginally as a result of the character of the work.¹ The archive sources for researching this theme are relatively limited. Only fragmentary material survives scattered in various Czech and Slovak archives. It is supplemented by basic information given especially in the newspapers of the two parties: the SNP's *Národné noviny* (NN, National News), the National Democratic *Bratislavské noviny* (Bratislava News) and later the *Národný denník* (ND, National Daily) or the Czech *Národní listy* (National Paper), as well as in other periodicals of the period concerned with the question of Czecho-Slovak co-operation. A large part of the material is preserved in the Archives of the National Museum in Prague, which includes collections of personal papers of the National Democrats: the chairman of the party Karel Kramář, general secretary František Hlaváček, leading members: Antonín Hajn, František Ježek and others, with their correspondence with representatives of the Slovak branch of the CSND and with the SNP. Important materials are also found in the Slovak National Library – Archives of Literature and Art in Martin in the collections of personal papers of representatives of the SNP, who maintained contacts with Czech and Slovak representatives of the CSND. Further materials are found in the National Archives in Prague, the Slovak National Archives in Bratislava, the Archives

1 KRAJČOVIČOVÁ, Natália. *Politika SNS v rokoch 1918-1925*. (The politics of the Slovak National party in the period 1918-1925). Bratislava, unpublished dissertation, 1967; VLČKO, Ivan. *Príspevok k dejinám Slovenskej národnej strany v rokoch 1932-1938*. (A contribution to the history of the Slovak National Party in the period 1932-1938). Bratislava, unpublished dissertation, 1975; GÁFRIK, Michal. *Martin Rázus II*. Bratislava : Literárne informačné centrum, 2000, p. 35-115.

of the Office of the President of the Republic in Prague and the Archives of the Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk Institute in Prague, which have mainly situation and police reports.

In its attempts to establish itself in Slovakia in 1919, the Czechoslovak National Democratic Party used especially a network of supporters, mainly state employees of Czech nationality working in Slovakia. They established new political contacts with various representatives of Slovak public, political and cultural life, and maintained contacts with Slovak politicians already established before 1918. These involved especially Matúš Dula and Viliam Pauliny-Tóth, who participated in the conference to revive the party in Prague.² The leading national democrat Antonín Hajn described this step as an indicator that national democracy would put down roots in Slovakia, while the NN and Dula stated that the two parties had the same political principles and program.³ In summer 1919, after the passing of several months, the national democrats wanted to send seven representatives to an assembly of SNP representatives in Turčiansky Svätý Martin, to actively participate in the reorganization of the Slovak National Party. However, the Slovak party unambiguously rejected this initiative because it did not want to come under the influence of another political force. Although it had some things in common with the Czech party, it also had different views on some political questions. According to Dula, the SNP wanted to preserve its independence from all the Czech and Moravian parties, although it was closest in program to the national democrats.⁴ In the course of 1919, the national democrats and especially their representatives in Slovakia reported further failures in their effort to penetrate into Slovakia.⁵ For example, the official of the steam sawmill in Vrútky V. Kliment wrote to A. Hajn that CSND “*had missed the opportunity of the time. However, this is nothing new, you know it yourself, that it was its own action, it economized, when other parties did not regret spending money*”. The author of this report recommended support for the party’s sympathizers, from which the party would gain in the future: “*don’t fall asleep again, because although we came to Slovakia early, we were there first, but we immediately retreated and so harmed ourselves. We should think about this*”.⁶ This situation also produced a proposal to create an advisory commission for Slovak affairs composed of people committed to the party, who knew the situation in Slovakia, as well as those, “*who have old connections with Slovakia*”.

2 The CSDN was originally formed as Czechoslovak Constitutional Democracy in February 1918 after the merging of four parties – Young Czechs, Progressives, Constitutional Progressives and People’s Progressives. The aim was to create a political representative of the whole nation and build a Czech state. The new name was accepted at the conference in March 1919. SLÁDEK, Zdeněk. *Československá národní demokracie. (Czechoslovak National Democracy)*. In MALÍŘ, Jiří – MAREK, Pavel et al. *Politické strany. Vývoj politických stran a hnutí v českých zemích a Československu 1861-2004. I. díl 1861-1938*. Brno : Nakladatelství Doplněk, 2004, p. 539-617; Slovak National Archives (hereinafter SNA) Bratislava, fond (f.) Matúš Dula, carton (c.) 2.

3 NN (hereinafter NN) 29 March 1919, no. 73, p. 2; SNA, f. M. Dula, c. 3, no.173. In the concept of an undated letter, Dula wrote to A. Bacher that the SNP “*will still cooperate and remain in constant contact with Czechoslovak Constitutional Democracy*.”

4 O čom my nevieme. (About things we don’t know.). In NN 31 July 1919, no. 174, p. 1; see also NN 2 Aug 1919, no. 176, p. 1.

5 SLÁDEK, ref. 2, p. 539-617; ČECHUROVÁ, Jana. *Česká politická pravice. (The Czech political right)*. Prague : Knižnice Dějin a současnosti, 1999, p. 14.

6 Archives of the National Museum (hereinafter ANM) Prague, f. A. Hajn, c. 134.

A preparatory committee was formed with sections for administration, education, small businesses, trade and so on.⁷

In autumn 1919, Alois Rašín and the chief editor of *Národní listy* František Šis sent František Ježek to Slovakia to establish contact with Slovak politicians and representatives of public and social life there.⁸ He got to know people from various political camps and professions, including Ivan Hálek, Vavro Šrobár, the Janoškas, Stodolas, Martin Mičura, Ivan Dérer, Vladimír Roy, Martin Rázus, Jozef Gregor-Tajovský and others. At a public meeting of CSND in the hall of the Chamber of Commerce in Bratislava in November 1919, he gave a speech on the relationship of his party to Slovakia and the Slovaks. He described Slovakia as the most acute problem in the life of the state, which required increased attention. On the subject of how his party would penetrate into the east of the republic he stated: “*we cannot and should not extend our political relations and forms into Slovakia. Instead, we must participate in the political life of the Slovak parties*”.⁹ In harmony with this statement, CSND expressed its support for the unification process of the Slovak civil parties at the end of 1919. This was an initiative of two currents in Slovak politics: the agrarians with Milan Hodža, Vavro Šrobár, Anton Štefánek, Pavol Blaho and others, and the Slovak National Party, which included Matúš Dula, Emil Stodola, Jozef Škultéty, Miloš Vančo and others. They attempted to form one united party. With regard for the approaching elections, the talks were speeded up, and around the turn of the years 1919-1920, the parties united to form the Slovak National and Agrarian Party (Slovenská národná a roľnícka strana – SNAP).¹⁰ The National Democrats positively evaluated this process for its simplification of party political relations. Apart from the SNAP as a united civil, nationalist and democratic force with social reforming elements, Slovakia would have a clerical People’s Party and the Social Democrat Party.¹¹

7 Ibid. The proposed members of the commission included the members of parliament Pilát, Rotnágl and Vlček, as well as the teacher St. Klíma from the Slovak section of the Ministry of Education; *Trenčanské noviny* 7 Dec 1919, no. 50, p. 3.

8 ANM, f. Ivan Dérer, c. 2, correspondence of Fr. Ježek with I. Dérer; *Desetiletí ČSND. Publikace k pražskému sjezdu z 13. a 14. 4. 1929.* (Ten years of CSND. A publication for the Prague conference of 13 and 14 April 1929). Prague 1929. p. 104-105.

9 *Trenčanské noviny* 7 Dec 1919, no. 50, p. 3.

10 It was an attempt by the Slovak civil political representatives to unite and create a balance to the Social Democrats and the Catholic People’s Party. This theme has been studied in detail in Slovak historiography. See e.g.: ZUBEREC, Vladimír. Pokusy o obnovenie Slovenskej národnej strany v Československej republike. (The attempts to revive the Slovak National Party in the Czechoslovak Republic) (1918 – 1921). In *Kmetianum*, 2 Martin 1971, p. 109-131; *ibid.*: Príspevok k dejinám vzniku agrárnej strany na Slovensku. (A contribution to the history of the origin of the agrarian party in Slovakia). In *Historický časopis*, 1967, year 15, no. 4, p. 573-599; *ibid.*: Českoslovakizmus agrárnej strany na Slovensku v rokoch 1919-1938. (Czechoslovakism in the agrarian party in Slovakia in the period 1919-1938). In *Historický časopis*, 1977, year 27, no. 4, p. 515-532; *ibid.*: Formovanie slovenského agrárneho hnutia v rokoch 1900-1918. (The formation of the Slovak agrarian movement in the period 1900-1918). In *Historický časopis*, 1972, year 22, no. 2, p. 205-246; KRAJČOVIČOVÁ, ref. 1, *Ibid.*: Slovenská otázka v programoch SNS. (The Slovak question in the programmes of the SNP) (1919-1925). In *Kmetianum*, 1971, year 2, Martin, p. 133-143; ROGULOVÁ, Jaroslava. *Politika Slovenskej národnej strany v rokoch 1918-1929.* (The policy of the Slovak National Party in the period 1918-1929). Bratislava : unpublished dissertation, 2005.

11 NN 20 April 1919, no. 92, p. 1; ANM, f. A. Hajn, c. 134. According to the view of one of the supporters of

Supporters of the CSND in Slovakia were instructed to join the SNAP, and in Bratislava they planned to create a club, which would work for it.¹² In the pre-election period, CSND also participated in the campaign. For example, a month before the election, its chairman Karel Kramář visited Slovakia. According to the NN,¹³ a crowd of people in Martin enthusiastically welcomed this “*fine but no unappreciated leader of our brother nation the Czechs*”.¹⁴

The National Democrats regarded the gaining of 12 seats by the SNAP in the April elections as partly the result of their campaigning. After the elections, the parties discussed forming a joint club for their members of parliament, but the agrarian wing of the SNAP decided on union with the Czech agrarians. Ježek informed the National Democrat Jan Herben about this: “*My talks with Šrobár and Hálek were in vain. They have their reasons for a united national-agrarian club [club of members of parliament with the Czech agrarian party – note J. R.], reasons that I also recognized. You won’t tempt them with anything.*”¹⁵ This step, as well as the list of candidates on which the representatives of the nationally oriented wing were put in unelectable places, shifted the balance of forces in the SNAP to the disadvantage of the national wing. Dula was their only representative to gain a seat in the Senate, and when he did not agree with the union of his party with the Czech agrarians, he joined the club of CSND senators. He continued to maintain close contacts with the Czech National Democrats. For example, he signed the appeal of the Červenobílí (Red-white club) of young rightists, working under the patronage of National Democracy. Its programme included the demand to build a strong national state.¹⁶ He informed Kramář about the dispute over the NN, which the leaders of the SNP wanted to make the official newspaper of their party, but Dula as chairman of the consortium publishing the newspaper fundamentally disagreed with this.¹⁷

In the course of 1920, the disputes in the SNAP deepened, with the nationally oriented opposition expressing ever greater discontent with the direction of the party, which emphasized the professional at the expense of the national. These views were supported especially by the National Democrats, for example, in the press, when the NN published critical articles on the leadership of the SNAP also from the National Democrats. On the subject of the SNAP becoming closer to agrarianism, Kramář stated that one universal

the CSND, the national party was not able to continue as an independent group because of the inactivity of its members.

12 ANM, f. Ivan Děrer, c. 2; *Desetiletí ČSND*, ref. 8, p. 104-105.

13 Dr. Kramář hovorí k svedomiu osvobodného národa. (Dr. Kramář speaks to the conscience of the liberated nation). In NN 20 April 1920, no. 88, p. 1. The newspaper reported his speech to an assembly in Banská Bystrica and published his statements from the constitutional debate at the end of February 1920.

14 NN 31 March 1920, no. 73, p. 2; ANM, f. A. Hajn, c. 134.

15 ANM, f. Fr. Ježek, c. 1, letter to J. Herben.

16 ČECHUROVÁ, ref. 5, p. 86. This author wrote about Dula in connection with the rise of fascism and the first Czech fascist-style organizations: “*The men, who supported the original fascists, included the aged Slovak nationally oriented politician Matuř Āula. The traditionalist writer Josef Holeček became another guarantor. Among these personalities, approaching fascism or succumbing to its “magic” was natural. In reaction to leftist progressivism, they decided to enthusiastically defend traditional national values, or, at least to help those, who presented themselves as their defenders.*” *Ibid.*, p. 83

17 ANM, f. K. Kramář, c. 7, correspondence between K. Kramář and M. Dula.

national party should function in Slovakia. In a series of articles from the end of 1920, the Prague correspondent of the paper, a National Democrat and future leading representative of CSND in Slovakia, Otakar Šimandl criticized Šrobár, the leading representative of the SNAP, because the nationally oriented members of the party and leading representatives of the Slovak intelligentsia such as Samuel Zoch, Milan Ivanka, Jur Janoška senior and Viliam Pauliny, had been pushed out of its narrower leadership because they rejected union with the Czech agrarians.¹⁸

After increasing disputes the nationally oriented wing separated from the SNAP in March 1921 and re-established the Slovak National Party as an independent party. They declared their allegiance to their original principles, which had been partly given up at the turn of the years 1919 and 1920 before the elections in the interest of forming a united party with the agrarian current.¹⁹ They proclaimed nationalism, the universal national principle and autonomism, which brought them close in programme to National Democracy. They established themselves as a nationalist party with a similar political programme – rejection of class principles and defence of the interests of all groups in society, the so-called universal national programme and the demand for decentralization of the public administration in Slovakia,²⁰ which was considered necessary by both parties.

The Slovak National Party gradually made its idea of Slovak autonomy more specific from the origin of the republic. Although even in the summer of 1919, some members of the SNP regarded it as a national political problem and spoke of autonomy as the fulfillment of the national rights of the Slovaks, the party finally decided to present the demand for autonomy as a matter of public administration. According to the SNP, a defined territory with Slovak administration would be able to find the best solutions for Slovak problems. The need to introduce autonomy was seen as a reaction to Prague centralism and the centralist form of administration, which the party regarded as inappropriate and ineffective for dealing with the specific problems of Slovakia and the real needs of this part of the republic. Since CSND perceived this question similarly, the two groups were close in programme. This party proposed to grant certain powers to autonomous authorities, in a way that would not threaten the unity of the state. The autonomous authorities would decide only about some specific matters, which would partially satisfy the demands of Slovakia. At the same time, it was considered a way of pacifying radical autonomism in Slovakia. In a discussion of county reform and the structure of the reformed administration in 1920, Kramář said: *“However, we should give them [the Slovaks – notes J. R.] a third instance for trivial matters, we will divert the autonomist idea. It is necessary to buy off a big evil with a small evil.”* He added: *“It is better to compromise early, than be forced to give later.”*²¹ Where the proposed county reform from 1920 was concerned, both parties took a positive view of the idea of forming a union of counties,²² which would

18 KRAMÁŘ, Karel. Všenárodní strana na Slovensku. (A universal national party for Slovakia). In NN 29 Dec 1920, no. 294, p. 1; see also: NN 25 Sept, no. 218, p. 1, 30 Sept 1920, no. 222, p. 1; 19 Nov 1920, no. 263, p. 1-2; 2 Dec 1920, no. 274, p. 3.

19 ZUBEREC, ref. 10; KRAJČOVIČOVÁ, ref. 10; ROGULOVÁ, ref. 10.

20 SNA, f. M. Dula, c. 2, undated (1921).

21 ANM, f. A. Hajn, c. 227, Slovenika, no. 6138/4.

22 KRAJČOVIČOVÁ, Natália. Župný zväz a úsilie o jeho vytvorenie v rokoch 1920-1926. (The union of

fulfill their idea of an autonomous authority: *"In Slovakia counties are nothing new, but a territorial union of them is something new. However, it is practical and may be useful. We consider it to be a possible and desirable form, which, with gradual development, should satisfy the wish of the people for the autonomy of Slovakia... By considering the question of the autonomy of Slovakia and so practically solving it, the Czechoslovak National Democrats will also determine their relationship to the Slovak parties. They will decide the possibility and degree of cooperation according to this."*²³

The year 1922 fully revealed the different understandings of basic political demands of the two parties, especially where the extent of Slovak autonomy and related questions were concerned. The SNP had fundamental discussions and divisions of view. From 1922, the party officially declared that according to its programme, autonomy was a national political problem. A basic point was that the party demanded autonomy on the basis of the demand for the recognition of the separate identity of the Slovak nation. Slovak autonomy would be a fulfillment of the national rights of the Slovaks and not just an administrative reform. However, this position was not acceptable to CSND, because it supported the idea of a united Czechoslovak nation. According to CSND, the Slovaks were part of the Czechoslovak nation, which formed the basis for the common state and a balance to the strong German minority in the republic. In spite of the fact that it recognized the need for decentralization of the administration, it saw this only as an administrative measure. However, some members of the SNP identified with the National Democrats' interpretation of decentralization. They moved to CSND and helped it to establish its own Slovak secretariat in December 1922.²⁴ The SNP reacted negatively to these activities. For example, the NN wrote about Kramář that: *"they think he is a true Slav"* but *"he has shown that he is a Czech chauvinist"*. The *Národné noviny* summarized the founding assembly of CSND as follows: *"In a word nothing new, only full of phrases, nothing positive, only condemnations of the autonomists. Gentlemen, you are capitalists and short-sighted Czech chauvinists... We support Slovak autonomy, we support Czechoslovak community, but as two brother nations: Czechs and Slovaks, because we are Slavs and we can support the union of all Slavs, but the Slovak nation will want to remain the Slovak nation."*²⁵ They accused the National Democrats of short-sighted Czech chauvinism, called them knights of an opportunist character and on the subject of their Slovak programme commented: *"The Slovak nation wants to see a trustworthy Slovak policy and not honeyed strings, without support even on the other side of the Morava."*²⁶

Especially Milan Ivanka, Gejza Rehák and Viliam Pauliny-Tóth moved from the SNP to CSND. According to Ivanka, they expected that the leadership of CSND would give

counties and the effort to create it in the period 1920-1926). In *Historický časopis*, 1993, year 41, no. 4, p. 379-393; ROGUL'OVÁ, Jaroslava. Autonomizmus Slovenskej národnej strany v medzivojnovom období. (The autonomism of the Slovak National Party in the inter-war period). In FERENČUHOVÁ, Bohumila (ed.). *Slovensko a svet v 20. storočí. Kapitoly k 70. narodeninám Valeriána Bystrického*. Bratislava : Historický ústav SAV, 2006, p. 49-66.

23 ANM, f. A. Hajn, c. 227, Slovenika, no. 6138/4.

24 *Desetiletí ČSND*, ref. 8, p. 104-105.

25 NN 21 Dec 1922, no. 105, p. 1.

26 NN 7 Jan 1923, no. 2, p. 1.

them a free hand in formulating a Slovak programme and that they would be able to fulfill their political ideas in the framework of a large, strong and well-financed party, active in the whole state, so that they would have a larger space for their political work. Ivanka saw the independent functioning of CSND in Slovakia as an excellent opportunity for Slovak politicians to implement an effective Slovak policy. He demanded as the most urgent requirement of the Slovak organization that the leadership and its newspaper should be in Slovak hands. However, his correspondence shows clear reservations towards the Czech leadership of the party and the Slovak secretariat, which had the above-mentioned O. Šimandl as its general secretary: *"I am watching with some degree of nervousness, and powerlessness, as my demand has not been fulfilled so far."*²⁷ According to his view, the Czech representatives of CSND, in spite of their qualities, did not understand Slovak problems. They were connected with Slovakia mainly by emotion, but they lacked real knowledge of the needs of Slovakia. He wrote to Rázus: *"In our party we have excellent men (Kramář, Hajn, Herben, Stránský, Lukavský, Matoušek etc.), but may Christ's hand defend you, to identify with their views on Slovakia. They all like Slovakia, but not even one of them understands it, and I am not surprised. From where could they learn to understand us? Indeed, we do not know the Czech people. Time, time and more time is necessary to enable us to know and rationally help each other."*²⁸

At the same time, there was the question of how far CSND represented competition for the SNP in Slovakia. During the whole of its activity in Slovakia, its Slovak policy was characterized by the fact that it spoke openly about the existence of the Slovak problem and Slovak question, as well as, for example, about the need to introduce autonomy for Slovakia. In this way, it differed substantially from the other Czech or Czechoslovak parties and their Slovak branches. Its clear advantage was that it was able to combine this rhetoric with moderation in the solution of Slovak questions. In this way, it was able to gain a position in Slovakia, which was comparable to or better than the results of the SNP. The popularity of the Czech politicians of this party also played a role. This applied especially to Kramář, who was famous from the Czech resistance during the First World War, and for his pro-Russian views, that were still popular in Slovakia.²⁹ However, National Democracy in Slovakia continued to represent an extraneous political element in Slovakia, and as was clear in the later period, this was one of the reasons why the Slovak public distrusted it. It was unpleasant for the SNP that National Democracy drew away

27 The Slovak secretariat suffered from inadequate financial resources, and had serious organizational problems, which arose as a result of disagreements between its Czech and Slovak representatives. Slovenská národná knižnica – Archív literatúry a umenia (SNK – ALU) (Slovak National Library – Archives of Literature and Art) Martin, f. M. Rázus, signature (hereinafter sig.) 45 D 7, correspondence with M. Ivanka; ANM, f. K. Kramář, c. 17, correspondence of M. Ivanka with K. Kramář, *ibid.* letters of O. Šimandl to K. Kramář.

28 SNK-ALU, f. M. Rázus, sig. 45 D 7, correspondence with M. Ivanka.

29 For example, Šimandl informed Kramář: *"I don't want to flatter you, but your name is pronounced with love and respect in the east, and the farming people there, influenced by former 'Americans', understand you better than our people in Bohemia and Moravia."* ANM, f. K. Kramář, c. 17, letter from O. Šimandl to K. Kramář; SNK-ALU, f. Rázus, sig. 45 B 25, letter from G.A. Bežo to M. Rázus; ROGULOVÁ, Jaroslava. Karel Kramář a Slovenská národná strana v medzivojnovom období. (Karel Kramář and the Slovak National Party in the inter-war period). In *Karel Kramář (1860-1937). Život a dílo*. Praha : Masarykův ústav Praha; Historický ústav Akademie věd České republiky, 2009, p. 463-474.

its members, including well known and active personalities. This was a further loss of membership after the losses to the agrarian party at the beginning of the 1920s. CSND also recruited former activists working for the SNP at local level,³⁰ by establishing various affiliated organizations. In this way it competed with the passive SNP. CSND built up an organizational network and founded the *Bratislavské noviny* newspaper, which was replaced as the official party newspaper by the *Národný denník* in 1924.

According to data from 1928, CSND had 24 local organizations in Slovakia and a centre for the National Association of Trade Union Organizations. The National Democrats established farmers' unions in the Slovak countryside. For a long time, the SNP had failed to mobilize active trade union organizations. Its projects for trade union or professional associations remained only on the level of ideas and preparations.³¹ National Democracy strove to gain the support of leading personalities well known to the Slovak public. For example, in the years 1922-1923, Martin Rázus worked for them in the *Bratislavské noviny*. Although he did not become politically engaged, he was offered the position of chief editor.³² National Democracy also addressed Vladimír Roy, who later represented the agrarian party.

Where supporters and voters for the two parties were concerned, National Democracy extended its influence into areas where the SNP was not active. Some supporters of CSND welcomed its origin as a possibility for combined work for Slovakia, and they encouraged the leadership of the SNP to participate.³³ The balance of strengths of the two parties can be compared on the basis of the results of the county elections from 1923. The SNP gained 2 100 in the county of Bratislava compared to 9 000 for National Democracy. In the county of Zvolen, the SNP got 6 300 and CSND 1 900. In Košice county the SNP gained no votes, but CSND got 2 700. It had founded its organization here in 1920. The SNP gained a total of 10 400 votes in Slovakia, compared to 13 600 for CSND.³⁴

Before the 1925 parliamentary elections, ideas of electoral cooperation appeared among the members of the SNP and CSND. This was not a matter of official talks, but more of the pre-election calculations and activities of individual members of both parties.³⁵ From the National Democracy side, Ivanka attempted to initiate cooperation, by inviting leading members of the SNP to a meeting during the celebrations at Martin in August.³⁶ He placed before them various benefits resulting from union, for example, help from headquarters in Prague and a large club of members of parliament when solving problems. He addressed to the members of the SNP criticism of their political work. In

30 SNK-ALU, f. M. Rázus, sig. 45 C 77, letter from C. Horváth to M. Rázus.

31 ROGUEOVÁ, ref. 10; ANM, f. K. Kramář, c. 17, letter from O. Šimandl to K. Kramář.

32 SNK-ALU, f. M. Rázus, sig. 45 D 7, letter from M. Ivanka to M. Rázus; *ibid.* sig. 45 I 5, correspondence with the secretariat of CSND. For more details on the work of Rázus in the editorial office of the *Bratislavské noviny* see: GÁFRIK, ref. 1.

33 Archives of KPR, f. T 528/23, no. 913/23 and f. T 1556/23, no. 685/23, correspondence of J. Turan with KPR; SNA, f. PR, MAT 53/1.

34 BYSTRICKÝ, Valerián – ZEMKO, Milan (Eds.). *Slovensko v Československu*. (Slovakia in Czechoslovakia). Bratislava : Veda, 2004, p. 579.

35 SNK-ALU, f. M. Rázus, sig. 45 D 11, letter from J. Janoška to M. Rázus.

36 SNK-ALU, f. M. Rázus, sig. 45 D 7, correspondence with M. Ivanka; *ibid.* sig. 45 B 13, letter from L. Bazovský to M. Rázus.

his view, it was futile for political work to use extra-parliamentary routes and almost exclusively the NN, which was read by very few people in the Czech Lands, while in Slovakia it appeared only twice a week and in small numbers. His party would demand absolute loyalty and party discipline.³⁷ He expected that union “*would not double but quadruple our strength. It would make an impression on many ‘neutrals’ and win them over to us. It will gain for the two parties united into one much greater respect among people without political training. If the union happens sooner, it will have more influence on the voters.*”³⁸ Allegedly, in the event of an electoral pact with the SNP, the National Democrats expected four parliamentary seats in Slovakia and agreed with the candidature of Rázus, Miloš Vančo and Štefan Krčméry, perhaps also Juraj Janoška, from May 1925 chairman of the SNP. When it decided not to make a pact with CSND, the SNP took into account especially the refusal of the National Democrats to recognize the separate identity of the Slovaks, as well as the fear of the SNP that by forming an alliance with a Czech party with a reputation for openly proclaiming the Czechization of the Slovak nation and for destroying the Slovak economy, it would lose many sympathizers, who would turn to the People’s Party.³⁹ The SNP also considered possible alliances with the People’s Party or the National Labour Party (Národná strana práce), but in the end it participated in the election independently. It gained 35 435 votes, a sufficient number to win one seat, but since they were not confined to one electoral region, the party failed to win any seats. CSND had candidates in Slovakia jointly with the Ruthenian National party (Ruská národná strana) and gained 24 954 votes.⁴⁰

The relationship of the SNP to CSND changed in the second half of the 1920s, partly as a result of the parliamentary election results from 1925. The victory of the opposition forces in Slovakia indicated discontent with the government, which was also proclaimed by the SNP, but on the other hand, in spite of this, the SNP remained without any seats in parliament. This forced the party to re-evaluate its political tactics. The question of alliance with another political group resounded ever more strongly in the party. Financial questions also played a very important role here, because the SNP suffered from a severe shortage of the money needed to cover the basic running of party apparatus, party newspaper and election expenses. Some members of the party regarded precisely National Democracy as one of the most appropriate allies, since it was a nationalist party with a programme of Slovak autonomy, engaging in solution of the Slovak question, which,

37 SNK-ALU, f. M. Rázus, sig. 45 D 7, letter from M. Ivanka to M. Rázus.

38 SNK-ALU, f. M. Rázus, sig. 45 D 7, correspondence of M. Ivanka with M. Rázus; *ibid.*, sig. 45 C 77, letter from C. Horváth to M. Rázus.

39 SNK-ALU, f. M. Rázus, sig. 45 G 27, letter from A. Pridavok to M. Rázus; *ibid.* sig. 45 D 11, correspondence between J. Janoška and M. Rázus. The chairman of the SNP Janoška informed the members of his party that CSND deliberately spread reports about cooperation as something certain to apply pressure to the SNP. However, an article by Janoška soon appeared in the NN with the title *Politickí pytači* (Political courting), in which he anonymously accused the Czech party of dishonest intentions and wanting to use the National Party; SNK-ALU, f. Ján Zeman, sig. 87 I 39, correspondence of M. Rázus with J. Zeman; *ibid.*, sig. 45 G 27, correspondence of M. Rázus with O. Škrovina and M. Vančo; SNA, f. PR, MAT 53/1; NN 16 July 1925, no. 57, p. 1.

40 BYSTRICKÝ – ZEMKO, ref. 34, p. 560.

like other Czechoslovak parties, directed attention after elections to Slovak problems and pursued policies in this direction. In December 1925, Kramář declared the interest of CSND in Slovakia and its problems in a speech to parliament as follows: *"It seems to me that we speak and think too much about one problem: the German problem, but we do not think about another problem, which is much closer to us, and is much more important and serious for us: namely the Slovak problem. I think we have a clear duty to finally stop acting like political ostriches in this matter, not looking at what is happening there. We should look at these problems with the justice we want and understand as true democratism, and with the love we feel for our nation, and so also for the Slovaks, who form one branch of our nation. I think that the Slovak problem is our vital problem. It is a problem for me and for our party much more serious than the problem of our relations with the Germans."*⁴¹ The Slovak secretariat of CSND worked out a new Slovak programme concerning political, economic, social, cultural and educational matters. The public were informed about the programme in various lectures about Slovakia at the beginning of 1926. Karel Locher, a member of the club of CSND members of parliament, wrote two years later that *"our un-egoistic, almost anonymous policy of rapprochement with Slovakia, which we began to vigorously promote at the end of 1925"* received great understanding and success among the public.⁴² As part of this activity, CSND organized a series of lectures in Prague by representatives of Slovak public, cultural and political life, to inform the Czech public about conditions in Slovakia. In February 1926, the National Democrats also invited representatives of the SNP, including Jozef Škultéty, Emil Stodola and Štefan Krčméry to this series, and organized a literary evening for Martin Rázus with readings from his works.⁴³

The new policy of CSND on Slovakia in the second half of the 1920s took two directions, and the SNP reacted to both very positively. The first was the activity of CSND in bringing the Slovak opposition (Hlinka's Slovak People's Party) into the government. The second was reform of the administration in the direction of decentralization, which meant the introduction of administrative autonomy in Slovakia. Especially the activity

41 Shorthand record from the Chamber of Deputies from 27 Dec 1925; NN 20 Jan 1926, no. 15, p. 1; National Archives of the Czech Republic (NA ČR) Prague, f. Prezidium ministerské rady (PMR), sig. X/K/37/13, no. 992; NN 19 Jan 1926, no. 14, p. 1; ANM, f. F. Hlaváček, c. 77, no. 1860/1, letter from F. Hlaváček to the Regional Secretariat of CSND in Bratislava. He wrote in it that the secretariat should strive to distribute the *Národní denník* newspaper to all parts of Slovakia, and promote the party: *"Dr. Kramář is extremely interested in this matter. Therefore, I ask you to kindly send reports on the results of this whole action with various details."*

42 SNK-ALU, f. M. Rázus, sig. 45 I 57, correspondence with the club of CSND members of parliament.

43 NN 12 Feb 1926, no. 34, p. 1. *"It appropriately supplements the Slovak programme of our party, aiming at a just solution to the controversy between the centralists and autonomists."* NA ČR, f. Prezidium ministerstva vnitra (PMV), sig. X/S/13/6, no. 6736. Report from 31 March 1926: *"In the last quarter year, the SNP has turned away from fundamentally opposition tactics, and voices are being heard calling for understanding between the Czechs and Slovaks, and a calm resolution of the Slovak question. The causes of this change should be sought both in the action of the National Democracy party in Slovakia and in the lectures organized by the ND club in Prague, at which Slovaks, especially members of the SNP are acquainting the Czech public with the culture, history and politics of Slovakia. The warm welcome and understanding extended to all the lecturers has had the good effect that the Slovak intelligentsia, as far as it is not Ludák oriented, has begun to think about the Czechs with some degree of objectivity, and the prejudices imported by party demagoguery were at least partly corrected."*

of Kramář contributed to the improvement of relations between the parties in this area. According to the *Národné noviny*: “*He flings on the table the monster of the Slovak problem*”⁴⁴ and it continues citing the principle presented by Kramář: “*to strengthen a strong and contented state with the help of a strong and contented Slovakia*”.⁴⁵ However, there was still the reservation against him, that in accordance with the views of his party, he refused to recognize the separate identity of the Slovak nation or to recognize autonomy as a national right. In January 1926, the *Národné noviny* criticized the fact that the National Democrats “*would force on their leader Dr. Kramář the halo of leadership in solving the problem of Slovak autonomy – without regard for the Slovak opposition autonomist parties*”, but it welcomed the fact that “*the long period of newspaper polemics about the Slovak problem have now brought a clearly visible result*”. From the side of the Slovak National Party, Kramář’s policy was highly evaluated by the former chairman Emil Stodola, who stated that Slovakia “*owes him much gratitude because he penetrated most deeply into these problems, and in this way he took up a task comparable to that of the great statesman Gladstone in relation to the Irish. It will be good only when the best Czechs make an effort to solve Slovak questions.*”⁴⁶ According to Kramář, the Slovak problem could be solved by unification of the administration in the republic and introduction of the regional system, as was put into practice in the whole state in 1928.⁴⁷ Although the SNP took a critical view of the reform, mainly because of the limited powers granted to the autonomous authorities, it could still appreciate the fact that Slovakia had been defined as an administrative for the first time, and regard this as a further step in the process of gradually introducing complete autonomy. In the view of the SNP, it was to a large extent the work of Kramář. According to the SNP he was a politician whose Slovak policy and position towards Slovakia “*had significantly re-oriented the Czech public in the question of the Slovak problem, so that the word ‘autonomy’ was no longer seen as a threat*”⁴⁸

In the second half of the 1920s, the SNP regarded CSND as closer in programme than the Czechoslovak class parties or their Slovak branches. The Slovak National Party considered that the cause of the catastrophic economic and social situation was insufficient nationalism and the social class or non-national principles, which had formed the basis

44 NN 17 Jan 1926, no. 13, p. 2; NN 19 Jan 1926, no. 14, p. 1; NN 20 Jan 1926, no. 15, p. 1; NA ČR, f. PMV, sig. X/K/37, no. 992. The lecture by Karel Kramář in the Bratislava Reduta on 17 Jan 1926; NN 4 March 1926, no. 51, p. 2 and 24 Nov 1926, no. 216, p. 1: “*It results only from the efforts of Kramář’s group, which is working on solution of the Slovak problem more intensively than any other Czech politicians. We welcome their action and naturally we want to support it, but we are doing so and will continue to do so in the future only according to the merits of each case, and as the independent SNP.*”

45 NN 20 Jan 1926 no. 15, p. 1; NN 17 June 1926, no. 134, p. 1; NN 26 Nov 1926, no. 225, p. 1.

46 STODOLA, Emil. Na obranu Slovenska. (In defence of Slovakia). In NN 1 Jan 1926, p. 1, p. 1; Na ceste k dorozumeniu. (On the way to understanding). In NN 5 Jan 1926, no. 4, p. 1.

47 KRAJČOVIČOVÁ, ref. 22; ŠUCHOVÁ, Xénia. Kompetencie krajinských samosprávnych orgánov vo svetle rozpočtov Slovenskej krajiny. (The powers of the regional administrative authorities in the light of the budgets of the Slovak region). In *Studia historica Nitriensia*, 1997, no. 6, p. 135-144; *ibid.*: K problémom unifikácie verejnej správy v predmníchovskej ČSR. (On the problem of the unification of the administration in the pre-Munich Czechoslovak Republic). In *Československo 1918-1938. Osudy demokracie ve střední Evropě, I.* Prague : Akademie věd ČR, 1999, p. 188-190.

48 NN 23 Feb 1926, no. 43, p. 1.

of government policy in Slovakia since the end of the First World War. According to the SNP, the reaction was a revival of nationalism. The leftist and internationalist direction of post-war politics had not respected the needs of the nation as a whole. The wave of leftist and internationalist thinking influencing political decisions had brought, in the view of the SNP, a retreat from nationalism, which was manifested in the splintering of the nation and the resulting formation of parties based on social class and internationalist principles. Examples included the agrarian Green International, the Social Democrat International and, in the view of the SNP, the very dangerous and subversive Communist International. As a reaction to the policies supported by these forces, people in Slovakia declared their allegiance to the word 'nationalism' and to fascism standing behind it. The SNP was convinced of the need for union of the national forces in the republic, so that they could jointly confront internationalism and communism.⁴⁹ It considered the ideological struggle between these two forces to be one of the most topical questions in domestic and world events. This position of the SNP also led to its close contacts, for example, with the National Fascist Community (Národná obec fašistická).⁵⁰ The National Democrats also cooperated with the fascists in this period. They sympathized with the fascists because according to Kramář, they proclaimed the national idea, struggled against communism and activated passive members. The split with the fascists in 1927 was caused by their increasing independence and the growing importance of the industrial wing compared to the national.⁵¹

The rapprochement of the SNP and CSND after the 1925 elections struck against serious disagreements in practice. The above mentioned lecture series of the National Democrats from February 1926, as well as the fact that they declared their willingness to cooperate in the field of Slovak policy with dissatisfied opposition political circles,⁵² evoked a reaction from the SNP. On the initiative of Otto Škrovina, Miloš Vančo, J. Škultéty and Š. Krčméry, the party really concerned itself with the question of possible cooperation from the end of February 1926. The possibilities were analysed in detail at a

49 ROGUEOVÁ, Jaroslava. Martin Rázus a analýza politicko-ideologických prúdov v medzivojnovom období. (Martin Rázus and analysis of the political and ideological currents of the inter-war period). In PEKNÍK, Miroslav (ed.). *Martin Rázus – politik, spisovateľ a cirkevný činiteľ*. Bratislava : Ústav politických vied; Veda, 2008, p. 100-116.

50 ROGUEOVÁ, ref. 10; KAMENEC, Ivan. Penikanie fašistickej ideológie a organizácií Národnej obce fašistickej do slovenského politického života v medzivojnovom období. (The penetration of the fascist ideology and organization of the National Fascist Community into Slovak political life in the inter-war period). In *Historické štúdie*, XXIV, Bratislava 1980, p. 54-55; *ibid.*: Vznik, vývoj a špecifické črty slovenského fašizmu v medzivojnovom období. (The origin, development and specific features of Slovak fascism in the inter-war period). In *Sborník k problematice dějin imperialismu*, vol. 5, part 2. Prague 1978, p. 281-299; ČAPLOVIČ, Miloslav. *Branné organizácie v Československu 1918-1939 (so zreteľom na Slovensko)*. (Armed organizations in Czechoslovakia 1918-1939 (with regard to Slovakia)). Bratislava : Ministerstvo obrany Slovenskej republiky, 2001; GAJANOVÁ, Alena. *Dvojí tvář*. (Two faces). Prague : Naše vojsko, Svaz protifašistických bojovníků, 1962; HARNA, Josef. K otázce pronikání fašizmu do politického systému buržoázní československé republiky. (On the question of the penetration of fascism into the political system of the bourgeois Czechoslovak republic). In *Sborník k problematice dějin imperialismu*, vol. 5, part 2. Prague : Ústav československých a světových dějin ČSAV, 1978, p. 261-281.

51 SLÁDEK, ref. 2, p. 604.

52 NN 12 Feb 1926, no. 34, p. 1.

meeting of the wider executive committee in Piešťany in March 1926. The party divided into two wings with different views. Rázus, Škultéty, Škrovina and others unambiguously supported cooperation with CSND, and Fedor Ruppeltdt apparently presented a plan for cooperation between the parties. According to Rázus they should also merge their party newspapers: the *Národný denník* and *Národné noviny*, which would be transferred from Martin to Bratislava. This group emphasized that in relation to financial questions, establishing cooperation was much more urgent for the Slovak than for the Czech party.⁵³ The chairman of the SNP Juraj Janoška was strongly opposed to cooperation. He did not trust CSND and suspected it of impure motives.⁵⁴ However, above all, he calculated with the expectation that if Hlinka's Slovak People's Party entered the government, the SNP would become the main opposition party and would clearly profit from that. The decision not to cooperate with CSND was finally supported by the fact that the SNP gained finance from another source, and so this question was closed for a time. The representatives of both parties denied information about a merger, which had appeared in the press and in situation and police reports. The National Democrats decided that first they must strengthen their own position in Slovakia and only then consider cooperation with the SNP.⁵⁵ The October discussion among SNP representatives about cooperation with National Democracy was just as turbulent as the one in March, and it ended the same way. A partial result of this rapprochement was establishment of closer contacts between members of the party. The most extensive surviving archive material testifies to the contacts of Rázus with the National Democrats, the offers he received from them concerning contributions to *Národní listy* or participation in lecture events.⁵⁶ The extensive materials in the Archives of the National Museum provide evidence of the attitude of the National Democrats to Slovakia and on the activity of their Slovak secretariat. For example, the National Democrats established their own organization in Martin, and deliberately selected Michal Viťázek as its secretary because of his good contacts with the people of Martin and the SNP, in which he became actively involved in the 1930s, after the liquidation of CSND.

Local and regional elections were stimuli for closer cooperation. The National Democrats invited some members of the SNP to talks in Prague.⁵⁷ In the case of the local

53 SNA, f. PR, c. 225, MAT 53/1, letter from M. Rázus to unknown: *"It is not possible to go on living like this. My plan is known to you. I want to accept help from the National Democrats. The chairman caught me unawares and then left the matter (Rehák!) as Janko Čietek still assume, which I did not think was a better starting point than mine. If no better, I can only recommend my proposal... I am not afraid of accepting help from the National Democrats. I am in contact with them and I see that it does not harm our national cause... and now we are in a situation, where we can only merge or cooperate with another party."*

54 NN 30 Jan 1926, no. 24, p. 3, NN 7 Feb 1926, no. 30, p. 1; SNK-ALU, f. M. Rázus, sig. 45 C 66, correspondence of M. Rázus with Fr. Hlaváček.

55 ANM, f. Fr. Hlaváček, c. 77, correspondence of O. Šimandl with Fr. Hlaváček, no. 1860/1.

56 SNK-ALU, f. Rázus, sig. 45 D 7, letter from M. Ivanka to M. Rázus from 29 April 1927. *"I think that not only your sympathy for our party, with which you largely agree, but also the fact that your articles could greatly contribute to clarifying and equalizing the relationship between the Slovak and Czech, should lead to you accepting this offer, but that really depends on you."*

57 ANM, f. Fr. Hlaváček, c. 77, correspondence between O. Šimandl and Fr. Hlaváček, no. 1860/1.

elections, the narrower executive committee of the SNP adopted a resolution stating that in all communities, where the party had enough supporters, it would have its own candidates. In other communities, it would join with parties that were close in programme. Decision making about alliance with specific parties would be left to local party organizations on the basis of the situation in particular communities. The SNP formed an alliance with the National Democrats in Košice. According to the election results, CSND gained 8 030 votes in Slovakia, which represented a loss of 4 034 compared to the 1925 parliamentary elections. The Slovak National Party gained 3 123, which represented a loss of 8 995 votes compared to the previous elections.⁵⁸ After the elections, the SNP stated that in all communities, where it had its own candidates, it gained seats according to expectations. The results in Bratislava and Košice were unsatisfactory because the Czech and Slovak parties did not gain enough votes to secure majorities in the city councils.

During the whole of 1928, the parties pursued tactics leading up to the regional council elections in December. Part of the SNP supported cooperation with the National Democrats, a significant advantage of which was an offer of financial assistance with the cost of the election campaign, while preserving the complete independence of the SNP.⁵⁹ The leadership of the SNP had turbulent discussions at its sessions in March at Martin and in November at Trenčianske Teplice. They testified to the continuing disagreements in the party on this question. Some proposed cooperation with CSND, others an alliance with Milan Hodža and the agrarians.⁶⁰ According to the calculations of the National Democrats, the SNP was in a position in which it would scarcely gain one seat in the regional council without cooperation, but with an alliance it could expect to gain two seats. They also considered a behind the scenes step: influence the agrarian party to reject cooperation with the SNP, so that it would be forced to accept the offer from CSND, which would also have a more advantageous position in the talks.⁶¹ The negotiations were held on 10 November 1928, but agreement was not reached. The SNP allied itself for a share of the votes with the Czechoslovak People's Party (Československá strana lidová). The SNP and the People's Party gained one seat each: for Rázus and Mičura, while CSND gained one elected and one appointed member.⁶²

58 BYSTRICKÝ – ZEMKO, ref. 34, p. 592.

59 SNK-ALU, f. Rázus, letter from G. A. Bežo to M. Rázus; ANM, f. F. Hlaváček, c. 77, correspondence of O. Šimandl with Fr. Hlaváček, no. 1860/1.

60 SNK-ALU, f. Ján Zeman, sig. 87 D 55, letter from M. Rázus to J. Zeman; *ibid.*, f. M. Rázus, sig. 45 F 22, letter from O. Škrovina to M. Rázus; *ibid.*, sig. 45 D 12, letter from O. Škrovina to J. Janoška st.; *ibid.*, f. M. Ruppeldt, sig. 18 A 101, letter from Š. Kréméry to M. Ruppeldt; *ibid.*, SNA, f. M. Vančo, c. 45, letter from M. Vančo to J. Janoška ml.; AÚ TGM, f. TGM, R – republika, osoby, c. 414, record from 7 Sept 1928.

61 ANM, f. K. Kramář, c. 9, letter from F. Hlaváček to K. Kramář: *"I had another meeting with the representatives of the SNP, which may promise some result this time because the SNP does not know where to go, alone they would get scarcely one seat in the regional council, but in alliance with us, it would be possible to get two joint candidates elected. I asked our gentlemen to continue the discussions and give us a definite answer not later than about 10 September... If the SNP does not agree to electoral cooperation, we will have to consider cooperation with the agrarians in Slovakia."* SNK – ALU, f. M. Rázus, sig. 45 B 13, letter from L. Bazovský to M. Rázus.

62 Československá statistika, vol. 60. Voľby do zemských zastupiteľstiev v roku 1928. (Elections to the regional councils in 1928). Prague 1929; Ročenka Československé republiky 1929, (Yearbook of the

From the point of view of cooperation between these parties, the parliamentary elections of 1929 were the most important. However, in comparison with the situation before the regional elections, the SNP had a stronger position, and the National Democrats also recognized this. The situation in the People's party after the conviction of its leading figure Vojtech Tuka,⁶³ the departure of the important Ľudáks (members of Hlinka's Slovak People's Party) Ferdiš Juriga and Florián Tománek, and various scandals in political parties clearly had results. "It's a great time for agitation" wrote Ján Čietek Smrek, and the party wanted to target regions, where the Communists and Social Democrats were showing weakness.⁶⁴ The SNP discussed cooperation with representatives of the Polish National Union (Polski Narodni Zwiast), Ruthenian National Party⁶⁵ and agrarians. The SNP would have agreed to the creation of a Slovak front after the elections under the leadership of Hodža, who allegedly wanted to enable the publication of the *Národné noviny* every day and without any obligations.⁶⁶ CSND also showed increased interest in concluding an electoral pact with the SNP. For example, Ivanka stated that the national party had good prospects for success and significant offers of cooperation from almost all the political parties. The circumstances suggested that the SNP could win as many as four seats in parliament. According to other estimates, CSND expected two seats in the Chamber of Deputies and one in the Senate.⁶⁷

The SNP finally decided to enter talks with CSND and they worked out a document outlining the principles of cooperation. It was concerned with questions of a constitutional character such as decentralization, autonomy, dualism, regionalism, federalism, the question of the co-existence of the Czechs and Slovaks in the republic and the idea of a single Czechoslovak political nation. The conclusion of the document expressed the need to settle newspaper and financial affairs, numbers of seats in parliament and representation in committees in the event of cooperation or merger. According to the proposed agreement, CSND would finance candidates and contribute to campaign expenses.⁶⁸ The parties finally signed an agreement in October 1929. Its nine points spoke of a common list of candidates called "Czechoslovak National Democracy and Slovak National Party". The SNP would have the first and second places on the lists of candidates for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate in the districts of Liptovský Mikuláš, Turčiansky Svätý Martin, Banská Bystrica, while CSND would have them in the districts of Nové

Czechoslovak Republic 1929), year III, 1929, p. 326.

- 63 HERTEL, Maroš. *Dr. Vojtech Tuka v rokoch 1880-1929. Pokus o politický profil*. (Dr. Vojtech Tuka in the period 1880-1929. An attempt at a political profile). Bratislava : unpublished dissertation, 2003.
- 64 SNK-ALU, f. M. Rázus, sig. 45 G 60, letter from J. Smrek to M. Rázus; *ibid.*, sig. 45 D 67, letter from P. Križko to M. Rázus; *ibid.* sig. 45 C 55, letter from J. Grniak to M. Rázus; SNA, f. PR, c. 225, MAT 53/1. Report on a SNP lecture on 14 October 1929 in Bratislava.
- 65 SNK-ALU, f. M. Rázus, sig. 45 F 46, letter from F. Staš to M. Rázus.
- 66 *Ibid.* sig. 45 C 55, letter from J. Grniak to M. Rázus; *ibid.* sig. 45 G 60, letter from J. Smrek to M. Rázus.
- 67 ANM, f. K. Kramář, c. 10, letter from M. Ivanka to K. Kramář; *ibid.* f. F. Hlaváček, c. 79, no. 1863/2, undated.
- 68 SNK-ALU, f. A. Kompánek, sig. 156 T 19. Clarification of questions for discussion (clarification of the policies of the SNP and National Democrats); ANM, f. Karel Kramář, c. 10, letter from M. Ivanka to K. Kramář; SNK-ALU, f. M. Rázus, sig. 45 0 7a.

Zámky, Trnava, Prešov and Košice. The approach to filling the other places on the lists of candidates was agreed in a similar way. The SNP would not have candidates in Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, but committed itself to supporting CSND and the Ruthenian party, which would also appear on the joint list of candidates. According to the agreement, any SNP members of parliament would become guests in the CSND club, they would be subject to its seating rules, but would be responsible only to their own party. The agreement guaranteed freedom to speak and vote on Slovak matters. The document was signed by M. Vančo, J. Janoška, V. Černák, B. Viest and F. Staš for the SNP, and by G. Rehák, V. Mikyna, K. Gregorka and O. Šimandl for the National Democrats. The SNP went into the elections with the slogan that after 10 years in opposition, it was entering active politics with the closest party, namely CSND. Milan Hodža had an interest in a pact not being concluded between these two parties. In an effort to stop the signing of the agreement even on the day it was signed, he sent Kramář a telegram urging him not to sign it, and he tried to persuade the SNP that they needed a joint approach with his agrarian party. According to some reports, he was allegedly afraid that the union of the SNP, National Democrats and Ruthenians would deprive his party of a seat in the Prešov electoral region.⁶⁹

The elections were held on 27 October 1929. The joint list of candidates of CSND, SNP and the Ruthenian National Bloc gained 53 745 votes in the whole of Slovakia, which corresponded to 15 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 9 in the Senate. On the basis of this joint list, Martin Rázus gained a seat in parliament and became a guest in the CSND club.

* * *

During Rázus' time as a guest in the club of CSND members of parliament, the two parties declared common policies: the need for economic equalization of the Czech Lands and Slovakia, rejection of tying party candidates list for elections and building of a nation state. On the other hand, basic differences of programme dividing them became deeper, especially that concerning the relationship between the Czechs and Slovaks and its importance for the Czechoslovak Republic from the point of view of the internal and international security of the state. CSND believed in the Czechs and Slovaks forming one nation, while the SNP believed in solidarity between two nations. It was a problem in their relationship, which continued from the 1920s.

In spite of the fact that the SNP gained a seat in parliament for the first time since the origin of the republic, it had to confront criticism from the Slovak public, which reacted negatively to the alliance of the traditional Slovak party with a Czech party of big business. Both centralist and autonomist papers and magazines used this alliance to discredit the party.⁷⁰ The SNP explained the reasons that led to it, and emphasized that

69 ANM, f. K. Kramář, c. 9, letter from Fr. Hlaváček to K. Kramář: "You may get Hodža's telegram late, so I ask you to immediately telegraph to Hodža in Martin, that you cannot retreat from the agreement you have concluded. Also please telegraph Ivanka in Bratislava, not to retreat from the agreement."

70 NN 29 December 1929, no. 152, p. 1; *Slovák* Vianoce (Christmas) 1929, no. 292, p. 5. The *Slovák* commented that Rázus had not got onto any of the parliamentary committees for CSND, which fundamentally limited the possibilities of his work, because almost all parliamentary activity actually took place in the

this pragmatic union enabled it to work more effectively in parliament in support of an autonomist policy. To the reproach from American Slovaks that this aim would be best served by an alliance of autonomist parties, Rázus replied that the SNP gave priority to the National Democrats rather than to the People's Party "*simply because unsettled confessional skirmishes and incitement mean that 3/4 of the voters would abandon it [the SNP – note J. R.] and the Ľudáks would certainly not want to give even one seat in parliament to the SNP*".⁷¹ The party declared that it would remain independent and faithful to its principles. Its member of parliament would be responsible exclusively to the committee of the SNP.

There was an organizational dispute between the SNP and CSND soon after the elections. The National Party criticized the trivialization of the importance of their party and the incorrect approach of CSND, which, allegedly in spite of the agreement, had put the name of the SNP on the list of candidates in small letters and claimed the credit for the electoral success almost exclusively for itself.⁷² Both parties realized that the primary aim of their electoral alliance was to gain seats, and after the elections, each of them more or less followed its own policy and rarely took an interest in the other. For example, according to a report from an assembly, a member of National Democracy declared that the alliance with the SNP was only tactical, so that "*the votes of true Slovaks would not be wasted in the election. Apart from this, it ensured that Hlinka's Slovak People's Party remained entirely isolated, in spite of its numerical strength*".⁷³ In occasional newspaper reports, the parties declared close views, especially on questions of the economic, cultural and social improvement of Slovakia. The *Národný denník* gives two reports on joint assemblies, in February at Roudnice and in September at Banská Bystrica, and the press published information about the parliamentary speeches of members of the Chamber of Deputies and Senate, such as Rázus, Ivanka and Kramář.⁷⁴ The National Democrats supported Rázus' activity directed towards creating a united front of Slovak members of parliament, which he developed during 1930 and 1931. In September 1930 the National Democrat Milan Ivanka initiated an enquiry by Slovak members of parliament at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, concerning the protection of the Slovak minority in Hungary. Both parties regarded it as an expression of cooperation not only between the SNP and CSND, but involving the whole Slovak political camp. It was signed by the Ľudák members of parliament and by Rázus for the SNP.⁷⁵ The National Democrat members of

committees. The *Slovák* expressed lack of confidence in the permanence of the alliance of the SNP with CSND in parliament: "*Rázus is a member of the club of National Democrats. He sits there next to Dr. Milan Ivanka, but with the difference that while Ivanka, a patented Czechoslovak, lives and dies for Prague centralism, Rázus condemns centralism and supports autonomy for Slovakia... The abyss between him [Rázus – note J. R.] and Czech National Democracy will widen until it is unbridgeable.*"

71 RÁZUS, Martin. Nedôvera amerických Slovákov. (The distrust of the American Slovaks). In NN 13 Dec 1929, no. 146, p. 1; see also: Aby sme sa nemýlili. (If we were not mistaken). In NN 6 Nov 1929, no. 130, p. 1.

72 SNK-ALU, f. S. Bůřovský, sig. 120 A 23, letter from M. Rázus to S. Bůřovský.

73 SNA, f. PR, c. 224, report from the assembly of CSND on 28 Feb 1930.

74 E.g.: ND 25 Jan 1930, no. 20, p. 1, ND 19 Feb 1930, no. 41, p. 2, ND 19 April 1930, no. 92, p. 1.

75 ND 20 Sept 1930, no. 217, p. 1. "*It was a good lesson especially for Dr. Szűllo, who still expresses the hope that the Hungarian opposition parties can form an alliance with the People's Party. If he has thought*

parliament supported Rázus' initiative of submitting an enquiry to the Ministry of Education concerned with the granting of state prizes.⁷⁶

In the first year of the participation of the SNP as a guest in the club of CSND members of parliament, both political parties more or less avoided the fundamentally conflicting points in their political programmes. An interesting example was the interpretation of Rázus speeches in the *Národný denník* in February 1930. When comparing them, we find that the Czech side produced copies of Rázus' speeches, but shifted their meaning and in key passages. According to the *Národné noviny*, Rázus as an autonomist addressed the non-autonomists on the need to solve the Slovak question saying: *"Here is the task for you, who oppose autonomy. We want you and you must help us to achieve a great aim: put Slovakia and the eastern part of the republic on their feet. Prove, honourable gentlemen, that all economic and cultural questions can be solved without autonomy. Since we have to solve them, let us not leave them aside, because autonomism will grow most acutely, and the greatest agitators will be those, who do not consider economic interests or other economic and cultural structures. So, let the people who want to build a counterweight to autonomism, do for the eastern part of the republic, without autonomism, everything that needs to be done for the economy and culture."*⁷⁷ The *Národný denník* interpreted this part of Rázus' speech as follows: *"The problem of solving the question of the relationship between the Czechs and Slovaks is also a state problem. However, we will not solve the Slovak question with partisan struggles. Member of parliament Rázus expects that the Czechs will help to solve this problem, but it is also necessary for the Slovaks to come together on a common platform. It is necessary to escape the divisions existing up to now. We will be thankful if the economic, cultural and social problems of Slovakia are solved without autonomy."*⁷⁸ The SNP did not react either to this text in the *Národný denník* or to information about the joint appearance of Ivanka and Rázus at Roudnice at the end of February 1930, which the National Democrats interpreted as follows: *"In summary, they stated that, first of all, the state must take care of the economic equalization of Slovakia with the historic lands, because when Slovakia is economically satisfied, there will be no obstacles to the introduction of complete national unity."*⁷⁹ The interesting thing here is mainly the reference to building the national unity of the Czechs and Slovaks, which opposed the idea of the separate identity of the Slovaks proclaimed

about this spontaneous act of the Slovak politicians, in which Hlinka has played a large part, he would have to ask himself how Hlinka could join an anti-government bloc with the clear tendency to secure the position of the Hungarians, when Hlinka is able to overcome party differences and join with opposing Slovak politicians for such a beautiful thing as a protest against the oppression of the Slovaks in Hungary by those Hungarians for whom Dr. Szüillo would like to prepare the ground in Slovakia. One may have various opinions on member of parliament Hlinka, it is not necessary to agree with his political tactics, his combinations and various experiments, but it is impossible to deny that when it is a matter of a real Slovak issue and the rights of Slovaks, he can be found in the right place by the side of other Slovaks."
 NN 19 Sept 1930, no. 61, p. 1.

76 NN 21 Nov 1930; Short-hand record from the Chamber of Deputies from 17 March 1931, tlač 801/IV.

77 NN 26 Feb 1930, no. 25, p. 2.

78 Poslanec Martin Rázus pre upevnenie pomeru česko-slovenského. (Member of parliament Martin Rázus supports the strengthening of Czecho-Slovak relations). In ND 22 Feb 1930, no. 44, p. 2.

79 ND 2 March, no. 51, p. 2.

by the Slovak National Party. The speeches of the National Democrat Ivanka in the spirit of Czechoslovak national unity were generally known, as was his rejection of the Pittsburgh Agreement, for Slovak autonomists the basic document guaranteeing the right of the Slovaks to autonomy. Ivanka described this document and the Martin Declaration as important documents from the historical point of view, but as expressions of their time, which had already lost their importance.⁸⁰

More serious mutual criticism and growing tension between the parties appeared in the course of 1931. It originated mainly from deepening of the dispute between the idea of a united Czechoslovak nation among the National Democrats and the idea of the solidarity of two nations – Czech and Slovak – held by the Slovak National Party. The new year issue of the *Národné noviny* contained an article criticizing Kramář for continuing to support the idea of Czechoslovak national unity. The article stated: “*Dr. Kramář has repeatedly behaved as a Czech chauvinist against us Slovaks. We did not expect it from him, especially because he is the Czech politician from whom Slovakia expected the most understanding – and not only understanding. We do not believe that Dr. Kramář should be an ossified politician, who cannot or will not revise some of his political views, if he is convinced that the circumstances require it.*”⁸¹ The National Democrats were surprised by this article, which their general secretary Hlaváček described as full of chauvinism and stupidity. On the other hand, however, Hlaváček stated that it was again necessary to address to the Slovak public an expression of the need to solve the Slovak question, and the National Democrats should devote more attention to this issue.⁸² In June 1931 he wrote to Kramář: “*We must prove to the SNP that we really want to care about Slovakia and we do care about it.*”⁸³ The NN wrote on the process of the Czechs and Slovaks coming together: “*We thought that the process of our nations coming closer to each other was progressing and that the idea of Czechoslovak solidarity was already an accomplished fact. It seemed to be progressing to a further phase of national unification or merging, as some apostles of solidarity, who mean by this complete unity of language and culture, often want to convince us.*”⁸⁴ The National Democrats regarded the question of Czechoslovak unity as a guarantee of the security and integrity of the state, while the introduction of autonomy on the basis of recognition of the separate identity of the Slovaks, their national rights and legislative powers would create a dangerous precedent from the point of view of the integrity of the state. On the other hand, the Slovak National Party persisted with the view that only a satisfied Slovak nation could be a support to the state and could provide a guarantee of security. The SNP was indignant about a speech by the National Democrat Antonín Hajn at Borová. The *Národné noviny* took its text from *Národní politika*: “*A vital condition for Czechoslovakia as a state is the real union of the Czechs and Slovaks into one nation, perhaps only in political and state terms at first, but*

80 ND 23 Feb 1930, no. 45, p. 1: “*complete national unity and complete equality of the Czechs and Slovaks. Equality and unity are inseparably linked*”.

81 NN 1 Jan 1931, no. 1, p. 1.

82 ANM, f. K. Kramář, c. 9, correspondence of Fr. Hlaváček with K. Kramář.

83 Ibid.

84 Prekážky vzájomnosti. (Obstacles to solidarity). In NN 21 Aug 1931, no. 96, p. 1; see also NN 7 June 1931; NN 1 July 1931; NN 22 Aug 1931, no. 97, p. 1.

later also as one nation in language, literature and culture. Such unification naturally also has its outward consequences in foreign policy. Therefore it will be better for us, if it is achieved sooner.” In reaction they wrote that this speech only proved the real plans of the Czech politicians in relation to Slovakia.⁸⁵ Another subject that significantly damaged the relationship of the SNP to CSND was its attitude to the Slovak opposition as such. The SNP criticized the fact that the Czech press identified Slovak autonomism with separatism and anti-state activities, from which it distanced itself. In this context, the SNP reacted negatively to Kramář’s speech at a rally in Prague in June 1931, from which the *Národné noviny* quoted the following: “There is not the slightest doubt that those Slovaks, who are not satisfied with us and would like to go to Hungary, know very well that if they came to Hungary, they would be welcomed with open arms. However, they would not be sincerely embraced, but suffocated. Let the Slovaks mark my words. If they really feel that they are our brothers, as we feel that we are, then they may be dissatisfied, after all we are all discontented, but they should not forget that foreigners should not know about this. Foreigners must know that the Slovaks are happy and content, that they can live their lives, that they have no master over them.”⁸⁶

In 1932, the final year of the activity of a SNP member in the club of CSND members of parliament, tension between the parties grew. The SNP developed activity to bring the fragmented Slovak political scene together. Their political and tactical view can be summarized as follows: The Slovak question and the problem of the Czech – Slovak relationship is the primary and fundamental problem of the state. It needs to be solved in the interest of securing the stability of the republic, its internal and international security. However, this can be done only by a united Slovak political elite with significant support from the Czechs and the government. According to the SNP, precisely this period, 12 years after the origin of the republic, was an essential time for the development of cooperation, unification and overcoming of differences between the Slovak political parties. The Slovak political elite finally had to understand that the national principle should replace the clerical and partisan principles.⁸⁷ In the course of the whole year, they spoke about intensive movement in Slovakia, about demonstrating a will to cooperate and be active. In this sense, they commented, for example, on the series of assemblies of the People’s Party in Slovakia from the beginning of 1932, the May events in Matica slovenská concerning the rules of Slovak grammar or the activation of the young generation at a conference in Trenčianske Teplice. The Czech political elite and parties should support this trend towards unification of the Slovak political elite in an effort to solve the Slovak question, and in the interest of the common aim of the whole state – to achieve stability of the whole state and its internal and international security. However, according to the SNP, a large part of the Czech political elite gave priority to the Czech – German prob-

85 NN 22 Aug 1931, p. 97: “The efforts of those who work for the elimination of the Slovak nation and its language, in the spirit of Hajn’s words, are futile.”

86 NN 7 June 1931, no. 65, p. 1. In a comment on this article, the NN stated that it was a mistake to look at any opposition activity by Slovaks as an anti-state act and pointed out that opposition Czechs were never said to want to go back to Austria.

87 RÁZUS, Martin. Poznámky z cesty. (Notes from journeys). In NN 27 May 1931, no. 54, p. 3; VLČKO, ref. 1, p. 26 etc.

lem and trivialized the urgency of solving the Slovak question. In March 1932, *Polední list* (Midday News) published an interview with Rázus under the title *A Slovak speaks to the conscience of the Czechs*. According to Rázus, the participation of Germans in the government was harmful to the Czechoslovak idea, the Slovak state forming element, the national character of the state and the coming together of the Czechs and Slovaks. It was also unfortunate that Hlinka's Slovak People's Party remained outside the government.⁸⁸ The representatives of the SNP pointed out that the Czechoslovak government had made concessions to the Germans and trusted them more than the Slovak autonomists. However, the result of this was great activity among the radical members of the German minority, who were organizing training similar to military manoeuvres in the Czechoslovak Republic: "*The Germans make these preparations against this state, while two German ministers sit in the government, enjoying full trust, but they do not trust the Slovak autonomists, to whom this state is closer, who have more interest in its existence than the centralist socialist Germans do.*"⁸⁹ In July 1932, Rázus addressed the following appeal to the Czech public: "*The Czech political elite is on the surest path to self-destruction. It bets on power, but has relatively little. If it bet on truth it would have more... The alternatives remain: either reform itself under pressure from Czech nationalism and our Slovak nationalism, or receive a powerful wound after the German victory of the Czech Germans, with whom it plays at alliance against its own and against us. The sobering up will be fatal, but it should not be too painful... And it will also be the end of the present official Czech political elite, for which sake wide groups of Slovaks and Czechs cannot find each other and to the joint struggle for survival fraternally give their hands.*"⁹⁰

The German question, the question of the German minority and the Slovak question in the Czechoslovak Republic in statements by representatives of the SNP, especially those of Rázus, were interpreted in the context of the ideological argument between right and left and their characteristic features of nationalism and internationalism, as was mentioned above. According to the SNP, nationalism as a political principle retreated after the First World War, while internationalism and leftist thinking prevailed. Various nationalist currents reacted to the bad economic and social conditions caused by the mainly internationalist or non-national governments of the 1920s, with demands for consideration of the interests of the nation. These ideas found an integrated form especially in Italian fascism, which also attracted the interest of the SNP with its nationalist rhetoric and demand to build a national state.⁹¹ In the view of the SNP, the second half of the 1920s saw an ideological struggle for power between the nationalist right and internationalist left. It culminated at the beginning of the 1930s with the victory of nationalism and the

88 Martin Rázus české veřejnosti. (Martin Rázus to the Czech public). In NN 23 March 1932, no. 35, p. 1: "*The effort to gain the Germans with concessions will prove illusory, and it will not make the best impression on our friend France, it will deprive the state of its national character.*"

89 Slováci a Němci v Československé republice. (Slovaks and Germans in the Czechoslovak Republic). In NN 30 March 1932, no. 38, p. 1.

90 RÁZUS, Martin. Česká politika. (Czech politics). In NN 30 July 1932, no. 88, p. 1; see also NN 26 March, no. 38, p. 1.

91 ROGUŠOVÁ, ref. 10.

right.⁹² According to the SNP, this was confirmed by developments in many countries, for example, in Italy, Poland and Germany, where strong national states were formed. In March 1932, Rázus wrote: *“I am pleased that I could not be intoxicated with the opium from the East like some Slovak writers... I am also pleased that the erroneous policy of Prague constraining Slovak nationalism since 1918, did not break me. The highest places authoritatively proclaimed that things were developing in a leftward direction! I knew that in spite of all its troubles, Europe would not be so stupid – to undergo vivisection with sacrifices of blood, tears and hunger. Development is now heading towards the right, and only this will save the world from catastrophe. So in relation to this, I proclaim for Slovakia creative living conditions, here and beyond the river Morava – equalizing the state forming Slovak nationalism, which is the most urgent economic, cultural and social programme. This nationalism will be able to reach agreement with Czech nationalism... Slovakia will become a subject of foreign attention as has happened in the case of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. If this does not happen, we need as a counterweight a good, purposeful, stateforming Slovak national policy.”*⁹³

From the beginning of the 1930s, the SNP affirmed that the future belonged to nationalism, and to the nationalism of individual nations. Therefore, it considered the application of Slovak nationalism to be the basic and only political principle, which could bring correction of the economic and social situation in Slovakia. At the same time, it emphasized that it was also a defensive principle against the aggressive nationalism of the nations in the neighbouring countries, which threatened the republic and its security. According to the SNP, only a satisfied and firmly united Slovak nation with its demands, claims and needs fulfilled, could be a support for the Czechoslovak state idea.⁹⁴ Therefore, it appealed to the Slovak political elite to close ranks and show it could successfully confront the expansive nationalist forces of the neighbouring states. According to the SNP, the political leadership and position of the German minority was an example of the expansion of nationalism, against which they had to defend themselves.

The criticism of the prioritizing of the Czech – German problem at the expense of the Slovak question and the results of this policy for the whole republic also resounded significantly in the relationship of the SNP to CSND. It was intensified by the fact that from the beginning of the 1930s, there was a power struggle between two wings of CSND. Kramár’s nationalist wing was opposed by the pragmatic wing of František X. Hodáč, which was linked with industrial circles. The latter wing wanted to build up CSND as solid rightist party, close to the Presidency and able to make political compromises with the Presidency.⁹⁵ Although the SNP had reservations towards Kramár and his wing of CSND, it still regarded him as a bearer of the national idea and a great Slav. Although he did not recognize the separate identity of the Slovaks, he understood the problems of Slovakia and was the only representative of the Czech political elite, who attempted to solve them. However, from the beginning of the 1930s, Hodáč’s wing, which was retreating

92 ROGUEOVÁ, ref. 49.

93 NN 26 March 1932, no. 37, p. 1.

94 ROGUEOVÁ, ref. 49.

95 AÚ TGM, f. TGM, R – rep., Politické strany (Political parties), c. 406, no. T 142/31. Report from 29 Jan 1931; SLÁDEK, ref. 2, p. 606 etc.; ČECHUROVÁ, ref. 5, p. 53 etc.

from the position of radical nationalism, came to the fore in CSND. The SNP described this as a retreat from nationalist positions, a loss of the national character of the party and so on. Up to this time, CSND had spoken of the national character of the state and presented itself as a force that wanted to resolve the Czecho-Slovak problem in the sense of a national state, but a change came from the middle of 1932. CSND was in a government, which included German parties but no Slovaks. The SNP regarded this as a result of the internal chaos in CSND and as a result of an internal crisis. According to the SNP, CSND had abandoned the position of nationalism and the national state, and the new power in the party was leading the state towards internationalism at the expense of nationalism and the national state. *“The unfortunate competition for leading positions has also changed the programme of the party. It has lost its national definition, and is now seriously compromised from the national point of view. It used to have the slogan: ‘Germans to the government, we to revolution!’, but now it follows the slogan: ‘Into government at any price and with anybody’. The nationalism of the party is discredited.”*⁹⁶

From the summer of 1932, ever greater disputes appeared and exchanges of fire began to appear in the press. For example, the *Národné noviny* published polemic and critical reactions to articles by the National Democrat Mikyna about the economic situation in Slovakia,⁹⁷ and in the following month tension between the parties was increased by reports that the National Democrats were allegedly trying to deprive Rázus of his seat in parliament, because of his seditious statements against the Czechs. In spite of the fact that it was journalistic invention, because only the SNP had the power to do it, this event as well as the tension between Ivanka and Rázus, contributed to tension between the parties.⁹⁸ The SNP called for the departure of Rázus from the club: *“Splits and ideological chaos have appeared in the leadership of the National Democrats. Slovak interests whether national or economic have got lost and there is no longer any prospect of the National Democrats being willing or able to help with Slovak issues. Even the work of the Slovak branch of National Democracy has done more harm than good to Slovak interests. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that the leadership of the Slovak National Party has decided to abandon the National Democrat club and interrupt even its limited ties with this Czech party.”*⁹⁹ On 31 October 1932, Rázus ceased to be a member

96 SUCHANSKÝ, Peter. Pohroma národných demokratov. (The disaster of the National Democrats). In NN 19 Nov 1932, no. 134, p. 1.

97 NN 19 Aug 1932, no. 96, p. 1. *“Czech capital took Slovak industry into its power. While this industry was strongly employed, it provided employment for neighbouring people, but today this industry is rapidly disintegrating, so Czech industry should be freed from unwanted competition. This Czech capital is comprehensively destroying Slovakia. We are short of capital, so naturally Czech capital comes. The result is that credit is more expensive in Slovakia than it was immediately after 1918 and it is at least two percent more expensive than in the Czech Lands. Thus Czech capital gains two percent more in Slovakia than at home for the same security, and apart from that thousands of their people are placed here... As long as Czech capital acts like this, and every complaint against Czech activity is described as an attack on the unity of the state, and its unpleasant credit policy in Slovakia is carried on as if under the protection of a higher power – things will not be good.”* See also: SUCHANSKÝ, Peter. Československá jednota a slovenská autonómia. (Czechoslovak unity and Slovak autonomy). In NN 14 Sept 1932, no. 107, p. 1.

98 NN 2 Sept 1932, no. 102, p. 1; NN 3 Sept 1932, no. 103, p. 1; NN 21 Sept 1932; SNK-ALU, f. M. Rázus, sig. 45A 28.

99 NN 19 Nov 1932, no. 134, p. 1.

of the club of CSND members of parliament.¹⁰⁰ The Czech side commented as follows: “*Rázus could not conceptually grow with our club, the disagreements increased until the only possibility was for him to leave the club. A government party, which must depend on the unity and strength of the republic, could no longer be host to an autonomist such as Rázus.*”¹⁰¹

After the origin of the Zvolen Pact between the Slovak National Party and Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party in October 1932¹⁰² relations between the parties considered here moved on several levels. Firstly, there were the traditional National Democrats, supporters of the principle of Czechoslovak national unity and opponents of autonomism such as Ivanka, who took a negative view of the cooperation between the autonomists. At the assembly of National Democracy in October 1932, Ivanka allegedly condemned the alliance between the SNP and the Ľudáks and declared that the so-called Zvolen Manifesto, which spoke of the Slovak nation, showed unprecedented impertinence. He strongly protests against the fact that the enemies of the Slovak nation call themselves the Slovak nation.¹⁰³ The group of members of the SNP, who opposed cooperation during the period of existence of the joint club of members of parliament, can be placed in the same category. Secondly, there were the more or less pragmatic, but unofficial considerations of individuals on the possibility of renewed cooperation. They included Milan Frič, who began to significantly engage in the SNP as a national economist. He wanted to initiate the transfer of the *Národné noviny* to Bratislava with financial help from National Democracy.¹⁰⁴

The third and perhaps the most promising level of the relations between the SNP and part of the National Democrats was contacts with the supporters of the radical and nationally oriented group known as the Young Generation (Mladá generácia) under the leadership of Ladislav Rašín, son of Alois Rašín. It was strongly opposed to the new leadership of CSND, which was in the hands of the above mentioned industrial wing represented by Hodáč and Josef Matoušek. The SNP regarded it as the only component of National Democracy that understood the real problems of the republic and declared support for a national state: “... *The Czechs have the same political demands as we in Slovakia, which we can regard as an eastern base for the Czechoslovak understanding, which must come in a short time. The party of the National Democrats has come into conflict with its young generation, and it must either revise its programme or expect to lose a large proportion of its voters.*”¹⁰⁵ Contacts between the SNP and the Young Generation in the following period, already occurred in the framework of attempts to create a broad united national Czech and Slovak opposition. From Slovakia it would include both autonomist parties, and from the Czech Lands the nationally oriented groups concentrated around Ferdinand Kahánek, Jiří Stříbrný and his National League (Národní liga).

100 Shorthand report from the Chamber of Deputies from 3 Nov 1932.

101 Zpráva o činnosti parlamentních klubů ve III. volebním období od 27. 10. 1929. (Report on the activities of the parliamentary clubs in the third electoral period starting on 27 Oct 1929).

102 VLČKO, ref. 1.

103 SNA, f. PR, c. 224, report from the assembly of CSND on 17 Oct 1932.

104 SNK-ALU, f. M. Rázus, sig. 45 B 25, letter from G.A. Bežo to M. Rázus.

105 NN 16 Nov 1932, no. 132, p. 1.

According to the National League, which had the ambition to be the “*moving force of this action*”, the growth of nationalism in this period forced the politicians to seek allies, since the national character of the state could be secured only by the closest cooperation between the Slavonic nationalists.¹⁰⁶ Since CSND became part of the party of the broad Czech opposition National Unification (Národné zjednotenie)¹⁰⁷ in 1934, the relationship of the SNP to it and to the Czech nationally oriented political groups came onto a new level.

In the politics of the Slovak National Party in the period 1919-1932, Czechoslovak National Democracy played the role of a potential ally. The similar views of the two parties on important national and state political questions formed the pre-conditions for this. The SNP had in CSND a party which substantially differed in rhetoric and programme from the other Czech or Czechoslovak parties and their Slovak branches. However, deeper analysis of programmes and political principles showed that it was more a matter of apparent similarity, which eventually always became the subject of disputes and growing tension between them. Autonomy for Slovakia could be regarded as the basic connecting link between them. However, the parties differed in their views on its form and degree, and this was directly connected with their views on the individuality of the Slovak nation. The SNP demanded autonomy as a recognition of the national rights of the Slovaks – the right of a separate nation to administer its own affairs. CSND, on the other hand, demanded only the administrative demarcation of Slovakia, so that some degree of power would be placed in Slovak hands and radical autonomism in Slovakia would be pacified. This would avoid setting a dangerous precedent for the solution of the question of other minorities, which would be a potential threat to the security of the Czechoslovak Republic. They had in mind especially the claims of the German minority. On the question of the Czech – Slovak relationship, the SNP spoke of mutuality between two nations, while CSND supported the idea of one united nation. Since both parties spoke of a national state and the need to build it from the foundations, they could agree and tolerate each other. However, when they came to more specific details, it was clear that each party started from a different basis: the Slovaks from Slovak nationalism, and the Czechs from Czech or Czechoslovak nationalism. In the period considered here, there were several attempts to establish a joint approach for these parties. For the SNP, the

106 AÚ TGM, f. TGM, R – rep., Politické strany, c. 406. Reports of P. Šámal; Národní liga (NL) 15 Aug 1933: “*If we did nothing other than maintain contact with the Slovak nationalists as the only Czech component, we would notice their pain and inform the Czech public about it. In this way we would perform an honourable task, valuable for the future. It is certain that the effort of the opposition on both sides will find closer cooperation. The coalition parties and the circles that betray the Slovaks, at least have the merit of forcing us to undertake further cooperation.*”; See also: NL 30 June 1933; NL 4 July 1930.

107 ČECHUROVÁ, ref. 5, p. 53 etc. The route of a moderate policy towards the Presidency was abandoned several years later by František Hodáč himself. This brought the National Democrats into the community of extreme nationalist groups: National Unification; HODÁČ, František. *Deset úkolů Národního sjednocení*. (Ten tasks for National Unification). without place, year or publisher; FIC, Vladimír. *Národní sjednocení v politickém systému Československu 1930-1938*. (National Unification in the political system of Czechoslovakia 1930-1938). Prague 1983; PASÁK, Tomáš. *Český fašismus 1922-1945 a kolaborace 1939-1945*. (Czech fascism 1922-1945 and collaboration 1939-1945.). Prague : Práh, 1999.

most successful was the gaining of a seat in parliament for Martin Rázus on a joint list of candidates with CSND in 1929, and his subsequent guest membership of the CSND club of members of parliament, which continued until 1932.

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
DIE TSCHECHOSLOWAKISCHE NATIONALDEMOKRATISCHE PARTEI IN DER POLITIK DER SLOWAKISCHEN NATIONALPARTEI 1919 – 1932

JAROSLAVA ROGUĽOVÁ

Die parteipolitische Struktur der Slowakei innerhalb der Zwischenkriegs-Tschechoslowakei war durch die Gründung selbstständiger Parteien aus den früheren Strömungen geprägt, sowie durch das Eindringen tschechischer Parteien, die bemüht waren, ihren Aktionsradius auf den Osten des Landes zu erweitern. Neben selbstständigen slowakischen Parteien entstanden daher durch Zusammenschluss tschechischer und slowakischer Strömungen Parteien mit landesweitem Wirkungsbereich. Die Einstellung der Slowaken zur tschechischen Politik erlebte einen qualitativen Wandel und es wurden engere Kontakte zwischen slowakischen und tschechischen Parteien und Politikern gepflegt. Als Beispiel sei die Beziehung der Slowakischen Nationalpartei (SNS) zu der Tschechoslowakischen Nationaldemokratischen Partei (ČSND) in den Jahren 1919 – 1932 erwähnt, deren Entwicklung an drei wichtigen Einschnitten verfolgt werden kann: Seit der Entstehung der Republik war die tschechische Seite bemüht, durch Annäherung an die hiesige national orientierte Gruppe in die Slowakei durchzudringen. Die Niederlage bei der Parlamentswahl 1925, eine Umwertung der politischen Strategie sowie eine seit der Mitte der 20. Jahre wachsende Nationalismuswelle trugen dazu bei, dass es wiederholt zu Kooperationsversuchen kam. 1929 gingen die Parteien gemeinsam in die Wahl, worauf ein Mitglied der SNS für drei Jahre in den Angeordnetenklub der ČSND gewählt wurde – dieser Zeitraum ist durch eskalierende Spannung und Differenzen auf beiden Seiten geprägt.

Beide Parteien waren ihren Erklärungen nach bemüht, eine Lösung der slowakischen Frage zu finden und die Autonomie der Slowakei zu errichten, entscheidende Differenzen gab es jedoch in den jeweiligen Vorstellungen zum Umfang der Selbstverwaltung – die SNS bestrebte eine gesetzliche Autonomie, die ČSND hingegen eine behördliche. Geteilte Meinungen gab es auch zur nationalen Selbstständigkeit der Slowaken – die SNS war bemüht, eine nationale Selbstständigkeit der Slowaken unter tschechoslowakischer Gegenseitigkeit zu erreichen, die ČSND hingegen bestrebt eine einheitliche tschechoslowakische Nation. Die vorliegende Analyse gewährt einen Einblick in die unterschiedliche Wahrnehmung der grundlegenden nationalen und staatsrechtlichen Fragen durch die beiden nationalen und national orientierten Repräsentationen in der Zwischenkriegszeit.

Juraj Benko a kol.



OBČAN A ŠTÁT

V MODERNÝCH DEJINÁCH SLOVENSKA

THE MILITARY INTERVENTION OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN SLOVAKIA, 9 – 11 MARCH 1939

VALERIÁN BYSTRICKÝ

BYSTRICKÝ, Valerián. The military intervention of the central government in Slovakia, 9-11 March 1939. *Historický časopis*, 2011, 59, Supplement, pp.77-110, Bratislava.

The military intervention of the Prague central government in Slovakia during the days from 9 to 11 March 1939 was intended to prevent the internal disintegration of Czecho-Slovakia. It would achieve this by replacing the autonomous government of J. Tiso and limiting the separatist tendencies of the radical members of Hlinka's Slovak People's Party and the para-military Hlinka Guard. However, the military coup was not thoroughly prepared from the military, political or propaganda points of view. After the initial successes of the Czech gendarmes, who penetrated into Slovakia on the evening of 9 March, the Hlinka Guard began to organize resistance and present the coup as an attempt to reverse the results of the Act on the Autonomy of the Slovak Region from 2 November 1938 and return to the centralist regime in Slovakia. In the struggle for public opinion, the Prague government could not convince the public about its intentions, and pressure from the People's Party and Hlinka Guard forced it to hand over power to the political representatives of the Slovak region on the afternoon of 11 March. During the evening of 11 March President E. Hácha appointed K. Sidor as the new premier of the autonomous government. Sidor began the work of political consolidation. He enforced the release of imprisoned members of the Hlinka Guard and representatives of the People's Party. He also forced the government in Prague to make various political concessions, which increased the legal powers of the autonomous government in Bratislava. The military intervention in Slovakia worsened relations between the Czechs and Slovaks. Adolf Hitler used the situation to achieve the internal break up of the republic. Berlin unambiguously supported the demand for the creation of a Slovak state. The Parliament of the Slovak Region declared an independent state on 14 March 1939. This began the process of internal disintegration of Czecho-Slovakia, which led to the occupation of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia by Hungary and the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia by Nazi Germany on 15 March.

Hlinka's Slovak People's Party. Hlinka Guard. Central government in Prague. Autonomous government in Bratislava. Military intervention of Czech gendarme and army units in Slovakia. Origin of the Slovak state. Occupation of the Bohemia and Moravia by Nazi Germany.

Relations between the Czechs and Slovaks worsened at the beginning of October 1938 as a result of the development of the international situation and the internal political conflicts connected with it. The Žilina agreement of 6 October 1938 between the Slovak political parties already evoked fears in Prague that it could be the beginning of the road to Slovak independence. The fact that former political opponents agreed a joint approach, also concerning questions on which they had carried on sharp struggles until

a short time before, was also negatively perceived. These considerations contributed to the view of some Czech politicians that the agreement was a step towards the “complete separation of Slovakia”.¹

They doubted the guarantees given by the agrarians, social democrats and other smaller parties as a counter-weight to the possible separatist ambitions of some members of the People’s Party. Some of the ministers in the central government saw such tendencies when they evaluated developments in Slovakia. The activity of Nazi agents in Slovakia was carefully monitored, although Prague did not have exact and reliable information about their contacts with the radicals in Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party (HSLS).²

At the same time, however, some ministers in the central government already had reports by the beginning of January, that some of the radicals in the People’s Party were talking to the Germans about separation from the republic, or that the Reich was preparing a new “solution” to the existence of the Czechoslovak state. They also recorded the contacts of political representatives of the People’s Party in Germany, about which nobody had informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Czecho-Slovakia.³ At the same time, a media campaign by Vojtech Tuka and Alexander Mach on the advantageousness and necessity of creating an independent state was observed. The fact that all the benefits the republic had brought were forgotten in Slovakia, while the negative aspects of Czecho-Slovak relations, often entirely insignificant, were emphasized, also had an unfavourable effect.⁴

The Prague government had enough information for there to be no doubt that some of the radical members of the People’s Party were strengthening the movement to declare the independence of Slovakia. Karol Sidor also confirmed to minister Jiří Havelka that he supported Slovak independence.⁵ A. Mach also allegedly informed the majority of the ministers in the central government that some of the leading figures in the People’s Party had decided to declare independence.⁶ The prime minister of the central government

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- 1 MASÁŘIK, Hubert. *V proměnách Evropy. Paměti československého diplomata.* (In the transformations of Europe. Memoirs of a Czechoslovak diplomat.). Prague; Litomyšl : Paseka, 2002, p. 278. E. Beneš was also dissatisfied with the situation, especially with the policy of the agrarian party in Slovakia after Munich. BENEŠ, Edvard. *Dopisy bratru Vojtovi.* (Letters to his brother Vojta.). Ed. Viera Olivová. Prague : Společnost Edvarda Beneš, 1998, p. 20.
 - 2 National Archives in Prague, Archive of the Ministry of the Interior (hereinafter: AMV) (1936 – 1940) 225, carton (hereinafter c.) 1 212, no. 18 675. Brno 30 Dec 1938; RYCHLÍK, Jan. *Češi a Slováci ve 20. století. Česko-slovenské vztahy 1914 – 1945.* (The Czechs and Slovaks in the 20th century. Czecho – Slovak relations 1914 – 1945.). Bratislava : Academic Electronic Press, p. 161 etc.
 - 3 LUKÉŠ, František. *Podivný mír.* (A strange peace.). Prague : Svoboda, 1968, p. 295; TULKISOVÁ, Jana. Informovanost česko-slovenské diplomacie o kontaktoch slovenských autonomistických politikov s nacistami v období pomnichovskej republiky. (The informedness of Czecho-Slovak diplomacy about the contacts of Slovak autonomist politicians with the Nazis in the period of the post-Munich republic.). In *Historický časopis*, 2009, year 57, no. 3, p. 565-591.
 - 4 Archive of the National Museum (hereinafter: ANM) Prague, no. 139. KLUMPÁR, Vladislav. Paměti, část II (Memoirs, part II), p. 1.
 - 5 SIDOR, Karol. *Denníky (Diaries) 1930-1939.* Bratislava: Ústav pamäti národa (Nation’s Memory Institute), 2010, p. 394. K. Sidor also said about the position of the Czechs in Slovakia on 10 February 1939: “We will expel them all”.
 - 6 MACH, Alexander. *Z dalekých ciest.* (From long journeys.). Martin : Matica slovenská, 2008, p. 147. “I spoke at some time [...] to almost all the ministers of the second republic. They learnt directly from me

Rudolf Beran even said that in “*all the Prague embassies they know the exact date for the declaration of the independent Slovak state*”.⁷

At the session of the central government on 9 March 1939 there was also a surprising revelation that in a discussion with a Slovak economic delegation around the turn of February and March, Hermann Göring had made Slovak independence a condition for granting economic aid to Slovakia.⁸

The accumulation of conflicts between the central and autonomous governments, the effort to limit the Act on the Autonomy of the Slovak Region and strengthen the power of the central government, with efforts to widen the powers of the new rulers of Slovakia on the other side, as well as disputes over financial questions,⁹ caused a continual increase in internal political tension. When “*leaving Prague aside, we went to Berlin to talk [...] these factors contributed to the internal situation being filled with electricity*”.¹⁰ When approving the programme declaration of Jozef Tiso’s government on 20 February 1939, the day before its presentation, the presidium of the People’s Party “*unanimously supported the idea of an independent state, but postponed its declaration until an indefinite and later date*”.¹¹ At the beginning of 1939, the difference between the individual factions of the People’s Party in relation to the future constitutional position of Slovakia and the break up, division or preservation of Czechoslovakia was the fact that the radicals wanted to create an independent state as quickly as possible without regard for the form, while the moderate wing wanted to do it by evolutionary, legal means over an undefined period of time. The demands addressed to the central government concerning questions of the promotion of Slovak officers, formation of Slovak military units, creation of a Slovak military command, increasing the authority of state secretaries and so on,¹² had the aim of creating conditions, so that Slovak statehood could be built in the framework of the republic, which would lay the foundations for the functioning of an independent state after the division or disintegration of Czecho-Slovakia.¹³ There was unprecedented

that we had decided to declare the independence of Slovakia. I was convinced that the separation could be done well, according to the example of Sweden and Norway.”

- 7 SIDOR, Karol. *Takto vznikol Slovenský štát*. (The Slovak state originated like this.). Notes and commentary by F. Vnuk. Bratislava : Odkazy. Ozveny, 1991, p. 77.
- 8 The delegation comprised the economic experts minister M. Pružinský, P. Zaťko, J. Balko and surprisingly also F. Ďurčanský. BALKO, Ján. *Desať rokov v slovenskej politike*. (Ten years in Slovak politics.). Prešov : Vydavateľstvo Michala Vaška, 2005, p. 57-59; MATIČ, Igor-Philip. *Edmund Veessenmayer. Agent und Diplomat der nationalsozialistischen Expansionspolitik*. Munich : R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2002, p. 69.
- 9 LIPSCHER, Ladislav. *Ludácka autonómia – ilúzie a skutočnosť*. (Ludák autonomy – illusion and reality.). Bratislava : Slovenské vydavateľstvo krásnej literatúry, 1958, p. 280 etc. The receipts from taxes collected in Slovakia did not cover the expected expenses in this period. There were disputes about Slovak military units, economic contacts of the People’s Party abroad and other matters.
- 10 TISO, Jozef. *Prejavy a články (1938 – 1944)*. (Speeches and articles (1938 – 1944)). Vol. II. Eds. Miroslav Fabricius, Katarína Hradská. Bratislava : Historický ústav SAV; AEPRESS, 2007, p. 168.
- 11 SIDOR, ref. 5, p. 397.
- 12 LUKEŠ, ref. 3, p. 257; *Vznik Slovenského štátu. 14. marec 1939*. (The origin of the Slovak state. 14 March 1939.) Part 1. eds. Valerián Bystrický, Róbert Letz, Ondrej Podolec. Bratislava : AEPRESS, 2007. F. Čatloš, p. 51.
- 13 Later, on 1 October 1939, J. Tiso stated about the events in March: “*Apart from an army and representa-*

sharpening of relations between the two parts of the state. Doubt was cast on the value of the republic from the point of view of organization of the security of its individual parts and of the Slovak region in particular. There were efforts to distance Slovakia from unsuccessful foreign policies and build new “friendships”, especially with Nazi Germany. The penetration of Slovak politicians into the field of international contacts began to be uncoordinated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Czecho-Slovakia. These tendencies were strengthened by the effort of the Bratislava government to expel from Slovakia state employees of Czech nationality, and Czechs in general, which led to conflicts. Both the central and the autonomous governments violated the spirit of the law about the autonomy of the Slovak region, and did not hesitate to act in contradiction to its principles, because they did not respect “the extent of their powers”.¹⁴ However, the essential and decisive factor in the given situation was the maintenance of the state or its disintegration caused by the radicals in the People’s party supported by the Nazis. Such a development could happen only in the case of active engagement of the Nazis in the process.

However, the ministers in the central government did not have a unified view on the relationship between the Nazis and part of the People’s Party or about the interest of Germany in the declaration of an independent Slovak state. František Chvalkovský thought that the efforts to create an independent state did not come from the Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt – the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs), that is from official circles, but only from a narrow faction in the Nazi Party.¹⁵ On the other hand, the group of ministers: Alois Eliáš, Vladislav Klumpár, Jiří Havelka, Dominik Čipera, Ladislav Feierabend and others came to the conclusion that Adolf Hitler “*has some plans against Czecho-Slovakia*” and wants to use the People’s Party in their implementation.¹⁶ They also thought that it was happening with the knowledge of J. Tiso or with his tolerance, which broke the promise the head of the autonomous government had given to President Emil Hacha during his visit to the Tatras at the end of 1938.¹⁷ On the basis of these partial evaluations and analyses, some ministers in the government of officials headed by Rudolf Beran came to the conclusion that it was necessary to prevent the given situation even at the price of an exceptional military intervention. In this context, it is interesting and symptomatic that nobody was concerned with what they would have to do if the military intervention in Slovakia succeeded.

At a famous meeting in the Čiperka restaurant near Prague on 12 February 1939 and three days later in the Agrarian Club in Prague, the essence of the discussions was the

tives abroad, we had all the attributes [of a Slovak state].” TISO, ref. 10, p. 168.

- 14 MATES, Pavel. *Mezi Mnichovem a Berlínem*. Státoprávní problémy druhé republiky. (Between Munich and Berlin. Constitutional problems of the Second Republic.). Brno : Masarykova univerzita, 1992, p. 95.
- 15 K. Sidor gave a similar assessment of the situation later. SIDOR, ref. 7, p. 152.
- 16 FEIERABEND, K. Ladislav. *Vě vládách Druhé republiky*. (In the governments of the Second Republic.). New York : Universum Press Co., 1961, p. 132, 139; RYCHLÍK, ref. 2, p. 165.
- 17 ČAPLOVIČ, Miloslav: *Návšteva prezidenta dr. Emila Hácha na Slovensku 26. – 31. decembra 1938*. (The visit of President dr. Emil Hácha to Slovakia 26-31 December 1938.). In *Vojenská história*, 1999, year 3, no. 3, p. 82-102; KRUŽLIAK, Imrich. *Úteky z tiesne. V tóni dvoch totalít*. (Flight from difficulties. In the shadow of two totalitarianisms.). Bratislava : Spolok slovenských spisovateľov, 2005, p. 58; LUKEŠ, ref. 3, p. 211.

question of how to prevent the threat of the internal disintegration of the republic as a result of the separatist ambitions of the radicals in the People's Party.¹⁸ Minister Jiří Havelka saw a starting point in eliminating the influence and position of the Hlinka Guard (HG) and a change of government, with a different but still "Catholic" politician replacing J. Tiso. Martin Sokol was considered.¹⁹ Some ministers in the central government gradually came to the conclusion that the only possible and effective way of solving the situation was a military intervention in Slovakia. Part of this military and political step had to be and also was an unambiguous declaration that the military action did not effect the autonomy of the Slovak Region. Dismissal of the ministers of the autonomous government started from considerations that this approach was in harmony with the constitution, and the president had the right to act in this way.²⁰ One of the later arguments was also the claim that: "*Although it involved the use of force, the law was still on our side because we were defending the state, in which elected representatives agreed on the regulation of constitutional relations and the constitution, which had given the Slovaks everything they could reasonably request or even more. A state that does not have the strength to free itself from subversive elements cannot be preserved.*"²¹

The evaluation of the situation by the organizers of the military intervention started from the view that in the event of failure of the action or even of its use by Nazi Germany, it was better "*for the republic to be broken up by outside intervention, than by internal disintegration*".²² The forcible intervention of Germany was considered the lesser evil of two bad alternatives for the strategic political reason that it would be possible to present it to the world public as Hitler forcing the Slovaks to declare independence and break away from the Czechs. In the case of internal disintegration it would be difficult to argue that it had happened only as a result of pressure from Germany and fulfillment of the ambitions only of some of the radicals and not of the Slovak nation as a whole. It was also not insignificant that in the case of liquidation of the republic, the Munich agreement and Vienna Arbitration would be violated. The validity of international agreements that Germany had initiated and signed would be broken.

The initiators of the military intervention relied on the army until the end of February, because up to that time the next year groups would not be demobilized. They also took into account the possible military intervention of Nazi Germany, but the ministers in the

18 SUK, Pavel. Prezident Emil Hácha a Slovensko v době mezi 9. – 14. březnem 1939. (Několik poznámek k méně či více známým faktům). (President Emil Hácha and Slovakia in the period 9-14 March 1939. (Some comments on more or less known facts).). In *Slovensko medzi 14. marcom 1939 a salzburskými rokovaniami*. Eds. Milan Pekár, Richard Pavlovič. Prešov : Prešovská univerzita, 2007, p. 403 etc.; ČAPLOVIČ, Miloslav. Čs. branná moc po Mníchov: náčrt problematiky (október 1938 – marec 1939). (Czechoslovak military power after Munich: an outline of the problem (October 1938 – March 1939).). In *Viedenská arbitráž v roku 1938 a jej európske súvislosti*. Ed. Daniel Šmihula. Bratislava 2008, p. 61.

19 ANM Praha, no. 139. KLUMPÁR, Vladislav. Paměti, part II, p. 9-10. The ministers from the central government General A. Eliáš, J. Havelka, V. Klumpár and L. Feierabend participated in the discussions at Nouzov, as well as H. Masařík, head of the office of the minister of foreign affairs.

20 MASAŘIK, ref. 1, p. 279-280.

21 ANM Prague, no. 139. KLUMPÁR, Vladislav. Paměti, party II, p. 11.

22 MASAŘIK, ref. 1, p. 180; FEIERABEND, ref. 16, p. 139-140; ČARNOGURSKÝ, Pavol. *14. marec 1939*. Bratislava : Veda, 1991, p. 125 etc.

central government still did not expect the subsequent occupation of the Czech Lands. When assessing the overall situation, the head of the office of the foreign minister Hubert Masařík held the view that Germany would not “*intervene in our internal political relations*”.²³ Similar information came from the military attaché in Berlin, who was assured by German diplomats that they regarded the Czech – Slovak “*dispute as our internal affair*”.²⁴

This assumed, but unsupported view accompanied the position of the majority of ministers in the central government and of the president of the republic. In a meeting with the chairman of the Parliament of the Slovak Region Martin Sokol on 10 March 1939, Emil Hacha said: “*Yes we did it with the knowledge of the appropriate representatives of the German Reich, and they assured us that they will regard it as our domestic affair.*”²⁵

F. Chvalkovský supported this evaluation, also on the basis of discussions with and assurances from the German chargé d'affaires in Prague A. Hencke that he knew nothing “*about any political plans of the government of the Reich concerning Slovakia*”. At the same time, the foreign minister declared that if “*Berlin wants an independent Slovakia then Prague will have to come to terms with such a solution in some way*”, because “*it does not want to senselessly pursue a policy that Berlin does not want*”.²⁶ He told Ján Lichner that Prague had a “free hand” in Slovakia and could establish order there.²⁷

The main initiators and supporters of the idea of solving the existing situation by forcible intervention were the minister of transport General Alois Eliáš and the minister without portfolio Jiří Havelka. However, at Nouzov and later in the Agrarian Club on 15 February 1939, there was no definitive decision because intervention was opposed not only by F. Chvalkovský and prime minister R. Beran but also by the minister of national defence J. Syrový.²⁸ At the Agrarian Club they decided to postpone the intervention, but they made preparations to do it later.²⁹ The definitive decision came on the morning of 8 March 1939 at a meeting of the Czech ministers in the central government. Rudolf Beran decided to solve the situation with the use of force, and he got the agreement of practically all those present. When K. Sidor announced on the next day that premier J. Tiso would not come to a session of the central government,³⁰ the conviction of the

23 FEIERABEND, ref. 16, p. 139-141.

24 Vojenský historický archiv (Military History Archive, hereinafter VHA) Prague, Vojenská kancelář prezidenta republiky (Military Secretary of the President of the Republic, hereinafter VKPR) 1919 – 1938, carton (hereinafter c.) 199/1939, no. j. 635.

25 *Vznik Slovenského štátu. 14. marec 1939.* (The origin of the Slovak State, 14 March 1939.). 2 volumes. Eds. Valerián Bystrický, Róbert Letz, Ondrej Podolec. Bratislava : AEPRESS, 2008. M. Sokol, p. 143, G. Medrický, p. 20.

26 Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918 – 1945 (hereinafter ADAP) Series D (1937 – 1945). Die Nachwirkungen von München, Oktober 1938 – März 1939. Baden-Baden 1951, doc. 184, p. 201. Prague 9 March 1939 about 17.15.; *Das Deutsche Reich und die Slowakische Republik 1938 – 1945.* Band I. Buch 1. Dokumente. Hg. Ladislav Suško. Bratislava : Lúč, 2008, doc. 110, p. 239-240.

27 Archive of the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic. S-511-4. J. Lichner.

28 ČARNOGURSKÝ, ref. 22, p. 112-113. The author provides much information about the preparations for the military intervention, but some of his statements are problematic.

29 ANM Prague, no. 139. KLUMPÁR, Vladislav. Paměti, part II, p. 9.

30 FEIERABEND, ref. 16, p. 145; SIDOR, ref. 7, p. 72.

Czech ministers was only strengthened. As a result, the question of Czecho – Slovak relations could not be solved according to the demanded confirmation of the integrity of the republic, around which complications arose at a confidential meeting of the central government on 9 March. Prague made it clear to the Slovak ministers that talks about the organization of mutual relations had no meaning and would lead to no result if it was not clear that Slovakia definitely wanted to stay in the common state.³¹ The talks showed that the Slovak government was not united on this question.³² Finally, on 9 March 1939 K. Sidor refused to issue such a declaration. The question of the talks in Berlin between a delegation of ministers from the autonomous government and H. Göring about the granting of German aid to Slovakia only in the event of a declaration of independence, was also opened. P. Teplanský also confirmed this information, which provoked the indignation of the commander of the Hlinka Guard. The deputy premier of the central government was also morally compromised by the fact that R. Beran had information about a visit by A. Seyss-Inquart to Bratislava on 7 March, which evoked a sharp reaction from the ministers in the central government, and the meeting had a turbulent course.³³ On 9 March at 17.15, the minister of foreign affairs F. Chvalkovský finally asked the German chargé d'affaires Andor Hencke for information on the visit of the Slovak ministers to Berlin and about the plans of the Reich to preserve or divide the republic. When he received the traditionally evasive “diplomatic” answer that A. Hencke did not know anything “*about any plans of the government of the Reich concerning Slovakia*”, F. Chvalkovský asked him to discreetly verify this information in Berlin.³⁴ After returning to the meeting of government ministers, F. Chvalkovský declared that “*Göring said nothing similar*”. These circumstances also influenced the decision to carry out a military intervention in Slovakia, but the majority of Czech ministers in the central government learned that the intervention was coming only after arriving at the session of the government on the afternoon of 9 March. None of them could leave the government building.³⁵ The military intervention had already been approved by the President and the prime minister. There is no evidence that any Czech ministers opposed this decision. Essentially, they could not because the session of the government lasted until late on 9 March 1939. The military intervention was not discussed, although it was already occurring. General A. Eliáš continually received optimistic reports that the operation was successful, prominent people had been arrested and so on. R. Beran even claimed that “*the great majority of Slovaks are entirely content with our action*”.³⁶ However, everything was done in complete secrecy, not only in the Czech Lands, but especially in relation to Slovakia. The optimistic assessments very quickly evaporated.

31 ADAP-D-IV, doc. 183, p. 200.

32 KRAJČOVIČ, Milan. *Medzinárodné súvislosti slovenskej otázky 1927/1936 – 1940/1944*. (The international connections of the Slovak question 1927/1936 – 1940/1944.). Hungarian documents in comparison with documents in Bonn, Buckurest, Vienna and Prague. Bratislava : Slovak Academic Press, 2008, doc. 68, p. 282. F. Chvalkovský.

33 LUKEŠ, ref. 3, p. 264 etc.

34 ADAP-D-IV, doc. 184, p. 200-201. A. Hencke did not receive any information from the Foreign Office.

35 ANM Prague, no. 139. KLUMPÁR, Vladislav. Paměti, part II, p. 13

36 FEIERABEND, ref. 16, p. 151.

The ministers in the central government did not consider the possibility of removing the People's Party from power and handing over the government of Slovakia to former political groups. They could not pursue this alternative for the simple reason that the former parties were in a state of disintegration and were not capable of actively engaging in politics. Therefore there was no thought of activating opposition or liquidated parties and this part of the Slovak political spectrum was not even informed about the prepared action. It is possible to say that Prague no longer trusted the politicians from this political spectrum, they were not considered entirely reliable. Perhaps only Imrich Karvaš was able to "guess" that "*something was prepared*". However, various warnings and observations connected with developments in Slovakia were directed to Prague. At the end of February V. Šrobár³⁷ wrote about the situation in Slovakia (Pro memoriam) to the head of the central government, and I. Dérer, a noted opponent of the People's Party, continued writing memoranda. During the March days, he came to the view that the question of solving the coexistence of the Slovaks and Czechs was "*entering an acute phase*".³⁸ Ján Lichner visited R. Beran and F. Chvalkovský on 7-8 March 1939 and later informed them, together with J. Ursíny and J. Lettrich about developments in Slovakia.³⁹ The head of the central government indicated that "*something was being prepared and he asked me to stay in Prague, saying that he would soon need me*". He learnt about the decision of the central government directly from R. Beran on 9 March about midnight. He also received further information about the prepared political changes in the autonomous government. At the same time, R. Beran asked him to return to Slovakia and cooperate with General Hugo Vojta, the regional military commander in Bratislava.⁴⁰ Apart from informing close associates and establishing contact with H. Vojta, with whom he discussed the situation, he did not develop any political activities.

Other opponents of the new regime behaved in a similar way. The intervention of the central government did not gain support even in these circles. The radio news at 7.00 in the morning of 10 March 1939 stated that the President "*was satisfying the repeated requests of true Slovak patriots*" and saving "*our Slovak nation from the danger of fratricidal struggles*",⁴¹ but nobody ever mentioned who this referred to. Although the Slovak Region contained enough people with reservations against the policies of the new rulers and especially against the separatist activities of the radicals, they did not accept the in-

37 Archiv literatúry a úmenia Slovenskej národnej knižnice (Archive of Literature and Art of the Slovak National Library – hereinafter ALU SNK) Martin, fond (hereinafter f.) V. Šrobár. V-173, N 1.

38 *Protifašistický a národně osvobozenický boj českého a slovenského lidu 1938 – 1945*. (The anti-fascist and national liberation struggle of the Czech and Slovak people 1938 – 1945.). Part I. Munich and the March tragedy, 3 volumes and 4 fascicles. Prague : Státní ústřední archiv, 1988, p. 116 etc.

39 AMZV Prague Office of the minister 1939, no. 579/39; SUK, ref. 18, p. 407.

40 Slovenský národný archív (Slovak National Archives, hereinafter SNA) Bratislava, AÚML ÚV KSS. Fond ZM. Letter from J. Lichner to P. Čarnogurský from 21 Jan 1967. ANM Prague. F. Milan Hodža, c. 12, b. č. J. Lichner Report on Slovakia for the council of ministers. London 31 Jan 1941. J. Lichner remembered that it was on the morning of 10 March. *Vznik slovenského štátu 14. marec 1939*. Part 1, ref. 12, p. 197.

41 FONTES RERUM SLOVACARUM, I. Vývoj česko-slovenských vzťahov v roku rozpadu spoločného štátu. (The development of Czecho-Slovak relations in the year of the break up of the common state.). Ed. Pavol Petruf. Trnava : FF Trnavskej univerzity, 2010, p. 84; *České slovo* 11 March 1939.

tervention of the central government and they did not evaluate it positively. Fears arose of the growth of Czecho – Slovak tension. It is necessary to see in this the reasons why part of the political spectrum in Slovakia only passively watched the development of the situation and gave practically no support, not even moral to the military intervention.

Not only resignation, frustration from recent defeats, the political shocks experienced by society and strengthening of the position of the People's Party and its support among the public, but also fears aroused by the difficult situation in the country, also had their effects on the opposition forces. Fear of the possibility of armed conflict and its possible impact on the territorial integrity of the Slovak Region was a further significant consideration. Essentially, they watched with relief and some sympathy, the effort of K. Sidor and later his government to consolidate and stabilize the political situation in Slovakia. Any sharper confrontation provided the opportunity for external intervention. Regardless of the fact that there was practically no consultation between the government in Prague and the opposition camp in Slovakia, these circles were not considering the possibility of using the arising situation for a regrouping of political power in Slovakia and replacing the HSLS as the decisive political force in the country. There was a simple reason for this. At this moment, Slovakia contained no consolidated and stabilized opposition force capable of taking power. The Czech media supported the consolidation effort of K. Sidor and his government. No fears about the break up of the republic appeared until 14 March. They approved of the military intervention and assured that it was not directed against autonomy, but they did not give much information about the specific causes and course of events in Slovakia.⁴²

The first units of gendarmes mainly from Moravia, began to penetrate into western and central Slovakia after 20.00 on 9 March 1939, and their arrival was noticed by the authorities.⁴³ However, indefinite reports about the possible appointment of a new government headed by General Rudolf Viest reached the circle of A. Mach from legionary circles already on the evening of 8 March. The general was expected to come to Bratislava with Czech armed forces.⁴⁴ Karol Sidor received the first indefinite information that a new government headed by General Viest had been formed only at 1.30 in the early hours of 9 March.⁴⁵ K. Sidor did not react to the information. Reports on the arrival of gendarmes in Slovakia came to Vienna about 4.00 on the morning of 10 March 1939 and to Berlin at 5.20.⁴⁶ At 14.30 on 10 March 1939, Miroslav Arciszewski, deputy of the

42 FONTES RERUM SLOVACARUM, I, ref. 41, p. 84-93.

43 SNA, Krajský úrad (Regional Office), c. 300, 303. The number of these units cannot be determined at present.

44 MACH, ref. 6, p. 139.

45 SIDOR, ref. 7, p. 76. A. Mach stated that he obtained this information already on 8 March, but he called Sidor only after midnight and so on 9 March 1939. MACH, ref. 6, p. 139.

46 IRVING, David. *Hitlerova válka a válečná stezka let 1933 – 1945*. (Hitler's War and the War Path). Brno : Yota, 2000, p. 186; MUTŇANSKÝ, Ľudovít. *Kalendár Slovenskej pracujúcej pospolitosti na obyčajný rok 1942*. (Calendar of the Slovak working community for 1942.). Bratislava 1941, p. 98. Ľ. Mutňanský was woken up on 10 March 1939 at 4.30 in the morning with the words: "Get up quickly, two SS officers with a car are waiting for you." They took him to F. Hammersmid. The news was apparently mediated by Friedrich Polte, an SD man in Vienna, who was informed by F. Murgaš at 4.00 in the Hotel Carlton. *Vznik Slovenského štátu. 14. marec 1939*. Part 1, ref. 12. K. Murgaš p. 304.

under-secretary of state at the Polish Foreign Ministry, allegedly informed P. Čarnogurský, who was visiting Warsaw, that a state of emergency had been declared in Slovakia, the railways and postal facilities were occupied by the Czech army and all the representatives of the autonomous government had been arrested.⁴⁷

Martial law was declared on the afternoon of 9 March on the order of the military commanders in Slovakia,⁴⁸ although the Regional Office was informed only on the morning of the next day. The President of the Republic dismissed from their positions “*the members of the former government of the Slovak Region dr. J. Tiso, dr. F. Ďurčanský, dr. M. Pružinský and dr. M. Vančo*” by a decision from 9 March 1939. At the same time, Jozef Sivák was entrusted with the position of acting head of the autonomous government.⁴⁹ The minister of foreign affairs of Czecho-Slovakia informed Andor Hencke, chargé d’affaires at the German Embassy in Prague about these changes about 9.30 on the morning of 10 March. At the same time, he gave information about the military intervention in Slovakia. The reason was supposed to be that: “[...] *the Slovaks did not want to promise that they renounced the intention to declare the independence of Slovakia if it appeared to them necessary, and they were not willing to commit themselves to stopping propaganda activities in support of the independence of Slovakia.*”⁵⁰

However, the scenario for the intervention in Slovakia was not prepared, either politically, ideologically or in the end even militarily. There was an unacceptable degree of improvisation. The simple conviction prevailed that J. Tiso had to be removed and replaced by another politician, as happened on 9 March. However, the decision to appoint J. Sivák as head of the autonomous government came only during the following night on the proposal of P. Teplanský.⁵¹

Minister L. Feierbend only learnt about the appointment of J. Sivák at midday on 10 March. Moreover, the decision to entrust J. Sivák with the position of head of the autonomous government happened without his knowledge and agreement, when he was in Rome for the coronation of Pope Pius XII. Nobody consulted Sivák about his appointment and he learnt about it in Rome only from the press.⁵² This step was also

47 In testimony from 9 July 1945 P. Čarnogurský stated: “*In Warsaw on 10 March 1939 I learnt about martial law in Slovakia.*” MV-SR Štátny archív (hereinafter ŠA) Bratislava. Ludové súdy (People’s Courts) 1945-1948. P. Čarnogurský 9/48, 355/48. In his memoirs he wrote that it was 9 March and on 10 March in Bratislava he welcomed K. Sidor on his return from Prague. ČARNOGURSKÝ, ref. 22, p. 178, 202 etc. The statement of P. Čarnogurský about information he allegedly obtained in Warsaw “*soon after 14.30*” on 9 March is doubtful. The whole action began later.

48 ĎURICA, S. Milan. *Jozef Tiso 1887 – 1947*. Biographical profile, third edition. Bratislava : Lúč, 2006, p. 225. Up to now we have found no document that could enable us to determine the exact hour of the declaration of martial law by generals B. Homola and O. Mézl.

49 Archiv ministerstva zahraničných věcí (Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, hereinafter AMZV) Prague. Political section II. Presidium of the Council of Ministers, no. j. 1364/S-39 m.r. Prague 10 March 1939. The hour of this decision is not given.

50 SCHVARC, Michal – HOLÁK, Martin. Marcová kríza 1939 v Československu vo svetle vybraných nemeckých dokumentov. (The crisis of March 1939 in Czechoslovakia in the light of selected German documents. In *Vojenská história*, 2007, year 11, no. 1, p. 95.

51 ČARNOGURSKÝ, ref. 22, p. 198.

52 F. Ďurčanský allegedly sent a letter by aeroplane to J. Sivák in Rome on 10 March, to ask him not to accept the post. *Vznik Slovenského štátu. 14. marec 1939*. Part 1, ref. 12. V. Kovar, p. 141.

very problematic because the president appointed him without the approval or even the knowledge of the Parliament of the Slovak Region, which was a constitutional condition. Jozef Sivák refused to accept the position, and so only Pavol Teplanský was politically engaged in Slovakia. The president left him in his function. It is also problematic when P. Teplanský learnt about the intervention. This apparently happened only on 9 March at 20.00.

Soon after coming to Bratislava on 10 March 1939, he came into dispute with the General Hugo Vojta, regional military commander in Slovakia, who was actually securing the whole action. Teplanský was clearly dissatisfied with the development of the situation, and on the afternoon of 10 March he issued a written order "*that the gendarme and army units sent to Bratislava from outside Bratislava and Slovakia should be immediately removed from Bratislava*". This struck against the opposition of General H. Vojta,⁵³ because it would actually have meant capitulation. Intervention in Prague by telephone was also ineffective at this moment.

Teplanský strove to restore order, prevent demonstrations, end the military intervention in Slovakia and so stabilize the political situation.⁵⁴ His position and the fact that he formally represented the interests of the central government, but, at the same time, was striving to liquidate the results of the military putsch, provoked disagreement and opposition in the ranks of the radicals of the People's Party, Academic Guard, Hlinka Guard and members of the former political parties. He was universally unacceptable as a politician. The single visits or rather short trips to Bratislava by the ministers from the central government A. Eliáš and Jozef Kalfus did nothing to change the situation. The central government gradually registered the situation, but only implemented some partial measures. Teplanský lost influence on the development of events and by 11 March he was only an extra on the political scene.

The regional military commander in Bratislava General H. Vojta had built up an intelligence network in Slovakia since the end of 1938 or beginning of 1939. It monitored the activity of the Hlinka Guard and representatives of the People's Party. Lists of prominent personalities, who had to be interned, were worked out, not only for Slovakia but also for Moravia.

This intelligence network functioned by the beginning of March 1939 in spite of the demobilization of the army. The central government strove to use its services. With the military intervention in Slovakia as the method of solving the given problem, a longer period for gradually implementing some measures was expected. On the afternoon of 8 March H. Vojta informed the prime minister that everything was prepared in Slovakia and his organization would act immediately they received the order.⁵⁵

In parallel, but apparently without any co-ordination with the Land Forces Military Command in Bratislava, the minister of the interior Otakar Fišer ordered at the beginning of March that gendarme units should be gradually concentrated in Brno and kept in a state of readiness, so that they could be quickly transported to Slovakia by bus. On

53 SNA, f. KÚ, c. 300, phonogram 21/1939, 10 March 1939 at 15.10.

54 *Vznik Slovenského štátu. 14. marec 1939*. Part 1, ref. 12. J. Kirchbaum, p. 97.

55 FEIERABEND, ref. 16, p. 146.

6 March 1939, the Second Intelligence Unit of the General Staff of Slovakia sent several observers.⁵⁶ The command of the army received the order from the President of the Republic to carry out the military intervention in Slovakia from 9 to 10 March.⁵⁷ At the same time, on 8 or 9 March, the regional commander in Slovakia H. Vojta received detailed oral instructions from the minister of national defence Army General Jan Syrový on how to proceed.⁵⁸ On the basis of the authorization from H. Vojta, the chief of staff of the Land Forces Military Command in Bratislava General Staff Colonel Bedřich Kratochvíl instructed General Bedřich Homola, commander of the VIIth Corps in Banská Bystrica and the commander of the VIth Corps in Spišská Nová Ves, General Ondřej Mézl on how to implement the extraordinary measures.⁵⁹ The declaration of a state of emergency was included in the powers of the Land Forces Military Command in Bratislava and both generals carried out the orders of their superior, so that their declarations were almost identical.⁶⁰ The generals had been informed in advance about the whole action and they had been making organizational preparations for some time in complete secrecy. It is clear that not enough attention was devoted to the political aspects of the military intervention. This led to improvisation, which was reflected in the mass media struggle and the interpretation of the whole event.

The command of the IIIrd Corps in Brno headed by General J. Sergěj Ingr, the regional president in Brno and the second intelligence unit of the IIIrd Corps in Brno also had information about the prepared action. These organizations played an important part in fulfilling some orders in cooperation with the Regional Gendarme Command in Brno and the Brno Police Directorate.⁶¹ The military, intelligence and gendarme units in Brno already endeavoured or were ordered to monitor the development of the situation in Slovakia soon after the Munich catastrophe.

The gendarme units from Moravia began to arrive in Slovakia about 20.00 on the evening of 9 March 1939 by the route through Kúty and Malacky. The main attention was devoted to Bratislava, which they closed from all sides. They controlled the railway line from Břeclav to Bratislava.⁶² Information gradually came from all parts of Slovakia

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- 56 ALU, SNK, f. F. Čatloš, no. 129 A7. Letter to P. Čarnogurský from 19 May 1967 about the information of František Fárek. the intelligence agents were distributed as follows: "Mjr. Dítě – Piešťany area, škpt. Fárek – Trenčín area, škpt. Longa – Banská Bystrica, Turčiansky Sv. Martin area, škp. Rybář – Bratislava and škp. Olmer – Žilina." All these except škpt. Olmer were members of the investigation group of the second department. Škpt. Olmer was dependent on cooperation with the Forward Agency Centre (Predsunutá agentúrna ústredňa) established in Žilina, as in various towns in Slovakia in 1935.
- 57 FEIERABEND, ref. 16, p. 146. When researching the orders to the gendarmes and troops, some relevant documents, such as orders to military commanders and gendarme units concerning where, why and when they had to intervene, have still not been found.
- 58 ANM, Prague, no. 139. KLUMPÁR, Vladislav. Paměti, part II, p. 12; SIDOR, ref. 7, p. 95.
- 59 VHA, Prague. VKPR, 1919 – 1939, c. 199/1939, no. j. 635. Report no. 205 from the command of the VIIth Corps from 12 March 1939.
- 60 SNA, f. KÚ, c. 300, b. no.; *Dokumenty slovenskej národnej identity a štátnosti. II.* (Documents of Slovak national identity and statehood. II.). Bratislava : Národné literárne centrum, 1998, p. 200-201.
- 61 Moravský zemský archiv (Moravian Regional Archive) Brno (hereinafter: MZA), f. Zemský úrad (Regional Office, hereinafter ZÚ), Skup. I/1, no. 2 606, 2 598, 2 668.
- 62 ČARNOGURSKÝ, ref. 22, p. 186; MURGAŠ, Karol. *Národ medzi Dunajom a Karpatmi.* (The nation between the Danube and the Carpathians. Bratislava 1940, p. 28. For example, in Trenčín they occupied

about the arrival of gendarme units. In some places, such as Nová Baňa, soldiers made arrests already at 19.00, but it was only at 21.00 that the adjutant of the garrison commander informed the district chief about the declaration of martial law.⁶³ At the police headquarters in Bratislava, Czech gendarmes disarmed and replaced the guards. The police director Ján Jusko issued weapons and the necessary keys under pressure.⁶⁴ At 21.00 they declared an alert and occupied “*all the important buildings*”.⁶⁵ An hour after midnight the Regional Gendarmerie Command in Bratislava ordered strict readiness in all subordinate units, although the originally deployed units did not receive any instructions about the situation that had arisen. “Foreign gendarmes” came to the units, disarmed guards and did not allow departure from residential accommodation.⁶⁶ After discussions and agreement with the police director Jusko, they gave up the possibility to permanently occupy the police headquarters in Bratislava. Thanks to this there was no clash between the gendarmerie and the state police. On the contrary, in the interest of maintaining law and order, the police actively intervened against the demonstrations of the Bratislava Germans on 11 March and dispersed the prepared demonstrations on the evenings of the 12 and 13 March, which were apparently organized by members of Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party (HSLS) and the Hlinka Guard (HG). In various cases, the participants condemned the political steps of K. Sidor’s government.⁶⁷

The regional commander of the gendarmerie Lieutenant Colonel Timoteus Ištók was dismissed on the morning of 10 March and re-appointed to the position later in the day. The gendarmerie units deployed in Slovakia, perhaps even their leading commanders did not have information about the aims of the intervention. They were able to occupy public buildings, important communication facilities, buildings of Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party, the central post office and radio building in Bratislava and the railway station, post office, district court, district government office and practically all other state offices in larger towns, but they limited themselves to holding these buildings. At 19.00 they interrupted telephone communications, briefly paralysing social life, transport and the normal course of events. Armoured vehicles were moving in Bratislava and elsewhere in the country. At the same time, gendarmerie units from Moravia and army units deployed in Slovakia on orders from General Bedřich Homola and General Ondřej Mězl, interned functionaries from the HG, HSLS and state employees in prisons in Slovakia.

the post-office about 20.30. SNA TnĽud, c. 30, p. 422.

63 SNA, f. KÚ, c. 300, , no. 19 010. For example, the decision on the declaration of martial law reached Čierny Balog only on 10 March at 11.00. SNA, f. KÚ, c. 300, no. 1 075.

64 VIBOCH, Pavel. *Zpráva o vývoji pomeroch na Slovensku od 6. X. 1938 do 10. XII. 1940.* (Report on developments in Slovakia from 6 Oct 1938 to 10 Dec 1940.). London 21 Sept 1941, p. 39. Archive of T.G. Masaryk. Collection 38 (Klecanda), sign. 516.

65 SNA, TnĽud, c. 30, p. 422. Record from 11 March 1939, 3.00.

66 Archiv ústavu T.G. Masaryka (Archive of the Institute of T.G. Masaryk – hereinafter AÚ T.G.M.), f. 38. V. Klecanda. Jak se vyvíjaly udalosti (se zřetelom k četnictvu) v Bratislavě od 10. března 1939 do vyhlášení samostatného Slovenského štátu, (How events (with regard to the gendarmerie) developed in Bratislava from 10 March 1939 to the declaration of the independent Slovak state, p. 239-247.

67 *Vznik slovenského štátu 14. marec 1939.* Part 1, ref. 12. J. Kirchbaum, p. 109, 112; part 2, ref. 25, J. Stano, p. 166; SCHVARC – HOLÁK, *Marcová kríza 1939 v Československu*, ref. 50, doc. 21, p. 109-110, doc. 37, p. 124.

Starting on 10 March they were gradually taken from Bratislava to Moravia.⁶⁸ In local conditions, internment was carried out by the commanders and members of gendarme stations on orders from superior Slovak commanders or gendarme stations controlled by Czech members.⁶⁹ In various rural communities suspended officials remained in their positions in spite of the fact that they had been dismissed. The Czech gendarmes did not go to some smaller communities and local gendarmes did not dare to implement decreed measures because they were afraid they would come into conflict with the HG and the population.⁷⁰

It was symptomatic of the whole situation in Slovakia after 6 October 1938 that as a result of Czecho – Slovak conflicts, there were attacks on Czech gendarmes and criticism of their activities, which led to them losing their authority and to growing fears that any actions against offenders would be interpreted as anti-Slovak activities. The growing anti-Czech feelings reduced the prestige and general power-political position of the Czech gendarmes and this was clearly manifested during the conflicts of March 1939.

At first, the military intervention appeared to be successful from the organizational point of view because many of the leading radicals from the People's Party were successfully imprisoned. The essential factor for the further development was that the lower components of the HG and People's Party succeeded in mobilizing their supporters, and already in the course of 10 March they paralysed the activity of the Czech gendarme units and army.

In connection with the military intervention in Slovakia, preventive measures on the Slovak – Moravian frontier were also planned. Already on 9 March 1939 at 18.00, on orders from the regional military commander, the command of the IIIrd Corps asked its second intelligence department to guard the regional frontier between Moravia and Slovakia, check travellers and detain any couriers. At 19.30 on 9 March the department gave the Regional Office in Brno by telephone a list of 28 people from the district of Uherské Hradiště, Hodonín and Kyjov, and 8 people from Slovakia, who had to be checked by the district governor (hejtman) or interned. At the time imprisonment of suspected people was abandoned.⁷¹

The former ministers in the autonomous government and prominent members of the People's party were arrested by officers from the defence section.⁷² At first the prisoners were concentrated in Brno, but it was soon decided that *"the prominent people confined in Brno should not be confined in prison, but in decent accommodation so that they cannot complain"*.⁷³ Some of them, including V. Tuka, A. Mach, M. Černák and another

68 ČARNOGURSKÝ, ref. 22, p. 203.

69 In local conditions, it is not clear whose orders were followed by gendarme stations and what orders were fulfilled. Czech gendarmes remained in Slovakia in this period, but it is impossible to exclude that members of a station would simply fulfill the orders of superiors without regard for nationality.

70 SNA, f. KÚ, c. 300.

71 MZA, f. ZÚ, Skup. I/1, no. 2 606.

72 STRANKMÜLLER, Emil: Československé ofenzivní zpravodajství v letech 1937 do března 1939. (Czechoslovak military intelligence in the period 1937 – March 1939.). In *Odboj a revoluce. Zprávy 1968*. Prague 1968, no. 2, p. 63-64.

73 MZA, f. ZÚ, Skup. I/1, no. 2 668, 11 March 1939.

twenty advocates, HG functionaries, editors and clergy were placed at Skalný Mlýn near Blansko. General Sergěj Ingr secured the imprisonment of the prominent prisoners.

In the identical texts of their declarations of martial law,⁷⁴ generals B. Homola and O. Mézl declared that the military intervention did not concern and was not directed against the autonomy of the Slovak Region.⁷⁵ The cause was stated as the violation of Czecho-Slovak unity. The generally not very well prepared and systematic ideological propaganda emphasized that “*autonomy and the Žilina agreement will not be effected in any way*”. Both declarations stated the decision “*to take all administrative and judicial power in the territory of the corps [!] into its hands for the necessary period*”. They were issued already on 9 March 1939 and the majority of chief district officials published them in their districts on the same day. Smaller and more remote villages in the countryside received the declarations by midday on 10 March 1939.⁷⁶ On the basis of the case of Brno, it is possible to judge that the lists for imprisonment of members of the government, HG, chief officials of districts and so on came immediately before the military putsch, in some cases by telephone. This was not only to keep the action secret, but also because of the constant movement of people in Slovakia.⁷⁷ In Bratislava, the task of imprisoning the listed people was carried out under the leadership of the Regional Military Command (ZVV). In the countryside, the two generals prepared and implemented the whole action. In individual towns and villages the gendarmes made arrests on the basis of telephoned instructions. They had no written orders. In short, in local conditions they arrested chief officials of districts, leading notaries, local commanders of the HG, functionaries of HSLS and politically engaged Catholic clergy.⁷⁸ The effort to paralyse the activity of the HG and state administration did not bring positive results for long. Imprisoned people had to be released as a result of pressure from the HG, public or protests by local citizens, especially when gendarmerie stations did not have enough manpower.

The argumentation directed towards the international community showed a similar spirit. The central government emphasized that the measures of the President of the Republic had the aim of preventing “*the break up of Czecho-Slovak unity [...] It does not effect Slovak autonomy or the Žilina agreement*”. The Prague government expressed the firm will to strengthen “*further the autonomous administration of Slovakia*”. The main argument was that the propaganda “*against the unity of the Czechoslovak state had reached such a level in recent times that the central government and President of*

74 This fact shows that the content of the declaration was worked out by a superior military body and not by members of the individual corps. GRACA, Bohuslav. *14. marec 1939. Z dejín Komunistickej strany Slovenska*. (14 March 1939. From the history of the Communist Party of Slovakia.). Bratislava : SVPL, 1959, p. 104 etc.; DANÁŠ, Jozef. *Ludácky separatizmus a hitlerovské Nemecko*. (Ludák separatism and Hitler's Germany.). Bratislava : Vydavateľstvo politickej literatúry, 1963.

75 SNA, f. KÚ, c. 300. Declaration of O. Mézl. Spišská Nová Ves 9 march 1939. Similarly also B. Homola. The decree banned all public assemblies, “*criticism of this my act*”, listening to foreign radio etc. People caught committing these acts had to be shot.

76 SOKOLOVIČ, Peter. Hektický marec 1939 v kronikách Hlinkovej gardy. (The hectic month of March 1939 in the chronicles of the Hlinka Guard.). In *Pamäť národa*, 2008, year 4, no. 1, p. 62-69.

77 V. Tuka was arrested in the Tatras, where he was lecturing at a meeting of priests from the Spiš region. M. Černák was found in Modrý Kameň, where he was participating in an assembly.

78 SNA, f. KÚ, c. 300. Reports from districts and communities in the whole of Slovakia.

the Republic considered it necessary to intervene in the interest of applying the constitutional act on autonomy".⁷⁹ The effort to give the intervention the legitimate character of a struggle against separatism was clear, but it had no effect. However, it was interesting that the foreign diplomats in Prague showed sympathy "*almost without exception for the Czech side*". Even the Italian ambassador Francesco Frasoni stated that the "*Slovaks were guilty of treason*".⁸⁰

H. Vojta's organization succeeded in arresting the majority of the people identified in advance, although with some exceptions including F. Ďurčanský. According to not entirely exact information, 23 people were imprisoned at Skalný Mlýn near Blansko, 101 in the regional court at Olomouc and perhaps another 100 in Brno and Olomouc.⁸¹ However, from the political, propaganda and military organizational points of view, the development was different. The central government with its officials and executive power were not successful in implementing the intervention in Slovakia by the gendarmerie and army, from the military and organizational points of view and certainly not from the point of view of propagandist argumentation. The Ministry of the Interior issued an order that reports from the foreign press could be reproduced only if the Czechoslovak Press Office (ČTK) provided them. "*Only official reports are allowed, commentaries in the press have to be brief and should not touch the Slovaks or be directed against them*",⁸² but it was also emphasized that any other news, such as information about the concentration of the gendarmes, would be "*suppressed*". This decree did not influence the mass media in Slovakia. The editorial offices of the HSLŠ papers *Slovák* and *Slovenská pravda* were occupied by the Czech armed forces, but the central government still lost the mass media "war", in spite of the fact that the regular papers did not appear in Slovakia on 10 March. The Regional Military Command in Bratislava began to be fully aware of the situation only on the evening of 10 March 1939, when the "radio was lost", but this came late and not in a preventive and conceptual form. The military command demanded direct control over broadcasting in Slovakia and Prague I radio had to immediately prepare Slovak programmes with Slovak speakers and Slovak official reports. At the same time, the local programmes in Bratislava had to be replaced and direct control established over the radio in Banská Bystrica and Prešov.⁸³ The editor of the daily *Venkov* was sent to Bratislava by air on 10 March 1939 to take control of the People's Party's press,⁸⁴ but did not achieve the aim, as he reported to prime minister Rudolf Beran on 13 March.

The organizers of the military intervention did not really have a well thought out justification for sending Czech gendarmes to Slovakia. The public learned about the action from the radio at 7.00 on the morning of Friday 10 March on the basis of a decision from

79 SCHVARC – HOLÁK, ref. 78, doc. 20, p. 108.

80 SCHVARC – HOLÁK, ref. 78, doc. 20, p. 108.

81 NA ČR, Prague, PMR, c. 208, no. 1 442/39. Various district commanders of the HG and other prominent people were interned in Slovakia.

82 MZA, f. ZÚ. Skup. I/1. no. 2 661. Information 10 March 1939, 21.35 hours, no. 2 598 from 10 March 1939.

83 VHA Prague. VKPR 1919 – 1939, c. 199/1939, no. j. 635. Request of the Regional Military Command in Bratislava for Czecho-Slovak Radio in the evening hours from 10 March 1939.

84 NA ČR Prague. National Court in Prague. TNs 1/7/47 Rastislav Korčák.

the central government.⁸⁵ It was a time when armed units of Czech gendarmes had been moving around Bratislava and other parts of the country for some time. Apparently it was an attempt to present the public with a *fait accompli*. However, the justification of the military intervention was rather vague, with the radio news emphasizing the principle of state unity and the “*indivisibility of autonomous units*”. The main argument was that “*in recent times elements have appeared among the Slovaks, which have begun to work against the statute of autonomy*” and not enough opposition to these tendencies “*had been seen from the side of some figures in the Slovak government*”. The explanation stated that the position Slovakia had gained from the Žilina Agreement was not disturbed. Reports ended with the statement: “*Anybody who claims that Germany wants to tear Slovakia away from the Czecho-Slovak Republic, is a false adventurer.*”⁸⁶ The main purpose of the intervention was not explained, but only indefinitely indicated. Obviously, such arguments could not really satisfy, let alone convince the public about the need for the unexpected and drastic method of solving the political situation. However, it was surprising that no politician publicly expressed the purpose of the whole action in Slovakia. The radio commentaries only had the character of information reports without justification of the whole action and its aims. Assessment of the changes in the composition of the autonomous government occurred in this context.

The central government considered that the most important political step was to change the functions of the autonomous government. The President dismissed Premier Jozef Tiso and all the other ministers in the autonomous government except Pavol Tepľanský and Jozef Sivák. None of the former ministers were imprisoned, or in the case of F. Ďurčanský he could not be because he was abroad. However, the subsequent approach was politically untransparent. The appointment of J. Sivák as acting premier could not have a satisfactory effect because he was abroad. Prague strove to quickly consolidate the situation, but it was clear that trust in the ability of P. Teplanský was fading because of his position in the Slovak political environment. It was found that the situation could be solved only by K. Sidor, who had a relatively high level of trust in Slovak society at this time. He was expected to stabilize the situation, although he had been regarded as a dangerous radical only a short time before. This was how they saw him in Prague, and Sidor put himself in this position approximately until the end of 1938. His programme was independence for Slovakia. He was already concerned with this idea at the time of the Žilina Agreement.⁸⁷ This evaluation was quickly “forgotten” by both sides and the deputy premier in R. Beran’s government began to be seen as an acceptable person by the majority of participants, and as somebody able to solve the given situation.⁸⁸ The fact that the commander of the Hlinka Guard had behaved correctly and helpfully during the president’s visit to the Tatras at the end of December 1938, had a positive effect.

85 FEIERABEND, ref. 16, p. 151; FONTES RERUM SLOVACARUM, I., ref 41, doc. 44, p. 84.

86 *Národné noviny* 11 March 1939; BYSTRICKÁ, Barbara. *Vojenský zásah na Slovensku v marci 1939*. (The military intervention in Slovakia in march 1939.). Diploma thesis. Bratislava 1999, p. 34 etc.

87 „*Tretia ríša*“ a vznik Slovenského štátu. *Dokumenty I*. (The “Third Reich” and the origin of the Slovak state. Documents I.). doc. 99; SIDOR, ref. 7, p. 121. SIDOR, ref. 5, p. 386.

88 *České slovo*, 12 March 1939.

As a result of his position in the central government, Karol Sidor also received from the head of the central government and later from President E. Hácha, late at night, after the incident when they wanted to arrest him by mistake, information about the military intervention and the dismissal of J. Tiso's autonomous government. It was a time when the whole action had been in progress for some time. His reaction was obvious; he protested against the intervention and offered his resignation, but he did not fulfill the threat on urging from the president.

After arriving in Bratislava on the evening of 10 March, he became the most active politicians in Slovakia, where he strove to solve the situation that had arisen. Already in the evening of 10 March he had consultations with the leader of the parliament of the Slovak Region and leading figures from the People's Party on working out a proposal for the formation of a new autonomous government. The chairman of parliament Martin Sokol immediately informed Prague about the results of the talks. Who would head the autonomous government remained a dilemma, because the members of the presidium of parliament and the People's Party proposed that J. Tiso should return to this position. However, it was clear to the participants that, if only for reasons of prestige, the President could not accept this proposal. This was apparently why the appointment of a new government came only 24 hours later, when the President invited the chairman of the Parliament of the Slovak Region Martin Sokol and the deputy chairmen Július Stano and Karol Mederly to Prague at 3.00 in the night. After long discussions, the President with the agreement of the Slovak representatives appointed Karol Sidor as the new premier of the autonomous government. This happened at 22.00 on 11 March 1939.⁸⁹ The new prime minister used the situation to set a whole series of conditions under which he accepted his new position. These included release of imprisoned members of the People's Party and HG, and creation of Slovak military units.⁹⁰

The effort to stabilize the situation resounded in the public radio statements of K. Sidor and in the discussions of leading figures from the People's Party and the Parliament of the Slovak Region. The aim was to avoid possible confrontations, which could lead to loss of life. Political discussions began quickly and essentially successfully. The effort of the new prime minister was directed towards consolidation of the political situation by means of removing the Czech gendarmerie units, strengthening the legal powers of the autonomous government, accepting demands for the release of prisoners, subordination of Hlinka Guard functionaries to the government, creation of the new government on the basis of the whole nation and so on.

The central government gradually accepted these demands or was forced to accept them. This also resulted from the development of the political situation in the streets of Bratislava and other Slovak towns and cities, where disturbances began to spread on 10 March in connection with the imprisonment of Tuka, Černák, Mach and others. There were confrontations on the streets, which forced the government in Prague and the new prime minister to react.

89 *Vznik Slovenského štátu. 14. marec 1939.* Part 2, ref. 25. K. Sidor, p. 113 etc. M. Sokol, p. 144, p. 168. M. Sokol, J. Stano, J. Sivák, P. Zaťko, A. Hrnčár and G. Fritz became ministers.

90 LUKÉŠ, ref. 3, p. 269.

The military intervention surprised political circles in Slovakia regardless of their orientation. It was the same and perhaps even for so among the general public. The gendarmerie units from Moravia and Bohemia briefly controlled the streets of Bratislava and other Slovak towns, but not the decisive mass media and especially not the radio. They began to behave passively and the units of the Czechoslovak army withdrew from the streets to their barracks. Activity was carried on mainly by the gendarmerie units, but it was clear that there was not sufficient co-ordination and co-operation between the forces of the Ministry of the Interior and the army.

The military units undertook little activity, and the Hlinka Guard, members of which very quickly understood that weapons would not be used against them, began to demonstrate continually in front of the occupied buildings where the gendarmes had barricaded themselves. The guards forced the gendarmes to leave and disarmed them.⁹¹ Especially the HG became more active. By the evening of 10 March it controlled the capital city, where the Academic Guard headed by J. Kirschbaum presented themselves singing in a demonstrative way. The “academics” were one of the most active elements opposing the military intervention. They included many people, who thought that the situation needed to be solved by declaring an independent state.⁹²

Many actions were organized by lower commanders of the Hlinka Guard, who succeeded in preparing demonstrations and anti-Czech actions in the countryside.⁹³ Karol Murgaš organized transporting of members of the guard from the countryside to Bratislava, and on the morning of 10 March he again declared the mobilization of the HG.⁹⁴ At the same time there were street confrontations. In Bratislava, a member of the guard Anton Kopal was killed in fight at the Živnodom, headquarters of the Hlinka Youth, newspaper and tobacco seller Mária Psotová died in an unfortunate accident,⁹⁵ and later, on 13 March, three inhabitants of Bratislava were killed in attacks organized by Reich Germans. There was shooting in Prešov and street conflicts in various towns in Slovakia, especially in Banská Bystrica and Trenčín. The Czech units were not able to confront the activities of the HG and its sympathizers, although they were not a very numerous part of the population.⁹⁶

It was characteristic of the situation that the secretary of the HSLS trade union organization Rudolf Strieženec could not organize a general strike in Bratislava and its

91 AÚ of T.G. Masaryk – BAR, c. 124. Několik záznamů o udalostech na Slovensku zejména od 4. 3. do 15. 3. 1939. (Some records of events in Slovakia especially from 4 – 15 March 1939.). Author: Prof. Lašfovka; SNA, f. KÚ, c. 300. The gendarmes were disarmed in almost all Záhorie and in many other places throughout Slovakia.

92 *Vznik Slovenského štátu. 14. marec 1939*. Part 1, ref. 12. M. Kirschbaum, p. 95-122.

93 SOKOLOVIČ, Peter. *Hlinkova garda 1938 – 1945*. Bratislava : Ústav pamäti národa, 2009, p. 127.

94 SUŠKO, Ladislav. *Hlinkova garda od svojho vzniku až po salzburské rokovania (1938 – 1940)*. (The Hlinka Guard from its origin to the Salzburg talks (1938 – 1940)). In *Zborník Múzea SNP*, 1969, year 2, p. 216, 219.

95 BYSTRICKÁ, ref. 86, p. 27.

96 Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919 – 1939 (hereinafter DBFP). Third Series. Eds. E. L. Woodward, Rohan Butler. London 1951, Vol. 4, doc. 450, p. 406-408. Bratislava 20 March 1939. The British consul Peter Pares wrote that only a few people participated in the demonstrations on the morning of 10 March 1939.

surroundings, although he visited the Bratislava factories and appealed to the workers to go onto the streets. His appeals supported by Nazi agents, did not find a response among the public. On the other hand, the trade union leader Rudolf Čavojský supported efforts to consolidate the political situation. He appealed for maintenance of calm and a peaceful solution of the conflict.⁹⁷ Members of the HG were brought to Bratislava from the surrounding region in lorries.⁹⁸ They demonstrated in the capital city and confronted the gendarmes, but sharp clashes were avoided.

The gendarmerie units were not able to confront the activities of the HG. By the evening of 10 March there was already such a situation in Bratislava, that at 18.25 the Regional Military Command, in reality H. Vojta, proposed to the Czechoslovak minister of national defence that the whole action should be cancelled. The proposal stated: *“Since, without bloodshed, which you have ordered me to avoid, the emergency measures cannot be maintained in Slovakia, if you do not intend to apply them and bear the consequences, they should be cancelled.”*⁹⁹ In the early hours of 11 March 1939, the Regional Office received information from the command of the 9th division that the gendarmerie and military units would intervene in events only if the police could not solve a situation.¹⁰⁰

There was a similar situation in the territory of the VIIth corps, where on the morning of 11 March *“military measures were partially relaxed, and new declarations were issued, announcing that after agreement between the military and political offices, civilian political offices were taking over power”*.¹⁰¹ The gendarmerie units withdrew not only from the buildings they had occupied but also from the streets. At this time, the army and the leadership of the gendarmerie were already striving to avoid political or armed complications. They freed the political space for the HG and they transferred responsibility for solving the tense situation to the political authorities.

However, it was typical that in Bratislava and in the rest of the country, the state police strove to avoid conflicts and maintain public order. They did not intervene or avoided intervening in street conflicts between the HG, Freiwillige Schutzstaffel (FS) and Czech gendarmes.

Even the so-called Czechoslovakists or members of the former government parties did not actively or morally support the military intervention.¹⁰² The events occurred without much engagement by the public on one side or the other. The Hlinka Guard found some power political support in the countryside, but only of a more or less local cha-

97 ČAVOJSKÝ, Rudo. *Spomienky kresťanského odborára*. (Memories of a Christian trade unionist.). Bratislava : Lúč, 1996, p. 42.

98 SNA, TnĽud, c. 30, p. 286. Reports of police officials from 10 March 1939.

99 VHA Prague, VKPR 1919 – 1939, c. 199/1939, no. 635. Minister J. Havelka read the proposal at 19.15. His reaction is not known.

100 SNA, TnĽud, c. 30, p. 367. Bratislava 11 March 1939 at 7.30.

101 VHA Prague, VKPR 1919 – 1939, c. 199/1939, no. 635. Declaration from Banská Bystrica, 11 March 1939 at 10.10.

102 The social democrat functionary Pavol Viboch later stated that everywhere the intervention brought *“much joy”* and *“nobody opposed the gendarmerie or the army”*. VIBOCH, Pavel. *Zpráva o vývoji pomerov na Slovensku od 6. X. 1938 do 10. XII. 1940*. (Report on development in Slovakia from 6 Oct 1938 to 10 Dec 1940.). London 21 Sept 1941, p. 37. Archive of T.G. Masaryk. Collection 38 (Klecanda) sign. 516.

racter. No direct military confrontation happened because the HG was not armed, it was only gradually and partially arming itself. Even supplies of weapons from Germany with the mediation of the armed units of the Deutsche Partei Freiwillige Schutzstaffel could not substantially change the situation.¹⁰³ The situation in the propaganda struggles was much more complex.

The organizers of the military intervention in Slovakia could not convince the Slovak public about the justification or the legal basis for their action, and especially about the legality of the dismissal of Jozef Tiso's government. They could not convince the public that it was not about the "dismantling" of autonomy, but was actually directed only against the separatist activities of the radicals in the People's Party and HG. The method they used to solve political disputes and conflicts also provoked nationalist feelings in a wide range of people.¹⁰⁴ The central government or individual military and gendarmerie units did not master the situation in the field of promotional activities and could not control the means of mass communications. As a result the propagandist explanation of events unambiguously directed towards presenting the intervention of the central government as an attempt to take away the autonomy of the Slovak region prevailed among the public. The public had been ideologically massaged for some time. Now it was offered the interpretation that the Czechs were striving to reverse development and return to the situation before 6 October 1938.¹⁰⁵ The disputes and conflicts, constantly repeated in the contacts between the central and autonomous governments, were used to explain that the military putsch had the aim of implementing the demands of Prague by force. However, they did not really state any concrete arguments about which articles of the statute on the autonomy of the Slovak Region had been violated. This was not even done from Vienna by Ferdinand Ďurčanský, one of the authors of the statute, which shows much about his professional qualifications. The declarations of politicians from the People's Party, HG and so, but also recent works of some historians, contain general, naive, inexpert and often defensive but essentially populist declarations about the unconstitutional dismissal of J. Tiso's government. These claims had no support in the statute on the autonomy of the Slovak Region.

Views on change in the constitutional position of Slovakia gradually sharpened after the military intervention by the central government. Activity abroad was developed by F. Ďurčanský, especially by means of the Slovak broadcasts of Vienna Radio, in which he incited opposition to the Czech units and so sharpened political tension. He undertook a personal initiative in the field of foreign policy. Already on 10 March, he sent in his own name, but allegedly in agreement with premier J. Tiso, a telegram to A. Hitler, stating that Slovakia considered itself to be an independent state and it wanted to closely cooperate with the German Reich.¹⁰⁶ On the next day, he prepared a draft telegram to Adolf

103 KOVÁČ, Dušan. *Nemecko a nemecká menšina na Slovensku (1871 – 1945)*. (Germany and the German minority in Slovakia (1871 – 1945)). Bratislava : Veda, 1991, p. 148-149; SOKOLOVIČ, ref. 93, p. 128 etc.

104 SUŠKO, Hlinková garda od svojho vzniku až po salzburské rokovania, ref. 94, p. 218.

105 ČARNOGURSKÝ, ref. 22, p. 113 etc.; *Slovák* 10-14 March 1939; Slovenská politika 12 March 1939; SNA, f. KÚ, c. 311, no. 2 003/39. Radio service.

106 *Das Deutsche Reich und Slowakische Republik 1938 – 1945*, ref. 26, doc 112, 120, p. 241-242, 251.

Hitler, stating that a Slovak state had originated, but it apparently was not sent.¹⁰⁷ The radicals from HSEŠ and the HG grouped themselves around Ďurčanský, and with the help and support of agents of the SD (Sicherheitsdienst), but also on their own initiative, they pushed the demand to declare an independent state. A declaration of independence was prepared and signed by F. Ďurčanský and J. Kirschbaum.¹⁰⁸ Both repeatedly asked K. Sidor to get involved in this direction.¹⁰⁹ The attention of all those, who saw a way forward in the immediate declaration of independence, was gradually concentrated on the newly appointed head of the autonomous government. In spite of these facts, it was characteristic of the atmosphere of the time, that the demand to create an independent state was not emphasized to the public unambiguously and prominently as the way forward from the given situation, except in occasional speeches and appeals by Ďurčanský, and after the withdrawal of the military measures of the central government also by Murgaš¹¹⁰ on Vienna Radio. In various radio statements from Vienna, Ďurčanský demanded that the HG should take over power in the whole of Slovakia. This could and had to create the pre-conditions for the revolutionary declaration of independence. However, the whole activity of F. Ďurčanský in Vienna and his broadcasts did not find sympathy in the moderate wing of his party and can be said to have evoked doubts. On the other hand he aroused enthusiasm among the radicals. The views of F. Ďurčanský and K. Murgaš, transmitted by radio from Vienna or by leaflets encountered more or less silent disagreement from K. Sidor, the ministers in his government and his devoted admirers. They were in conflict with the effort to consolidate the political situation. There were limited polemical disputes between the radicals abroad and the moderates in the People's Party, but only after the cancellation of the military intervention. The most typical expression was the dismissal of K. Murgaš from the position of chief of staff of the HG, after he ardently appealed for an independent state and attacked K. Sidor from Vienna on 13 March. He was replaced by Pavol Čarnogurský. After their release from prison, Alexander Mach and Matúš Černák did not conceal their dislike of Karol Sidor's activity. The "academics" also did not take a very positive view of K. Sidor's views.¹¹¹ The political positions and actions of the commander of the Hlinka Guard during the military intervention and in relation to the immediate declaration of independence permanently disturbed his previously good relations with his former colleagues and partners, especially A. Mach, M. Černák, V. Tuka, K. Murgaš and others.

The Hlinka Guard succeeded in disarming the smaller gendarmerie units quickly in the countryside and more slowly in Bratislava. The gendarmes were also unable to

107 *Vznik Slovenského štátu. 14 marec 1939.* Part 1, ref. 12. V. Kovar, p. 145-146; SNA, f. KÚ, c. 311. Record of a statement by F. Ďurčanský on Vienna Radio 10 March 1939. The minister stated that he had full authority from J. Tiso.

108 SIDOR, ref. 7, p. 125-126; *Vznik Slovenského štátu. 14 marec 1939.* Part 1, ref. 12. J. Kirschbaum, p. 101

109 SIDOR, ref. p. 110 etc.

110 On 13 March K. Murgaš spoke on Vienna Radio about an immediate declaration of an independent state under the protection of A. Hitler. MURGAŠ, Karol. *Národ medzi Dunajom a Karpatmi.* (Nation between the Danube and the Carpathians.). Turčianský Svätý Martin : Komars, 1940, p. 149.

111 MACH, ref. 6, p. 131 etc. *Vznik Slovenského štátu. 14. marec 1939.* Part 1, ref. 12. J.M. Kirschbaum, p. 100.

influence or prevent the social and political activities of the Academic Guard. It was gradually proved that even from the military point of view, the organizers of the military intervention were not able to keep the development of the situation under control and, in contrast to the gendarmerie, the behaviour of the army was rather passive.¹¹²

Opposition to the military intervention was organized mainly by the Hlinka Guard. It received much assistance from the leadership of the Deutsche Partei and its armed unit, the Freiwillige Schutzstaffel, which could do almost anything in the streets of Bratislava. They established contacts with German agents from the SD and SS (Schutzstaffel), who promised to provide weapons.¹¹³ They even occupied the building of the prime minister's office. They could go so far because the Czech gendarmes had to avoid any confrontation with the "Germans".¹¹⁴ However, the essence of the engagement of the DP and FS was not to support the demands, proposals or claims of the HG or HSL'S, but to provoke a "revolutionary" situation, destabilization of the political situation and increased tension. The Nazis promoted these tendencies in Slovakia as part of the internal break up of the republic. However, except in Bratislava, the overall political activity of the public did not reach a high level, and demonstrators always numbered dozens or hundreds.¹¹⁵ Most conflicts occurred in the capital city. The Academic Guard, actively led by J. Kirschbaum, dominated the streets here, singing "Rež a rúbaj do krve" (Cut and hack to the blood), self-confident behaviour, shouts of "Czechs out" and so on.¹¹⁶ Members of the People's Party, HG and representatives of the German minority also developed activities. The German agents Edmund Veesenmayer,¹¹⁷ Werner Götsch and Helmut Naujocks came to Slovakia. The journalists and SD agents Kuno Goldbach, Lorenz Karbus and others worked here. Weapons were smuggled and so on.¹¹⁸ These SD agents did not come to Slovakia in connection with the military intervention of the central government, but their actions were planned in advance. They had the role of provoking a "revolutionary" situation by organizing terrorist actions at a time precisely determined in advance. Although they allegedly had meetings with some of the radicals from HSL'S,¹¹⁹ they cooperated mainly with the Deutsche Partei and especially with F. Karmasin. Naturally, their stay in Slovakia was secret. A characteristic feature of their activity is the fact that the most extensive terrorist actions were carried out in Bratislava¹²⁰ on 13 March 1939 after 20.00, that is at the end of A. Hitler's talks with J. Tiso. This was also a time when the military intervention of the central government in Slovakia had been cancelled. The members of the DP and FS and the agents specially sent from the Reich, who concentrated their ac-

112 SOKOLOVIČ, ref. 93, p. 132 etc.

113 SUŠKO: Hlinkova garda od svojho vzniku až po salzburské rokovania, ref. 94, p. 219.

114 KOVÁČ, ref. 103, p. 149 etc. The author maps the activity of the DP and its armed units in detail.

115 KRAJČOVIČ, ref. 32, doc. 72, p. 284.

116 SNA, TnFud, c. 30, p. 286. Declarations from 10 March 1939.

117 MATIČ, ref. 8, p. 66-68.

118 SCHVARC, Michal. *Sicherheitsdienst a Slovensko v rokoch 1938 – 1944*. (The Security Service and Slovakia in the period 1938 – 1944.). Bratislava : Múzeum kultúry karpatských Nemcov, 2006, p. 20 etc.

119 *Vznik Slovenského štátu. 14. marec 1939*. Part 2, ref. 25. A.H. Naujoks, p. 49.

120 Four "Reich Germans" were arrested after the terrorist actions, but they had to be released after intervention by the German consul general in Bratislava.

tivities almost exclusively in Bratislava, did not succeed in provoking a “revolutionary” situation, as A. Hitler later had to admit. The actions of the SD agents had little influence on the thinking of the inhabitants of Slovakia. The consolidation efforts of K. Sidor and later of his government evoked a greater response.¹²¹ Away from Bratislava, the reaction of the public was relatively more restrained, as is shown by the fact that in Prešov on 11 March at 8.30, unknown organizers sent pupils into the streets to demonstrate during school hours.¹²² This led to an incident worthy of condemnation – soldiers shooting into demonstrating secondary school pupils.

Apart from the activities of F. Ďurčanský and later K. Murgaš from Vienna and some members of parliament, the political leaders of the People’s Party attempted to solve the crisis with a political compromise. Jozef Tiso resigned as deputy chairman of HSĽS, he accepted being dismissed from his position and on 10 March he wanted to go back to his work as parish priest at Bánovce. However, he let himself be persuaded by member of parliament Gejza Medrický, who stopped at the car with the words: “*Your departure could be explained as indecision. I understand that you are offended, but please overcome it and don’t leave Bratislava [...]*”¹²³ And so Tiso stayed in Bratislava for one more day. He did not intervene in the course of political events until 13 March 1939. He explained that he did not want to be the Kerenský of Slovak politics.¹²⁴ He made no speeches and did not engage with the mass media. J. Tiso did not intend to use the situation to declare independence.¹²⁵

On 10 March E. Veesenmayer, the most active of the Nazi agents in Slovakia, offered him two German divisions to oppose the Czech military intervention. The former premier rejected this proposal, and the claim that he asked Hitler for help is fruitless make-believe.¹²⁶ Tiso supported the evolutionary and legal approach to the possible building of independence.

K. Sidor took the political initiative. M. Sokol was also active and so were the deputy chairmen of the Slovak regional parliament K. Mederly and J. Stano.¹²⁷ The result of their political effort and of the defencelessness of the central government and its inability to solve the conflict by force was the decision announced on afternoon of 11 March 1939: “*The measures of the corps commanders regarding the establishment of a military dictatorship were cancelled and annulled by the regional military command in Bratislava.*” This decision was announced by telephone to the police headquarters in Bratislava,

121 MATIČ, ref. 8, p. 75.

122 SNA, f. KÚ, c. 300, no. 21 216. Prešov 22 March 1939.

123 *Vznik slovenského štátu. 14. marec 1939.* Part 2, ref. 25, G. Medrický, p. 18-19.

124 “*He did not say anything on the radio, he could not give an exact view on how to maintain himself.*” State Archive in Bratislava. The People’s Court in Bratislava 9/48, no. 355/48. Statement of P. Čarnogurský 11 July 1948.

125 KIRSCHBAUM, M. Jozef. Jozef Tiso a vznik Slovenského štátu. (Jozef Tiso and the origin of the Slovak state.). In *Pokus o politický a osobný profil J. Tisa*. Eds. Valérián Bystrický, Štefan Fano. Bratislava : Slovak Academic Press, 1992, p. 119-120.

126 MATIČ, ref. 8, p. 72; NA, Prague, AA, no. 763, 213 510. Bratislava 10 March 1939. L. Karbus also offered K. Sidor “two divisions”; SIDOR ref. 7, p. 110; *Die Tagebücher von Joseph Geobels*. Hg. Elke Fröhlich. Teil I, Band 6, Jana Richter. Munich: K.G. Saur, 1998, p. 281.

127 *Vznik Slovenského štátu. 14 marec 1939.* Part 2, ref. 25. P. Zaťko, p. 317-318.

Žilina, Prešov and after 18.00 to the district offices.¹²⁸ Thus the military intervention of the central government ended in complete failure and it caused further sharpening of tension between the two governments and the public in the two parts of the republic. Even the command of the VIIth Corps had to state on the morning of 13 March 1939 that “*all public power has more or less been taken over by the Hlinka Guard*”.¹²⁹

The government in Prague sought a way forward in political negotiations with the autonomist government in Bratislava, by which it accepted the demands of the new government. The prominent people imprisoned in Moravia were already released on 12 March. A. Mach and M. Černák were released during the night from 12 to 13 March and transported to Bratislava, where they were going to meet K. Sidor in the morning. V. Tuka had to return to Bratislava with his own escort at the request of M. Sokol only on the afternoon of 14 March.¹³⁰

Political pacification began after the appointment of K. Sidor’s autonomous government. It was a time when the military intervention had already been cancelled. The claim that the J. Tiso’s government was deprived of power illegally was quickly forgotten. At the same time, it was evident that the central government in Prague realized that it could not demand that the new autonomous government should be formed by a group other than the People’s Party. The fact that the new government included various experts and did not give space to radically oriented politicians, clearly had a positive effect. The Czech gendarmerie units gradually began to leave, and later, after 14 March 1939, also the military units. Although there were confrontations in individual cases, the withdrawal was not accompanied by any loss of life.¹³¹

The HG attempted to disarm the gendarmes in the departing transports in Prešov and later in Žilina, but the Regional Office (Dr. Klinovský) demanded that the leadership of the guards should take all necessary steps “*to avoid any shooting, in which loss of life could occur*”.¹³² In spite of the complicated situation, armed conflict did not accompany the whipped up political passions, emotive approach to the solution of problems, departure of the Czech gendarmes and subsequent division of the state. In some cases, as in Ružomberok, the Czech gendarmes were disarmed in return for securing of their undisturbed departure.¹³³ The HG imprisoned people of Czech or Jewish nationality, for example in Piešťany and Banská Bystrica, but correction was immediately sought. This atmosphere was also reflected on the pages of the mass media.¹³⁴ After 14 March, the HG

128 SNA, f. KÚ, c. 300. Phonogram of the Presidium of the Regional Office no. 31/39; VHA, VKPR 1919 – 1939, c. 199/1939, no. j. 635. Bratislava 11 March 1939 at 18.25.

129 VHA, Prague, VKPR 1919 – 1939, c. 199/1939, no. 635. Command of the VIIth Corps, 13 March, 11.00.

130 SNA, f. KÚ, c. 300, no. 18 987. The named people left Brno at 1.25.

131 SNA, f. KÚ, c. 303, no. 69 292. Information about shooting between Czech gendarmes and members of the HG at Trenčianska Teplá on 14 March 1939, when four Slovak workers travelling in the train to Píferov with the Czech gendarmes, were injured.

132 SNA, f. KÚ, c. 300, no. 19 631, 14 March 1939 at 18.15.

133 *Vznik Slovenského štátu. 14. marec 1939*. Part 2, ref. 25. Jozef Turanec, p. 287-288.

134 GEBHART, Jan – KUKLÍK, Jan. *Druhá republika 1938 – 1939. Svár demokracie a totality v politickém, spoločenském a kultúrnom živote*. (The Second Republic 1938 – 1939. The conflict between democracy and totalitarianism in political, social and cultural life.). Prague; Litomyšl 2004, p. 238; NOVOMESKÝ,

also strove to expel Czech citizens from Slovakia, and their departure was accompanied by indecency and violence.¹³⁵

The military intervention of the central government in Slovakia failed. It succeeded in eliminating the leaders of the Hlinka Guard and imprisoning the radicals from the ruling party, but not in controlling the political situation and convincing the Slovak population about the aim and justification for the intervention. In terms of propaganda, the political confrontation clearly turned out in favour of the autonomous government, the People's Party and HG, with the traditional accusation that the Czech political elite was unfavourable to Slovakia providing the explanation. Czech citizens working in Slovakia, especially members of the intelligentsia, already saw the Žilina agreement as a "*complete capitulation to the Slovaks*". It was difficult to bear the strongly anti-Czech campaign and especially the fact that the Prague government was not going to defend them. From this point of view, they had strong reservations against the military intervention of the central government. In their view, it came too late, the army behaved passively, the gendarmes did not have exact orders, propagandist actions were not done and the result was that "*complete panic seized the Czechs*" and a general migration occurred. The so-called Homola putsch had a negative affect on the position of the Czechs in Slovakia and on Czecho – Slovak relations.¹³⁶

Nazi Germany used the situation to justify the internal break up of the republic, which reversed the original aim of the organizers. The much desired and carefully prepared internal break up of the Czecho-Slovak Republic began immediately.¹³⁷ All these circumstances were directly reflected in the political views of the Third Reich on the unfolding events.

Berlin immediately reacted to the information about events in Slovakia. Favourable, it could even be said, ideal conditions had arisen for the "revolutionary" solution of the situation, provision of assistance to the "oppressed" Slovaks and a subsequent pacification action in the Central European region. The military putsch gave Hitler the excuse for intervention, and the route to the definitive destruction of Czecho-Slovakia led through Slovakia.¹³⁸

However, no concrete documents indicate that the Nazi secret service gained any advance information about the prepared military intervention. It is impossible to say unambiguously that the Nazis provoked the action and it cannot be proved, but there is convincing evidence that Berlin cleverly and systematically supported the worsening of Czecho-Slovak relations. The question of whether they expected such a worsening of relations between Prague and Bratislava cannot be answered unambiguously positively,

Ladislav. *Slávnosť istoty*. (The celebration of certainty). Publicistika, vol. IV, 1938 – 1944. Bratislava : EPOCHA, 1970. Nelúčenie, p. 192-194. Ohlasy nelúčenia, p. 201-204. *Das Deutsche Reich und die Slowakische Republik 1938 – 1945*, ref. 26, doc. 153, p. 285-289; FONTES RERUM SLOVACARUM, I, ref. 41, doc. 64, 70, p. 104, 108-109.

135 SOKOLOVIČ, ref. 93, p. 143 etc.

136 AÚ T.G.M. – BAR, c. 124. Some records of events in Slovakia, especially from 4-15 March 1939. Author: Prof. Laštovka.

137 WEIZSÄCKER, Ernst von. *Erinnerungen*. Munich; Leipzig; Freiberg : List, 1950, p. 216.

138 KUHN, Axel. *Hitlers Aussepolitisches Programm*. Stuttgart 1970, p. 207.

but neither can it be answered negatively. Already in November 1938, the legal adviser to the Deutsche Partei Kurt O. Rabl stated: “I regard the anti-Czech prejudices of the Slovaks as such valuable capital for us that we should not do anything to reduce them.”¹³⁹

It was also claimed that “in recent days” Czech gendarmerie units were transported to Slovakia,¹⁴⁰ but the more substantial thing was that Berlin provoked Prague to take such a step.¹⁴¹ The assurances that the settlement of strained Czecho – Slovak relations were considered an internal problem of the republic, while on the other side informing Slovak politicians that Berlin did not express agreement with the military intervention¹⁴² had a clear aim: to support the sharpening of relations between the central and autonomous governments, and to some degree indirectly stimulate the confrontational solution of the situation. The German chargé d’affaires A. Hencke informed the Czecho-Slovak minister of foreign affairs F. Chvalkovský, that the question of relations between the Czechs and Slovaks was essentially an internal matter, but he told the deputy chairman of the Slovak parliament Július Stano after his arrival in Prague on 11 March 1939, that such reports “are invented”.¹⁴³ Interpretation of whether the changes in the autonomous government of Slovakia were constitutional or unconstitutional was also part of this struggle.

On 9 March 1939, the President of Czecho-Slovakia E. Hácha dismissed J. Tiso from the position of head of the autonomous government of Slovakia in connection with the growing ambition of the radicals in HSLS to declare an independent state.¹⁴⁴ The two sides naturally evaluated this act differently. In Slovakia the view prevailed that it was an unconstitutional act with the aim of returning to the situation before 6 October 1938. This was how it was presented to the public and used or misused in propaganda. Whether it was a constitutional or unconstitutional act also had far-reaching foreign policy implications. Especially F. Ďurčanský spread agitation abroad about the unconstitutional nature of the step. However, he was one of the creators of the act on the autonomy of the Slovak region, and it was partly a result of his inactivity that the act did not solve the question of

139 “*Tretia ríša*” a vznik Slovenského štátu. *Dokumenty I.* (The “Third Reich” and the origin of the Slovak state. Documents I) doc. 102.

140 NA, f. AA, no. 19 564. Brno 10 March 1939 at 20.20. HOENSCH, K. Jörg. *Slovensko a Hitlerova východná politika. Hlinkova slovenská ľudová strana medzi autonómiou a separatizmom.* (Slovakia and Hitler’s eastern policy. Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party between autonomy and separatism.). Bratislava : Veda, 2001, p. 149 states that the first gendarmerie units went to Slovakia on 8 March 1939.

141 The published literature contains the view that the intervention of the central government in Slovakia began with stimulation from Germans. A review can be found in: ĎURČANSKÝ, Ferdinand. *Biela kniha.* (White Book.). Buenos Aires : Lach, 1954, p. 57-58. He did not support this view himself. P. Čarnogurský states that: “*On 1 March 1939, the conspirators through their representative in Berlin Dr. Hubert Masařík informed Dr. Alternburg, the political deputy and representative [sic] of von Ribbentrop, so that they could get the agreement of Berlin*”. ČARNOGURSKÝ, ref. 22, p. 260. The reliability of this statement is not confirmed by the record of the conversation. ADAP-D-IV., doc. 177, p. 192-195. *Das Deutsche Reich und Slowakische Republik 1938 – 1945*, ref. 26, doc. 101, p. 225-227.

142 NA, f. AA, no. 76 380. Prague 12 March 1939; SNA, NS, Tnľud, c. 45, p. 994-996. J. Stano 6 June 1946; ĎURČANSKÝ, Milan. *La Slovacchia e le sue relazioni politiche con la Germania (1938 – 1945) I.* Padova : Marsilio editori in Padova, 1964, doc. 37, p. 174; FEIERABEND, ref. 16, p. 146 etc.

143 SCHVARC – HOLÁK, Marcová kríza 1939, ref. 50, p. 110; *Vznik Slovenského štátu. 14. marec 1939.* Part 2, ref. 25, J. Stano, p. 169.

144 The decree of dismissal was delivered to J. Tiso only on the morning of 10 March.

the dismissal of the autonomous government. The act did not contain a statement that it could happen only with the consent of the Parliament of the Slovak Region.

The Nazis immediately endeavoured to use the situation for intervention in internal political affairs and to provoke complications between the central and autonomous governments. In the early hours of 10 March, Günther Altenburg, an official in the political department of the Foreign Office, already asked the administrator of the German Embassy in Prague to provide him with the information necessary to assess the subject, namely whether the dismissal of J. Tiso's government was in harmony with the constitution. A. Hencke already confirmed in a telephone conversation at 9.40 that President E. Hacha was entitled "*to dismiss and appoint the central and regional governments*".¹⁴⁵

After consultation with "*the leading expert on state law at the German University in Prague*" he informed Berlin in the evening that the members of the Slovak autonomous government were appointed on the proposal of the Presidium of the Parliament of the Slovak Region. "*Dismissal happens according to the constitutional charter from 29 February 1920, on the basis of which the President has the right to dismiss ministers. In the case of dismissal, the signature of the responsible minister in the central government is necessary.*"¹⁴⁶

J. Tiso also gradually came to a similar conclusion: "*However, I later found that this was not unconstitutional, because only appointment was tied to the approval and proposal from parliament, but not dismissal.*"¹⁴⁷ President E. Hacha also stated in a discussion with Hitler on 15 March 1939: "*I am too much a lawyer and for too long a judge to be capable of an unconstitutional act. My approach was in full accordance with the constitution, which was essentially formulated by the Slovaks themselves.*"¹⁴⁸ The Führer did not react to this argumentation.

Hitler's approach to the method of declaring the independent state, how it would arise and be internationally established, was characteristic of his and the Nazi approach to Slovakia, its destiny, importance and wider international position. After the preceding interventions, many assurances of F. Ďurčanský and V. Tuka, media appearances of A. Mach and other radical figures from the People's Party, it might have appeared and apparently it did appear to the Führer's circle, that it was enough to give the signal that the Third Reich had an interest in a declaration of independence, and the Slovak politicians, if not all with enthusiasm, but certainly the radical part of the People's Party would declare an independent state, perhaps by radio or in some other way. However, it is problematic whether Nazi circles were really convinced, or for certain reasons it did not matter to

145 ADAP-D-IV, doc. 186, p. 203.

146 SCHVARC – HOLÁK, Marcová kríza 1939 v Československu, ref. 50, p. 95, 100.

147 SNA, f. NS. Tnřud. 6/46. J. Tiso, c. 51. Testimony of J. Tiso from 8 March 1946; RYCHLÍK, ref. 2, p. 169. At the end of the 1970s, member of parliament Gejza Medrický still claimed that the dismissal of the government could be done only with the consent of the Presidium of the Parliament of the Slovak Region, although there was no mention of this in the act on autonomy from 22 Nov 1939. *Vznik Slovenského štátu. 14. marec 1939*. Part 2, ref. 25. Gejza Medrický, p. 16. The view that the dismissal of J. Tiso's government was unconstitutional is still repeated by various historians and other writers.

148 *Dokumenty z histórie československé politiky 1939 – 1943*. (Documents from the history of Czechoslovak politics 1939 – 1943.). Part II. Eds. L. Otáhalová, M. Červinková. Prague : Academia, 1966, p. 421. E. Hácha was thinking of the part of the constitution about the autonomy of the Slovak Region.

them, that the national ambitions of the Slovaks came into the foreground. They could support the creation of a state on the basis of the right of nations to self-determination, or entice or force them as a way of saving the nation from division or occupation. It was simply a matter of carrying out the plans of Berlin and the method of implementing them was not considered very much. Neither was the future prestige derived from such a method of creating an independent state. The sending of not very competent people, such as the state secretary from the Foreign Office for extraordinary deployment W. Keppler to Vienna on 11 March 1939 and then on the night of 12 March to Bratislava, indicated that Berlin underestimated or did not consider the real state of things. It also confirmed the attitude or relationship of the Third Reich to Slovakia. It was practically a matter of improvisation because Hitler was not satisfied with the development in Slovakia, and especially with the fact that the “Viennese gentlemen” negotiated with the Slovaks without any orders.¹⁴⁹ On the other hand, the Nazi press on 11 March 1939 showed significantly increased interest in developments in Czechoslovakia and especially in Slovakia. Attacks on Prague and its violent actions against the Slovaks multiplied.¹⁵⁰ Reports on the efforts of the Slovaks and Slovakia to create an independent state were deliberately presented to the public.¹⁵¹

Apparently to make an impression, W. Keppler came to the capital city of the Slovak Region in the night of 12 March between 3.00 and 4.00, accompanied not only by the “Viennese gentlemen”, but also by uniformed party functionaries and SD agents. He self-confidently demanded without any justification, ideological or political arguments, that the newly appointed head of the autonomous government should declare independence: “*Ever more demands for the independence of Slovakia are coming to the Führer from Slovakia*”, claimed W. Keppler. In a firm discussion, K. Sidor denied these claims and later wrote: “*My blood began to boil over the social methods of this Berlin German.*” He also rejected the telegram F. Ďurčanský had sent to Hitler, which stated that a Slovak state had originated and his government asked for Slovakia to be taken under the “*protection of the Great German Reich*”. He also rejected the statement of Josef Bürckel that he had agreed that J. Kirschbaum should inform F. Ďurčanský about the formation of a new government for an independent Slovakia.¹⁵² Although, according to his own words, K. Sidor had Slovak independence in his programme and had openly said so in various conversations, he refused to accept pressure from the Nazi emissaries and declare independence in the given conditions and situation. Everything suggests that his approach was not influenced only by political or state considerations and conclusions, but perhaps also by personal motives. It was a response to the method by which the bureaucratic, in his view unimportant officials of the Third Reich were talking to the head of the

149 MATIČ, ref. 8, p. 73.

150 AÚ T.G.M., BAR, c. 247, no. 695/2. Testimony of A. Hencke 17 Oct 1947.

151 TULKISOVÁ, Jana. Zánik ČSR – vznik Slovenského štátu v tlači nacistického Nemecka. (The break up of the Czecho-Slovak Republic and origin of the Slovak state in the press of Nazi Germany.). In *Rozbitie alebo rozpad. Historické súvislosti zániku Česko-Slovenska*, manuscript in press, p. 4.

152 SIDOR, Karol. Ako som sa zrazil s Nemcami v roku 1939. (How I clashed with the Germans in 1939.). In *Kalendár Jednoty*. Middletown 1947. The events are described and evaluated from a different point of view, but deliberately very briefly by ĎURČANSKÝ, ref. 141, p. 153-154; LUKÉŠ, ref. 3, p. 273-277.

autonomous Slovak government.¹⁵³ The new prime minister was also unwilling to ask for the help and support of the Third Reich. His policy was actively directed towards stabilization of the internal political situation, to remove the disturbances and consequences of the military intervention of the central government in Slovakia. Even on 13 March he still thought “*that Germany is not planning anything serious, it is only the actions of irresponsible people*”.¹⁵⁴

After the collapse of discussions with K. Sidor on 12 March 1939, German officials continued with the widened view that the decisions of E. Hácha were unconstitutional and they recognized only J. Tiso as the legitimate prime minister. This was intended to worsen relations between the two governments and the public. The republic had to be presented as an unconsolidated and legally doubtful state formation. Members of the HG and the lawyer F. Ďurčanský used similar arguments to the Nazis with the aim of sharpening the situation. The minister of transport, post and telegraph in the autonomous government began to use the argumentation about the unconstitutional nature of E. Hácha's actions immediately. Although he had himself participated in preparing the act on the autonomy of the Slovak Region, he misled the public in broadcasts from Vienna.¹⁵⁵ After a time, Berlin declared that J. Tiso's government was the only legal government, and this was supported by F. Ďurčanský from Vienna. A similar pragmatic approach was also used in relation to K. Sidor's newly appointed government. During the night time visit of W. Keppler and other Nazis to Bratislava, they spoke to him as if he was premier when they asked him to declare an independent state, but when he refused, they considered his government illegal. At the same time, they carried on a psychological propaganda campaign in the press. Their sympathy was unambiguously on the side of the “martyrs for autonomy”, and attacks on Prague and the Czech politicians gradually increased.¹⁵⁶ However, it was only a short time before reports of persecution of the German minority more or less obviously appeared, with attacks on it in Bohemia and Moravia, and by Czech gendarmes in Kežmarok. Rumours were manufactured according to the example of September 1938, about Czech provocations, but until the military intervention of the central government in Slovakia, the German press did not pay much attention to problems in Slovakia. Even after 10 March 1939, when a systematic campaign began around

153 “*If the Germans had spoken on that fateful night as they should have spoken to the prime minister of Slovakia... perhaps I would have flown to Berlin and perhaps I would have actively declared the independence of Slovakia.*” SNA, f. S-178-1. Letter from K. Sidor to K. Čulen from 14 April 1939; HOLÁK, Martin – MEDVECKÝ, Matej. Vznik Slovenského štátu v korešpondencii Karola Sidora a Konštantínom Čulenom. (The origin of the Slovak state in the correspondence between Karol Sidor and Konštantín Čulen.). In *Historický zborník*. Bratislava 2007, p. 119.

154 SCHVARC – HOLÁK, Marcová kríza v Československu, ref. 50, doc. 29, p. 116.

155 SNA, f. KÚ, c. 311, no. 18 953. Statement by F. Ďurčanský from Vienna at 21.00 on 11 March 1939. “*The action of the Prague government is illegal. The government is appointed by the President of the Republic on the proposal of the Presidium of the Parliament of the Slovak Region. No confidence can be expressed only by the Slovak Parliament and no such condition existed.*” In his work *Biela kniha* (White Book, Buenos Aires 1954), F. Ďurčanský also gives very one-sided interpretations of many events. Essentially, he strove to prove that the origin of the Slovak state was prepared and organized exclusively by Slovak politicians. He ignored or concealed many essential events in which he had participated.

156 SMETÁČEK, Zdeněk. *Od Mnichova k válce*. (From Munich to the war.). Second enlarged edition. Prague : Práce, 1945, p. 96-71.

developments in the republic, the German press pushed the view that the dispute had foreign policy aspects, but this did not mean that the Slovaks and Czechs could not settle it by themselves.¹⁵⁷ The behaviour of Adolf Hitler and Joseph Goebbels fitted in with this atmosphere. They diligently went to the theatre, appeared in public and gave the impression of peaceful development in the Reich.

The position of the decisive circles in Nazi Germany after the military intervention of the central government was unambiguous. “*Now the question we could only half solve in October can be solved entirely.*” After the so-called Homola putsch “*The Führer was delighted*” because “*the result is fatally certain.*” The definitive decision “*to invade Prague on the fifteenth*” was taken at a meeting between Hitler, J. von Ribbentrop, J. Goebbels and Marshal Keitel on the afternoon of 10 March.¹⁵⁸ The action of the Prague government on 9-11 March 1939 offered Hitler an “*elegant solution*” for achieving his aim of breaking up and occupying Czecho-Slovakia.¹⁵⁹ The chosen military units received precise instructions with the plan to move at 17.52 – 18.25 on the decided day.¹⁶⁰

The preparation for the occupation of the Czech Lands had to be done in secret.¹⁶¹ In contrast to the “*first Czech crisis*”, the second was done “*to some degree as a disintegration process within Czecho-Slovakia*”.¹⁶² At the same time, “*the role played by the Sudeten Germans in 1938 was entrusted to the Slovaks this time*”.¹⁶³ However, the Nazi idea of “*revolution*” or revolutionary conflict in Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia was not fulfilled. They did not succeed in provoking disturbances. In this phase of development, they were “*disappointed*” not only by K. Sidor, but also by J. Tiso, who did not want to declare independence directly from Berlin after his visit to Hitler. “*We will have to look for the foundations*” complained Goebbels in his diary.¹⁶⁴ On the other hand, the Nazis gave support to the part of the political spectrum of the People’s Party, which had emigrated to Vienna, especially F. Durčanský. However, nothing suggests that they expected this group to play a large part in carrying out their plans. This is shown by the provision of material and moral support from leading political figures in the former Austrian capital: A. Seyss Inquart, J. Bürkel and their subordinates. The Slovak broadcasts of Vienna radio were entirely directed towards fulfilling the plans of Nazi Germany.¹⁶⁵ This group

157 TULKISOVÁ, Jana. Zánik ČSR – vznik Slovenského štátu v tlači nacistického Nemecka, ref. 151, p. 2, rkp.

158 *Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels*, ref. 126, p. 279-280.

159 MATIČ, ref. 8, p. 71.

160 KOKOŠKOVI, Jaroslav and Stanislav. *Spor o agenta A – 54.* (The dispute about agent A – 54.). Prague : Naše vojsko, 1994, p. 120.

161 *Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels*, ref. 126, p. 279-280; IRVING, David. *Goebbels. Pán myšlenek Třetí říše.* (Goebbels, master thinker of the Third Reich.). Brno : Books, 1998, p. 402-403.

162 WEIZSÄCKER, ref. 137, p. 216.

163 BULLOCK, Alan. *Hitler a Stalin.* Paralelní životopis. (Hitler and Stalin. A parallel biography.). Plzeň : Mustang, 1995, p. 58.

164 *Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels*, ref. 126, p. 281.

165 DELFINER, Henry. *Vienna Broadcasts to Slovakia 1938 – 1939.* A Case Study in Subversion. New York and London : Columbia University Press, 1974, p. 5 etc., p. 13, p. 58 etc.; SCHRIFFL, David. *Die Rolle Wiens im Prozess der Staatswerdung der Slowakei 1938/1939.* Frankfurt am Main : Peter Lang Europäischer Verlag der Wissenschaften, 2004, p. 159 etc.

from the People's party had entirely adopted the German plans, Nazi argumentation and approach of Berlin. With the exception of inviting in the Nazi army, they wanted to achieve their ambitions with the help of the Third Reich. They started from the idea of a unique historic opportunity that might not be repeated and the only possible way of defending Slovakia or finding a way forward from a complex situation. The argumentation of F. Ďurčanský started from the view that: *"If we hesitate we could sink into the abyss"* and lose everything because *"they will occupy or divide us, if we cannot use the opportunity to declare independence"*. This alternative was presented as the only way *"to save Slovakia from division or occupation"*. F. Ďurčanský also stated in Vienna that *"we can count on help from Germany if the Hungarians or Poles want to occupy us"*. They were determined and they strove to create such a situation that *"if parliament does not declare independence, we will declare it on Námestie slobody [Freedom Square]"*¹⁶⁶ In this period, the radicals from the People's Party had maximal support from Nazi circles and especially they enjoyed the confidence of the "Viennese gentlemen". However, in the real situation of the moment, Berlin could rely only on F. Ďurčanský and a few of his associates, because V. Tuka, A. Mach, M. Černák and others were in prison. For these reasons, the former minister was only one of the figures with whom the representatives of the Third Reich played or manipulated, so his influence and position had only limited political weight. This is also shown by the fact that in Vienna on 11 March 1939, in spite of having no authority to do so, F. Ďurčanský and his secretary at the ministry J. M. Kirschbaum signed a document declaring independence, but the response from the public was minimal.¹⁶⁷ The objective reality was that the decisive actors in the declaration of an independent state were not the adherents of the radical wing of the People's Party, but the members of its moderate part.

The military intervention of the central government in Slovakia during the days from 9 to 11 March 1939 did not fulfill the aims of its organizers. It was an essentially unprepared action whether we look at it from the political, military, organizational or conceptual points of view. This is also shown by the fact that its main organizer General H. Vojta had to admit failure after little more than 24 hours from the arrive of Czech gendarmes, and propose the cancellation of the whole action. Inability to present the aims of the intervention and so convince the Slovak public of the need for it, contrasted with the successful agitation from the Hlinka Guard that it was an effort to reverse the achievement of autonomy. From this point of view, argumentation containing a strong anti-Czech element unambiguously triumphed in the Slovak environment. This led to a worsening of relations not only between the governments in Prague and Bratislava, but also between the publics on the two sides of the river Morava. Nazi Germany exploited the situation to carry out its plan for the "internal" disintegration of the republic and to justify the occupation of the Czech Lands as a process of political stabilization of the Central European region.

166 MACH, ref. 6, p. 102; *Vznik Slovenského štátu. 14. marec 1939*. Part 1, ref. 12. J. M. Kirschbaum, p. 100, 103, 107.

167 *Vznik Slovenského štátu. 14. marec 1939*. Part 1, ref. 12. J. M. Kirschbaum, p. 101. The document is also mentioned by F. Vnuk in the publication of the memoirs of K. Sidor.

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MILITÄRISCHER EINGRIFF DER ZENTRALEN REGIERUNG IN DER SLOWAKEI AM 9. – 11. MÄRZ 1939

VALERIÁN BYSTRICKÝ

Das Münchner Abkommen hatte eine internationale Schwächung der Tschecho-Slowakischen Republik und Umgruppierung des Machteinflusses der politischen Elite im innenpolitischen Leben zur Folge. Die Umwandlung des Staates in eine Föderation aufgrund des Gesetzes über die Autonomie des Slowakischen Landes vom 22. November 1938 bedeutete Stärkung des Einflusses der slowakischen Elite, Realisierung der Grundsätze des Pittsburger Abkommens in der Praxis und Möglichkeiten für den Aufbau der slowakischen Staatlichkeit innerhalb der bestehenden Republik. In der tschechischen Gesellschaft und unter der tschechischen Elite entstanden wiederum Befürchtungen vor dem Zerfall oder der Teilung des gemeinsamen Staates. Diese Ängste steigerten sich mit den wachsenden separatistischen Tendenzen unter den Mitgliedern des radikalen Flügels der Hlinkas Slowakischen Volkspartei, die in der Zeit nach dem Münchner Diktat aufgrund des Übereinkommens mit den slowakischen und tschechischen politischen Subjekten die Macht im Slowakischen Land übernahm. Die Idee der Errichtung des Slowakischen Staates wurde auch in manchen Kreisen der gerade entstehenden halb-militärischen Organisation der Hlinka-Garde stark unterstützt. Gleichzeitig kamen immer mehrere nazistische Agenten in die Slowakei, die anfangs des Jahres 1939, im Unterschied zur Vorperiode, mit der Förderung und Unterstützung der Entstehung des unabhängigen Staates begannen.

Die Entwicklung in der Slowakei bereitete den tschechischen Ministern der zentralen Regierung in Prag Sorgen. Sie begannen einen militärischen Eingriff in der Slowakei in Erwägung zu ziehen, mit dem Ziel der Eliminierung und Pazifizierung mancher radikalen Vertreter der Volkspartei, durch eine Inhaftierung und Enthebung des Ministerpräsidenten der autonomen Regierung J. Tiso und der meisten Minister seiner Regierung vom Amt. Solche radikale Lösung erwägten die tschechischen Minister am 12. Februar 1939 bei ihrem Treffen in Nouzov in der Nähe von Prag. Als sich die Beziehungen zwischen der zentralen und der autonomen Regierungen bei den Verhandlungen über die Finanzen und Errichtung der slowakischen Regimenter anfangs März zuspitzten, entschieden sich der Ministerpräsident R. Beran und der Präsident E. Hácha die Situation in der Slowakei durch einen Machteingriff zu lösen. Sie entheben den Vorsitzenden der autonomen Regierung J. Tiso seines Amtes, die Mehrheit seiner Minister wurde abberufen und es kam zur Inhaftierung von etwa 230 prominenten Mitgliedern der Hlinkas Slowakischen Volkspartei (HSLŠ) und Hlinka-Garde (HG).

Die tschechischen Polizeieinheiten begannen am 9. März in die Slowakei einzudringen. In der Hauptstadt belagerten sie die öffentlichen Gebäude, aber bereits am 10. März zeigte sich aufgrund des Widerstands der Hlinka-Garde und eines Teils der Öffentlichkeit, dass der militärische Putsch ohne Erfolg blieb. Es gelang nicht die slowakische Öffentlichkeit zu überzeugen, dass es sich um einen Angriff gegen den abtrünnigen Tendenzen mancher Mitglieder der Volkspartei handelt. Im Gegenteil, erfolgreich wurde die Argumentation, dass der Militärangriff die Beseitigung der Autonomie der Slowakei und das Wiedereinsetzen des zentralistischen Regimes zum Ziel hatte. Infolge der politischen Machtkämpfe musste die zentrale Regierung ein Misserfolg einräumen und

bereits am 11. März den militärischen Angriff beenden. Gleichzeitig kam es zur Ernennung neuer Regierung unter K. Sidor, die die Verhältnisse in der Slowakei konsolidierte und viele Forderungen, die ihre Position zum Nachteil der zentralen Regierung in Prag verstärkten, durchsetzte.

Durch den Militärangriff spitzte sich das Verhältnis zwischen den Regierungen in Prag und Bratislava zu und es wirkte sich negativ auf die tschechisch-slowakische Beziehungen aus. Diese Situation wurde vom nazistischen Deutschland ausgenutzt und durch die Unterstützung und Druck zwang einen Teil der slowakischen Politiker zur Deklaration eines unabhängigen Staates. Die endgültige Entscheidung kam nach dem Gespräch zwischen A. Hitler und J. Tiso in Berlin am 13. März 1939. Am nächsten Tag erklärte das Parlament des Slowakischen Landes die Entstehung des Slowakischen Staates. Gleichzeitig kam es zur Besetzung der Karpatenukraine durch Ungarn und am 15. März 1939 zur Besetzung von Böhmen und Mähren durch nazistisches Deutschland. In Berlin wurde dieser Prozess als innerer Zerfall der Republik präsentiert.

THE DISCUSSIONS OF NAZI GERMANY ON THE DEPORTATION OF JEWS IN 1942 – THE EXAMPLES OF SLOVAKIA, RUMANIA AND HUNGARY

EDUARD NIŽŇANSKÝ

NIŽŇANSKÝ, Eduard. The discussions of Nazi Germany on the deportation of Jews in 1942 – the examples of Slovakia, Rumania and Hungary. *Historický časopis*, 2011, 59, Supplement, pp. 111-136, Bratislava.

The study is an attempt to compare the discussions and resulting deportations of Jews in individual states. Nazi Germany asked more or less the same questions in these discussions, but the three states reacted differently to the possibility to deport their Jews, in spite of their home-grown policies of anti-Semitism. The rejection of deportation at this time by Rumania and Hungary did not result in the political elites of these countries losing power. Quiet collaboration of the individual countries, economic cooperation, especially in the armaments industry, and sending of military units to the Eastern Front, were much more important for Nazi Germany than the deportation of Jews.

The Holocaust. Deportation. Slovakia. Hungary. Rumania.

One of the possibilities for deepening our knowledge of the Holocaust is to compare the course of the Holocaust in different states. As an example of such an approach, I have attempted to compare the discussions between Nazi Germany and three Central European states about the deportations of Jews in 1942.

1. The comparison starts mainly from the allied position of Slovakia,¹ Rumania² and Hungary³ in relation to Nazi Germany. This means that the foreign, military and economic policies of these states, or the position of the individual states started from their alliance relationship with the Third Reich. However, we can see some difference here between the Nazi allies Rumania and Hungary, and the satellite Slovakia.

2. All the compared states were unoccupied at this time and in the broader period of 1941-1943. Hungary and Slovakia only came under occupation in 1944.

1 See e.g.: PETRUF, Pavol. *Zahraničná politika Slovenskej republiky (1939 – 1945)*. (The foreign policy of the Slovak Republic (1939 – 1945)). In *Historické štúdie*, 38, Bratislava : Veda, 1997, p. 7-42; SUŠKO, Ladislav. *Obsadenie Slovenska – posledná fáza nacistického ovládania Slovenska*. (The occupation of Slovakia – final phase of the Nazi domination of Slovakia.). In *Archeológia – história – geografia*. Nitra : Archeologický ústav SAV, 1991, p. 63-83; SUŠKO, Ladislav: *Slowakische-deutsche Beziehungen 1938 – 1945 unter dem Prisma psychologischer und subjektiver Faktoren*. In *Der Weg in die Katastrophe. Deutsch-tschechoslowakische Beziehungen 1938-1945*. Essen : Klartext Verlag, 1994, p. 241-244; TÖNSMEYER, Tatjana. *Das Dritte Reich und die Slowakei 1939-1945: politischer Alltag zwischen Kooperation und Eigensinn*. Paderborn : Schöningh, 2003.

2 On the position of Rumania see, e.g.: BALTA, Sebastian. *Rumänien und die Großmächte in der Ära Antonescu (1940 – 1944)*. Stuttgart : F. Steiner, 2005; DiNARDO, Richard L. *Nerovní spojenci. Německo a jeho evropské spojenci od koalice ke zhroutilí*. (Unequal allies. Germany and its European allies from coalition to ruin.). Brno : Nakladatelství Jota, 2006.

3 On the position of Hungary see, e.g.: DURUCZ, Peter. *Ungarn in der auswärtigen Politik des Dritten Reiches 1942 – 1945*. Göttingen : V&R Unipress, 2006.

3. All three states, like many others in Europe, had already implemented their own home-grown anti-Semitic policies,⁴ although with varying degrees of radicalism.

4. The basic comparative factor for the problem traced by us starts from the knowledge that Nazi Germany pursued the instrumentalization and institutionalization of the home-grown anti-Semitic policies in the individual states. Individual embassies, units of the SD (Sicherheitsdienst – Security Service) and other institutions informed Berlin about the expressions of these policies in legislative and institutional form in the individual states, including Slovakia, Hungary and Rumania.

5. The Nazis analysed these results and on this basis they expected cooperation or problems during implementation, for example, during the deportation of Jews.⁵

6. Comparison is also possible because Nazi Germany asked each state similar questions during talks on deportation, concerning cooperation when solving specific steps in the anti-Semitic policy of the Third Reich. However, these states answered and reacted to German ideas in various ways. To put it briefly, we can trace the Nazi policy from registration of Jews, through their marking, pauperization by means of Aryanization of firms and property, to deportation to the concentration camps. In spite of the dominant position of Nazi Germany in relation to the allies and satellites, the Third Reich used classic diplomacy also when discussing the Jewish question. It attempted to gain the support of the individual states for the implementation of the Holocaust or for the individual steps of anti-Semitic policy. As an example, we can mention the marking of Jews with foreign citizenship in the territory of the Third Reich. Even in such apparently unimportant matters, the Nazis did not venture to order marking with Jewish stars automatically. Nazi diplomacy turned to all the then allied, satellite and neutral states in Europe to obtain their agreement with this step.

7. Comparison is possible especially in relation to Slovakia and Rumania because German advisers were involved in solving the Jewish question in both states: in Slovakia Dieter Wisliceny,⁶ in Rumania Gustav Richter.⁷ With their help, institutions to solve the Jewish question were created: the Central Economic Office (Ústredný hospodársky úrad) in Slovakia, the Commission for Solving the Jewish Question in Rumania, as well as obligatory organizations for all Jews: so called Jewish councils, in the case of Slovakia, the Jewish Centre (Ústredňa Židov).⁸

4 For more details see: HILBERG, Raul. *Die Vernichtung der europäischen Juden*. (vol. 3). Frankfurt a. M. : Fischer Verlag, 1999, p. 811-926.

5 We can also see this at the Wannsee conference of January 1942, where the deportation of Jews from Europe to the East was discussed. For more details see, e.g.: ROSEMAN, Mark. *Setkání ve vile u jezera. Konference ve Wannsee a "konečné řešení židovské otázky"*. (Meetings in the villa by the lake. The Wannsee Conference and the "final solution of the Jewish question"). Prague : Dokořán, 2003. (The book includes the whole text of the official record of the conference).

6 For more details see: HRADSKÁ, Katarína. *Pripad Wisliceny. Nacistickí poradcovia a židovská otázka na Slovensku*. (The case of Wisliceny. Nazi advisers and the Jewish question in Slovakia.) Bratislava : Academic Electronic Press, 1999.

7 Gustav Richter (1912 – ?), SS-Sturmbannführer, from April 1941 to August 1944 adviser on the Jewish question in Rumania.

8 For more details see: *Holokaust na Slovensku 8. Ústredňa Židov (1940 – 1944). Dokumenty*. (The Holocaust in Slovakia 8. The Jewish Centre (1940-1944). Documents). Ed.: Katarína Hradská. Bratislava:

The first problem raised by Nazi Germany during talks with these three states in relation to “solution” of the Jewish question was marking of the Jews. This step was taken in Nazi Germany in September 1941. The Third Reich used diplomatic channels to ask the individual states for permission to mark their Jewish citizens in the territory of Nazi Germany, including the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and the Ostmark, which meant former Austria. Croatia, where Jews were already marked, and Slovakia, where Jews were marked after the adoption of the Jewish Code of 9 September 1941 by Decree 198/1941 Col., responded positively to this initiative. In 1941, Rumania also originally agreed to marking of Jews in the territory of the Third Reich.

German and then also Czech and other Jews began to be deported in autumn 1941 to concentration camps or ghettos organized by Nazi Germany. Therefore, it was “logical” that Germany turned by the diplomatic route to individual countries, starting with the ones that had agreed to marking of Jews, to ask whether they agreed to the “transfer”, that is deportation of their Jews “to the East”, together with the German Jews deported from the Third Reich, including the Protectorate and the Ostmark. The Germans asked, through their embassies for the views of the individual states.⁹ Slovakia, Croatia and Rumania agreed to the deportation of their Jewish citizens.¹⁰ The Slovak side was only interested in what Jewish property it could claim.¹¹

Dokumentačné stredisko holokaustu; Zvolen: Klemo, 2008.

- 9 F. Rademacher from the Nazi Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) wrote to secretary of state Erich von Weizsäcker already on 28 Oct 1941, that he had asked the Supreme Office for Reich Security by telephone, whether the deportation of Jews from Germany had to include Jews from Slovakia and Croatia. He recommended that for the sake of decency, this question should be discussed through the embassies in Bratislava and Zagreb. The under-secretary of state at the Nazi MFA M. Luther wrote on 17 Nov 1941 to the German Embassy in Bratislava that they should ask the Slovak government whether it agreed to the deportation of Jews with Slovak citizenship from Nazi Germany, including the Protectorate and the Ostmark, to “ghettos in the East”, or whether the Slovak government would accept them. This had the result that: *“On 21 November 1941, the legation adviser at the German Embassy Dr. Ringelmann informed the local office that the German government had decided to deport all Jews from the Reich and the Protectorate to the East as quickly as possible. The German government asked for an immediate reply, especially with regard to the large number of Jews with Slovak citizenship resident in the Protectorate. Did the Slovak government want these to be deported with the other Jews from the Reich to the East, or did it want these Jews sent back to Slovakia. The government of the Reich wanted to carry out the deportation as quickly as possible, so it wanted a quick reply from the Slovak government.”* *Holokaust na Slovensku 4. Dokumenty nemeckej proveniencie 1939 – 1945.* (The Holocaust in Slovakia 4. Documents of German origin 1939 – 1945.). Ed. Eduard Nižňanský. Bratislava : Nadácia M. Šimečka, 2003, p. 107-110.
- 10 A telegram from the German ambassador Killinger in Bucharest to Berlin on 13 Nov 1941: *“Herr Antonescu [...] erklärte mir, daß die rumänische Regierung es der Reichsregierung überlasse, die Juden rumänischer Staatsangehörigkeit gemeinsam mit den deutschen Juden in die Ghettos nach dem Osten abschieben zu lassen. Die rumänische Regierung habe keine Interesse daran, daß die rumänischen Juden nach Rumänien zurückkehrten.”* Yad Vashem Archiv, Jerusalem (hereinafter YVA), fund R1 “Auswärtiges Amt”, Inland II g 52/5 (Microfilm JM 2215). Telegram from the German ambassador Kasche in Agram-Zagreb to Berlin 20 Nov 1941. *“Kroatische Regierung dankt fuer die Geste hinsichtlich in Deutschland lebenden Juden kroatische Staatsangehoerigkeit. Sie waere aber fuer Abschiebung dieser Juden aus Deutschland nach dem Osten dankbar.”* YVA Jerusalem, fund (hereinafter f.) R1 “Auswärtiges Amt”, Inland II g 52/5 (Microfilm JM 2215).
- 11 Ludin’s telegram to Berlin on 4 Dec 1941 about the deportation of Jews with Slovak citizenship from Nazi Germany: *“The Slovak government replies that it agrees in principle with the deportation of Jews*

I will now analyse the talks with individual states.

Slovakia

As I already stated, the Slovak side agreed to the marking of Jews with Slovak citizenship in the territory of Nazi Germany, and to their deportation to the “East”.

In relation to the deportations from the territory of independent Slovakia, the existing literature about the Holocaust points to the importance of the visit of leading representatives of the Slovak state to Hitler’s headquarters in October 1941.¹² The agreement of 2 December 1941 between Vojtech Tuka and the German ambassador in Bratislava Hanns Elard Ludin was interpreted as its result. In this agreement, the Slovak side agreed to the deportation of Jews with Slovak citizenship from the Third Reich “to the East”.¹³ However, if we analyse the situation in the second half of 1941 in its wider context, we can cast doubt on this conclusion. As we have seen, Nazi Germany turned successively to individual states with requests for the implementation of two measures – marking and deportation to the East – regardless of whether the representatives of the states had visited Hitler. The Holocaust became part of Nazi foreign policy, and so Germany turned to the individual states to solve this problem.

Since the Slovak side agreed to the deportation of Jews with Slovak citizenship from the territory of the Third Reich, the logical next step was deportation from the territory of Slovakia itself. In the end, the German side did not expect any problems with this. The positive note on Slovakia from the Wannsee Conference of January says everything.¹⁴

In spite of extensive research, we are still not sufficiently informed about German – Slovak talks on the deportations at the beginning of 1942. The contemporary documents do not enable us to decide unambiguously whether the German or the Slovak side took the initiative over the deportations.

with Slovak citizenship to ghettos in the East, but it must emphasize that the justified Slovak claims to the movable and immovable property of these Jews must not be threatened by their deportation to the East. In the Slovak view, these are almost exclusively Jews, who moved from autonomous Slovakia to the territory of the Protectorate after the events of 1938, and who illegally took their property with them. The Slovak government asks whether it is possible to register in detail the value of the property of the Jews with Slovak citizenship in the Reich, so that there will be a basis for further discussion of the return of this property even after the Jews have been deported. It also asks whether the German side is willing to secure the return of Jewish property on the basis of this information, or to ensure its use in the national economic interest, and discuss the details of implementation. I have already explained that justified claims to Jewish property will be granted as far as possible. I request instructions on how to answer individual parts of the Slovak question.” *Holokaust na Slovensku* 4, ref. 9, p. 111-112.

12 For further details see: HRADSKÁ, ref. 6, p. 38; HRADSKÁ, Katarína. Jozef Tiso v Hitlerovom hlavnom stane a na Ukrajine roku 1941 vo svetle nemeckých dokumentov. (Jozef Tiso at Hitler’s headquarters and in Ukraine in 1941 in the light of German documents.). In *Historický časopis*, 2003, year 51, no. 4, p. 685-694; KAMENEC, Ivan. *Po stopách tragédie*. (On the Trail of Tragedy.). Bratislava : Archa, 1991, p. 155.

13 *Holokaust na Slovensku* 4, ref. 9, p. 111-112.

14 Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik (hereinafter ADAP), Serie E, Bd. 1, p. 272 (document 150). “In der Slowakei und Kroatien ist die Angelegenheit nicht mehr allzu schwer, da die wesentlichsten Kernfragen in dieser Hinsicht dort bereits einer Lösung zugeführt wurden.” For further details see, e. g.: ROSEMAN, ref. 5.

The historian Ladislav Lipscher wrote about Slovak initiative.¹⁵ According to him, the German side requested an increased number of Slovak workers in the Reich, and after agreeing with Izidor Koso,¹⁶ the Slovak government plenipotentiary offered Sager, representative of the Ministry of Labour of the Reich, 20,000 Jews as a substitute. The adviser Dieter Wisliceny confirmed this Slovak offer after the war.¹⁷

According to his statement, when Adolf Eichmann learnt of this, he invited him to Berlin, where he said that, on orders from Himmler, the Jews would be transported to camps under the administration of the RSHA (Reichssichererheitshauptamt – Supreme Security Office of the Reich). At the same time, Wisliceny had to inform the Slovak side that Germany was willing to accept the offered number of Jews as workers.¹⁸ We must take the post-war testimony of Slovak and German representatives with reserve. It is logical that the Germans strove to transfer responsibility for the deportations to the Slovaks and the reverse.

We can also document this on the basis of the testimony of the German ambassador H. Ludin, who did not remember after the war that Sager had told him something like this. In his testimony he said: *“I assume that this offer came on the basis of a Slovak initiative, because Sager was not concerned with Jewish matters, and according to my knowledge no German office pushed for something like this from the Slovak offices. [...] I remember that at the beginning of the deportations there was no opposition to the deportations from Slovak officials.”*¹⁹

Extensive research in the Archives of the Foreign Office in Berlin, as well as in the Federal Archives in Berlin, has still not produced documents, which would solve this problem. According to the organizational structure of the time, Sager must have informed Berlin about the Slovak offer, since he was subject to the Reich Ministry of Labour,

15 LIPSCHER, Ladislav. *Židia v slovenskom štáte 1939 – 1945*. (The Jews in the Slovak state 1939 – 1945.). Bratislava : Print-servis, 1992, p. 114-115. His view was adopted by various other historians including G. Fatranová and Y. Bauer.

16 In his post-war trial before the People’s Court in Bratislava (trial 13/48) Izidor Koso rejected his responsibility for this step in the record from 22 Sept 1947: *“It is not true that at the end of January 1942, I, alone or with others, agreed with Wisliceny that 20,000 citizens of Jewish origin would be sent to Germany to work, because I learnt about this agreement only during the investigations [meaning after the war – E. N.]. Similarly it is not true that I participated in concluding a framework agreement on the deportation of all the Jews or that I took any initiative. This agreement was concluded by Tuka alone in Berlin, and as far as I can remember, I learnt about the payment of 500 RM for each deported person, only at a meeting of the government. At the end of February or beginning of March, Tuka told me that they were going to be resettled in the Lublin – Minsk region, where all the Jews would be concentrated.”* State Archives Bratislava (hereinafter SAB), f. Ludový súd (People’s Court) Bratislava, Tn’ud 43/46-58.

17 His testimony was confirmed after the Second World War by former representatives of the Jewish Centre Tibor Kováč and Andrej Steiner. However, the documents about talks on the deportations with representatives of the Slovak government, which Wisliceny promised to Steiner, were never produced. It is difficult to determine from the statements, whether Wisliceny gave this information in 1942 or only in 1943 before his departure from Slovakia. From the side of Wisliceny, who already knew from autumn 1942 that the majority of the deported Jews from Slovakia were no longer alive, this could have been a deliberate manoeuvre in relation to the representatives of the Jewish Centre. SAB, f. Ludový súd Bratislava, trial of I. Koso Tn’ud 43/46-7, 43/36-11.

18 SNA, f. Národný súd, Dr. Anton Vašek, 17/46-72.

19 SAB, f. Ludový súd Bratislava, T.J. Gašpar 14/48, carton 13.

which was not responsible for Jews. This ministry must have informed the Foreign Office in Berlin about this problem. Such a document has not survived. It is also important that the post books of the Foreign Office, which have survived from this period, do not contain any mention of the arrival of such a letter.²⁰ The collection of documents from the embassy in Bratislava in the Political Archive of the Foreign Office (PAAA) in Berlin contains no such report from Sager, although he sent information about labour problems at various times in 1942. The collection of documents from the Reich Ministry of Labour in the Federal Archives in Berlin does not preserve an item from Sager about talks on labour forces.

If we should trace German documents, in August 1942 the deputy secretary of state at the Foreign Office Martin Luther²¹ wrote that after the transports of Jews of Slovak and other nationalities from the Reich, there was a shortage of workers and so the German side turned to the Slovak government with a request for 20,000 Jewish workers.²² As we learn from a telegram, which ambassador H. Ludin sent to Berlin on 20 February 1942. *"The Slovak side accepted the proposal with enthusiasm. It is possible to begin preparatory work."*²³ The German side then expressed willingness to accept all the Jews.²⁴ However, no historian has found a German diplomatic note corresponding to this content. This note must have come to Slovakia by the end of February 1942.

We can add to the contradictions in the contemporary sources, a statement by Alexander Mach at a session of the State Council on 26 March 1942, where he said: "[...] it

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- 20 See: Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (hereinafter: PA AA), Journalbücher Inland A-B. Juden.
- 21 Martin Franz Julius Luther (1895 – 1945), 1941 – 1943 deputy secretary of state at the Foreign Office (AA) and head of department D (Deutschland) at the AA responsible for cooperation with H. Himmler and the RSHA, as well as the department D III (*"Judenfrage, Rassenpolitik, Information der Auslandsvertretungen über wichtige innenpolitische Vorgänge"*). In cooperation with A. Eichmann, he became one of the leading organizers of the Holocaust. He participated in the Wannsee Conference of January 1942, which was concerned with the technical aspect of the deportations, not only from Nazi Germany, but also from Nazi occupied Europe.
- 22 M. Luther to H. Ludin 16 Feb 1942: *"In connection with the measures for the final solution of the European Jewish question, the German government is prepared to take 20,000 young and strong Slovak Jews and transfer them to the East, where the need for labour continues. Please inform the government there about this. As soon as the Slovak government gives its agreement in principle, the adviser for the Jewish question will orally clarify the details."* *Holokaust na Slovensku 4*, ref. 9, p. 113-114.
- 23 *Holokaust na Slovensku 4*, ref. 9, p. 113-114.
- 24 *"Die Zahl der auf diese Weise [understand foreign citizens resident in the Reich – E.N.] nach dem Osten abgeschobenen Juden reichte nicht aus, den Bedarf an Arbeitskräften dort zu decken. Das Reichssicherheitshauptamt trat daher auf Weisung des Reichsführer-SS an das Auswärtige Amt heran, die slowakische Regierung zu bitten, 20 000 junge kräftige slowakische Juden aus der Slowakei zur Abschiebung nach dem Osten zur Verfügung zu stellen. Die Deutsche Gesandtschaft Preßburg wurde zu D III 874 mit entsprechender Weisung versehen. Die Weisung haben abgezeichnet: Der Herr Staatssekretär, U. St. S. pol. Und Pol. IV. Die Gesandtschaft Preßburg berichtete zu D III 1002, die Slowakische Regierung habe den Vorschlag mit Eifer aufgegriffen; die Vorarbeiten könnten eingeleitet werden. Auf diese freudige Zustimmung der Slowakischen Regierung hin schlug der Reichsführer-SS vor, auch den Rest der slowakische Juden nach dem Osten abzuschieben und die Slowakei so judenfrei zu machen. Die Gesandtschaft wurde zu D III 1559 Ang. II mit entsprechender Weisung versehen, den Entwurf der Weisung hat der Herr Staatssekretär abgezeichnet, nach Abgang wurde er des Büro RAM und U. St. S. Pol zur Kenntnis gebracht."* *Holokaust na Slovensku 4*, ref. 9, s. 207-212.

*came from us, not from the Germans [...]. We gained the help of the Germans also in this Jewish question. We want to rid ourselves of the Jews. We took the greatest step when we were at the Führer's Headquarters. We had the possibility to talk to Himmler and in the presence of the foreign minister; we were asked how many Jews we have, and we replied 90,000. They told us they would need these Jews. [...] This was how the idea arose and it cannot be dropped [...] because we are doing it hand in hand with the Germans. [...] We will not stop this action at any price.'*²⁵

However, Mach spoke too generally in this statement, so that we cannot say unambiguously that the initiative was on the Slovak side or that the Slovak side offered the Jews first as labour and then also all the others. On the other hand, it is clear that the German side did not have to put pressure on the Slovak politicians over the deportations. Ambassador Ludin said this already in April 1942.²⁶

Where the subsequent deportation of Jewish families was concerned, D. Wisliceny said in his post-war testimony on 25 September 1947:

"Dear friend, if you knew the history of our nation, you would know that, for us the Jewish question is not only a Jewish problem, but also a national problem. He told me the names of many Slovak writers and said, that the Jews in our country were bearers of the foreign state ideology of the Hungarians or Magyars. For this reason, he wished to eliminate the Jews from Slovakia. As head of the government, he asked me to request in Berlin if all the Jews could be transported to Germany. I told Tuka that I would ask my chief, Eichmann in Berlin about this. I raised the subject in Berlin orally and then in writing. Eichmann refused at first, because he did not have anywhere to put these people in Poland.

Perhaps 14 days after Tuka's offer, Eichmann called me to Berlin and told me that Himmler had agreed to the deportation of all the Jews from Slovakia to Germany, but under two conditions. Firstly: the Slovak state must take away the citizenship of the Jews; and secondly: the Slovak state must pay a resettlement fee for each Jew. With this decision, I immediately returned to Slovakia and informed Tuka, who also summoned Dr. Koso. Tuka expressed his agreement with the conditions, but he asked that these matters be included in an official note, so that they would have a basic document for the government.²⁷ [...] Eichmann then put the above mentioned conditions into an official

25 *Holokaust na Slovensku 2. Prezident, vláda, Snem SR a Štátne rada o židovskej otázke 1939 – 1945. Dokumenty.* (The Holocaust in Slovakia 2. The President, Government, Parliament of the Slovak Republic and State Council on the Jewish Question 1939 – 1945.). Eds. Eduard Nižňanský, Ivan Kamened. Bratislava: NMS a ŽNO, 2003, p. 153-178.

26 *Holokaust na Slovensku 4*, ref. 9, p. 127-128.

27 The witness A. Steiner, who was one of the representatives of the so-called working group (Nebenregierung) at the Jewish Centre, also testified on this problem at the trial of I. Koso: "[...] On instructions from German officials, Wisliceny asked Mach and Koso to provide about 15,000 young men and women to work in Germany. Mach and Koso replied to Wisliceny: Yes we will provide them, but they will be Jews. 15,000 young men and women of Jewish origin would be deported. Wisliceny showed me a record of his discussions with Mach and Koso. According to this record, Tuka had also agreed. Wisliceny also wanted me to make transcriptions of their record of discussions with the Slovak government, but then he went to Hungary to organize deportation of Jews there, so that I did not obtain these transcriptions from him. [...] Tuka, Mach and Koso proposed that they should not break up Jewish families, that whole families should

*diplomatic note through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.*²⁸ *The government then decided on the matter.*²⁹

These statements by Wisliceny are confirmed by the session of the government on 3 March 1942, at which V. Tuka and A. Mach informed the government about the deportations.³⁰ We also have information from Tuka's statement on 6 March 1942 to a session of the State Council, in which he already spoke of payments for the deported people: "[...] *The Jewish question has to be solved gradually by deportation to the area of Ukraine.*

We have already been informed about where they will be placed. When they leave the territory of our state, the Jews will cease to be citizens of the Slovak Republic. They will be able to take enough food for 14 days with them. The Slovak Republic is obliged to pay 500 RM for each Jew. The deportation of Jews will begin in March and end in August 1942. However, our side has set the condition that Jews, who were baptized will be placed in separate settlements in their new home, where they will have their clergy and churches."³¹

A meeting between V. Tuka and a representative of Nazi Germany occurred in Bratislava on 10 April 1942.³² The logic of this meeting started from the idea that after the deportation of "young Jews for work", which had actually finished, the deportation of the other Jewish citizens would proceed.

The document states in concise official language that: "*The Prime Minister Dr. Vojtech Tuka spoke today with the representative of Heinrich Himmler, the Reich commander of the SS and chief of the German police, as the representative of Reich Marshal Göring, who has a direct order from the Reich Chancellor and Führer Adolf Hitler to solve the question of the European Jews. In the talks, it was stated that the deportation*

be deported to Germany. Tuka gave religious arguments for this. Allegedly, it would not be Christian to break up families. Wisliceny smiled ironically when he told me this. He commented that he liked the way the pious Tuka, who went to church every day, put the proposal into such a Christian wrapping." SAB, f. Eudový súd Bratislava, trial of I. Koso, 43/46-7, testimony of A. Steiner 1 April 1946.

28 No historian has succeeded in finding this German note up to now. It is also mentioned in the report of the deputy secretary of state of the Nazi Foreign Ministry M. Luther from 21 Aug 1942: "*With the enthusiastic agreement of the Slovak government [meaning the reaction of the Slovak side to the offer of 20 Feb 1942 to accept Jewish labour – E. N.] the Reich leader of the SS also proposed the deportation to the East of the rest of the Slovak Jews, and so make Slovakia a state free from Jews. The embassy received at D III 1559 Ang. II the appropriate instructions; the proposed instructions signed by the secretary of state, after sending they were forwarded for the information of /successfully communicated to the offices of the Reich Foreign Ministry and the St. S. Pol.*" *Holokaust na Slovensku 4*, ref. 9, p. 211.

29 SAB, f. Eudový súd Bratislava, trial of I. Koso, Tnřud 43/46-58. Testimony of D. Wisliceny 25 Sept 1947.

30 SNA Bratislava, f. Národný súd (National Court), Gejza Fritz Tnřud 74/45.-27-30. A partial extract from the II/84 session of the government on 3 March 1942. "*The prime minister announced that representatives of the government of the Reich had expressed willingness to accept all the Jews, and they set the condition that the Jews would lose their citizenship. The minister of the interior [Alexander Mach – E. N.] submitted a detailed report on the preparations to deport the Jews, which the government took into account.*" The record did not mention the fee of 500 RM for each deported Jew. See also: *Holokaust na Slovensku 2*, ref. 25, p. 142.

31 *Holokaust na Slovensku 2*, ref. 25, p. 146-148.

32 We still cannot be sure who came to Slovakia, but the published literature usually says it was Reinhard Heydrich.

of the Slovak Jews is only one part of the programme. Half a million Jews are being transferred from Europe to the East. Slovakia is the first state, from which the German Reich was willing to remove the Jews. At the same time, Jews are being removed from France (occupied territory), Holland, Belgium, the Protectorate and the territory of the Reich. The Jews from Slovakia will be placed in several places in the district of Lublin, where they will remain permanently. Families will remain together. The status of the Jews in international and state law will be that of protected persons (Schutzbefohlene) of the German Reich. Baptized Jews will be deported separately and settled in a separate territory. (Baptized Jews are understood as Jews qualified as baptized by the Jewish code and baptized before 10 September 1941.³³ The most recently baptized Jews do not come under this term, because they were baptized for opportunist reasons.) The German government is treating the Jews as humanely as possible. (In August 1941, the ministerial adviser Izidor Koso saw³⁴ what a Jewish town looks like, with its own local government, council of elders and police).’’³⁵

Adolf Eichmann³⁶ himself came for talks about the deportations in May, but the talks and his visit to Slovakia ended early because of the assassination of Reinhard Heydrich in Prague.³⁷

One relevant intervention by Nazi Germany in the continuing deportations is known from June 1942. It happened because on 24 June 1942 a planned transport did not go to Lublin. The Nazi advisers and ambassador H. Ludin had a meeting with Tuka on the next day. At this meeting, the adviser on the Jewish question Wisliceny reported in detail on the deportations. He stated that: *“The Jewish action is in its final stage. 52,000 Jews have been deported,³⁸ 35,000 remain.³⁹ The latter possess protective documents, which must now be subjected to revision. This should be done by summoning their employers and instructing them about the irreplaceability of Jews. Some of them will remain, perhaps 4,000 protected by the act of 15 May.⁴⁰ The latter is the most dangerous part. Department 14 of the Ministry of the Interior worked very well, regardless of its chief,⁴¹ just as the Ministry of Transport did.”*

33 Understood before adoption of decree 198/1941 Col. – the so-called Jewish Code.

34 On a visit to Upper Silesia in July 1941. See, e. g.: *Holokaust na Slovensku 4*, ref. 9, p. 87-90.

35 YVA Jerusalem, f. M 5/49.

36 Adolf Eichmann (1906 – 1962), SS Obersturmbannführer. From 1934 in the SD, from 1935 in the department II 112 (Juden), in August 1938 at the head of the Zentralstelle für jüdische Auswanderung in Vienna, which forcibly deported Jews from the “Ostmark” as the Nazis called Austria, later head of the department IV B 4 at the RSHA, responsible for the deportation of Jews to concentration camps. He was the main organizer of the deportation of Jews to the death camps.

37 *Holokaust na Slovensku 4*, ref. 9, p. 144-145.

38 This number was exaggerated. In July 1942 a further four transports left Slovakia, in September two, and on 20 October the last. This meant a total of about 58,000 deported Jews. According to this, about 50,000 had been deported at the time of Wisliceny’s statement.

39 There were already fewer Jews in Slovakia at this time. At least 5,000 – 6,000 had fled to Hungary, and about 2,000 were hiding in Slovakia, so that they could obtain so-called Aryan papers.

40 This was constitutional act 68/1942 Col., which enabled the deportation of Jews from Slovakia and the removal of their citizenship, while also setting the conditions for granting of exceptions.

41 The head of Department 14 of the Ministry of the Interior was Anton Vašek.

Tuka reacted to this statement as follows: *“Yesterday’s meeting of the government agreed that every ministry has to report the protective documents it has issued to the Ministry of the Interior, which will carry out revision.”*⁴² *Neither he nor minister Mach would rest until this important work was finished.”*

Wisliceny urged that Augustín Morávek should remain chairman of the Central Economic Office. He is “pure and uncompromising”.⁴³ In answer to a question from Tuka, he described Anton Vašek as a compromiser, who made agreements on all sides, so that everything is tied up, so that revision of the protective documents cannot be done. Ambassador Ludin recommended “100% solution of the Jewish question”,⁴⁴ which meant the deportation of all the Jews from Slovakia.

On 26 June 1942, Ludin reported to Berlin: *“The evacuation of the Jews from Slovakia has come to a dead end at this moment. As a result of church influences and bribing of individual officials, perhaps 35,000 Jews have obtained documents which mean that they do not have to be evacuated. The deportation of the Jews is very unpopular among a wide range of ordinary Slovak people. This position has been further strengthened in recent days by strong English propaganda. However, Prime Minister Tuka wants to continue the deportation of Jews and he requests support in the form of sharp diplomatic pressure from the Reich. I ask for instructions on whether steps have to be taken in this direction.”*⁴⁵

Another man from the foreign service of Nazi Germany – Ernst von Weizsäcker⁴⁶ – became involved in the problem. He wrote a telegram to Ludin stating: *“[...] the diplomatic support requested by Prime Minister Tuka can be provided by occasionally mentioning to President Tiso that stopping the deportation of Jews, and especially freeing from deportation the 35,000 mentioned in the wire report, would cause great surprise in Germany, considering how very valuable the cooperation of Slovakia on the Jewish question has been up to now.”*⁴⁷

If we can summarize this “pressure”, the Slovak side did not receive any verbal notes, in which the German side officially demanded the “immediate 100%” deportation of the Jews from Slovakia. The German side did not issue any threats. Therefore, the Slovak politicians did not have to fear the loss of political power as a result of insufficiently fast deportations. In the end, after this “stopping” of deportations from Slovakia, a further seven deportation trains left the country. The “stopping” of the deportations was also caused by the fact that many Jews had obtained exceptions or work permits. They were

42 According to the minutes of the session of the government on 24 June 1942: *“The government approved a proposal for an act on the implementation of some provisions of the Constitutional Act on the Deportation of Jews. During the discussion of this proposal, the government considered the family members of economically important Jews and decided that in exceptional cases, the parents of such Jews could be exempted from deportation.”* *Holokaust na Slovensku* 2, ref. 25, p. 220-221.

43 D. Wisliceny sent a different evaluation of A. Morávek to Germany. *Holokaust na Slovensku* 4, ref. 9, p. 71-79, 93-102.

44 *Holokaust na Slovensku* 4, ref. 9, p. 152-154.

45 *Holokaust na Slovensku* 4, ref. 9, p. 150-151.

46 Ernst Freiherr von Weizsäcker (1882 – 1951), diplomat. Secretary of state at the Nazi Foreign Ministry (Auswärtiges Amt) in 1938 – 1943. The second man after Joachim von Ribbentrop in this office.

47 *Holokaust na Slovensku* 4, ref. 9, p. 151-152.

“economically important”. The “social need for them” decided that they remained in Slovakia. This concerned, for example, doctors, vets and engineers, but also “assistants”, without whom Aryanized firms could not continue to operate.

The talks about the payments for the deported Jews were a special question in Slovak – German relations. Activity in this area came from the German side.⁴⁸ The German explanation of the payments for the necessity of retraining, housing and so on is an example of the cynicism of the time.

The German side intervened several times with regard to the payments.⁴⁹ I consider important the Slovak verbal note from June 1942, in which the Slovak government clearly declared its willingness to pay for the deported people.⁵⁰

The fifth meeting for discussions of the Slovak – German government committee in September 1942 adopted a document in which point 31 spoke of the payments for the deported Jews and about property problems. “*An exchange of notes between the German and Slovak foreign ministries (verbal notes of the German Embassy from 29 April 1942 [...] and 1 May 1942 [...]) – as well as the Slovak Foreign Ministry from 23 June 1942 [...] agreed that the Slovak government will pay a sum of 500.- RM for each Jewish citizen of Slovakia, who has been or will be deported to the territory of the Reich. In these notes, the German government gave up further claims to the property left in the territory of Slovakia by the Jews accepted by the Reich.*”⁵¹ In spite of this agreement, the Slovak side strove to reduce the sum set for the deported people, but did not succeed.⁵²

Apart from the Slovaks, the Croats also had to pay for the deportation of Jews, but only a sum of 30.- Reich marks.⁵³

I regard the deportations of 1942 as the culmination of the policy of anti-Semitism in Slovakia. The German side did not have to put pressure on the Slovak politicians to agree to the deportations.

The Aryanization and liquidation of Jewish businesses, especially in 1940 – 1941, and the prohibition of work in various professions in 1939 – 1941 caused extensive social changes in the Jewish community. In Slovakia, these changes were a sort of necessary “pre-condition” for deportation. The creation of a mass of pauperized Jews had the result that the state suddenly had to look after them, or create work opportunities for them. However, there was a lack of financial resources for the creation of ghettos⁵⁴ or

48 *Holokaust na Slovensku* 4, ref. 9, p. 115-116, 135-139.

49 For further details see: NIŽŇANSKÝ, Eduard – KAMENEC, Ivan. Poplatky za deportovaných slovenských Židov. In *Historický časopis*, 2003, year 51, no. 2, p. 311-342.

50 *Holokaust na Slovensku* 4, ref. 9, p. 150.

51 *Holokaust na Slovensku* 4, ref. 9, p. 217-219.

52 The minutes of the thirteenth meeting of the Revision Committee of the Slovak National Bank in Bratislava from 14 February 1945 contain the statement: “*The state had to pay 500 RM for every deported Jew. This had no basis, it was entirely arbitrary.*” Archives of the National Bank of Slovakia, f. Slovenská národná banka, revidujúci výbor – zápisnice 1939 – 1945. See also *Holokaust na Slovensku* 2, ref. 25, documents no.95, 121.

53 ADAP, Serie E, Band IV, p. 83. We can read in the report of the ambassador of Nazi Germany in Croatia Kasche: “*Finanzminister Košak hat sich am 9. 10. 42 bereit erklärt, dem Deutschen Reich für jeden ausgesiedelten Juden RM 30.- zur Verfügung zu stellen.*”

54 Vojtech Tuka proposed the creation of a Jewish ghetto for 10,000 inhabitants in 1940. The Jews would

large labour camps,⁵⁵ because Aryanization meant essentially state guaranteed robbery of Jewish property and the state would have to provide financial resources for the impoverished Jewish population.⁵⁶ The Jews became a “social burden” for the Slovak state. From autumn 1941, the Jewish question in Slovakia was simply a social problem.⁵⁷ The Jews were not responsible for this situation,⁵⁸ but the executive and legislative institutions of the wartime Slovak Republic, including the president.

In autumn 1941, the results of the home-grown anti-Semitic policy of Hlinka’s Slovak People Party (HSĽS) combined with the Nazi Holocaust and the result was the deportations. The Slovak side agreed with them and actively participated in them.

The German side also evaluated the attitude of the Slovak authorities to the deportations very positively. The German ambassador Ludin already wrote to Berlin in April 1942: *“The Slovak government has agreed to deport all the Jews from Slovakia without any German pressure. The president also personally agreed with the deportation, in spite of the intervention of the Slovak episcopate. The deportation relates to all Jews. Jews standing outside the Jewish Code, that is people of Jewish race, who were baptized before 1938, and who number about 2,000, have to be concentrated in camps within the territory of the state according to a decree from the president of the republic. The depor-*

have to pay for its construction. See: *Holokaust na Slovensku 2*, ref. 25, p. 82.

- 55 Jewish labour camps were established in 1941 or 1942 at Nováky, Sereď and Vyhne. Various Jewish labour centres also existed. For further details see: *Holokaust na Slovensku 5. Židovské pracovné tábory na Slovensku 1938 – 1944. Dokumenty.* (The Holocaust in Slovakia 5. Jewish labour camps and centres in Slovakia 1938 – 1944. Documents.). Eds. Eduard Nižňanský, Igor Baka, Ivan Kamenec. Bratislava : NMŠ; ZNO; VHÚ, 2004.
- 56 The report from the Ministry of the Interior on 1 April 1942 justifying the government proposal for an act on a Fund to Establish and Maintain Enterprises for the Labour Duties of Jews, stated that the cost of supporting 16,000 pauperized Jewish households was estimated at 160 million crowns per year (10,000.- for each household). For further details see: *Holokaust na Slovensku 2*, ref. 25, p. 180-181.
- 57 To confirm this historical construct, I will give data from the report justifying the already mentioned government proposal for an act on a Fund to Establish and Maintain Enterprises for the Labour Duties of Jews, produced by the Ministry of the Interior on 1 April 1942. According to this report, from 88,951 Jews (according to government decree 198/41 the number of Jews was 89,053), forming about 22,000 households, a total of 32,527 (36.3%) had originally been economically active. A further 4,000 Jews lived on the income from their property without doing any work (making a total of 41%). Aryanization and liquidation of firms and companies, denial of work permits and other anti-Jewish measures excluded 22,267 people, while among from the total of 4,000, 2,500 people lost the possibility to live on the income from their property (24,767, that is 71.7%). According to the justifying report, about 2/3 were heads of families or households. The report concludes, that 16,000 households (that is 72% from the original number of 22,000) had been left without the possibility to support themselves. This meant a total of about 64,000 Jews. If we compare this number with the number deported – about 58,000 and add the roughly 4,500 Jews in the Jewish labour camps and centres or the VI Labour Battalion in the army, the social problem with the Jews or their economic support was successfully solved by the government after the deportations. For further details see: *Holokaust na Slovensku 2*, ref. 25, p. 180-181.
- 58 The Jewish Centre (the organization created by the state in September 1940, to which all Jews had to belong) strove to help, for example, by means of requalification. Only in 1941, about 10,000 mostly young Jews attended such courses. It also organized people’s kitchens to provide food for pauperized Jews. See e. g.: *Holokaust na Slovensku 5*, ref. 56, p. 102-108, 116-117. See e. g.: Reports of the Jewish Centre to the Central Economic Office in 1941. SNA Bratislava, f. ÚHÚ, carton 145.

tation of the Jews is proceeding smoothly, without complications [...]"⁵⁹ Günther⁶⁰ from A. Eichmann's department at the RSHA wrote to the Nazi Ministry of Foreign Affairs in May 1942, giving a similar description of the role of the Slovak authorities: "*The securing of mobility [understand: the deportation trains⁶¹ – E. N.] by the Slovak government significantly facilitated the technical securing of the evacuation, because the railways of the Reich would have found it very difficult to provide trains due to the already heavy burden on them.*"⁶²

We know of German pressure to continue the deportations only from June 1942. Finally, we know from a report written in August 1942 by the deputy secretary of state at the Foreign Ministry M. Luther, that the instructions to Bratislava concerning the deportations clearly stated: "[...] *it definitely must not lead to internal political difficulties*".⁶³ I have not found significant pressure for the implementation or continuation of deportations in the German – Slovak talks during 1941 and 1942. The German side could not have carried out the deportations of 1942 without the help of the Slovak administration and police.

In 1943 we find several German attempts to revive the deportations from Slovakia. The Slovak side did not allow them, and there were no repressive consequences on the internal political scene from the Nazis.⁶⁴

Rumania

Above all, it is necessary to say that Rumania applied its own home-grown anti-Semitic policy, which included legislation, and its own Rumanian deportation and killing of Jews.⁶⁵ In relation to the actual deportations of Jews from the territory of Rumania, it is necessary to note that Rumania "distinguished" between Jews from the historic part of Rumania – Moldavia and Wallachia, where many had Rumanian citizenship, and Jews from the "acquired territories". The Rumanian government independently deported and killed Jews in Bukovina, Bessarabia and Transistria, especially in 1941 and 1942.⁶⁶ The government treated "Rumanian" Jews differently.

59 *Holokaust na Slovensku 4*, ref. 9, p. 127-128.

60 Rolf Günther (1913 – 1945?) from 1941 deputy to A. Eichmann in department IV B 4 at the RSHA, which was concerned with the deportation of Jews to concentration camps.

61 The Slovak side prepared six complete trains for the deportation of Jews. For further details on the technical preparation of the deportations and Slovak – German talks on railway transport see: *Holokaust na Slovensku 4*, ref. 9, p. 116, 128.

62 *Holokaust na Slovensku 4*, ref. 9, p. 143-4.

63 *Holokaust na Slovensku 4*, ref. 9, p. 207-212.

64 For further details see: KAMENEC, Ivan: Neúspešné pokusy o obnovenie deportácii slovenských Židov. (Unsuccessful attempts to revive the deportation of Slovak Jews.). In MILOTOVÁ, Jaroslava – LORENCOVÁ, Anna (eds.). *Terezínske štúdie a dokumenty*. Prague : Academia, 2002, p. 299-315.

65 For further details see: BENZ, Wolfgang. Rumänien und der Holocaust. In BENZ, Wolfgang – MIHOK, Brigitte. *Holocaust an der Peripherie. Judenpolitik und Judenmord in Rumänien und Transistrien 1940 – 1944*. Berlin : Metropol, 2009, p. 11-30; HEINEN, Armin. *Rumänien, der Holocaust und die Logik der Gewalt*. Munich : R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2007; HAUSLEITNER, Mariana. Großverbrechen im rumänischen Transistrien 1941 – 1944. In *Rumänien und der Holocaust*. Hrsg. Von Mariana Hausleitner u. a. Berlin : Metropol, 2001, p. 15-24.

66 It is estimated that 280,000 – 360,000 Jews were killed in the Rumanian regions of Bukovina, Bessarabia

Even in the time when Jews were being deported from the whole of Europe to the General Government territory, the Rumanian side continued its wild expulsion of Jews from “its” territory.

According to Eichmann’s report from 14 April 1942, the Rumanian side had driven 10,000 Jews across the river Bug into Ukraine, which was controlled by Nazi Germany. Eichmann expressed dissatisfaction with this uncontrolled and unplanned action. On 12 May 1942, a report by Franz Rademacher⁶⁷ from the Foreign Office directly to Eichmann spoke of the expulsion of a further 60,000 Jews across the Bug.⁶⁸ The last Rumanian deportation from Bukovina to Transistria occurred in September 1942.⁶⁹

From the point of view of the Rumanian – German talks considered by us, it is necessary to note that in 1941 Rumania at first agreed to the marking and deportation of Jews with Rumanian citizenship resident in the Third Reich.⁷⁰ In the course of 1942 the Rumanian representative institutions changed their view. Rumanian consulates submitted various protests.⁷¹ On 23 June 1942, Rumania demanded in a verbal note that Jews with Rumanian citizenship should be treated the same as Italian, Hungarian and Swiss Jews.⁷² Later, on 21 July 1942, there were discussions at the Foreign Office between the German representative Klingenfuss⁷³ and the secretary of the Rumanian Embassy in Berlin Valeanu. The Rumanian representative said that different treatment of Rumanian Jews compared to Hungarian Jews, was understood in Rumania as a loss of political prestige. They were also interested in the property of the Rumanian Jews. Klingenfuss stated that it was a mistaken view, and in the case of property, he argued for the territorial principle,⁷⁴ but the Rumanian side did not accept this. The Germans did not succeed in

and Transistria. For further details see: BENZ, ref. 66.

67 Franz Rademacher (1906 – 1973), Nazi diplomat, in 1940 – 1943 head of the so-called Jewish department at the Foreign Office, which participated in carrying out the Holocaust.

68 PA AA Berlin, f. Inland II geheim. R. 100.883 Rumänien 1941 – 1944.

69 For further details see: BENZ, ref. 66, p. 21.

70 ADAP, Serie E, Bd. 2, dokument 209, p. 353-360. There is also a specialized Rumanian – German edition of documents about the Holocaust. See: A1 III-lea Reich și Holocaustul din România 1940 – 1945. Documente din arhivele germane. Eds. Ottmar Trașcă, Dennis Deltant. Bucharest 2007.

71 PA AA Berlin, f. Inland II A/B. Das Judentum in Deutschland 1941-42, R 99355. For example, the position of the Rumanian consul in Vienna on the marking of Rumanian Jews from 25 March 1942. On 16 March 1942, the Rumanian consul general turned to the Reichstatthalter in Vienna on the matter of the marking of Rumanian Jews. On 25 March 1942, the Reichstatthalter sent a report to Berlin with regard to a reply. The Rumanian consul appealed to the different treatment of this question in the cases of Bulgarian, Hungarian, Turkish, Italian and Swiss Jews. In June 1942, the deputy secretary of state at the Foreign Office M. Luther reported protests against the marking of Jews with Rumanian citizenship from the Rumanian consuls in Paris, Brussels and Prague.

72 PA AA, Berlin, f. Inland II geheim. Die Judenfrage – Kennzeichnung der deutschen und ausländischen Juden 1941-42. R 100 851.

73 Karl Otto Klingenuß (1901 – 1990), Nazi diplomat. In 1942 active in the so-called Jewish department of the Foreign Office, subordinate to F. Rademacher.

74 Nazi Germany applied this principle in relation to Slovakia. It meant that each country gained the property of the Jews deported from its territory, even if they were foreign citizens. The property of a Jewish citizen of Slovakia, who was deported from Nazi Germany, passed to the German state. The property of Jews with German citizenship, deported from Slovakia, would fall into Slovak hands. The Rumanian side started from the principle that it could not give up any Jewish property abroad, because Rumania was

changing the Rumanian position. The German side did not demand the changing of the Rumanian consuls, who had actually “gone beyond” an earlier agreement of the Rumanian government. It could not quickly sweep this problem from the table. It became the object of negotiations by Germany not only with Rumania, but also with other European governments including those of Hungary and Italy.

The question of the marking and subsequent deportation of Jewish citizens of Rumania became a question of political “prestige”. Rumania felt “aggrieved” by the fact that the Hungarian and Italian Jews in Germany were not marked or deported. The Rumanian side raised the problem of the “marking of Jews with citizenship of different states” as a question of the equal treatment of allies. The Rumanian question was whether Rumania was a lesser ally of Nazi Germany than the other states?⁷⁵ Thus, the German effort to mark Jews with foreign citizenship provoked an “unwanted” result. Germany had to deal with the comments of its allies, which wanted to draw “political” or even “alliance” conclusions about the relationship of Nazi Germany to individual states, from the German treatment of Jews with citizenship of different states.

The solution of this problem went so far, that in 1943, Rumania accepted some of the Jews with Rumanian citizenship from the territory of the Reich back into the territory of Rumania.⁷⁶ However, this was already in a different military and political situation – it was after Stalingrad.

Concerning the actual Rumanian – German talks about deportation of Jews from the territory of Rumania “to the East” – that is to the General Government, it is necessary to say that the deputy prime minister Mihai Antonescu⁷⁷ originally agreed to the deportation of Jews from Rumania, or from Transylvania and Banat, from the middle of September 1942.⁷⁸

We also know about the letter of agreement from M. Antonescu to adviser G. Richter from the report of the German ambassador in Bucharest Manfred von Killinger,⁷⁹ sent to the Foreign Office on 12 August 1942.⁸⁰

“Rumanianizing” (the Rumanian version of Aryanizing) Jewish property, and would not give up any part of it.

75 PA AA Berlin, f. Inland II geheim. Die Judenfrage – Kennzeichnung der deutschen und ausländischen Juden 1941-42. R 100.851. Rumanian ambassador to Woermann – 24 July 1942: „*Während Deutschland die rumänische Juden z. B. im besetzten Frankreich den französischen und deutschen Juden gleich-stelle, gelte dasselbe nicht für italienische und z. B. ungarische Juden. Es sei aber mit Rücksicht auf das ungarisch-rumänische Verhältnis für die Rumänische Regierung abträglich, wenn die Juden ungarischer Staatsangehörigkeit gegenüber denjenigen rumänischer Staatsangehörigkeit privilegiert würden.*“

76 PA AA Berlin, f. Inland A/B. R 100.882 Rumänien. In 1943, Jews were transported to Rumania from Holland, Italy and Greece.

77 Mihai Antonescu (1904 – 1946), deputy prime minister of Rumania, 1943 – 1944 minister of foreign affairs of Rumania. Executed after the Second World War.

78 PA AA Berlin, f. Inland II geheim, R 100.883 Rumänien 1941-1944. 14 Aug 1942 – M. Luther to Bucharest: “*Wie der Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD mitteilt, ist vorgesehen, etwa ab 10. September 1942 nunmehr auch Juden aus Rumänien in Sonderzügen nach dem Osten abzubefördern.*”

79 Manfred von Killinger (1886 – 1944) ambassador of Nazi Germany to Rumania 1941 – 1944. From Salzburg until the beginning of 1941 he held the same position in Slovakia. In 1944, he committed suicide in Bucharest, when Rumania changed to supporting the Allies.

80 PA AA Berlin, f. Inland II geheim, R. 100.881. Rumänien. M. v. Killinger to the Foreign Office, 12 Aug

On 19 August 1942, Rintelen⁸¹ wrote to the deputy secretary of state M. Luther, that in Rumania everything was prepared for the deportation of the Jews.⁸² It is necessary to observe here that from the Rumanian point of view these were not “Rumanian” Jews, but Jews from Transylvania or Banát, who mostly spoke Hungarian.

However, the situation slowly began to change. The German ambassador M. von Killinger wrote to the Foreign Office on 15 September 1942, with a note that it should go to A. Eichmann, that an exact date for the beginning of the deportations could not be determined.⁸³ Rumania quietly retreated from the deportation of Jews from its territory to the territory of the Third Reich.

On 29 September 1942, the deputy secretary of state at the Foreign Office Martin Luther intervened with the German Embassy in Bucharest regarding the deportations.⁸⁴

On 5 October 1942, the German adviser for the Jewish question G. Richter wrote an extensive report, in which he stated that panic had broken out among the Jews, when they learnt they were going to be deported. Various Jewish activists made contact with Rumanian politicians in an effort to stop the deportations. Richter named especially Juliu Maniu and Dinu Bratianu.

According to Richter, the Jews also gained the support of Metropolitan of the Orthodox Church in Transylvania Balan. On the other hand, he said openly that Mihai Anto-

1942: „[...] mit der Aussiedlung der Juden aus Rumänien und mit dem sofortigen Abtransport der Juden aus den Bezirken Arad, Temeschburg und Turda einverstanden erklärt. Mihai Antonescu hat in dem Schreiben darauf hingewiesen, dass dies auch der Wunsch des Marschalls Antonescu sei.“

- 81 Emil Otto Paul von Rintelen (1897 – 1981), German diplomat. In the period 1941 – 1943, he belonged to the staff of the minister of foreign affairs Joachim von Ribbentrop. In the cited report we can read: „Es ist vorgesehen, die Juden aus Rumänien, beginnend etwa mit dem 10.9.1942, in laufenden Transporten nach dem Distrikt Lublin zu verbringen, wo der arbeitsfähige Teil arbeitseinsatzmäßig angesetzt [sic] wird, der Rest der Sonderbehandlung unterzogen werden soll.“ KLEE, Ernst. *Das Personenlexikon zum Dritten Reich*. Frankfurt/M. : Fischer Taschenbuch, 2005, S. 498.
- 82 PA AA Berlin, f. Inland II geheim, R. 100.881. Rumänien. Rintelen to M. Luther 19 Aug 1942: „Der Bericht des Chefs der Sicherheitspolizei und des Sicherheitsdienstes vom 26. Juli an den Reichsführer-SS betreffend Evakuierung von Juden aus Rumänien lautet wie folgt: Die Vorbereitungen in politischer und technischer Hinsicht in Bezug auf die Lösung der Judenfrage in Rumänien sind durch den Beauftragten des Reichssicherheits-Hauptamtes soweit abgeschlossen, daß mit dem Anlaufen der Evakuierungstransporte in Zeitkürze begonnen werden kann. Es ist vorgesehen, die Juden aus Rumänien, beginnend etwa mit dem 10. 9. 1942, in laufenden Transporte nach dem Distrikt Lublin zu verbringen, wo der arbeitsfähige Teil arbeitseinsatzmäßig angesetzt wird, der Rest der Sondebehandlung unterzogen werden soll. Es ist Vorsorge getroffen, daß diesen Juden nach Überschreiten der rumänischen Grenze die Staatsangehörigkeit verloren geht. Die Verhandlungen bezüglich der Regelung in Rumänien sind seit einige Zeit mit dem Auswärtigen Amt im Gange, ebenso die Besprechungen mit dem Reichsverkehrministerium zweck Fahrplannerstellung; die Verhandlungen sind als durchaus günstig anzusprechen. Auf Weisung des Reichssicherheits-Hauptamtes ließ sich der Berater für Judenfragen in Bukarest, SS-Hauptsturmführer Richter, vom stellvertretenden rumänischen Ministerpräsidenten Mihail Antonescu ein persönliches Schreiben aushändigen, dessen Fotokopie ich diesem Schreiben mit der Bitte um Kenntnisnahme beifüge. Ich bitte um Genehmigung, die Abschiebungsarbeiten in der Vorgetragenen Form durchführen zu könne. [...]“
- 83 PA AA Berlin, f. Inland II geheim, R. 100.881. Rumänien.
- 84 PA AA Berlin, f. Inland II geheim, R. 100.881. Rumänien. Luther to Killinger 29 Sept 1942: „Rumänische Teilnehmer sind zur vereinbarten Fahrplankonferenz über Judenausiedlung nicht erschienen. Bitte darauf hinzuwirken, daß nachdem unsererseits alle Vorbereitungen getroffen Maßnahme bescheunigt und vor Eintritt Winterwetters durchgeführt werden können.“

nescu had retreated from his decision, in spite of his previous signed consent given in a letter to G. Richter.⁸⁵ As Richter stated, the change of attitude of Marshal Ion Antonescu was also decisive.⁸⁶ It is necessary to say that in spite of this retreat, Rumania created a Commissariat for the Jewish Question in October 1942 after talks with the German side. It was headed by Leccu and was supposed to strive for a more radical solution of the Jewish question in Rumania.

The German side continued to discuss deportations with the Rumanians. On 9 October 1942, the adviser from the German Embassy Dr. Stelzer met M. Antonescu, who agreed that on 22 October 1942, he would again meet G. Richter to discuss deportations. During the talks, Antonescu submitted a copy of the decision of Marshal Antonescu,⁸⁷ that the “evacuation” of the Jews from Transylvania was only being studied and implementation was postponed.⁸⁸

Finally, the above mentioned Martin Luther wrote to the German ambassador in Bucharest Killinger on 14 December 1942, that it did not matter that the deportations were not happening. The important thing was that they should begin in spring 1943. However, this did not happen. A memorandum of the Rumanian government from 26 March 1943, which summarized Rumania’s anti-Jewish policy since 1938,⁸⁹ spoke of deportation of the Jews as a solution. However, it was considered that the Jews should be deported to regions under the control of the Anglo-Saxon powers.⁹⁰

In spite of its own Rumanian deportation and killing of Jews, Rumania avoided the deportation of Jews from its territory to the Nazi concentration camps in 1942 and later.⁹¹ The German side could not carry out deportations from Rumania with its own forces. In spite of failure over the question of deportation of Rumanian Jews, Nazi Germany did not demand that the Rumanian politicians responsible, for example, M. Antonescu, be punished or removed from office.⁹²

85 This document or letter has not been found or published by any historian up to now.

86 PA AA Berlin, f. Inland II geheim, R. 100.881. Rumänien. Richter also mentioned a personal intervention by Dr. Lupu with Marshal I. Antonescu.

87 Ion Antonescu (1882 – 1946), Rumanian marshal, in the period 1940 – 1944 prime minister with dictatorial powers. Executed after the Second World War.

88 PA AA Berlin, f. Inland A/B. R. 100.881 Rumänien.

89 The deportation of Jews from Bukovina, Bessarabia and the killing of Jews in Transistria are not mentioned in the memorandum. For further details see: HAUSLEITNER, Mariana: *Die Rumäniesierung der Bukowina 1918 – 1944. Die Durchsetzung des nationalstaatlichen Anspruchs Großrumäniens*. Munich 2001; HAUSLEITNER, ref. 66.

90 “Für die endgültig Lösung des jüdischen Problems in Rumänien gibt es unserer Meinung nach – nur eine einzige Lösung: die Auswanderung ist auch heute möglich, da die Regierungen der Angelsächsischen Länder das Einwandern der Juden in gewissen Gebieten zulassen.” PA AA Berlin, f. Inland A/B. R. 100.881 – Rumania. Finally, on 12 Dec 1942, Manfred von Killinger informed Berlin that I. Antonescu was preparing to deport the Jews to Palaestine, and that he wanted to gain 200,000 lei for every Jew. Killinger concluded from this that Antonescu wanted to get rid of the Jews and he also wanted to obtain financial resources. PA AA Berlin, f. Inland II geheim, R. 100.881. Rumanien.

91 However, on the basis of the Second Vienna Arbitration, Rumania lost part of its territory to Hungary. In 1944, Jews from Transylvania were deported together with other transports of Hungarian Jews, because this territory belonged to Hungary.

92 For further details see: YVA Jerusalem, f. R 1, A.A. Deutschland III (Microfilm 2 215 and 2 218).

Hungary

Hungary also applied its own policy of anti-Semitism and had done so since 1920. Various anti-Semitic legal norms were adopted after 1938.⁹³ In 1941, Hungary even deported Jews with foreign citizenship, who were handed over to Nazi Germany. After the beginning of the war against the Soviet Union, Bardóssy's⁹⁴ government deported about 15-17 thousand Jews mostly from Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia to the region of Kamenec Podolský. The deportation was done by the government commissioner for Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia M. Kozma⁹⁵ with the agreement of M. Horthy⁹⁶ as well as Bardóssy. The Germans killed most of these Jews immediately.⁹⁷

The home-grown Hungarian policy of anti-Semitism also included large-scale slaughter at Novi Sad in Vojvodina⁹⁸ in January 1942. The Hungarian general F. Feketehalmy-Czeydner⁹⁹ had several thousand Jews and Serbs shot.¹⁰⁰

These examples may document that Hungary, like Rumania but unlike Slovakia, “differentiated” between Jews, namely between Jewish citizens of Hungary on one side, and Jewish refugees or inhabitants of “acquired” territories on the other.¹⁰¹ For the politicians of the Slovak state no such distinction existed. For them, all Jews were the same.

In relation to the present problem, it is possible to say that Hungary did not agree with the marking of Hungarian Jews in the Third Reich or with their deportation from the territory of Nazi Germany to concentration camps. Like Rumania, but to a larger extent, Hungary received some of its Jews back into its territory from France, Belgium and Holland in 1943.

There was a change of government in Hungary in the period we are concerned with. The government of L. Bardóssy was replaced in March 1942 by a new one headed by Miklós Kállay.¹⁰²

HILBERG, ref. 4, p. 811 – 858.

- 93 In 1938, article XV of the act *On the more effective securing of social and economic life* was introduced, and in 1939, article IV of the act *On limiting expansion of the public and economic life of Jews*. These amendments started from the confessional definition of Jews. In 1941, articles XV and XXXI of the act introduced the racial definition of the Jews in Hungary.
- 94 László Bardóssy (1890 – 1946), from 1941 minister of foreign affairs. Prime minister of Hungary from 3 April 1941 to 7 March 1942. Executed in Hungary after the Second World War
- 95 Miklós Kozma (1884 – 1941), from 1935 to 1937 prime minister. In the period 1940 – 1941 government commissioner for Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia.
- 96 Miklós Horthy de Nagybánya (1868 – 1957), from 1920 to 1944 Regent of Hungary.
- 97 See e.g.: HILBERG, ref. 4, p. 875-877.
- 98 Hungary gained this region after the defeat of Yugoslavia in 1941.
- 99 Ferenc Feketehalmy-Czeydner (1890 – 1946) was the military commander in Novi Sad after the occupation of Yugoslavia, in which Hungary gained part of Vojvodina. In 1943 he gained asylum in Nazi Germany. In October 1944, he returned to Hungary and became deputy minister of war in F. Szálasi's government. After the war he was handed over to Yugoslavia, convicted and executed for the killings in Novi Sad.
- 100 See, e.g. HILBERG, ref. 4, p. 876.
- 101 On the basis of the First Vienna Arbitration, Hungary gained part of southern Slovakia. In March 1939, it gained Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. In 1940, Hungary gained territory in Transylvania from Rumania by the Second Vienna Arbitration, and in 1941, part of Vojvodina at the expense of Yugoslavia.
- 102 Miklós Kállay (1887 – 1967). From 9 March 1942 to 22 March 1944 head of the Hungarian government.

The differentiated approach to the Jews, distinguishing between Hungarian citizens and “foreigners”, can also be seen in the following Hungarian offer. According to a report from the deputy secretary of state at the Foreign Office M. Luther to F. Klengenfuss at the Foreign Office, at the beginning of the year [understand 1942 – E. N.], the Hungarian lieutenant general J. Heszlényi¹⁰³ expressed the wish of the Hungarian government for the deportation (*Aussiedlung*) of the Jewish refugees, who lived in Hungary without permission. Hungary finally proposed that they should be deported “to the region east of the Dneestr”. The German side concerned itself with this problem at the beginning of July 1942 through the Hungarian military attaché. However, it was not more closely concerned with the Hungarian proposal, because it was rejected by the RSHA.¹⁰⁴

The problem was so serious that H. Himmler also knew about it. He mentioned it in a letter to Joachim von Ribbentrop¹⁰⁵ on 30 November 1942. Himmler also rejected such a partial solution and wrote that the “Abschiebung” of the stateless Jews could wait until the Hungarian side was prepared to agree that the “action” would also include the Jews with Hungarian citizenship.¹⁰⁶ At this time, Himmler even offered Hungary an adviser on the Jewish question.¹⁰⁷ He would be D. Wisliceny, who, in Himmler’s view, had proved himself in Slovakia. However, the Hungarian side did not accept an adviser.¹⁰⁸

After the occupation of Hungary in 1944, the Germans took him to the camp at Mauthausen and later to Dachau, where he was freed by the Allies. For general information on Hungarian – German relations in the period of Kállay’s government see e.g. DURUCZ, ref. 3.

103 Jozsef Heszlényi (1890 – 1945), in 1942 commander of the IV Army Corps.

104 PA AA Berlin, Inland II – geheim. Die Judenfrage in Ungarn – Bd. 208, Nr. 2275, years 1942 – 1943, microfiche – R 100.890. Report from M. Luther to Klengenfuss from 24 Dec 1942. In a letter from A. Eichmann to F. Klengenfuss from the Foreign Office from 25 Sept 1942, we can read: „[...] daß es aus technischen Gründen z. Zi. nicht möglich ist, eine Teilaktion für Ungarn in die Wege zu leiten. Als eine solche Teilaktion wäre die Übernahme lediglich der seinerzeit nach Ungarn geflüchteten Juden anzusprechen. Erfahrungsgemäß ist für die Vorbereitung und Durchführung solcher Teilaktionen derselbe Kräfteaufwand erforderlich, wie bei generellen Vorhaben, die möglichst alle Juden einer Landes umschliessen. Ich halte es daher nicht für engebracht, daß zur Aussiedlung nur jener Juden, die seinerzeit nach Ungarn geflüchtete sind, der ganze Evakuierungsapparat in Bewegung gesetzt und dann, ohne daß man der Lösung der Judenfrage in Ungarn näher gekommen wäre, wieder abgestoppt wird. Aus diesen Gründen wäre es nach h. T. besser, mit dieser Aktion solange zu warte, bis Ungarn bereit ist, auch die ungarischen Juden in die Maßnahmen einzubeziehen. [...]“ PA AA Berlin, f. Inland II – geheim. Die Judenfrage in Ungarn – Bd. 208, Nr. 2276, roky 1942 – 1943, microfiche - R 100.890.

105 The Foreign Office was informed about this problem by letter from the OKW on 21 July 1942. See PA AA Berlin, Inland II – geheim. Die Judenfrage in Ungarn – Bd. 208, Nr. 2276, years 1942 – 43, microfiche – R 100.890. Minister J. von Ribbentrop also wanted information about the stateless Jews from ambassador D. von Jagow on 10 Dec 1942. See: PA AA Berlin, f. Inland II – geheim. Die Judenfrage in Ungarn – Bd. 208, Nr. 2275, year 1942 – 1943, microfiche – R 100.890.

106 PA AA Berlin, f. Inland II – geheim. Die Judenfrage in Ungarn – Bd. 208, Nr. 2275, years 1942 – 1943, microfiche – R 100.890.

107 The question of an adviser for the solution of the Jewish question in Hungary also appeared in the minutes of the Wannsee Conference in January 1942. See, e.g.: ROSEMAN, ref. 5, p. 138-139. “*To solve this question in Hungary, it is necessary to insist on the Hungarian government having an adviser on the Jewish question as soon as possible.*”

108 PA AA Berlin, f. Inland II – geheim. Die Judenfrage in Ungarn – Bd. 208, Nr. 2275, years 1942 – 1943, microfiche – R 100.890.

The German efforts to mark and deport the Jews with Hungarian citizenship resident in the Third Reich, and to deport the Jews in Hungary itself can be traced during the years 1942 and 1943 in a multitude of discussions of the German side with the Hungarian ambassador D. Sztójay,¹⁰⁹ representatives of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and prime minister Kállay himself.

The first important meeting was the talks between ambassador Sztójay and the deputy secretary of state at the Foreign Office Luther on 11 August 1942. In the name of his government, Sztójay protested against the fact that Jews with Hungarian citizenship had to wear the Jewish star in occupied France. According to his government, he spoke of discrimination because Rumanian or Italian Jews did not have to wear it. However, Sztójay himself said that it was unpleasant to have to say this, because he was himself a fighter for anti-Semitism. Luther told him that the situation with Rumania was already being solved, and it was the same with Italy.¹¹⁰ Thus, we can see that like Rumania, Hungary was calling for the solution of the problem of its Jewish citizens as a problem of reciprocity, that is of equal treatment of all Jews with foreign citizenship by Nazi Germany.

After this meeting, the German side recognized the problems with Hungary. We can illustrate this on the basis of a statement by M. Luther. In a telegram of 21 August 1942 to Rintelen, who worked for minister Ribbentrop in relation to Hungary, he stated that deportations could not be implemented, because the anti-Semitic legislation had not been sufficiently prepared.¹¹¹

A letter of 26 September 1942 from Werkmeister to the Foreign Office contains information about defeatism in Hungarian political circles with regard to the victorious waging of war on the Eastern Front, and in this area he found Jewish influence.¹¹² It is a clear example of the idea that Jews are behind everything bad in the world, and so also in Hungary.

M. Luther again met Sztójay on 2 October 1942. Regarding the Jews with Hungarian citizenship in the Third Reich and in the western territories, Luther gave Sztójay a clear choice: either marking and “evacuation”, or these Jews must be accepted back in Hungary by 31 December 1942. With regard to their property, he supported the territorial principle. Luther formulated his ideas about “solution” of the Jewish question in Hungary in three points:

1. Exclusion from cultural and economic life.
2. Marking of Jews.
3. “*Aussiedlung nach dem Osten*”.

109 Döme Sztójay, really named Dimitrije Sztojakovich, (1883 – 1946), 1932 – 1935 military attaché in Berlin; 1936 – 1944 Hungarian ambassador in Berlin; 22 March 1944 – 29 Aug 1944 prime minister of Hungary. Executed after the Second World War.

110 PA AA, Berlin, f. Inland II – geheim. Die Judenfrage in Ungarn – Bd. 208, Nr. 2276, years 1942 – 1943, microfiche – R 100.890.

111 ADAP, Serie E, Bd. 2, document 209; “*An die ungarische Regierung ist wegen Judenausiedlung noch nicht herangetreten worden, weil der Stand der ungarischen Judengesetzgebung bisher einen ausrechenenden Erfolg nicht verspricht.*”

112 PA AA Berlin, Inland II – geheim. Die Judenfrage in Ungarn – Bd. 208, Nr. 2275, years 1942 – 1943, microfiche – R 100.890.

With regard to Jewish property, Nazi Germany also supported the territorial principle in this case.¹¹³ Ambassador Jagow reported on 13 October 1942 that the Hungarian side rejected this principle.¹¹⁴

As if his meeting with Sztójay was not enough, on 8 October 1942 Luther informed the ambassador in Budapest Jagow about the German policy on Jews with Hungarian citizenship. Jagow had to pass this information on to the Hungarian government.¹¹⁵

The seriousness of the situation is also documented by discussions between Germans regarding the planned meeting between Sztójay and minister Ribbentrop. The latter decided on 13 October 1942 that the Hungarian ambassador would “only” meet the second man at the Nazi Foreign Office: secretary of state Weizsäcker.¹¹⁶

The secretary of state received Sztójay on 14 October 1942 and essentially repeated everything the ambassador had already heard from Luther. He added that during his planned visit to Budapest, Sztójay should discuss the problem with the Hungarian government. Weizsäcker also pointed out that in his view, the Jews had provoked panic in Budapest during its bombardment. According to him, this was another reason for “*Aussiedlung Juden nach Osten*”.¹¹⁷

On 17 October 1942, Jagow reported that according to the Hungarian foreign ministry, the Jewish question was the responsibility of prime minister Kállay.¹¹⁸

On the same day, Jagow also interpreted the Hungarian reply regarding the “Jewish problem”. With regard to the Jews with Hungarian citizenship, the Hungarian side supported the principle of “equality”. This meant that it was willing to accept the principle that all such Jews should be treated equally. Where Jewish property was concerned, Hungary still rejected the territorial principle, as Jagow soon reported.

Regarding the general principles of the “solution”, the Hungarian side stated that in relation to state sovereignty, every state had to find its own solution to the problem, and it mentioned the anti-Semitic decrees from 1920, 1938 and 1939. However, there was a different situation in the economic field, which the Jews almost entirely filled. At the same time, the Hungarian side noted that 80% of the Hungarian economy was in the “service of German economic interests”. Precisely for this reason, the Jews could not be removed from key positions, although they were trying. The Hungarian side also rejected the marking of Jews, because it could cause problems for their exclusion from economic life. “Aussiedlung” of the Jews from Hungary could not be done, because it could easily

113 PA AA Berlin, Inland II – geheim. Die Judenfrage in Ungarn – Bd. 208, Nr. 2276, years 1942 – 1943, microfiche – R 100.890.

114 PA AA Berlin, Inland II – geheim. Die Judenfrage in Ungarn – Bd. 208, Nr. 2276, years 1942 – 1943, microfiche – R 100.890.

115 PA AA Berlin, Inland II – geheim. Die Judenfrage in Ungarn – Bd. 208, Nr. 2276, years 1942 – 1943, microfiche – R 100.890.

116 PA AA Berlin, Inland II – geheim. Die Judenfrage in Ungarn – Bd. 208, Nr. 2276, years 1942 – 1943, microfiche – R 100.890.

117 PA AA Berlin, Inland II – geheim. Die Judenfrage in Ungarn – Bd. 208, Nr. 2276, years 1942 – 1943, microfiche – R 100.890.

118 PA AA Berlin, Inland II – geheim. Die Judenfrage in Ungarn – Bd. 208, Nr. 2275, years 1942 – 1943, microfiche – R 100.890.

lead to disturbances, or damage to the economic war effort.¹¹⁹ However, the Hungarian side promised that it would continue to “solve the Jewish question”.

In the same month ambassador Jagow reported a speech by Kállay, in which he said: “*It is not enough to deprive the Jews of some political positions and of property. We must also exclude their spirit*”.¹²⁰

On the other hand, when he wrote about his meeting with Kállay on 27 October 1942, he noted that the Hungarian prime minister promised that Hungary would give a reply about the Jews with Hungarian citizenship. However, according to Jagow, Kállay said that the Jewish question in Hungary was a purely internal political matter. The position of Hungary was different because there were about one million Jews in the country. Jagow replied that the Jewish question was an international question, and he offered to arrange a meeting between Hungarian and German experts on this question.¹²¹

After Sztójay returned from Budapest, he met Weizsäcker on 26 November 1942. The ambassador only stated that the Hungarian government had still not decided about the Jewish question.¹²²

Kállay subsequently emphasized to Jagow that if they completely excluded the Jews and deported them, they would have to assimilate the Germans in Hungary, because the Hungarian Jews were assimilated. The deputy secretary of state Luther was also informed about this view.¹²³

German pressure had still not succeeded. On 9 March 1943, Bergermann from the Foreign Office wrote to Martin Bormann, asking him to intervene during the visit of the Hungarian minister B. Lukács with regard to the “solution of the Jewish question” in Hungary, and to repeat the three German demands: exclusion from cultural and economic life, marking of Jews and “*Aussiedlung nach Osten*”.¹²⁴

The problem of the “solution” of the Jewish question in Hungary was one of the points discussed in the talks between Hitler and Horthy on 17 April 1943. There was already a different military and political situation after Stalingrad, and Hitler did not succeed in convincing Horthy of the need to deport the Jews from Hungary.¹²⁵

The analysed statements of ambassador Sztójay and Prime Minister Kállay may show a rather wide range of Hungarian arguments against deportations and rapid intervention against the Jewish community. The statement about the impossibility of excluding the Jews from economic life, where they had an important position, was significant.

119 PA AA Berlin, Inland II – geheim. Die Judenfrage in Ungarn – Bd. 208, Nr. 2275, years 1942 – 1943, microfiche – R 100.890.

120 PA AA Berlin, Inland II – geheim. Die Judenfrage in Ungarn – Bd. 208, Nr. 2276, years 1942 – 1943, microfiche – R 100.890.

121 PA AA Berlin, Inland II – geheim. Die Judenfrage in Ungarn – Bd. 208, Nr. 2276, years 1942 – 1943, microfiche – R 100.890.

122 PA AA Berlin, Inland II – geheim. Die Judenfrage in Ungarn – Bd. 208, Nr. 2276, years 1942 – 1943, microfiche – R 100.890.

123 PA AA Berlin, Inland II – g, Akten Judenfrage in Ungarn – Bd. 212, Nr. 2288, microfiche – R 100.894.

124 PA AA Berlin, Inland II – geheim. Die Judenfrage in Ungarn – Bd. 208, Nr. 2274, years 1942 – 1943, microfiche – R 100.890.

125 HILBERG, ref. 4, p. 881.

The Hungarian side even used the argument that it would threaten military supplies to Germany. If the Rumanian side appealed to loss of prestige if Rumanian Jews were marked while Hungarian Jews were not, the Hungarian side tried to find out whether Italy was also implementing anti-Jewish measures.

Therefore, we can find a relatively extensive range of arguments, which the German side had to consider or discuss.¹²⁶ The Hungarian – German talks show that there were some possibilities for an ally to unambiguously disagree with German demands for the solution of the Jewish question. The Hungarian politicians did not suffer the immediate loss of their political power as a result.¹²⁷

The Slovak politicians were not informed in detail about these discussions, but the published documents show that they were interested especially in the position of Hungarian Jews in Nazi Germany.¹²⁸ Perhaps we should add that Jews with Hungarian citizenship were not deported from Slovakia to concentrations camps in 1942, and they had to appeal to their citizenship to achieve this. The Slovak side also agreed with this. The situation changed after Hungary and Slovakia were occupied by Nazi Germany in 1944. However, Eichmann's task force could not have carried out the extensive deportation of Jews from Hungary without help from Hungarian officials.

If we compare the situation in Hungary and Slovakia, I consider D. Wisliceny's report from autumn 1942 interesting. On 1 October 1942, Wisliceny met Fay in Budapest.¹²⁹ Fay spoke about the important position of Jews in the economy, which could be changed only gradually – in three stages: first Sub-Carpathian Ukraine and Transylvania, then the Hungarian countryside, and finally Budapest. He unambiguously said that deportations like those done in Slovakia, could not be implemented in Hungary. Wisliceny did not comment on this. We do not find any critical comments on Fay's view even in Wisliceny's report.

On the other hand, a report from the German embassy from 8 October 1942, after 56 transports had left Slovakia,¹³⁰ stated that the Jews still had an important economic position, even after the liquidation of about 10,000 Jewish shops and businesses and the Aryanization of almost 2000. As soon as Slovakia willingly accepted the deportation of Jews, the German side "logically" demanded complete deportation and the creation of a state that would be "Judenrein" – entirely without Jews.

Conclusion

By comparing the situation in three unoccupied states, which had alliance or satellite relationships with Nazi Germany, the author wants to say the following in conclusion:

126 YVA Jerusalem, f. R 1, A.A. – Inland II g 58/1 (microfilm 2219); HILBERG, ref. 4, p. 859-926.

127 Slovak politicians used this argument in trials after the Second World War.

128 *Holokaust na Slovensku 4*, ref. 9, p. 140-142.

129 The literature contains a continuing argument about whether "Fay" was Kállay's secretary Gedeon Fay-Halasz or the member of parliament László Vay. The problem is that in German, the letter "V" is pronounced like "F". See, e.g.: HILBERG, ref. 4, p. 879.

130 *Holokaust na Slovensku 4*, ref. 9, p. 220-222.

It was much more important for Nazi Germany to win the war than to implement the Holocaust at any price in individual European states. For the Third Reich, it was more important that:

1. The states were stabilized, the solution of the Jewish question did not provoke internal political crises, and the Nazis did not have to occupy these states. Collaboration was more important than the forcible occupation of states. It was not that the Third Reich did not have enough police and military units, but that it needed them on the Eastern Front.

2. The stability of these states was important because of military production intended for Nazi Germany. The Wehrmacht impatiently awaited the results.

3. It was also more important that these states and others sent their military units to the Eastern Front, either to fight in the front line or for duties behind the front. Any forces were valuable to Germany in 1942.

This view from Nazi Germany was purely pragmatic. As soon as the war was won, they would be able to do whatever they wanted with Europe, and not only with the Jews.

However, failure to deport Jews in 1942 did not mean a threat to the political career or even the life of a collaborating politician. Some Slovak politicians from Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, who had participated in politics under the Slovak state, made such claims after the Second World War. Rumania even retreated from agreement to deport some of the Jews from the territory of Rumania, and the German side did not attempt to remove M. Antonescu. Similarly, in spite of pressure on Hungary, K. Kállay's government avoided deportation of Jews in 1942. According to the course of the talks, as well as on the basis of documents from the deputy secretary of state M. Luther, it is possible to state that every reservation of Hungary or Rumania, concerning why they did not have to deport Jews, became the subject of bilateral diplomatic discussions. Germany put pressure on states, but we know of no documents mentioning threats to the representatives of states or demands for their removal if they did not deport Jews.

The political representatives of these states did not have full knowledge of the discussions of the others with Nazi Germany. However, it is clear that when the Jews were deported from the territory of Slovakia, the representatives of the Slovak state knew very well that, for example, Jews with Hungarian citizenship could not be deported from Slovakia, or they had to be handed over to Hungary.

It is necessary to say that the Nazis certainly realized that without the support of individual governments, or the state, police and other institutions of these states, they would not be able to carry out the deportation of the Jews. We can see this in the case of Slovakia, where the deportations were carried out by the Slovaks themselves.¹³¹ It was the same in Hungary in 1944,¹³² when the Jews were deported after the occupation of the

131 For further details see: *Holokaust na Slovensku 6. Deportácie v roku 1942*. Ed. Eduard Nižňanský. Bratislava: NMŠ, 2005.

132 On 11 July 1944, German ambassador Veese Mayer sent a report from Budapest to the Foreign Office, in which he wrote that the Hungarian foreign ministry had pointed out: „[...] wie schwierig die Stel-

country. Eichmann's so-called task force could not have carried out mass deportations in only a few months without the help of Hungarian state and political institutions.

Therefore, the political elites of these states cannot escape political responsibility for the implementation of home-grown anti-Semitic policies, or for their cooperation with Nazi Germany in the preparation and implementation of the deportation of Jews, whether already in 1942, or only later in 1944 and 1945.

* The study was produced in the framework of the project APVV 0352-07 *Slovak – German relations in the period 1938 – 1945 in documents (From Munich to the end of the war)*.

VERHANDLUNGEN DES NAZISTISCHEN DEUTSCHLANDS ÜBER DIE JUDENDEPORTATIONEN IM JAHR 1942 – AM BEISPIEL DER SLOWAKEI, RUMÄNIEN UND UNGARN

EDUARD NIŽŇANSKÝ

Die Studie „Verhandlungen des nazistischen Deutschlands über die Judendeportationen im Jahr 1942 – am Beispiel der Slowakei, Rumänien und Ungarn“ ist ein Versuch der Komparation von Verhandlungen über die Deportation der Juden aus den erwähnten Ländern in den Jahren 1941/1942. Die Komparation wird dadurch ermöglicht, dass sowohl die Slowakei, als auch Rumänien und Ungarn Verbündete des nazistischen Deutschlands waren. Für bedeutend halte ich auch die Tatsache, dass alle analysierten Staaten zu dieser Zeit (im weiteren Sinne 1941-1943) nicht zu den besetzten Staaten gehörten. Alle drei genannten Länder praktizierten bereits vorher autochthone Politik des Antisemitismus, auch wenn mit unterschiedlichem Ausmaß des Radikalismus. Das Grundelement der Komparation des von uns betrachtenden Problems geht aus der Kenntnis hervor, dass das nazistische Deutschland die Instrumentalisierung und Institutionalisierung der autochthonen antisemitischen Politik in den einzelnen Staaten verfolgte. Die Komparation ist auch deswegen möglich, weil das nazistische Deutschland den einzelnen Staaten bei den Verhandlungen über die Deportationen im Grunde genommen ähnliche Fragen stellte, die die Zusammenarbeit bei der Holocaustdurchführung betrafen. Die Unterschiede gab

lung der ungarischen Regierung durch die unterschiedliche Behandlung der Judenfrage durch die zuständigen deutschen Stellen in Ungarn, Rumänien und der Slowakei sei. Während wir hierzuland von der Regierung schärfstes Vorgehen gegen die Juden forderten, erlaube man den Rumänen und Slowaken, die dortigen Juden weit milder zu behandeln. Aus Rumänien gingen sogar weiterhin regelmässige Judentransporte nach Palästina ab. Nach den Berichten der ungarischen Gesandtschaften in Bukarest und Pressburg seien in der letzten Wochen zahlreiche ungarische Juden illegal über die Grenzen nach Rumänien bzw. der Slowakei übergetreten, wo sie oft den Landebehörden mehr oder weniger offen geduldet würden. Die Rumänen gingen sogar so weit, dass sie ihren Judentransporten nach Palästina neuerdings 20 Prozent ungarische Juden beimischen. Offenbar geschehe das, um bei unseren Feinden einen günstigen Eindruck hervorzurufen. Nach aussen entstehe daher der Eindruck, dass die Rumänen und Slowaken in der Judenfrage einen ganz anderen Standpunkt einnehmen als bei Ungarn, gegen die der ganze Hass der Feindstaaten und auch der Neutralen gelenkt werde. Dies wirke sich sehr ungünstig auf die Stellung der ungarischen Regierung aus.[...]“ PA AA Berlin, f. Inland II – geheim. Die Judenfrage in Ungarn – Bd. 209, Nr. 2279, years 1943 – 1944, microfiche R 100.891.

es bei der Art, wie sie dem Reich antworteten und wie diese Länder im Bezug auf die deutschen Vorstellungen und Anforderungen handelten. Aufgrund der Analyse der Verhandlungen kann man sagen, dass es für nazistisches Deutschland von wesentlich größerer Bedeutung war, den Krieg zu gewinnen, als um jeden Preis in allen europäischen Ländern den Holocaust durchzuführen. Die Kollaboration mit den Nazis war wichtiger als gewaltsame Besetzung der Staaten. Die Stabilität der Satelliten und Verbündeten ermöglichte dem Reich ihre Rüstungsindustrie zu nutzen, ihre Militäreinheiten halfen den Nazis auf der Ostfront. Es war eine nazistische pragmatische Entscheidung. Hätten sie den Krieg gewonnen, würden sie sowieso mit Europa (und zwar nicht nur mit den Juden) tun, was sie wollen. Solche Schlussfolgerung können wir auch durch die Behauptung bekräftigen, dass die Nichtdurchführung der Deportationen in Rumänien und Ungarn im untersuchten Zeitraum keine politische Machtverluste für ihre Elite oder deren physische Eliminierung zur Folge hatte. Die Slowakei wiederum eilte mit den Deportationen und die deutsche Seite konnte sie nur dank der ergiebigen Unterstützung durch die slowakische Exekutive und Gesetzgebung durchführen.

REVIEWS

ŠTEFÁNIK, Martin – LUKAČKA, Ján et al. *LEXIKON STREDOVEKÝCH MIEST NA SLOVENSKU. (A LEXICON OF MEDIEVAL TOWNS IN SLOVAKIA)*. Bratislava : Published by the Institute of History of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Prodama, 2010, 632 p.

The problem of towns has resounded in domestic and international historiography for several decades. The experts receive an extensive work of encyclopaedic character, which has been produced during a period of three years as a project financed by the Agency for the Support of Research and Development. The guarantor and main implementor of the project was the Department of the Slovak Medieval History at the Institute of History of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, in cooperation with several external experts from among the archivists and university historians. The team of twenty authors studied forty-seven medieval towns within the territory of present-day Slovakia in detail. The individual authors did not limit themselves to collecting and organizing existing finds. They also undertook extensive basic research, which brought a large amount of new information in many cases. The problems the authors encountered during this work and their progress towards solving them are presented in the introduction to the book. The method of selecting the individual localities is also explained there.

The book contains forty-seven sections, each covering one town. Every section has a fixed structure; it begins with the present official name of the town, accompanied by its names in German and Latin, and then is divided into eleven chapters. The first chapter deals with the original name of the town as recorded in medieval written sources, the etymology of the name as well as with first written accounts about the town. The second chapter gives information on the location of the town and its natural conditions. In the case of mining towns, the geology is briefly described. The town's place within administrative units and the medieval road network are discussed and changes regarding its territorial extent are mapped. The third chapter deals with the issue of the earliest settlement. The data concerning the origin and formation of a town, its categorization, its charter of privileges as well as its later confirmations can be found there too.

There is also information about the economic and political context of the emergence of the town, distinctive features and regional specifics that influenced its origins or further development. It is also specified which town law type a particular town followed.

The fifth chapter addresses the issue of building activities and topography, the sixth gives a chronological overview of events in the town's history up to the end of the Middle Ages, while the seventh is concerned with demographic development and the ethnic situation.

The eighth chapter deals with the economic activity of the town, namely the data regarding the economic activities of townsmen, their participation in long-distance trade, the imported/ exported goods and their quantities are further discussed as well as economic privileges, crafts, guilds and their organizations.

The ninth chapter deals with town self-government, its development and structure, economic policy, town officials, municipal administration and its origins, the oldest town symbols and archives. There is also a list of mayors included.

The tenth chapter contains information about important personalities, who came from the town, lived in it for a long time or significantly influenced its history. The numbers of students from the locality who studied at the universities in Cracow, Prague or Vienna are also given here.

The eleventh chapter of each section is concerned with the ecclesiastical history. It discusses the town's place within the particular dioceses and archdeaconries, information about the parishes,

selection of parish priests, churches, monasteries, chapels, church schools and religious societies within a town's territory as well as about important religious personalities and the beginnings of the Reformation up to 1526. Each section ends with extensive notes in abbreviated form and a summary in English, having the same structure as the section itself though in a reduced form.

The conclusion of the publication includes a list of abbreviations, archives and archive collections, published sources and literature. The aim of this work of encyclopedic character is to provide as much information as possible about each town for the researcher concerned with the problem of medieval towns. A Lexicon of Medieval Towns in Slovakia is the most comprehensive summary and presentation of the source base on the most important medieval towns in Slovakia.

Mária Grófová

VÖRÖS, László. *ANALYTICKÁ HISTORIOGRAFIA VERSUS NÁRODNÉ DEJINY : "NÁROD" AKO SOCIÁLNA REPREZENTÁCIA. (ANALYTICAL HISTORIOGRAPHY VERSUS NATIONAL HISTORY : THE "NATION" AS SOCIAL REPRESENTATION)*. Pisa : Edizioni Plus – Pisa University Press, 2010, 230 pages.

In 2010 the University of Pisa published a dissertation by a researcher from the Institute of History of the Slovak Academy of Sciences László Vörös. It is also a part of a large pan-European project named *Creating Links and Innovative Overviews for a New History Research Agenda for the Citizens of a Growing Europe* (CLIOHRES), in which 45 European universities participated. This fact already indicates that it is a work reaching beyond the usual horizon of Slovak historiography. The actual character of the work is also novel, since it is largely a theoretical work offering ideas about how to write history. Unfortunately very few such works appear in Slovakia. It also includes an extensive 25 page summary.

The main theme of the book is nationalism in Slovakia, or criticism of the way traditional historiography works with the categories of "nation" and "nationalism". Vörös was largely inspired by the works of Rogers Brubaker, who spoke of nations as "*practical categories, situated actions, cultural idioms, cognitive schemas, discursive frames, organizational routines, institutional forms, political projects and contingent events.*" In this context, he pointed, for example, to the problematic nature of the use of categories in the context of scientific analyses, and he emphasized the need for an analytic interpretative apparatus. He pointed to the importance of distinguishing between social categories and social groups. A social group is a group of people based on the positive identification of the members and capable of organized actions. In contrast, social categories represent particular classification systems. In agreement with Brubaker, Vörös speaks of nationalisms without nations and he explains his theories with examples from the history of the Kingdom of Hungary. He does not devote much attention to defining the historic roots of nationalism, and he does not develop a view on the objective existence of nations, as historians writing on similar themes have frequently done. Precisely the reverse, inspired by the social science research of leading sociologists, anthropologists and social psychologists, also connecting with the so-called "cognitive turn", he knocks them down and devotes his attention not to research into nations, but to investigating ideas about them. He considers questions of the following type relevant: When and why did people begin to regard themselves and other people as members of a nation and to think that humanity was naturally divided into nations? When and why did ethnicity begin to be essentialized? When and why did the concept of nationality as an inherent property of human beings

arise and become established? How was the social reality of nation constructed in the past and is still constructed today? He points to “groupism” as a tendency to think of the social world as consisting of bounded entities. An important argument of the work is that traditional historiography, by its very essence, cannot produce anything other than nationalist history. On the other hand, the role of analytical approaches to the study of nationalism is investigation of the gradual nationalization of the social world.

The first two chapters consider the relationship between traditional and analytic historiography. The author observes that the primary aim of traditional historiography is the production of identity narratives. The category of nation is the basic reference framework in them. The fact that the institutionalization of historiography occurred precisely in the period and environment that was substantially influenced by national ideologies, significantly contributed to this. He very convincingly develops the already mentioned argument that the traditional historical epistemology and methodology do not enable any other type of writing of history. Using six critical points from the “new historiography” as outlined by Peter Burke, he criticizes this concept, which is unfortunately still strongly propagated and maintained in Slovakia. In this way, he has evaluated the discussion developed in world historiography especially since the rise of the *Annales* school in France. The author proposes that the solution is to integrate the results and methods of the social sciences and establish an analytical conceptual apparatus. The aim is, above all, to avoid the influence of eternalization and essentialism in scientific language.

The third chapter offers a theoretical consideration of selected theories of nations and nationalism, widening to theories of collective and social representation. It is rather like an “obligatory journey” mainly through the modernist classics, but it is not an end in itself. It acquaints the reader with the well-known typology of Anthony Smith: primordialists, perennialists, ethno-symbolists, modernists. In spite of good illustrativeness, this also includes various problematic places, as Miroslav Hroch most recently observed. In this direction, for example, Vörös discusses whether it is right to regard the anthropologist Geertz as a classic primordialist. In his careful selection of still topical classics, the author devotes attention only to some themes: especially to Gellner’s consideration of modernity, Anderson’s “imagined communities” and Hobsbawm’s “invention of tradition”. He introduces the reader to the problems of the theories of collective and social representations developed by Émile Durkheim, Serge Moscovici and Roger Chartier. The reality of the nation is established and reproduced in everyday practice precisely by these means.

The final, fourth chapter represents the application of the approaches described above. The author gives a more precise version of his older research in the area of the social representations of the Slovaks and Slovak identity, which was published in the *Historický časopis* in 2006. He investigates the occurrence and meaning of the categories “Tud – people”, “národnosť – nationality” and “národ – nation” in Hungarian – Magyar nationalistic discourse of the second half of the 19th century, on the basis of which he confirmed the dichotomy in the representation of Slovaks / Tótok in Hungarian – Magyar discourse, which also represented the real social situation in the country. Finally, he analyses this theme in articles from the Hungarian language press in the periods 1914 – 1917 and 1917 – 1918, when there was a radical change. Authors began to emphasize the originality of the Slovak culture, especially in relation to Czech culture, and they even spoke of Czech imperialism. In his research, Vörös confirmed the political and ideological conditionedness of the social representations of the “Slovak nationality”, “people” and “Hungarian nation”. He points to the changeability of contents in the course of the 19th century in connection with the idea of the Hungarian nation.

The reviewed book represents an important contribution to discussions about the method of work by historians, both in Slovakia and abroad. To a large extent, it presents and systematizes selected theoretical concepts, which are moving through the social sciences at present. The mono-

graph is logically constructed and very clearly written, sometimes with a reader-friendly style of explanation. Many examples are given and there is occasional repetition. The method of writing the book means that it should serve as an important aid to the expert preparation of historians and other social scientists. I also see an advantage in the fact that the work and many others from the same international project are accessible online at the website: <http://www.clioher.net/>. Therefore, it will be interesting to trace the degree to which the arguments presented in it appear in expert writing in Slovakia, because similarly inclined works have appeared only rarely in Slovak historiography up to now.

Miroslav Michela

SEGEŠ, Vladimír et al. [Baka, Igor; Cséfalvay, František; Čaplovič, Miloslav; Dangl, Vojtech; Maskalik, Alexej; Purdek, Imrich; Štaigl, Jan; Štefanský, Michal]: *SLOVAKIA – MILITARY CHRONICLE*. Bratislava : Perfekt, 2009, 204 pages.

Publications devoted to military history or the history of individual military conflicts belong among the most popular titles in the expert and popularizing literature concerned with the past, as we can see from the shelves of our bookshops. The reviewed expert publication is a supplemented and expanded English translation of the book: *Slovensko – Vojenská kronika* from 2007. Therefore, it has very good pre-conditions to address a wide range of foreigners interested in the military history of Slovakia. Vladimír Segeš headed the team of authors from the Institute of Military History, one of whom now works at the Institute of History of the Slovak Academy of Sciences after many years at the IMH. They offer a cross-section through the history of military conflicts, wars and armed forces in the territory of present-day Slovakia from prehistory to the most recent development represented by the introduction of a fully professional army in the Slovak Republic from 2006.

The book is composed of 15 chronologically arranged chapters written in the spirit of the already traditional territorial – national approach to Slovak history, which is accepted by society and apparently also by the majority of historians. Therefore, it is a history of battles and armies in the territory of Slovakia. In the later period, from the 18th century, this approach is supplemented by the history and roles of regiments and other military units of the Habsburg Monarchy, which included ethnic Slovaks or natives of the counties of the Kingdom of Hungary situated in the territory now belonging to Slovakia. Such a selective approach has its problems, as I will point out below.

The first chapter takes the reader back to the years before our era, when the Celts emerged from the mists of history as the first known ethnic group in the territory of Slovakia. There is also brief consideration of even earlier periods. The reader is then informed about the further settlement of the Central European region, the coming of the Germanic tribes and their conflicts with ancient Rome. These developments included the creation of the first known state in this territory: the Kingdom of Vannius. The chapter ends with the military expeditions of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius against the Germanic Marcomanni and Quadi.

The second chapter begins with the migrations of the 4th century, and its centre of gravity is the coming of the Slavs to the Central European region. The region also experienced military expeditions by the Huns, Ostrogoths, Longobards, Suebi and other Germanic tribes, which had temporary homes here. Apart from the coming of the Slavs and their co-existence with the Avars, the chapter includes the battles connected with the creation of Samo's Empire, and two centuries later with the rise, flourishing and decline of Great Moravia. The chapter ends with the coming of

the old Magyars to the Carpathian Basin. After the defeat on the Lech in 955, they began to build a new early feudal state here, connecting with the Great Moravian tradition. Numerous foreigners including Slavs became part of their prince's retinue. The reader will find here mentions of many battles, thanks to which Svätopluk built up his extensive empire, but he will not find an answer to the question of why, under the rule of his sons, it so quickly fell into a deep crisis ending in its dissolution.

The next chapter traces the struggles and military aspects of the development of the territory of Slovakia from the establishment of the Hungarian state in the second half of the 10th century to the Battle of Mohács in 1526. Precisely this chapter shows the limitations of the above mentioned territorial – national concept of the publication. Great attention is devoted to the battles and conflicts of the Kingdom of Hungary with the German Empire in the 11th century, a substantial part of which occurred in the present territory of Slovakia, but the conflicts of the next century, when the direction of Hungarian campaigns turned mostly towards the Balkans, hardly appear at all. There is a similar disproportion between the reigns of Charles I Robert and his son Louis I the Great. The conflicts of the first with Hungarian magnates occurred in the territory of Slovakia and so they are covered in detail in the book, but Louis's wars, thanks to which Hungary became one of the greatest European powers, are hardly mentioned. It was a matter of the same multi-ethnic and multi-cultural state, as the authors emphasize at other points in the book. At the same time, the chapter deals with the military provisions of the Golden Bull of Andrew II from 1222 and the resulting military rights and duties of the nobility in relation to defence of the country. The chapter includes descriptions of the most important battles of this period, such as the battle of Rozhanovce in 1312 and the battle between John Giskra and John Hunyadi near Lučenec in 1451. A detailed description of the defeat of the Hungarian army by the Ottomans at Mohács in 1526 is understandably included due to its importance for the history of the whole Central European region.

The fourth chapter is devoted to the military encounters of the Hungarian armies with the Ottoman Empire and with the uprisings of the Hungarian nobility against the Habsburgs up to the beginning of the 18th century, when the final Estates uprising by Francis II Rákóczi was defeated and the Ottomans were pushed out of the greater part of Hungarian territory. In contrast to the previous chapter, there is not such a great problem with the territorial definition of conflicts, because after the battle of Mohács, the present territory of Slovakia became the most important part of the territory of the Kingdom of Hungary. Detailed descriptions of battles against the Turks alternate with exhaustive accounts of individual Estates uprisings, from which the reader learns about new techniques for waging war and new types of military unit.

The next chapter is devoted to the 18th century, in which the dynastic wars over recognition of the succession of Maria Theresa had an important place in the military history of the Habsburg Monarchy. It was also a period of unprecedented development of the armed forces in connection with strengthening of the central government and royal absolutism. It began with the building of regular mass armies composed of recruited soldiers. The artillery definitively became the third part of the army and it constantly grew in importance. Another new feature was the growing importance of the Hungarian light cavalry called "hussars", which already proved their value in the 17th century and gradually became part of the armed forces of the majority of European countries. The chapter includes accounts of battles in the War of the Austrian Succession, the Seven Years War and the War of the Bavarian Succession with an emphasis on the actions of natives of Slovakia in Hungarian regiments. They included the legendary "oldest soldier in the world" Ladislaus Škultéty-Gabriš, who participated in the capture of Berlin in 1757 under the command of another native of Slovakia Andreas Hadik. While the book points to the Slovak roots of various important soldiers of this period, Hadik is paradoxically said to have been neither Slovak nor Hungarian in the modern sense, but a typical representative of the noble ruling class known as the *natio hungarica*.

The sixth chapter is devoted to the Napoleonic Wars and their consequences for the Habsburg Monarchy. The French Revolution removed the Ancien Regime and brought epoch making changes, which also affected the armed forces. The French Army gave space to talented young officers, whose career advance no longer depended on their origin. The wars brought new tactical and strategic advances, especially thanks to Napoleon. However, these changes were only slowly introduced to the Habsburg army, which had the result that this army was unsuccessful in most of its battles with Napoleon, although it was one of the best armies in Europe at the end of the 18th century.

The next chapter begins with the revolution of 1848 – 1849 and ends with the assassination of the heir to the throne Franz Ferdinand at Sarajevo. Much space in it is devoted to the first Slovak national army, the Slovak volunteers and their campaigns in the revolutionary years. In a publication of this type, the political background of the Slovak national movement and its political aims should be given some space, because many foreign readers of the book will not be as oriented in this part of Slovak history as the readers of the original Slovak language version. For the same reason, the wider background of the revolutionary events and struggles in the whole Kingdom of Hungary should receive some attention in the book. The chapter also considers the transformation of the Habsburg army after 1850, and the unsuccessful military conflicts of the second half of the 19th century from its point of view. The changes in individual units of the armed forces with their home base in towns in Slovakia are described. The chapter ends with the growing international tension that led to the outbreak of the First World War.

The Great War is the subject of the next chapter. It is concerned with developments on the battlefields of the greatest conflict up to that time with an emphasis on the Eastern Front, where most of the soldiers of the Imperial and Royal Army recruited in Slovakia fought. However, it also deals with the overall developmental situation on the battlefield, and considerable attention is understandably devoted to the first struggle in exile, especially the formation and military actions of the Czechoslovak legions in Russia, France and Italy. These military units became the main argument, which convinced the Entente to recognize the representatives of the Czechoslovak struggle as the representatives of the government of the future Czechoslovakia.

The ninth chapter is concerned with the establishment and organization of the armed forces of the new Czechoslovak state. Their basis was the legions, which were also involved in fighting in Slovakia in 1918 – 1919. The changing military-strategic importance of Slovakia for the republic is also described here. In the second half of the 1930s, Slovakia was to be a rear base for the retreating army in the expected conflict with Germany. Considerable space is devoted to the preparations of the army for war in 1938 and the course of both mobilizations. The factors, which caused the very small number of Slovaks among the higher officers of the army of the First Republic are also explained in detail here. For the reasons already stated above, at least a brief outline of the basic political and social problems of the republic, especially the aspects influencing relations between the Czechs and Slovaks, would also be useful here. The chapter ends with the break up of the state in March 1939.

The next chapter is concerned with the building up of the armed forces of the first Slovak Republic and their participation in the Second World War. From the beginning, the Slovak army developed in the context of the limited independence of a satellite of Nazi Germany, which supervised the construction of the armed forces. The character of the state was also expressed by the fact that Jews and Roma with military obligations were placed in special labour groups in a Labour Corps. From 1943 Jews no longer had military duties in accordance with the racial legislation of the state. The chapter also gives a detailed analysis of the military actions of the Slovak army in the conflict with Hungary in March 1939, and in alliance with Nazi Germany in Poland, the USSR and Italy. Where the Eastern Front is concerned, the chapter does not avoid either the war

crimes committed especially by some members of the Security Division in the rear of the front in Ukraine and Belarus, or the defection of members of the Security Division and Rapid Brigade to the Soviet side. The final part of the chapter covers the desperate attempt of the Lúďák government to reconstruct new armed forces after the outbreak of the Slovak National Uprising. These were obviously entirely subject to the German occupying authorities.

This is followed by a chapter devoted to the Czechoslovak armed struggle on the battlefields of the Second World War. It gives very balanced coverage to the Western Front including Czechoslovak units in North Africa and the Eastern Front, where the First Czechoslovak Army Corps was formed and went into action. It does not omit the activity of Slovaks in partisan movements in the USSR, France, Italy and Yugoslavia. However, it is a little surprising that only a brief mention in the chronological part is devoted to Jozef Gabčık and the assassination of Heydrich.

A separate chapter is devoted to the armed struggle in Slovakia and especially to the Slovak National Uprising. This is certainly justified in view of the importance of this event in modern Slovak history including its military aspect. The reader will find here a clear presentation of the problem of the formation of the civil resistance and of resistance in the ranks of the Slovak army. A substantial part of the chapter is understandably concerned with the preparations and alternative plans for the uprising, the course of the military operations and the transition to a partisan method of fighting after its suppression at the end of October 1944. In spite of the objective limits to the possibilities of the armed forces of the uprising, which lagged behind the Germans in heavy weapons and aircraft, and the numerous mistakes of its leaders, the text leaves unanswered the question of whether the uprising could have achieved more than it did against the German occupiers. However, in spite of these facts, it is necessary to agree with the author's statement, and evaluate the uprising highly positively, because it was one of the most important anti-fascist uprisings of the Second World War. Its distorted image in the period 1948 – 1989 is already another chapter of Slovak history.

The thirteenth chapter of the book is devoted to the first part of the post-war period, specifically to the years 1945 – 1967. The transformation of the Czechoslovak exile armies, part of the Slovak army and some of the partisans into the new armed force of the revived Czechoslovak state is excellently described. The author of the chapter devotes attention to the attempt to create Slovak national units with their officers and men mainly of Slovak nationality, and the misuse of this fact by the communists in the internal political struggle. The chapter captures all the waves of purges in the armed forces after the communist coup of 1948, the strict ideological and cadre domination of the army by the Communist Party, the construction of the army of a member state of the Warsaw Pact according to the Soviet model, as well as organizational changes in the armed forces with an emphasis on Slovakia.

The next chapter begins with the reform process of 1968. In the army, the aim was the gradual removal of ideology and the formulation of a separate Czechoslovak military doctrine. Like the reform effort in the whole of society, these efforts were ended by the intervention of the "friendly armies" of the Warsaw pact. The chapter presents the results of the intervention and of the temporary stay of Soviet troops in the territory of Czechoslovakia, as well as the course of Normalization in the army. It ends with the departure of Soviet forces after the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989, the subsequent reform of the army and the break up of Czechoslovakia in 1992.

The last chapter of the book is devoted to the armed forces of the Slovak Republic in the period 1993 – 2009, the changes in their organizational structure and integration into the European and trans-Atlantic groupings. Attention is also devoted to the activity of Slovak units in various peace-keeping missions under the UN, EU or NATO.

According to the head of the team of authors, their task was to provide the readers with an overview of the most important military events in the history of Slovakia and the Slovaks. It is

necessary to state that they successfully achieved this aim. The book is made more attractive by a large number of illustrations and maps. The character of a chronicle is given by a chronology of the most important events, which supplements the text on almost every page. Brief word pictures providing the reader with information about types of weapon, biographies of important military leaders and in more recent periods officers in the Czechoslovak or Slovak army or legion, and quotations from original documents concerning military matters, excellently add variety to the text. The book is supplemented by illustrations of the indications of rank in the Czechoslovak and Slovak armies in the period 1920 – 2003, as well as badges and insignia of different parts of the armed forces since 1950. There is also a list of monarchs and presidents, who ruled this territory, a selection of literature concerned with the military history of Slovakia, and indexes of places and people.

In spite of the reservations mentioned above, it is necessary to welcome the book as a successful and useful achievement of the team of authors. This book in the English language will undoubtedly be a useful source of information for the foreign reader. This is especially true of the chapters devoted to the 20th century. The publication has all the pre-conditions to fulfill the function of an introduction to the military history of a wider region of Central Europe. The quality of its graphic format and large number of illustrations must also be highly appreciated.

Matej Hanula

ŠUCHOVÁ, Xénia. *IDEA ČESKOSLOVENSKEHO ŠTÁTU NA SLOVENSKU 1918 – 1939. Protagonisti, nositelia, oponenti. (THE IDEA OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK STATE IN SLOVAKIA 1918 – 1939. Protagonists, bearers, opponents)*. Bratislava : Institute of History of the Slovak Academy of Sciences; Vydavateľstvo Prodam, 2011, 312 pages.

The idea of the Czechoslovak state, the Slovak aspects of which form the thematic axis of Xénia Šuchová's monograph, was previously defined by various thinkers. Some of these definitions were considered, for example, by the Czech historian Kamil Krofta, who served as a diplomat and in the last years as minister of foreign affairs of the First Czechoslovak Republic. Krofta sought the historical roots of the *idea of the Czechoslovak state* in the thinking of František Palacký, for whom "the right of nations is really the right of nature", but he also took into account the arguments of Josef Pekař and justified the right to a state with historical arguments: "The historical forerunner of the present Czechoslovak Republic, the old Czech state, was founded by the Czechs in the 10th century, and throughout its whole history it remained essentially the state of the Czech nation, the expression of its will to live and the instrument for fulfilling its historic mission, in spite of all the powerful German influences on its development"¹. [...] Similarly, the present Czechoslovak state has grown from the roots of the old Czech state created by the joint work of the Czechs and their Slovak brothers, who were excluded for centuries from the common national community. It was created by the will and work of the members of both branches of the Czechoslovak nation, their achievements and sacrifices, according to their wishes and ideals. It was created for them so that they could live a full national life, a possibility they never had anywhere else."² For Krofta, the basic components of the "idea of the Czechoslovak state" were Masaryk's ideals of democracy

1 KROFTA, Kamil. *Idea československého štátu. (The idea of the Czechoslovak state)*. In *Z dob naší první republiky*. Prague : Jan Laichter, 1939, p. 25.

2 Ref. 1, p. 27.

and effort for the continuing democratization of political, social and everyday life. In his view, Masaryk saw the spiritual development of the Czech nation and the meaning of Czech history in the *religious idea*, still valid in the time of the Czechoslovak republic, this time in the form of an effort for the moral and spiritual improvement of oneself and others, as a struggle for higher moral values.³ Respect for them was expected to become a guarantee of the freedom and equality of all the citizens of the Czechoslovak Republic and its protection against possible internal disintegration, while at the same time seeking a route to Czech – German co-existence in the Czech Lands and to wider Central European cooperation on a new basis.

Xénia Šuchová defines her idea of the Czechoslovak state in Slovakia more closely. In the introduction to her work she writes that precisely “*the idea of the Czechoslovak state of the Czechoslovak nation*” formed the basis of the First Czechoslovak Republic. She emphasizes especially the single “Czechoslovak nation” understood as “*an ideological construct, initially appropriated by only a small minority of protagonists, and by a larger part of inter-war Slovak society with reservations, while a large part of society rejected it, either consciously or under the influence of autonomist or communist opponents.*”⁴ This statement is made more serious by the fact that according to the research and conviction of the author, without the idea of the Czechoslovak nation, the Czechoslovak state would have had no hope of originating and no chance of resisting the territorial and other claims of expansive neighbours.⁵ If we take this statement literally, the Slovak nation did not experience a euphoria of national liberation similar to that of the Czech nation, but suffered a double frustration after the origin of the Czechoslovak Republic: a crisis of Slovak identity and loss of its own history. According to the state ideology it was part of the Czechoslovak nation. It was left out of the abbreviations of the time. Its historic identity was denied not only by the dominant Hungarian or Magyar state ideology, which had already deprived the Slovaks of their participation in the history of the Kingdom of Hungary, but also by this *idea of the state*, which emphasized the nation, the historicness and the Czechness of the state going back to the 10th century, at the expense of the civil principle. The author underlines the *secular* character of Masaryk’s democracy, which pushed religion into the private sphere. In Slovakia, this struck against the conservatism of the Catholic clergy and traditional Lutherans or Evangelicals. However, in this direction, the policy of the state was not radical and sought compromise solutions in the field of education and in talks with the Vatican. Slovakia, as well as the Czech Lands, was opened to both Western and Eastern cultural influences. Slovakia recognizes the Czechoslovak Republic as its own state. It contributed to the origin of this state, and its results included the development of a fully structured Slovak society and the foundations for the cultural flowering of Slovakia. As the author emphasizes, even the autonomists wanted to solve the problems they perceived in the framework of the existing state.

Xénia Šuchová thoughtfully and effectively structured her monograph into three parts with the titles: *Protagonists, Bearers and Opponents*, and so gave her work the necessary depth and dynamism. As protagonists, she identified the pioneers of the Czechoslovak idea, embodied in Slovakia by “Vavro Šrobár and his men” appointed by him, namely the 14 members of the revolutionary National Assembly of the Czechoslovak Republic in Prague, 14 government officials in his office in Bratislava as minister with full power to administer Slovakia and the first 28 Czechoslovak officials, who alternated at the head of the Slovak county administrations. The protagonists also included the important social democrat politician Ivan Dérer and the most successful Slovak poli-

3 Ref. 1, p. 30-31.

4 The reviewed work, p. 10.

5 Ref. 4, p. 7.

tician in inter-war Czechoslovakia Milan Hodža. Especially the destiny and activity of Ivan Déřer in various stages of his life is comprehensively considered.

In the first chapter, the author goes back to the period before the First World War to show the possibility of political cooperation between men from different ideological and political orientations, using the example of the leftist lawyer Ivan Déřer and the temperamental Catholic priest and Slovak member of the Hungarian parliament Ferdinand Juriga. First Judr. Jozef Déřer and later also his son Ivan helped Juriga in his election campaigns in 1906 and 1910. Already from this period, we find in the book interesting information about the developing democratic political movement in western Slovakia. As Déřer stated, this gained him recognition and also agreement from the old patriots in Martin. They recognized that Slovak politics had to rely on the “*three foundations of Slovak political life: the working class, the nationally conscious small farmers and the large Catholic part of the Slovak population.*”⁶

At the time of the public assembly in Bratislava on 27 August 1905, Emanuel Lehocký, Milan Hodža and Ferdinand Juriga stood at the head of these currents of Slovak political life. They represented hope for the future, and in 1918 they supported the formation of the Czechoslovak Republic. Ivan Déřer also appears in the chapters devoted to the administration of Slovakia, when he briefly replaced Šřobár as minister with full power to administer Slovakia, after the victory of the social democrats in the parliamentary elections of 1920. While before the elections Šřobár appointed the heads of county administrations mainly from among the recognized patriots of the pre-war period, including representatives of the whole of the Slovak political spectrum, after the appointment of the government of officials of Jan Černý in mid September 1920, the central government in Prague began to influence appointments more clearly. Lack of harmony between many lower officials from the Czech Lands and their superiors, the heads of county administrations of Slovak nationality, are also explained by cultural differences. An important theme of the first part of the book is the ideas of the protagonists about how to satisfy the legitimate demands of the Slovak population without threatening the existence of the young state, the prospects of which were doubted by the majority of its immediate neighbours. The protagonists of the *idea of the Czechoslovak state* did not agree with autonomy on the basis of the Pittsburgh Agreement involving a Slovak legislative assembly as was supported in various forms by the People’s Party (ľudová strana) led by Andrej Hlinka. They spoke of “administrative autonomy” for Slovakia, first in the framework of county administration and the planned County Union (Župný zřváz), then in the framework of a regional system. Analysis of the conceptions of Ivan Déřer, explanation of his opposition to the regional system, disagreement with rigid centralism in practice and their position in comparison with the conceptions of the politically much more flexible and changeable Milan Hodža, continues into the second part of the book.

The bearers were the representatives of the Czechoslovak public administration in Slovakia. Five chapters are devoted to problems in this field, from the unification of the public administration in pre-Munich Czechoslovakia and the integration of Slovakia into the republic, through the introduction of the regional system in Slovakia in 1928, the method of election and appointment to regional authorities, to their powers including financial matters. The author points to the fact that, apart from economic and linguistic aspects, the question of the position of Slovakia in the republic had its personnel and official sides, and these were considered to be especially serious. In the centralized and unitary Czechoslovak Republic, the proportion of Slovaks in the central state institutions was also an important indicator. With increasing education, the number of Slovak officials at higher levels increased slowly, but not sufficiently. The personnel question had great importance for Czecho – Slovak relations, and it also played an important role in the minority ques-

6 Ref. 4, p. 18.

tion. In this direction, the monograph presents especially important findings about the proposals of Milan Hodža for the solution of the whole complex of minority and Czecho – Slovak problems in connection with the preparation of the Nationality Statute of 1938. Unfortunately the international situation developed so unfavourably that these proposals were not implemented.

In the second part of her book, the author also solves the extraordinarily serious problem of citizenship of the Czechoslovak republic in connection with the international obligations anchored in the peace treaties after the First World War. Gaining of citizenship was automatic in some conditions, and was connected with right of residence in a municipality in the territory of the Czechoslovak republic. The republic was also obliged to grant the right of option to members of national minorities. If they wished to leave the territory, all their immovable property was left to them and they could export their personal assets without paying customs tariffs. Not all who applied this option were welcomed with open arms in the territories of Austria or Hungary, and there were disputes about where these people really had the right to reside, who had to pay the pensions of state officials, soldiers and their widows, who would provide social payments to them and so on. In Slovakia they had the problem that gaining the right of residence in the former Kingdom of Hungary was much less formal than in the Austrian Lands. On the basis of a decision of the Supreme Administrative Court at the end of 1923, the inhabitants of Slovak towns and villages were required to prove their right of residence in the same way as in Moravia and Bohemia. This led to doubting or denial of the Czechoslovak citizenship of many inhabitants of Slovakia, including Slovaks as well as members of minorities.

By analysing the historical background of the adoption of “the act on granting of citizenship to some persons” proposed by Ivan Dérer and combined with the proposal from the member of parliament for the Hungarian National Party József Szent-Ivány, the author wants to point out that the problems over state citizenship did not involve only the members of national minorities, but also “members of the Slovak branch of the state-forming Czechoslovak nation”. The author also devotes attention to the problem of citizenship and its possible consequences against the background of entirely different historical circumstances. She points out that under instructions from the Reich, the members of the German minority did not use the right of option, and became an instrument in the struggle against Czechoslovakia. After 15 March 1939 they automatically gained German citizenship, while retaining all rights derived from residence in the Protectorate. On the basis of the bilateral Czechoslovak – Hungarian treaty from 18 February 1939, Hungary could expel from the annexed part of southern Slovakia any Slovaks or Czechs, who settled there on land awarded to them under the land reform policy after 1920.

The third part of the book is devoted to the convinced *Opponents* of Czechoslovak democracy from the positions of radical socialism, communism and Bolshevism. In the period 1918 – 1920, immediately after the origin of the republic, we can speak of a period of flourishing of Czechoslovak social democracy, of its national differentiation, and of its varied and independent approach to the Czechoslovak Republic. Socialist radicalism formed under the influence of people returning from Russia, especially to the Czech Lands. In Slovakia they were mainly subject to Hungarian influence, which propagated the internationalism of Béla Kun and welcomed his armed export of revolution. The right and initially also the left of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party supported the defence of the homeland, and the parliamentary elections of April 1920 brought it to the head of the government. It lost its position and former strength by splitting into the Communists, who accepted the 21 conditions for joining the Communist Internationale, and the weakened Social Democrats. Apart from patriotism and social policy, the latter group especially supported local government and an effort to gradually fill the local government and state offices with socialists, so that the Czechoslovak Republic would gradually be changed into a socialist state. In further chapters, the communists with the aim “to wring the neck of the bourgeoisie” and install the dic-

tatorship of the proletariat, come into the centre of attention. We learn about how the communists saw the nationality and Slovak questions in Czechoslovakia, and we follow their growing dependence on the views and directives of the Komintern. Apart from the well-known views of Bohumír Šmeral and his clear loyalty to the Czechoslovak Republic, for example, at the time of the second attempt of the former Emperor Karl to return to the throne of Hungary in October 1921, the author presents many interesting details from archive documents about the Slovak communists such as Jozef Schiffel and Július Verčík. She analyses the views of the communists on the autonomy as supported by the Ľudáks, on Hodža's administrative autonomy, on the attempts at more independent application of the theses of the Second Congress of the Komintern on the nationality question in 1921 – 1924, and on the gradual inclination of the Slovak communists to support demands for the right of the Slovak nation to self-determination even extending to separatism. She also places in its broad international context, the policy of the Slovak and Czech communists in the period 1935 – 1939, when they supported the slogan: “Defend Czechoslovak democracy against internal and foreign fascism”. A further change in the position of the Slovak communists, who spoke of a “Soviet Slovakia” rather than the renewal of now divided Czechoslovakia, prepared a future for Slovakia similar to that of the Baltic states.

In the conclusion of a work rich in ideas and documentation, the author underlines that the fall of the First Czechoslovak Republic was caused by international political circumstances and not by the faults of Czechoslovakism and centralism, although these were serious. She repeatedly points to them in this interesting work.

Bohumila Ferenčuhová

FERENČUHOVÁ, Bohumila. *FRANCÚZSKO A SLOVENSKÁ OTÁZKA 1789 – 1989 (FRANCE AND THE SLOVAK QUESTION 1789 – 1989)*. Bratislava : VEDA, vydavateľstvo SAV 2008, 492 pages.

In the opinion of the reviewer, the extensive collected work by Bohumila Ferenčuhová is concerned not only with the attitude of France to the “Slovak question” over the period of more than two centuries from the beginning of the French revolution to the first years after the origin of the independent Slovak Republic on 1 January 1993, but also with relations between France and the Czech Lands, and France and Czechoslovakia in this period. It includes 28 chapters, all with rich presentation of facts based on a wide range of sources, and a good linguistic level. This makes the work not only instructive, but also attractive and readable. Orientation is facilitated by an index of names, and the potential French reader is provided with an appropriate French summary giving brief information about the content of individual chapters, as well as the circumstances and motives for the origin of the publication.

In the first seven chapters, which cover the period from the year 1789 to the beginning of the First World War, the author is concerned with the penetration of the ideas of the French Revolution into the Kingdom of Hungary. She traces how the revolutionary ideals, symbolized by the words “*Liberté, égalité, fraternité*” influenced the Slovak national emancipation movement and its representatives. The second major theme of this part of the work is the nationality question in the Habsburg Monarchy and Austria-Hungary in the last two-thirds of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. Where the French Revolution is concerned, the author states that it had an immediate and wide response in Slovakia, where it aroused both positive and negative reactions in different sections of Slovak society. In the educated circles of Slovak intellectuals, it stimulated

consideration of the ideal form of civil society, of possible changes in the internal organization of the Kingdom of Hungary, of the relationship between the Hungarian state as the “homeland” and the ethno-linguistic communities, which formed it. Under the influence of the conceptual message of the French Revolution, the Slovak intellectuals also developed the conviction that the relationship between these two components of society must be based on justice and law, because only “love of a just homeland” is natural. Passages devoted to the lives and political ideas of the Hungarian Jacobins are very interesting and stimulating in this context, as is information about Štúr and his followers, who were also inspired by the ideas of the French Revolution. It is also necessary to mention the part of the introduction dealing with the French Slavists and their views on Austria-Hungary, Slovakia, the Slovaks and the Slovak national emancipation movement. The chapter devoted to the reports of the French Consulate in Budapest on the nationality question in the Kingdom of Hungary around 1900 presents this theme in the language of diplomats.

Several chapters are concerned with the struggle in exile and the origin of Czechoslovakia. The author denies the validity of the partly still persisting “myth” *“that the Entente powers liberated and also defended Czechoslovakia”*, because although Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, Milan Rastislav Štefánik and Edvard Beneš found in France during the First World War *“a prepared and extraordinarily favourable environment for promoting the formation of the new state”* thanks to the activities of the French Slavists, journalists and some important politicians (P. Deschanel, G. Clemenceau, S. Pichon and others), they had to work out for themselves the concrete political programme needed to achieve their aim (p.110). In the period before the outbreak of war and during it *“French policy towards the nationalities [...] varied according to the military situation, and changed depending on wider strategic and political aims”* (p. 111). Therefore, an essential precondition for success was purposeful activity by the leaders of the struggle in exile, coordinated with the French side, as well as the support that French government bodies, especially the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, gave to the Czechoslovak movement in its effort to create military units to fight for the common cause on the Western Front. From the point of view of the further destiny of the Czechoslovak struggle in exile and of the Czechs and Slovaks, it appears to be especially important that *“all the strands of thought in wartime France, which supported the origin of a Czech state, whether independent or confederated in a larger unit, spoke of the importance of its union with the Slovak part of Hungary”*. According to the leading French Slavist Ernest Denis, *“the Slovak question is a matter of general European importance because the disappearance of the Slovak nation, threatened by growing Magyarization, would also mean a mortal danger for the Czech nation, which would find itself entirely surrounded by enemies”* (p. 125).

The chapters devoted to M.R. Štefánik and Štefan Osuský, two *“important personalities in Slovak – French relations”* are a valuable contribution to knowledge of the Czechoslovak struggle in exile. The author shows that the position of some influential French politicians towards Štefánik changed in the course of the war. For example: *“the advisors of the French foreign minister Ribot, who held the position after Briand, adopted a more cautious attitude towards Štefánik”* (p. 139) The cause of this was Štefánik’s effort to seek support for the Czechoslovak struggle also outside France, specifically in Italy. On some of Štefánik’s journeys to Italy and to the Vatican, he called on Italian political leaders to ensure that Italy took the initiative in the expected territorial and political reorganization of Central Europe after the war (p. 144). As a result, he was viewed with suspicion in Paris. The author gives an interesting description of the growing misunderstanding between Štefánik on one side and Masaryk and Beneš on the other in the final phase of the war, when the world found itself on the threshold of peace after four years of war. The author’s information on p. 162 concerning the Italian diplomat in Prague Laga needs to be corrected to the extent that he did not hold the position of ambassador but of chargé d’affaires, at least as far as we know from the official documentation of the establishment of diplomatic relations and the diplomatic representa-

tion of Czechoslovakia abroad and of foreign states in Czechoslovakia. The memories of Louise Weiss and her letters to Štefánik, published in the tenth chapter of the book, are a very valuable contribution giving an interesting view of the personality of M.R. Štefánik.

In the next part, the reader finds chapters devoted to the negotiations about the frontiers of Czechoslovakia in the initial phase of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the activity of Italian and French military missions in Slovakia in the period immediately after the end of the war, the monument to Štefánik on Bradlo as an important memory place in Slovakia, the Little Entente in correlation with the question of the security of Slovakia in the 1920s and Briand's plan for European federal union, the integration ideas of Milan Hodža in the 1920s, and the talks on the French – Czechoslovak treaty of alliance and friendship signed in January 1924. These chapters are followed by another six, in which the author deals with Tardieu's plan for economic cooperation between the Central European states at the beginning of the 1930s, the French – Czechoslovak alliance in the inter-war period and some other questions, among which the author's consideration of two women – Alice G. Masaryková and L. Weiss – in the high politics of Czechoslovakia and France deserves special attention. Weiss was already mentioned in connection with M. R. Štefánik.

A whole series of new findings on the negotiations about the frontiers of Czechoslovakia are presented in the part entitled: *The problem of Czechoslovakia in the Comité d'Études*. This committee was a specific organ of the Peace Conference composed of French experts from the fields of history, geography and other branches of science. Their expert reports served as background material for the technical committees of the conference and for its political authorities. The content of the passage about the activities of the Comité d'Études and the parts directly connected with it show that the question of the frontiers of Czechoslovakia, which represented a great ethno-geographical and political problem, was decided on the basis of reliable information and with the appropriate responsibility. On the basis of study of many little known historical materials, the author came to the conclusion that: *“the delegates and experts [of the Peace Conference] were better informed about the facts of the problems of Central Europe than the opponents of the peace settlement after the First World War claimed, and better than, for example, T. G. Masaryk or Mihály Károlyi thought”* (p. 219). No less instructive is the chapter about the Italian and French military missions to Slovakia and the Czechoslovak – Hungarian conflict of 1918 – 1919, in which the author admits, with a necessary dose of caution, some justification to the consideration of the “disloyalty” of the Italian military mission towards the Czechoslovak government (p. 225). A fascinating account based on thorough knowledge of the facts is a characteristic feature of the chapter devoted to the monument to Štefánik on Bradlo and its place in the historical memory of the Slovaks.

While this chapter contains information about subjects at least partly known to the wider public, the problem of the Little Entente, intended *“to secure peaceful cooperation in Central Europe on a new basis”*, the agreements signed in Locarno in October 1925 and other themes analysed in the concluding part of the work are matters exclusively for expert circles. It is possible to say that all the remaining chapters in this part of the work are thematically interesting and instructive. This applies to the Little Entente and Briand's plan for a European federal union, in connection with which the author also gives a detailed account of the activities of the Pan-European Union in Czechoslovakia, of Tardieu's plan for economic cooperation in Central Europe, and about M. Hodža's ideas on integration in the 1920s. Among the other chapters, it is especially necessary to mention the study with the title: *Alice G. Masaryková and Louise Weiss – women in the high politics of Czechoslovakia and France* (chapter 25).

Among the small deficiencies of the work, it is possible to mention the occasional use of words and phrases that should not occur in an academic text: *“I do not want to kick some themes out of play”* (p. 8). At the beginning of the 1840s Štúr was *“enchanted with Hegel's dialectics”* (p. 23),

and “*Beneš’ circular*” means Beneš’ circular telegram (p. 379). A further inaccuracy is that if by the word “highest” she means the “Creator”, as is clearly the case in the last sentence on p. 437, the word should begin with a capital letter.

In conclusion, it is possible to state that, in spite of these minor criticisms, the reviewed publication, representing the most important results of many years of academic research by Bohumila Ferenčuhová is an important and substantial contribution to knowledge of the relations of France with Slovakia and France with the Czech Lands in the 19th and 20th centuries, and of France with Czechoslovakia in the 20th century, as well as covering a whole series of personalities, who built or shaped these relations, or left a permanent stamp of their existence in them.

Pavol Petruf

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