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REVIEW-ANNOTATIONS-BIBLIOGRAPHY-CHRONICLE

ARTICLES

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN HUNGARIAN LATE ENLIGHTENMENT DISCOURSE

IVONA KOLLÁROVÁ

KOLLÁROVÁ, Ivona. Freedom of the press in Hungarian Late Enlightenment discourse. *Historický časopis*, 2016, 64, 5, pp. 785-808, Bratislava.

The study analyses the socio-political discourse about freedom of the press in the Kingdom of Hungary in the context of the 1790-1791 parliament and the work of the commission for public and political affairs on the preparation of legislation on freedom of the press in the period 1791-1794. Against the background of Hungarian constitutionalism, it notices the opposition and argumentation of Hungarian county authorities concerning decrees on the closure of private printing presses. It analyses further philosophical, religious and political considerations, in order to point out their context in the philosophy of the European Enlightenment, the concept of the social contract, the French revolution and its liberal ideas. It shows how the concept of the nation and the development of its culture as an expression of Hungarian nationalism was brought into these considerations, and that the intensive debate on freedom of the press and expression had no impact on the growing pressure of censorship as an expression of a weakened political power.

Key words: Freedom of the press. Freedom of thought. Censorship. Enlightenment. Liberalism. Kingdom of Hungary. Law.

The tradition of discourse on the social effects of the exchange of information by means of the printed media can be traced back to the Council of Trent. The Enlightenment contributed the narrative of freedom to it. People began to talk about freedom of the press in the Kingdom of Hungary in connection with the reform of censorship introduced by Joseph II. Although the monarch never used this verbal combination in his *Basic rules for establishing the system of censoring books*, and never abolished preventive censorship, supporters and opponents described the new, more liberal system in precisely this way. However, at the end of his reign and especially under the influence of the French Revolution and strong opposition, the Emperor succumbed to pressure and repealed some of his own reforms. A new censorship patent was also prepared.¹ The liberal system allowing freedom to present views even if they disagreed with official opinion gradually became a

1 WANGERMANN, Ernst. *Von Joseph II. zu den Jakobiner-Prozessen*. Wien; Frankfurt; Zürich : Europa Verlag, 1966, p. 57.

thing of the past. The censors received orders to search the bookshops and printers, and to confiscate especially works concerning political life in Hungary, more frequently than ever before. In spite of this, the idea of a free and entirely unlimited flow of ideas became part of the debate on social problems. This brought views and legislative tendencies going beyond the liberalism of the Josephine “freedom of the press”.

The act on freedom of the press

The most important event after the death of Joseph II was preparation of a Hungarian parliament and constitution. The parliament started in June 1790, moved to Bratislava in autumn and continued until March 1791. Slovak historiography mainly attributes to it the introduction of legislation on Magyarization. However, its important results also included the establishment of a commission called the deputation. It had to prepare proposed legislation to reform all important political aspects of the Kingdom of Hungary. One of the people who influenced the decisions of the parliament was Joseph Hajnóczy. In 1789 he already wrote a conceptual preparation for the parliament with the title: *Public political dissertation on the limits of royal power in Hungary*.² It is devoted to the most important questions concerning the Hungarian constitution and other fields of law. Among other things he pointed out that the Hungarian statute book contained only one mention of censorship, this dated from 1553 and there was no positive act. He regarded this as a reason not to speak of an act on censorship but on freedom of the press.³ He expanded this idea into a principle of functioning in society. He saw the freedom of the press as a way to keep political power within limits and prevent its misuse, because the holders of power feared the *typographeum*. If somebody was accused of writing or printing text that unjustly offended somebody, he had to be punished according to the appropriate legislation – the act on damage to reputation. The censor could not and did not have to be the judge of thoughts. He also stated that freedom of the press would teach the nation what was appropriate and what was not, and lead to a state he called happiness. Therefore, the advantages flowing from it were much greater than the risk of it being misused. Preventive censorship would be allowed only in the case of printing of sermons.⁴ The phrase “freedom of the press” (*libertas preli*) appeared here for the first time in the sense of almost complete absence of preventive censorship. The ideals of the French Revolution, its perception of the rights and freedoms of the individual, probably led Hajnóczy to such views.⁵

- 2 [HAJNÓCZY, Joseph] *Dissertatio politico publica de regiae potestatis in Hungaria limitibus*. [s. l.] : [s. n.], 1791. On Hajnóczy's share in preparing the parliament: KOWALSKÁ, Eva – KANTEK, Karol. *Uhorská rapsódia alebo tragický príbeh osvietenca Jozefa Hajnóczyho*. (Hungarian rhapsody or the tragic story of the enlightened Joseph Hajnóczy.). Bratislava : Veda, 2008, p. 126-129. ISBN 9788022410342. On reform projects in Hungary: HOÓS, Eva. *At the crossroads of the ancient and modern. Reform Projects in Hungary at the End of the 18th Century*. Discussion Papers No. 36. Budapest : Collegium Budapest-Institute for Advanced Study, 1996. ISSN 1217 – 5811.
- 3 HAJNÓCZY, ref. 2, p. 70.
- 4 HAJNÓCZY, ref. 2, p. 153-155.
- 5 RAPANT, Daniel. *K počiatkom maďarizácie*. Zv. 2. (On the beginnings of Magyarization. Vol. 2.). Bratislava : Filozofická fakulta UK, 1931, p. 125-126.

The Estates Parliament of the Kingdom of Hungary met in Budapest on 10 June 1790 after 26 years. It urged the monarch to recognize Hungary as an independent kingdom with its own constitution. It reserved the right to discuss regulation of the relationship between the serfs and the nobility, and it confirmed its privileges. It passed the first act giving priority to the Hungarian language by establishing departments of Hungarian at universities, academies and grammar schools, where the Hungarian language became an optional subject.⁶ Historians have devoted less attention to the fact that according to article 15 issued by this parliament, a commission had to be established for the purpose of working out “a system for the general principles of national education and freedom of the press”.⁷ Thus, the commission had to talk about the preparation of an act based on Hajnóczy’s idea.

Article 67 handed over preparation of this material to the Deputation for Public and Political Affairs (*deputatio publico-politica*). It had to work in cooperation with the Deputation for Education (*deputatio literaria*). However, the article containing the tasks for this deputation speaks of censorship, not of freedom of the press.⁸ The Deputation for Public and Political Affairs had 16 members and was headed by Cardinal Joseph Batthyány.⁹

The discussions of this deputation were recorded and published in two books of minutes. *Opus excelsae deputationis regnicolaris in publico-politicis* covers all the legislative tasks of the deputation, events at its sessions, the legislative process and its results. Here we will trace the development of the act on freedom of the press from the first proposal to its definitive result as the product of various amendments (*opinio*) proposed by members of the deputation. Minutes are given for individual sessions up to the 43rd in April 1793.¹⁰

According to the minutes, the adviser Joseph Haller proposed the legislation. He created not only the “general principles of freedom of the press”, but also a sort of conceptual explanation of the future act: *Planum Generalis preli libertatis continens*. In the *Planum* he describes freedom of the press as the most important “vehiculum” for preserving all kinds of freedom. Its absence meant danger for the whole nation. He spoke of the universal right of people to communicate their ideas to others in spoken, handwritten or printed form. The only criterion for limiting freedom of the press is the *securitas* of public life and advantage for public life. Harmful books – threatening public order and security – needed to be defined as clearly as possible, so that authors would not be exposed to subjective censorship. He observed that it was necessary to distinguish between books provoking unrest and those which only spoke about themes of public law. Books

6 KOWALSKÁ – KANTEK, ref. 2, p. 122-126.

7 *Articuli Diaetales Posonienses Anni M. DCC. XCI*. Posonii : Landerer, [1791], p. 40.

8 *Articuli*, ref. 7, p. 98-99.

9 *Articuli*, ref. 7, p. 104-106. The other members of the deputation were: Carol Zichy, Nicolaus Forgach, Joseph Ürmény, Ladislaus Prónay, Joseph Haller, Joseph Zabraczky, Peter Balogh, Ignatius Almásky, Franciscus Bedekovics, Stepha Aczel, Joseph Majláth, Ludovicus Pogány, Carol Prileszky, Joannes Margarics, Joseph Stettner.

10 *Opus Excelsae Deputationis Regnicolaris in Publico-Politicis Quoad Objecta Articulo 67. Anni 1791. Regnicolariter sibi delata elaboratum*. Eds. B. Tromby, K. Eubel, Konrad. Posonii : Landerer, 1826.

subverting religion by containing the principles of atheism and materialism were also dangerous, but this danger should not be over-rated because only a few intellectuals read such philosophical books. There was a potential danger, but it was necessary to consider whether it was more harmful to limit freedom of the press and civil freedom, because useful books might also be banned in this way. Obscene books had to be banned. Attacks on the tolerated religions also threatened public order. The security of society is based on the security of each of its members, and this had to be secured by banning books in which named persons are attacked. Haller observed that the subjectivity of censors causes harm and delays. This influenced the price of books and could deter authors from writing. This was not in harmony with the most important motive for freedom of the press, namely raising and spreading the culture of the nation. In the proposed new system, the author and printer would be obliged to print their names in a book. In books subject to censorship this was superfluous.¹¹

Two other people probably also contributed to the initial proposal. We can probably attribute important roles in writing the act to Joseph Hajnóczy and to the chairman of the deputation Joseph Batthyány.¹²

Proposals for the act on freedom of the press were available to members of the deputation at its first session on 10 August 1791. The *Idea plani circa censuram librorum qualiter ordinandam* – eleven questions that the act clearly had to solve, was produced by the second session. They only partially agreed with a text bearing a similar title preserved in Batthyány's papers. Batthyány's *Idea plani* does not contain questions, but eight points, which he saw as the basic problems in the prepared legislation. In his view, it was necessary to solve the basic question and contradiction: Were they preparing an act on censorship or an act on freedom of the press? He thought that freedom of the press excluded any censorship, but censorship could allow some degree of freedom of the press. According to him unlimited freedom of the press could not be allowed, but strict censorship would be in conflict with what parliament enacted. The limits of censorship of books had to be clearly defined to eliminate any doubts. There was only one criterion for this clear boundary between the permitted and the prohibited, namely what is harmful to a well-ordered state (*quae statui bene ordinato noxia sunt*). He wanted to develop this principle into a list of types of harmful books and submit it to the deputation. However, this probably did not happen, or at least no record of it survives in the minutes. The principle of freedom of the press could be applied to all other books and they could be published without preventive censorship. Like Haller he underlines that such freedom supports the culture of the nation, and that such freedom means that authors and printers will unconditionally give their names in books, so that those who go beyond the limits by publishing books that are judged to be harmful to a well-ordered society can be punished. Production of anonymous publications would be a punishable offence. The principle of

11 *Opus*, ref. 10, Pars III. Elaboratum ... Comitis Josephi a Haller, circa generalia preli libertatis principia, projectumque articuli super hoc objecto, p. 3-7.

12 In the case of Batthyány this is proved by the minutes, but also by his documents. Regina Donáth attributes an important role in writing the act to Hajnóczy. DONÁTH, Regina. Adalék a magyarországi cenzúra XVIII. századvégi történetéhez (Contributions to the history of censorship in 18th century Hungary.) In *Magyar Könyvszemle*, 1955, year 71, no. 4, p. 311.

freedom of the press also had to apply to imported books. Batthyány did not omit the question of creating a system of censors. In his view, the Deputation for Educational and Literary Affairs would decide how many censors there would be and where to put them.¹³ However, Batthyány probably did not submit this material to the deputation. The eleven questions were discussed, but private notes already answer whether and how to set the boundary for censorship; how to ensure that these limits were not violated; how to deal with imported books.¹⁴

According to the minutes, the third session of the deputation was held after more than a year – on 5 November 1792. The members of parliament only stated in connection with the legislation, that Joseph Haller had prepared a proposed text.¹⁵

They read this proposal at the fifth session of the deputation on 12 November. Haller's proposal contained "the general principles of freedom of the press". They developed from the basic principle that natural freedom could be limited if the security of society demanded it, and so the distribution of books threatening this security was prohibited. The proposal explicitly named five groups: books that contain illegal attacks on the person of the king and royal family, constitution and public administration of the kingdom. However, books analysing the principles of the law did not belong to this group. Books provoking disturbance and unrest, undermining legislation and royal decrees, damaging good morals and the Christian religion or containing ridicule (*scommata*) and injury (*iniuriae*) against the tolerated religions. Caricatures and defamation (*calumniosa scripta*) against any person, not only against officials of the realm, had to be unconditionally prohibited. Haller questioned in the proposal, how to ensure that such books were not published: whether to ban the publication of any books without censorship, or to set penalties for authors and printers of books clearly prohibited in advance because they belonged to the above mentioned categories. Haller stated in the proposal that the danger threatening from publication of dangerous books would not be removed by the subsequent punishment of the authors and printers, so no book should be published without censorship. However, this contradicts the idea stated in the *Planum generalis preli libertatis continens*, which strengthens the idea that it was not really written by Haller but by Haynóczy. He cautiously removed the idea of the absence of preventive censorship from the proposed legislation. The text speaks further of two kinds of offence in the future system: printing of a text without preventive censorship and printing of a text with content rejected in advance. If a book published without preventive censorship was proved to be harmful, the printer had to be punished with a fine of 200 gulden. In the case of a repeated offence, the penalty had to be multiplied. In the second case, that of a book being printed with content clearly prohibited in advance, the book had to be confiscated, the printer fined and the author also prosecuted on the basis of criminal law. The proposal enacted judicial proceedings against authors of such books and the powers of individual courts in the kingdom. Establishment of a college of censors made up of people, who were not only educated but also free of prejudices, was considered the most important pre-condition for correct application of the legislation without excessive benevolence leading to

13 DONÁTH, ref. 12, p. 309-310.

14 *Opus*, ref. 10, *Protocolum consessuum Deputationis Regnicolaris in Publico-Politicis*, p. 23-24.

15 *Opus*, ref. 10, *Protocolum consessuum Deputationis Regnicolaris in Publico-Politicis*, p. 26.

“harmful freedom” or excessive strictness causing limitation of culture, education and science or persecution of the tolerated religions. Theological books of a particular religion had to be censored by members of that religion. The proposal contained an exception to the ban on imported books: permission for the use of one copy by educated and irreproachable people. The bookseller had to prove who such a book was intended for.¹⁶

The first version of the act *De libertate preli ejusque limitibus* also existed at this session. It copied Haller’s proposal and worked it out in more detail. The act speaks of “moderated freedom of the press”. On one side it had to contribute to education and science (*cultura ingeniorum et scientiarum*), and on the other it would not harm the *securitas et tranquillitas* of the realm. Apart from the college of censors, censors at academies and other local censors subordinate to the college of censors had to be included in the system. They would be responsible for various small, less important texts. The proposal includes a decree on penalties for censors who allowed books that were later proved to be problematic, and penalties for booksellers who sold prohibited books.¹⁷

The eighth session on 5 December 1792 was devoted only to this act. The members of the deputation made various small amendments to it. A new version of the proposed act was produced on the basis of these amendments.¹⁸

At the twentieth session of the deputation on 23 January 1793, the Deputation for Educational and Literary Affairs, which was supposed to cooperate in preparing the legislation, participated in the debate.¹⁹ Its members made further changes to the proposed text. The formulation that the aim of freedom of the press was not only to promote the development of culture, but also to uncover its misuse, had to be added to the introduction. They also proposed a supplement stating that the text of a book could not attack another state. They recommended changes to the part about books clearly prohibited in advance because they were directed against Christian morals, additional clarification concerning “openly obscene” books and books inconsistent not only with the principles of morality, but also with the Old or New Testament, or attacking one or more of the tolerated religions. They proposed not using the word caricatures (*pasquillus*), because it was ambiguous, but only the phrase *calumniosa et injuriosa scripta*. They also proposed that “private printers” should be specified and not just printers.²⁰

The minutes also include two imperial decrees from 1790. A resolution of Leopold II from 13 September 1790 explains what content is considered harmful (*nocivus seu adversus*). The term “communal tranquillity” (*communis tranquillitas*) seems to be officially used here for the first time. Everything that disturbed it, promoted division in society or weakened civil and religious solidarity, had to be prohibited.²¹

16 *Opus*, ref. 10, Protocollum consessuum Deputationis Regnicolaris in Publico-Politicis, p. 31-32.

17 *Opus*, ref. 10, Protocollum consessuum Deputationis Regnicolaris in Publico-Politicis, p. 33-34.

18 *Opus*, ref. 10, Protocollum consessuum Deputationis Regnicolaris in Publico-Politicis, p. 35-39.

19 Members of the Deputation for Educational and Literary Affairs: *Articuli*, ref. 7, p. 113-114.

20 *Opus*, ref. 10, Protocollum consessuum Deputationis Regnicolaris in Publico-Politicis, p. 84-87. I explain the meaning of the term “private printers” and why it was put in the act in the section on county decrees and the response to them.

21 *Opus*, ref. 10, Elaboratum ... Comitum Josephi a Haller, circa generalia preli libertatis principia, projectumque articuli super hoc objecto, p. 11-12.

When we compare the content of the prepared act with the Josephine *Basic rules* (*Grund-regeln*), we can find some breakthroughs. They do not speak of freedom of the press, but of a new system of censorship. However, the conviction that at least some types of book – expert, scientific – did not need to be censored, is present here and we can regard this as a sort of prehistory of freedom of the press. Religion and morals had to remain under supervision, as did insults against the monarch, but he could be criticized. Equally, the view that some books were read only by a small group of educated people and so did not need to be banned because of some inappropriate passages, already appeared in Josephinism. This had brought experience of the contradiction between the Emperor's decrees and the subjectivist, prejudiced approach of the censors.²² This experience probably contributed to the tendency to exactly define the boundary between the forbidden and the permitted, to state that political texts that critically but rationally analyse political or legal questions do not belong among the prohibited books. It contributed to raising the theme of the personal qualifications needed for work in the censorship office. However, the *Planum* worked out by Leopold II's officials contains several topics not included in Joseph II's *Basic rules*. We can see them as an indirect result of the French Revolution. On 22 August 1789, the *Magyar Kurir* already published the *Declaration of the rights of man and the citizen*. Article 11 stated: “Free communication of ideas and views is one of the most important rights of man. Therefore, every citizen can speak, write and publish freely, with the exception of things that misuse this right in cases determined by law.” It is impossible to avoid noticing that the right of freedom of expression in the context of other human rights is a leitmotiv of the *Planum* submitted to the deputation. The fact that this freedom was narrowed by another new conceptual scheme: public order or security, can be considered a result of the French Revolution and fear of social chaos. What is called freedom of the press in the *Planum* is already only a new system of censorship with a new terminology in the definitive version of the act. Something else not recognized or used by the Josephine instructions or intellectuals also appears: the culture of the nation. The nation, culture and different variations of this topic probably replaced the Josephine “Volksaufklärung”, and are a sign of emerging Hungarian nationalism. It characterized the whole parliament of 1790–1791 and the following period.

The minutes of parliament contain the definitive version of the act.²³ We do not learn more about its fate. As Rapant already noticed, the establishment of deputations had more delaying than reformist significance, since “it was certainly not only a result of unstable relations and disturbed times, that the matters entrusted to this deputation were discussed only by the parliament of 1825–1827”.²⁴ He also states that the texts produced

22 KOLLÁROVÁ, Ivona. *Slobodný vydavateľ, mysliaci čitateľ. Typografické médium v josefínskej dobe.* (Free publisher, thinking reader. The typographic medium in Joseph II's time.). Bratislava: Vydavateľstvo Rak, 2013, p. 175–209. ISBN 9788085501575. A translation of the *Basic rules* is given on p. 247–250.

23 *Opus*, ref. 10, *Elaboratum ... Comitis Josephi a Haller, circa generalia preli libertatis principia, projectumque articuli super hoc objecto*, p. 7–10.

24 RAPANT, ref. 5, p. 123. On the parliament of 1825–1827, the activities of the deputation and the further destiny of legislation on freedom of the press: *Opinio excelsae regnicolaris-deputationis motivis suffulta, pro pertractandis in consequentiam articuli 67: 1790/I elaboratis Systematicis Operatis Articulo 8. 1825/7 exmissae, circa Objecta ad Deputationem Publico-Politicam relata*. Posonii (Bratislava): Weber, 1830.

by the deputation “*go beyond the degree of progress achieved in the thinking of the noble ruling class*”. He states that they were too “progressive” even in 1825, when they were revised on the pretext of being out of date. He explains this with the view that thanks to the tactics of the court, educated and enlightened people were elected to the deputations. However, in his view, conservative thinking prevailed in the parliament itself.²⁵ Some have called this state a sort of delayed effect of Josephinism – the political and legal tendency of people thinking in terms of the modernization of the Monarchy, which no longer had support from those in power after the death of Leopold.

The last session of the Deputation for Public and Political Affairs was held on 7 April 1793. Several months earlier and a few months after the death of the Emperor Leopold II, the printing of any version of Rousseau’s *Social Contract*, more or less the Bible of the French Revolution, was prohibited.²⁶ Several measures were prepared which proved that development in the field of control of social communication had taken the opposite direction to the debate at the sessions of the deputation. The next parliament met several years later – on 6 November 1796. The theme of freedom of the press was probably not even on the programme.²⁷

Two Hungarian “Areopagites”

We do not have published minutes from the discussions of the second relevant deputation – that for education, and so we have no more consistent information about how it contributed to the preparations apart from the already mentioned proposed legislation. The cited *Opus* probably contains only what its compilers in 1826 considered important, or what was preserved among the minutes. It does not contain the minutes from the 26th to 32nd sessions of the Deputation for Public and Political Affairs, so that we do not know what happened at them between 7 February and 6 March 1793. The absence of information about six sessions of the deputation could also be a result of censorship when the records were published. We can suppose that the members of the two deputations produced longer or shorter amended proposals, on which we do not have complete information today. One of the members of the Deputation for Education and member of parliament for the County of Szabolcs Stephan Vay prepared an extensive discussion with the title “*separata opinio*”, which is found in the unpublished minutes of the 32nd session. Starting from the assumption that freedom of the press is a right of the human being or citizen and a condition for public well-being, he considered it his duty to express his views on the proposed legislation. Vay proposed specific amendments to some passages in the proposal and justified them. In the first point of the act on the prohibition in advance of texts attacking the king and royal family, state and public administration, he proposed that apart from the king and royal family, those who should not be attacked should also include “*regnicolas cujuscunque conditionis*”, while the formulation about attacks on the constitution should be left out. Thus, he proposed that books attacking citizens should also be forbidden. At the same time, he proposed changing the formulation on

25 RAPANT, ref. 5, p. 124.

26 Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár (National Archives of Hungary, hereinafter MNL), C 60, cs. 79, 25050, f. 674.

27 *Diarium comitiorum regni Hungariae a ... Francisco Secundo in ... civitatem Poseniensem ... 6tam Novembris anni 1796. indictorum. ... Posenii* : Landerer, 1796.

the style of forbidden texts “*concitando agunt*” to the more precise “*ad vi agendum vel obedientiam eadem rationem detrudendam concitant*”. In his view, vague formulations create space for delays. A book written in a more lively style may become a target for prejudices and subjective interpretation by the censors. The mention of the constitution in this article is equally counter-productive. It creates a situation in which it will be very risky to write anything about the constitution that could not be considered an attack, although it might contribute to improvement. Such “silencing” is harmful. Vay mentioned further tightening and amendments to the formulations to restrict the possibility of subjective interpretation by the censors. For example, he proposed leaving out the word “*sarcasmi*” because a prejudiced censor could interpret anything humorous as sarcasm. The “Christian religion” had to be shortened to “religion”. The explanation of this view has a taste of Deism. Society should fight against or prohibit only what threatens its meaning and so its security. The “*moralitas actionum*” and “*obligationum sanctimonia*”, that is morality and duty, serve this aim because without them the bonds important for fulfilling the aims of society are released or become unreliable. In addition, according to Vay, a sort of internal bridle (*frenum internum*) was needed and such a bridle was precisely religion – God, who rewarded the good and punished the bad in eternal life. Restriction of books that subvert religion of any type is necessary because they threaten the security of the community. Addition of the adjective “Christian” to religion is not only superfluous, but also contradictory. It is not necessary to prohibit, for example, the symbolic books of the tolerated Jews or to fear them, because they could not threaten the Christian religion or its internal truth and strength. On the contrary, attacks strengthened it.

He also devotes attention to the problem of whether to really allow publication of manuscripts without censorship. What he calls the “*gloria nationis*” influences the appropriate decision on this question. On the one hand, it is necessary to prevent the publication of texts threatening security, but on the other, it is necessary to defend the general principle of freedom of the press. He speaks of the risks of freedom of the press: In his view, the condition that the author’s name is printed is not enough to protect the security of society. Authors will not expose themselves to the risk of being punished by really giving their names. The wish for profit, perversity or ambition will be stronger than the responsibility expected from printers and authors. They would believe that they would succeed in avoiding punishment. Protection against misuse of freedom of the press by means of judges would have to continue. He also explains the motives for maintaining the principles of freedom of the press. It is impossible to ensure that the press is free and, at the same time, subject to censorship, or to set a more precise system of rules for censorship, which also secure more freedom. Therefore, censorship should not concern manuscripts, but only books imported into the kingdom. He mentions the “*spiritus scrupulositatis*” of the Bratislava and later Budapest censors. On the other hand, freedom of the press would not only help domestic authors, but also bring foreign authors from countries without this freedom into the country to publish their books. This would contribute to knowledge of the literature of these nations and the growth of education of all kinds. However, strict censorship would limit all these developments. Conflicts with the censors would lead authors to have their manuscripts published abroad, where there is

more freedom and so take the economic profit abroad. A further argument is the strictness of the college of censors and distrust of them. The independence and justice of the court has to balance them.

In opposition to the view that the danger from publication of dangerous books is greater than the possible social benefits of freedom of the press, Vay repeats the already familiar arguments: Freedom of the press is a driving element in the spread of national knowledge and ennoblement of the nation by means of good literature. In his view, freedom of the press does not bring any dangers, because the punishment threatening the authors of harmful books is an adequate deterrent, and there is also the possibility to refute the arguments contained in them. The public authority will apply its power and the author will be punished, while the bridle of censorship is also ineffective without punishment. He also mentions the most sensitive theme of the day: whether it is possible to spread the idea of revolution by means of particular texts. In his view it was not possible, because the spread of revolution was caused by a mixture of different internal and external causes. He states that the revolutionary spirit flourishes where "literature is banished" and authority is supported by ignorance. In his view, culture is the most useful means of protection from revolution. However, culture does not exist without freedom of the press, which leads to "*illuminatio mentis*". Freedom of the press flourishes in the Netherlands and in some German states without producing any bad results. It is also necessary to point out that reading is not sufficiently widespread in the kingdom to require limitation of the free press. He speaks of the spirit of the inquisition, which demanded that everything circulating in society should be restricted. Freedom of the press is harmless, while preliminary censorship is a burden. Freedom of the press is beneficial to legality in a peaceful state. Arguments about poison and infection regularly used in connection with books from which people allegedly need to be defended, are allegorical and actually contain nothing that threatens civil freedom. Vay promptly replaces it with another allegory: "*Physical evil is removed by physical medicines, evil thoughts are removed by the medicines provided by freedom of the press.*" Its misuse will be punished by judges. Misuse is a lesser evil than suppression of national culture and thought (*culturae et cognitionis nationalis suppressio*) and the resulting irreparable threat to public happiness (*irreparabilis felicitatis publicae iactura*) as Vay concludes his argumentation.²⁸

The period when Vay prepared and probably also submitted his discussion paper, which did not get into the minutes, came about a year after the death of the Emperor Leopold II and the accession of Francis II. It brought change to the relatively liberal and reformist course in many areas of life, not excluding the book market. Vay's consideration of the freedom of the citizen, culture of the nation, explicit references to the (French) revolution and countries where moderately higher degrees of freedom of expression existed, may have meant that in the given situation he was pushed out of the discourse as an extremist. His proposals to change some formulations got into the proposed

28 The contribution to the discussion is preserved only in transcripts. Lyceálna knižnica v Kežmarku (Lyceum Library in Kežmarok), Rkp. Vol. 214. *Separata Opinio, quoad Generalia Libertatis Preli principia in Conformitate Art. 15. 1790/1 deligenda.*

legislation. However, the proposed text itself and especially the principle of freedom was unacceptable to the Emperor at this time.

Stephan Vay was not the only person whose argument did not get into the official documentation of the deputation. Another "*separata opinio*" has survived. This time we do not know its author. In comparison with Vay's position, it is a less consistent and concise concept, but many arguments are the same. Like Vay, the anonymous author, probably also a member of parliament, describes freedom of the press as the bearer of many important freedom, as is proved by the experience of cultured nations. Like Vay, he also supports the absence of preventive censorship with the condition of consistent printing of the names of the author and printer. He expresses himself more openly than Vay on the theme of whether freedom of the press leads to revolution. He mentions that the revolution in England happened even before the introduction of freedom of the press in that country. He also refers to the situation in France. The French did not have freedom of the press before the "*modernam rerum faciem*" as he diplomatically describes the revolution. He points to the case of Voltaire and his works, which were printed outside France, while the author lived in exile. However, they were not banned in Hungary. Holland and other countries with freedom of the press preserved their constitutions undisturbed. Especially a look into past centuries shows that revolutions happen more frequently when the majority of people cannot read. In this "century of the sciences" there had been hardly any. In his view this showed that education and national culture enable freedom of the press and knowledge is the opposite of revolution. Freedom of the press did not either provoke or spread revolution. Books did not provoke revolutions. On the contrary, unlimited freedom of the press would calm the country. Freedom of the press strengthens the truth and is an enemy of error as the anonymous member of parliament concludes his interpretation of the relationship between revolution and freedom of the press.

Apart from these general views, he also contributes specific proposals to amend the proposed legislation. He is led to this mainly by an effort to eliminate subjective censorship as far as possible. Like Vay, he thinks that people should be allowed to write freely about constitutional matters like in England, because this would contribute to improvement. Formulations in the proposed legislation leave a lot of space for judgement by the censors. He wanted to add to the formulations about books provoking discontent that this meant books directly provoking discontent (*excitantes, directe exercentes*). He points out that the proposed text does not contain a precise definition of caricature. He understands caricature as "*falsus error*" and also slander against a person, but this is called "*calumnia*" in legal terminology.

Like Vay, he gives his own interpretation of the part of the proposed legislation speaking of books that deny good morals and the Christian religion. His position is similar. He states that the legislation had to defend religion not in the sense given in theological texts, but in accordance with civil law. A "*civitas*" without "*moralitas*" cannot exist, and without religion it is impossible to achieve a sense of community, meaning its security and "*commoditas vitae*". The moral principles of the Christian religion were compatible with the principles of natural religion. It would be sad for the Christian religion if it had to contain enforcement for its preservation, because enforcement is always counterproductive. He states that people seek out forbidden books and also that thanks to the

wisdom of Joseph II, censorship and customs barriers to the trade in symbolic books were eliminated between Hungary and Transylvania, which led to prosperous trade. He mentions *varietas religiosorum opinionum* and states that what is truth for some is untruth for others. If the limits of freedom of the press are not set sufficiently clearly, the development of national culture is restricted. He states that “*the education we could get from our fellow citizens will be obtained from abroad*”. If freedom of the press was limited they would never succeed in gaining recognized scholars for the universities and academies of Hungary. Science would be harmed if an author had to be extremely careful not to use an expression that a “*debilis aut malevolus censor*” would use against him like a sword. Censorship stifles talent. A dissection in a work on anatomy provokes the fears of the censor over the immortality of the soul, and this applies to all the sciences. The consequences of censorship take away the sleep of authors, they are obstacles to them and harmful for the country. He states that expert books are only read by a few people, so they cannot be considered a threat.²⁹

The contribution to the discussion has no date. The anonymous author probably had a legal education and we cannot exclude that the author was Stephan Vay, since both texts are compatible in concepts, sometimes the same and the author of the anonymous text refers to his previous contribution at one point.

Milton's *Areopagitica*, a speech defending freedom of the press given in the English Parliament against an attempt to limit freedom of the press in the 1640s, was not known in Europe and probably not in Hungary in this period.³⁰ His arguments about censorship as an obstacle in the search for truth in the context of religious, moral, intellectual and political freedom were unusual in the 17th century and did not attract a wider response. They were discovered by liberals only in the 19th century.³¹ However, in the 18th century they were already compatible with the currents of thought of the late Enlightenment.

The unpublished discussion papers provoke associations with him and with the ideas of David Hume, which contain argumentation that freedom of the press cannot be misused and does not provoke rebellion.³² An “added value” in the positions is patriotism towards the Kingdom of Hungary – argumentation that the absence of preventive censorship not only does not harm society, but will actually assist its cultural and intellectual development.

County declarations and the responses to them

The discussion on freedom of the press at the sessions of the deputation had almost nothing in common with the reality of the book market. The Emperor, acting through the governor, ordered the town and county authorities to investigate the printers, book sellers

29 Lyclálna knižnica v Kežmarku, Rkp. Vol. 214. *Separata Opinio in Negotio Libertatis Proeli*.

30 MILTON, John. *Areopagitica*. Prel. (Translated by) J. Vojtek. Bratislava : Jaspis, 1992. ISBN 8085576007.

31 VOJTEK, Juraj. Publicistika, ktorá pretrvala veky. Úvodná štúdia. (A publicist, who endures through the ages. An introductory study.). In MILTON, John, ref. 30, p. 7; NORBOOK, David. *Areopagitica, Censorship, and the Early Modern Public Sphere*. In BURT, Richard (ed.). *The Administration of Aesthetics. Censorship, Political Criticism and the Public Sphere*. Minneapolis; London : University of Minnesota Press, 1994, p. 3-33. ISBN 0816623651.

32 HUME, David. *Essays Moral, Political and Literary*. London etc. : Frowde, [1904], p. 8-12.

and book binders, search for specific non-consensual texts, confiscate them and investigate their origin. This systematic pressure cannot be compared to any form of censorship applied in the previous periods, and we can probably attribute it mainly to what many call fear: the political climate prevailing in Europe after the French Revolution.

The first decree of the Emperor Leopold II came in September 1790. At first sight it continued Joseph II's system: The censors had to follow the instructions from 1782 until new legislation was introduced, and take care that slanderous and harmful books were not distributed in the country. The decree emphasized that it was necessary to consider prohibited anything that threatened the maintenance of general peace, promoted error and division, reduced the obedience of citizens to the monarch, encouraged indifference towards religion or insulted the clergy. The instruction speaks not only about "books", but also about "booklets" (*libelli*), meaning mainly brochures and pamphlets. Reaction to the anti-Catholic atmosphere of the previous decade and fear of the French Revolution is evident here, especially in the emphasis on maintaining public peace and order.³³ This was only the beginning. A year later came instructions about revision of the rules on books allowed under Joseph II. Special rules were created for the censorship of Hungarian language newspapers. The censors had to take care that they did not contain information about the French Revolution.³⁴ Searches of bookshops were repeated. In 1790 they were aimed at the brochures of Friedrich Trenck among others.³⁵ The pressure increased after Leopold's death. The town and county authorities were literally buried in restrictive decrees aimed at the book market in the country. On 5 February 1793, the Emperor issued a decree that all printers without privileges had to be closed. These printers are designated private (*privatae typographiae*) and later also receive the adjective secret (*secretae typographiae*). A mention of private printers in this period also got into the proposed legislation. However, the important thing is that these printers were described as spreaders of dangerous content disturbing public peace. The distribution of their products had to be considered illegal. At the same time, the decree appealed to article 45 from 1599 on prohibition of the printing of an unauthorized calendar and the imposition of a financial penalty on the guilty person. The town and county authorities were responsible for eliminating such printers. The decree promised a reward of 200 gulden to a person who reported the existence of such a printer.³⁶

No printer was allowed to operate without a privilege until the accession of Joseph II, who regarded printing of books as free enterprise. Some of the printers established during his reign did not obtain or even apply for privileges. In 1793 they became the subject of investigation because they allegedly evaded censorship.

The county and town authorities gradually sent the results of their investigations to the governor. They usually replied that there was no such printer in their territory. The first signs of passivity or opposition apparently appeared in June 1793, when the decree

33 MNL, C 60, cs. 208, 25387, f. 153, 13 Sept 1790.

34 MNL, C 60, cs. 208, 16566, 6 Sept 1791.

35 KOLLÁROVÁ, Ivona. Vydavateľské aktivity Frídricha von Trenck v podmienkach uhorskej cenzúry. (The publishing activity of Frídriich von Trenck in the conditions of Hungarian censorship.). In *Studia Bibliographica Posoniensia* 2015. Bratislava : Univerzitná knižnica, 2015, s. 87-106.

36 MNL, C 60, cs. 208, 2859/266, f. 206, 5 Feb 1793.

on the closure of private or secret printers was repeated in a further circular. It again emphasizes that such printers are subject to royal jurisdiction and the situation is not connected with the parliamentary article 15 on working out legislation of freedom of the press.³⁷ From July 1793 to March 1794, no fewer than 17 Hungarian counties conceived positions doubting these decrees. The counties involved in this opposition included Abov, Gemer, Hont, Nitra, Žilina, Novohrad, Zemplín and Spiš.

On 12 August 1793, the representatives of the County of Abov sent their statement explaining that the royal circular contained much that contradicted the legislation of the kingdom. In their view, this undermined the foundations and essence of constitutionalism. They stated that the article from 1599 was inappropriately applied and misinterpreted. On the contrary, the statute book contained no trace of a prohibition on any private person owning a printing business without a privilege. What is not prohibited by legislation is permitted. It is necessary to prevent the distribution and propagation of books in an appropriate way. Experience shows that strict censorship is counter-productive. It leads to the publication of anonymous caricatures, which would never see the light of day if their authors had to sign them. With reference to England, Sweden and Denmark, Germany and other countries, they pointed out that freedom of the press is an important element of civil and political freedom in educated Europe. Despotism and the activity of censors obstruct it. They give specific examples of censorship of the press, which they consider inappropriate. It is necessary to supervise the censors and set precise limits for them, so that they do not threaten public well-being and the culture of the nation.³⁸ Thus they do not speak of freedom of the press as the absence of preventive censorship, but only say that censorship should be less strict without subjectivity from the censors.

The representatives of the County of Bihar observed that they formulated their views not only because of the decree on the closure of private printers, but also because of the problematic prohibition of books: The Emperor had prohibited sale of Hajnóczy's Political and legal discourses³⁹ and the Hungarian translation of the *Historia universal* by Claude François Xavier Millot.⁴⁰ In their view, Hajnóczy's discourses spoke about the content of the discussions of the deputations of parliament and citizens had the right to express their views on them. Writing about legislative matters could not be forbidden – precisely the opposite. If the constitution was going to be well worked out, there had to be discussion, both for and against. If these matters could be freely discussed in parliament, how could somebody be prohibited from publishing his views on them. Fear of political discussion meant that although the next parliament was supposed to bring

37 MNL, C 60, cs. 208, 16039. f. 235, 26 March 1793.

38 The text of the protests from Abov and Bihar counties were published by the English physician and traveller Robert Townson. TOWNSON, Robert. *Travels in Hungary with a short account of Vienna in the year 1793*. London : Robinson, 1797, p. 334-335. The texts of the protests can also be found in MNL, C 60, cs. 83 and 85. The text of the protest from Bihar county is also found in the: Ústredná knižnica SAV (Central Library of the SAS), Lyceálna knižnica, Rkp. Vol. 35, p. 671-674. Several further texts of county declarations with similar arguments are preserved in the cited archive.

39 HAJNÓCZY, ref. 1, HAJNÓCZY, Joseph. *De Comitibus regni Hungariae, deque organisatione eorundem dissertatio iuris publici Hungarici*. [s. l.] : [s. n.], 1791.

40 MILLOT, Claude François Xavier. *A világnak közönséges története. (Elements of general history)*. (2 vols. Pestén és Budán : Weingand, 1790-1791. Translated into Hungarian by Ferencz Verseghy.

greater freedom of the press, in reality the opposite was happening and the legislation never acquired validity. They repeat arguments from the legislation that it is not necessary to limit freedom, only to punish those who violate its precisely defined framework. In their view, the powers of the censors are too great and illegal: they have no right to judge citizens on the basis of their writings. Their activity is acceptable only where it is necessary to protect public order. Freedom of thought, freedom of conscience and freedom of discussion are inseparable and in a free country there cannot be any limitation of them. Like the representatives of the County of Abov, “they could not understand” how it was possible to apply article 45 from 1599 to banning of printing businesses without privileges. Such a ban could arise only as a consensus between the king and the estates, it was not a subject for the royal prerogative, because this was not mentioned in the statute book, as they stated in agreement with the other counties. The king could ask the estates to set general limits for freedom of the press, since the estates are the body responsible for freedom of the press. In harmony with the other counties, they stated that there was no valid legislation according which a member of the nobility could be legitimately convicted and punished for owing a private printing press, using it or buying and selling forbidden books.⁴¹

It became clear that not only limitation of freedom of the press disturbed the representatives of the counties. There was also the traditional tension in the framework of the division of legislative power in the kingdom. The declaration of the County of Nitra had a similar spirit. Apart from the fact that the decree had no support in the legislation of the kingdom, they stated that public debate on constitutional and legislative themes helped to eliminate errors and improve legislation, and so was beneficial for the public. The reward promised to informers is much more dangerous than the products of printers without privileges. Such stimuli encourage fraud, lies and cunning. The final results did not contribute to security, peace and the public good. Prohibiting private printing presses is an injury to the constitution and the rights of the nobility. A decision on this issue needs to be left to the next parliament.⁴²

The authors of the declaration from the County of Zemplín directed their attention more to the philosophical and social aspects of closing printing businesses and the historical tradition of suppressing debates about constitutional affairs, rather than to the legal facts. They recall the parliamentary ban on the discourses of Adam Francis Kollár from 1764 with the explanation that it is an insult to the constitution. They mention that the recently published pamphlets *Babel* and *Ninive* and other works by Joseph Grossinger damage the constitution much more but were not banned.⁴³ According to them, freedom of the press is an “*anima virtuositatis*” and does not deserve the “thrashing” it actual-

41 TOWSON, ref. 38, p. 335-339.

42 Repraesentatio comitatus Nitriensis: MNL, C 60, cs. 83, 23806, f. 156-157, 6 September 1793. Repraesentatio comitatus Honthensis : C 60, cs. 83, 24507, f. 159-161, 7 September 1793.

43 [HOFFMANN, Leopold Alois] *Babel. Fragmente über die jetzigen politischen Angelegenheiten in Ungarn*. [Salzburg] : [Mayr], 1790; [HOFFMANN, Leopold Alois] *Ninive. Fortgesetzte Fragmente über die dermaligen politischen Angelegenheiten in Ungarn*. [Wien] : [s. n.], 1790. Today the discourses are not attributed to Grossinger, but Hoffmann. The statement that they were permitted is not true: On prohibition of the sale of pamphlets: MNL, C 60, cs. 77, 24121 f. 256 and others.

ly gets. “*Truth does not flee from the light, time as a teacher, experience as a witness and the constitutional rights of the nation speak for freedom of the press.*” They also point out that books written in foreign languages are publicly for sale, but translated into Hungarian they are forbidden.⁴⁴ They return to the scheme of the nation and its culture. A cultivated nation has a variety of books about public law, but this is not possible in the Kingdom of Hungary precisely because of strict censorship. The truth shines more clearly in the context of various contradictory principles. The strictness of censorship takes away reason, gives birth to barbarism and barbarism takes away humanity. On the other hand, freedom of the press shapes wisdom and educates the citizens. The mind is cultivated by reading. The representatives of the County of Zemplín underline that the legislative power is harmed by strict censorship and point out that handing over of the legislation to discussion by a deputation was mainly intended to delay the acceptance of a definitive proposal.⁴⁵

The declaration of the County of Gemer is also written in a similar spirit. It is not only an official position, but more an enthusiastic and erudite philosophical and legal tract by one author,⁴⁶ divided into 24 paragraphs. The first is devoted to an explanation of the social contract and the origin of the rights of the monarch. It includes an almost exact citation of article 11 of the *Declaration of the rights of man and the citizen* – freedom to think and communicate is a natural right of man.

The second paragraph recalls that one monarch enabled discussion of freedom of the press by means of parliamentary article 15 from 1791, but another did not allow publication of the legislation. The third and fourth paragraphs contain a legal analysis of the decrees to which the counties were reacting, leading to the conclusion that they are unjustified. Experience teaches that prohibition provokes increased interest and so promotes a book. According to the author of the declaration, this enriches the sellers because it raises the price of the book, while impoverishing the readers. The sixth paragraph repeats that thought is a natural ability of the human being and communication of thought is their inalienable right. The aim of civil society is achievement of happiness, but prohibition of free communication is opposed to this aim and against nature itself, because “*it is impossible for a mind not to think, just as it is impossible for a healthy eye not to see*”. Communication of thought assists progress and knowledge, it pleases people, gives them peace and improves the lives even of the “unworthy”. Printing is a divine invention, a gift for humanity. The happiness of a nation depends on its enlightenment or education. Banning books gives birth to darkness, spiritual captivity and lack of cultivation. The author gives historical arguments for free communication. Without legislative support, the right to communicate is left at the mercy of the censors, but they have no qualifications to serve as judges of the thoughts of the nation. Bans should be imposed only on texts that could subvert society and not on insults, because an insulted person will find protection in the

44 During the reign of Joseph II the rule was that a translation of a permitted original was automatically allowed if the content was not changed. Censors in Hungary had a tendency not to respect this. KOLLÁROVÁ, ref. 22, p. 62, p. 201.

45 MNL, C 60, cs. 85, 20603, f. 275-276, 6 July 1793.

46 BALLAGI, Géza. *A politikai irodalom Magyarországon 1925-ig. (Political literature in Hungary up to 1925.)*. Budapest : Franklin társulat, 1888, p. 772-774.

law. Incorrect views do not need to be banned because it is not difficult to refute them. In the end, a writer cannot force anybody to read his texts. Reading does not make a reader unhappy. Good texts develop the reader, while less good texts actually help to strengthen his own position. The author concludes the county declaration with the statement that the truth is only that which is considered true and nobody is mistaken from his own will.⁴⁷

The county declaration is a sort of development of article 11 of the *Declaration of the rights and freedoms of man and the citizen*. It could not fail to provoke a reply, not only because of its content, but also because of the determination of the county officials to distribute it in print. The investigation by the governor's council show that there were actually two Hungarian language versions of the declaration. The shorter version was printed by the county notary Andreas Chazár, while the longer was intended for distribution by the county authorities as their official position.⁴⁸ Further investigation shows that 400 copies of one of the versions were produced by the printer Johann Joseph Ellinger in Košice. Chazár kept 300 copies for his own use, while 100 were given to the printer Johann Michael Landerer, who allegedly had the declaration printed again.⁴⁹

Authorship can be attributed with a high degree of certainty to Andreas Chazár, notary of the County of Gemer. This is proved especially by his correspondence with Ferenc Kazinczy. His letters show how not only he and Chazár, but also his brother Diénes Kazinczy notary of the County of Bihar, were involved in events.⁵⁰ A letter written by Chazár in March 1794 shows that the declaration also had a German version allegedly printed by Weber in Bratislava or by an unspecified printer in Vienna. He writes about a great response, citing the following commentary: "*You see how far forward are the Hungarians, we thought they were barbarians, they do not read, did you ever read something like this?*"⁵¹ On the basis of Kazinczy's letters, it is possible to suppose that the county authorities were coordinated in some way and Joseph Hajnóczy may have stood in the background. Kazinczy informed him in July 1794.⁵²

The county movement attracted a response and not only in the form of a reply from the Emperor, who informed all the relevant counties in March 1794 that their positions were not consistent with legislation, the constitution and maintenance of the public good. The Emperor provided his own legal interpretation of the dispute. In his view, private printing businesses fall under the jurisdiction of the royal administration and as long as legislation on the press did not determine otherwise, he would delegate censorship to the

47 The Hungarian text of the representation: MNL, C 60, cs. 85, 29053, f. 317-325. The text of the declarations of the counties of Pest, Gemer and Bihar and the imperial decree: BENDA, Kálmán. *A magyar jakobinusok iratai. (Writings of the Hungarian Jacobins)*. vol I. Budapest : Akadémiai kiadó, 1957, p. 931-956. Texts of other county declarations in MNL, C 60 cs. 86-90.

48 MNL, C 60, cs. 85, 29053, f. 317-325.

49 MNL, C 60, cs. 208, 10811, f. 311-312; cs. 208, 510, f. 356.

50 BENDA, Kálmán. Kazinczy Ferenc ismeretlen levelei 1794-ből. (Unknown letters of Ferenc Kazinczy from 1794). In *Irodalomtörténet*, 1949, year 41, no. 2, p. 319-332.

51 CENTGRAF, Károly. Egy ismeretlen Kazinczy-levél. (An unknown letter of Kazinczy.). In *Irodalomtörténeti Közlemények*, year 78, 1974, no. 2, p. 234-237. The editor of the letters states that the German version is not available. Copy of Kazinczy's reports from meetings of the Bihar County authorities : Ústredná knižnica SAV, Lyceálna knižnica, Rkp. Vol. 35, p. 675-676.

52 BENDA, ref. 50, p. 327-329.

royal censors to prevent harm to the public good. The Emperor threatened punishment for disobedience, and sending a message especially to the County of Gemer, he did not approve its daring, sharp and inappropriate views.⁵³

The fact that officials wanted to spread their views in print provoked a decree according to which such declarations are superfluous and only what really needed to be published could be printed and in the necessary number.⁵⁴

The English doctor of medicine and traveller Robert Townson also had information about the opposition of the Hungarian counties. He published three texts of county positions in his book.⁵⁵

Martin Schwartner wrote in his *Statistics of the Kingdom of Hungary*: “According to my information, the first book published in Hungary giving reasons for and against freedom of the press, is the *Analysis repraesentationis* [Incluti] C[omitatus] G[ömeriensis] *pro libertate preli* still wet from the press”.⁵⁶ However, the real reason for writing the *Analysis*⁵⁷ was not impartial consideration for and against, but reaction to Chazár’s text, its distribution, the opposition of the counties to the closure of the so-called private printing businesses and logically also support for the Emperor’s position. According to the date in the introduction, the *Analysis* was written on 3 March 1794, and so a few months before the discovery of Martinovics’s conspiracy. However, it was published only two years later. The delay could have been caused precisely by the events surrounding the Hungarian Jacobins. The author of the *Analysis* starts by summarizing all the connecting events and arguments. He openly and definitely declares support for the necessity of the Emperor’s decrees. He comments that what is presented as the position of the County of Gemer is the work of one person to which the county agreed. He translated the Hungarian text into Latin, since he is allegedly so skilled in it, that he could analyse the text. He uses his freedom to think and write, for which the author of the county declaration struggles. Then he analyses the text itself point by point and argues against the declaration. He uses his authorities, namely the Bible, Puffendorf, Grotius and others, according to which the power of the ruler is derived from God, against the platform of the Social Contract on which Andreas Chazár based his argumentation. For him, Chazár’s argumentation is insolent in the style of a “convent of Jacobins”. He uses the arguments of the Hungarian statute book to support the approach of the monarch in connection with the so-called private printing businesses. He speaks of the “terrible example of the French” and the evils threatening from misuse of the power to punish. He ridicules the view that banning books is counter-productive and states that those who seek them out have no respect for God. He uses classic arguments about the mental harm caused by inappropriate lessons.

Freedom of thought cannot be considered a human right because it is only an ability (*potentia*). A right or ability to think about everything does not mean the ability to understand anything. Censorship is only the restriction of deviant thoughts and the monarch

53 MNL, C 60, cs. 208, 10811, f. 301-304.

54 MNL, C 60, cs. 208, 510, f. 359.

55 TOWNSON, ref. 38.

56 SCHWARTNER, Martin. *Statistik der Königreichs Ungern*. Pest : Trattner, 1798, p. 570.

57 [TOMPA, Ladislav]: *Analysis repraesentationis I. C. G. [inclutus comitatus gömöriensis] circa libertatem preli*. Budae : Typis Vniversitatis, 1796.

has the right “to hold in check insolent tongues or pens”, because nobody has the right to infect others with deviant thought. Printing of books is not only a gift from God, but also a channel for the spreading of the excrement and infection of human thought. To the usual counter-arguments of the free flow of ideas in society, he adds those provided by the French Revolution: A fire is devastating Europe, destroying the work of apostles and politicians. Precisely the free communication of ideas had contributed to this anarchy. Therefore, it is not the “mother or enlightenment” and the way to make a nation happier. He strives to convince the reader that the author of the declaration is an adherent of the French Revolution, an illuminatus or Jacobin. The aim of the ruler is to prevent evil by banning books, and nobody can cast doubt on this intention.

The author of the *Analysis* remained anonymous with the text ending: *Datum ad Istrum ... F.T.* The bibliography of Hungarian publications attributes authorship to the canon of Esztergom Ladislav Tompa, although his name does not fully correspond to the initials F.T.⁵⁸ Other indications of authorship are not available. The author not only uses the classical ecclesiastical pro-censorship arguments, but also fear of the French Revolution. He was not the only person inspired to write a reaction to the county declarations.⁵⁹

On 28 February 1793 the Emperor ordered the confiscation of Hajnóczy’s *Public political dissertation on the limits of royal power in Hungary*, probably the text that introduced the debate on freedom of the press as a theme in parliament.⁶⁰ A month later the Emperor banned sale of the book *On the parliaments of the Kingdom of Hungary and their organization, a dissertation on Hungarian public law*.⁶¹ In June came a ban on another legal – historical work to the surprise even of the Budapest censor Matthias Riethaller.⁶² What these legal syntheses symbolized was probably more important than their actual content. However, the idea of freedom of expression was already absorbed in society no less than the fear of it. Banning and confiscating texts regarded as its bearers and exalted counter-arguments could do nothing to change that.

The essence of freedom in politico – philosophical currents

In September 1791 the governor’s council granted permission for the publication of Stephan Tichý’s book *Philosophical comments on education in Hungary*.⁶³ Mainly thanks to this book, Stephan Tichý is regarded as the first follower of Kant in the territory

58 BENDA, ref. 47, p. 940.

59 Another reaction: Országos Széchényi könyvtár (National Széchényi Library): Manuscript collection: Quart. Lat. 3305. SZVORÉNYI, Michael Joseph. *Opuscula contra libertatem proeli*. On the image of Ladislav Tompa: KOWALSKÁ, Eva. Tradície študentských revolt na bratislavských školách. (The tradition of student revolt in the Bratislava schools.). In SEDLÁK, Imrich (zost.) *Ludovít Štúr v súradniciach minulosti a súčasnosti*. Martin : Matica slovenská, 1997, p. 43-45. ISBN 9788070904046.

60 HAJNÓCZY, ref. 2. MNL, C 60, cs. 84, 6620 f. 1. Confiscation order from 28 February 1793.

61 HAJNÓCZY, ref. 39, MNL, C 60, cs. 85, 8745, f. 392. 26 March 1793.

62 [HAJNÓCZY, Joseph] *De diversis subsidiis publicis dissertatio*. [s. l.] : [s. n.], 1792. MNL, C 60, cs. 85, 14895 f. 392, f. 396.

63 [TICHÝ, Stephan] *Philosophische Bemerkungen über das Studienwesen in Ungarn*. Pest; Ofen; Kaschau : Strohmayer, 1792. Hungarian bibliographic and biographical sources (Szinneyi) name him as Franz Tichý. In the assessment of the censor Riethaller cited below, he is named Stephan Georg Tichý.

of Slovakia.⁶⁴ The censor Riethaller noticed this and did not allow a longer account. He stated that he did not support the author in his views concerning the existence of God, human freedom and the mortality of the soul, since among other things he supports intolerance in students, the courage to judge anybody and intellectual obstinacy. In his view Tichý plays at being the patron of naturalism. He does not believe in eternal punishment and the final result is that he supports sectarians, atheists and materialists. He asks whether such views are tolerable in an ordained professor. He points to the fact that Tichý supports unlimited freedom of the press. The governor's office would notice this and draw the consequences. In spite of this, the governor's office gave permission for the publication of Tichý's manuscript.⁶⁵

The censor Riethaller was part of the conservative current of thought, which did not allow the writing and distribution of anything opposed to the dominant view. He already worked as a censor during the reign of Joseph II. He followed instructions and did not strive to prohibit at any price. If a manuscript was not in harmony with his convictions, he reported this in an assessment and waited for the decision of his superiors.⁶⁶ Even so, Riethaller symbolized for many what they called the "*ex-Jesuit way of thinking*", which meant the opposite of freedom of expression and tolerance. Johann Molnár (1757–1819) also points to this in a historical account of the rights and freedoms of Protestants in Hungary. Like many others he did not avoid the theme of free communication in relation to defence of the right of non-Catholics to freely spread their teachings. In his view it could not happen if they had to submit to "*Catholic censorship*".⁶⁷

Riethaller was not the only unpopular censor for whom debate on freedom of the press was not permissible. In the period 1791–1795 Emericus Vajkovics (1715–1796) canon of Kalocsa and former Bratislava censor published four from ten originally planned discourses on the history of censorship. First he published the *Dissertation on the power of secular princes in the censorship of books*. In the introduction he addresses the "*Deputatio librorum censoria*" by which he probably meant the Deputation for public political affairs, which was concerned with preparing legislation on freedom of the press at this time. Not only the introduction, but the whole dissertation is a celebration of the system of censorship during the reign of Maria Theresia.⁶⁸ The *Dissertation on pernicious books and especially those infected with libertinism* is a free continuation directed towards the methods by which Maria Theresia fought against atheists, materialists, deists, indifferentists and others, who "*ridicule religion*".⁶⁹ Libertinism was also the reason why he published in the same year the first of ten dissertations: *On the origin of*

64 ORAVCOVÁ, Marianna. Štefan Tichý – prvý stúpenec Kanta na Slovensku. (Stephan Tichý – the first supporter of Kant in Slovakia.). In *Filozofia*, 1986, year 41, no. 5, p. 588–602. ISSN 0046-385 X.

65 MNL, C 60, cs. 78, 18380, f. 297–301.

66 KOLLAROVÁ, ref. 22, p. 192–195.

67 MOLNÁR, Johann. *Prälminarien zu einer historisch-kritischen Untersuchung über die Rechte und Freyheiten der protestantischen Kirche in Ungarn*. Gedruckt im protestantischen Deutschland : [s. n.], 1790.

68 VAJKOVICS, Emericus. *Dissertatio de potestate principum saecularium in censuram librorum ...* Colocae : Neuner, 1791.

69 VAJKOVICS, Emericus. *Dissertatio de censura librorum perniciosorum, ac specialiter libertinismo infectorum ...* Colocae : Neuner, 1791.

the right of the Church to censor books. He again pointed readers to the fact that an act on censorship was being prepared and again inaccurately stated that a special deputation for its establishment had been created.⁷⁰

The above mentioned Stephan Tichý, professor at the Academy in Košice, was probably one of the reasons inspiring Vajkovics to underline the importance of censorship carried out according to the Tridentine rules. Tichý was forced to retire in 1795 because of alleged participation in the Jacobin conspiracy.⁷¹

The philosophical remarks on education in Hungary arose on the occasion of the conceiving of a new study system in Hungary. Tichý needed to express himself mainly on the textbooks planned for faculties of philosophy, since he regarded them as the basis for all the other higher sciences and the source of what he called “*Nationalaufklärung*”. He devoted a whole chapter to his ideas on the censorship system, although at first sight it may appear that it was not connected with the content of the work. However, Tichý starts from the fact that every academy has a censor, who has instructions not to allow the printing of anything opposed to morals, religion and the state. He considers this rule to be indefinite and unstable, because, in his view, it essentially meant that anything that threatens prejudices and deep-rooted errors is prohibited. He speaks of a sort of indefinite boundary line, which allows the censor to decide for himself, according to his own views and prejudices, whether a writer has crossed it or not. He asks whether the censors have the necessary knowledge and ability to take such decisions. One person cannot decide on truth and untruth. Only the “*thinking public*” is a competent judge. He states that the censor’s office was always occupied by sworn enemies of enlightenment and philosophy. The existing censorship system serves the petrification of prejudices and deep-rooted untruths. He speaks of the need to introduce new principles. His views are compatible with the idea of legislation on freedom of the press. He devotes more attention to some questions, for example, whether the state should be involved in theological disputes and whether texts opposed to the prevailing theological system are dangerous. He states that priests should not misuse the secular power to promote their truths. The monarch should care for the happiness of the nation in this life and not the fate of the individual after death. Theological disputes are only dangerous when the state interferes in them. Otherwise they have no more influence on public peace than any other academic disputes. If the state has to prohibit something, then it should ban only texts that joke about the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, because such texts may fall into the hands of readers without independent thought and the ability to distinguish satire from evidence. In his view, censorship is also justified in the case of texts directed against “*good morals*”, namely those containing indecent and obscene descriptions and stories, stories about love or “*romantic foolishness*” encouraging fantasy among young people

70 VAJKOVICS, Emericus. *Decas Dissertationum Ecclesiastico-Politicarum De Censoria Librorum Disciplina*, ... Pestini : Landerer, 1791. For more on Vajkovics’s texts: KOLLÁROVÁ, Ivona. *Cenzúra kníh v tereziánskej epoche. (Censorship of books in the Theresian epoch.)*. Bratislava : Ústredná knižnica SAV, 1992, p. 76-83.

71 MÉSZÁROS, Ondrej. Prvý verejný spor v maďarskej filozofii: spor o Kantovu filozofiu na prelome 18. a 19. storočia. (The first public dispute in Hungarian philosophy: the argument over Kant’s philosophy around 1800.). In *Filozofia*, 2010, year 65, no. 10, p. 968. ISSN 0046-385 X.

and women or acting as a model. He also recommends banning books containing “*Epicurean*” and “*morally light-minded, egoistic or greedy principles*”, books proclaiming intolerance and persecution or containing insults and obscenity.

Tichý's views on freedom of expression “smuggled” into a work on education in Hungary are compatible not only with the proposed legislation on freedom of the press, but in the wider context also with the philosophical views of the time. The debate about freedom of thought, expression, philosophy and criticism as a guaranteed value was never so intense as in the enlightened discourse of the second half of the 18th century.⁷²

Freedom as a social utopia appears in the works of the social contract theorists: Spinoza, Locke, Hume, Rousseau.⁷³ Armin Biermann points out that apart from the wish for freedom of expression, it is necessary to see in the discourse the fact that: “*The absolutist feudal structures blocked to a critical degree the unavoidable growth of power potential and so also the general development of social structures.*” He states that “*the anti-censorship discourses of the Enlightenment period changed into discourses on freedom of the word and thought, in principle demanding a larger share of social power*” not only the absence of preventive censorship.⁷⁴

The debate in the Kingdom of Hungary on freedom of the press can be perceived in various contexts: Enlightenment ideas, the reform parliament of 1790–1791, the preparation of a new constitution and the liberal content we can find in it. It is also necessary to see it in the context of Hungarian constitutionalism and its development, opening the way to the liberal reformist movement of the 1830s to 1840s and finally to the revolution of 1848.⁷⁵ When seeking an answer to the question of whether it is possible to find a dividing line between late Enlightenment and early liberalism, Mórítz Csáky speaks of a gradual transition and mixing of these abstract terms in the real political and socio-political context of the Kingdom of Hungary. He also points out that the opposition of the counties to the central government had not only liberal but also conservative attributes. The opposition of the counties to the elimination of the so-called private printing businesses with reference to the lack of any legislation in the royal law needs to be understood not only in the context of ideas of freedom, but also the traditional Estates opposition to the central power.⁷⁶

72 On freedom of thought in Enlightenment philosophy: ZENKER, Kay. *Denkfreiheit : libertas philosophandi in der deutschen Aufklärung*. Hamburg : Meiner, 2012. ISBN 9783787322817.

73 A summary of the meanings of the term freedom after the French Revolution: TINKOVÁ, Daniela. Ohyzda na prodej a „zmatení pojmů“. Koncept svobody a rovnosti v protirevolučních brožurách z českých zemí (1793–1799). (The ugly for sale and “confusion of terms”. The concept of freedom and equality in counter revolutionary brochures from the Czech Lands (1793 – 1799). In MADL, Claire – TINKOVÁ, Daniela. *Francouzský švindl svobody : Francouzská revoluce a veřejné mínění v českých zemích*. Praha : Argo, 2012, p. 110–113. ISBN 9788025706954.

74 BIERMANN, Armin. „Nebezpečná literatura“ – náčrt teorie literární cenzury. (“Dangerous literature” – an outline of the theory of literary censorship.). In PAVLÍČEK, Tomáš – PÍŠA, Peter – WÖGERBAUER, Michael (eds.). *Nebezpečná literatura ? : Antologie z myšlení o literární cenzuře*. Brno : Host, 2012, p. 189–190. ISBN 9788072948598.

75 SZIJÁRTÓ, István M. Sociálne a kultúrne dejiny uhorského snemu v 18. storočí. (Social and cultural history of the Hungarian Parliament in the 18th century.). In *Historický časopis*, 2012, year 60, no. 2, p. 269. ISSN 0018-2575.

76 CSÁKY, Mórítz. *Von der Aufklärung zum Liberalismus : Studien zum frühliberalismus in Ungarn*. Wien

A close combination of freedom of expression with the topic of the “nation” appeared in the 1790s. In this fiction, freedom of expression is an essential condition for the development of the cultural aspects of the nation, its literature, language, education and science. This combination appears not only in political declarations, but also in concrete national “programmes”.⁷⁷ It was part of the process by which the Josephine scheme of “*Volksaufklärung*” was gradually transformed into the nationalism of the 19th century. As Csáky points out, revival of the Hungarian language and nationalism were symbols of freedom in the Estates society of the multi-national Kingdom of Hungary. They were expected to become a firm part of liberalism in the future.⁷⁸

“Freedom of thought and freedom of the press will only be limited to the degree needed to ensure that they cannot harm sovereignty and the constitution”, as Ignaz Martinovics formulated the second paragraph of his *Proposed new constitution of Hungary*.⁷⁹ Here, freedom of thought and the press is part of the “freedoms of the Hungarian Republic”, part of the concept of independence and a modern distribution of social power. However, this concept was opposed in real life by the concept of public order and security, which the *status quo* had to secure for the threatened, vulnerable regime. Freedom of the press was in the sunshine only in the debates of intellectuals. There was less of it than ever before in the real book market.

The idea of the absence of preventive censorship, although worked out in legislation, did not find a response and support from the people actually in power. The development after the discovery of Martinovics’s conspiracy led to even stricter measures. This development shows that on the level of actual interaction, censorship is the opposite of the functioning of the regime, because political systems in crisis strive to compensate for their lack of “power” with censorship.⁸⁰ This is how we can understand why the prepared legislation on freedom of the press remained no more than evidence of the penetration of liberal ideas into Hungarian politics.

PRESSEFREIHEIT IM UNGARISCHEN SPÄTAUFKLÄRERISCHEN DISKURS

IVONA KOLLÁROVÁ

Die Studie analysiert den gesellschaftlich-politischen Diskurs über die Pressefreiheit in Ungarn in der Zeit 1791 – 1794. Auf Grund der Niederschriften der Kommission für öffentlich-politische Angelegenheiten wird die Entstehung des Gesetzes über die Pressefreiheit verfolgt. Sie bringt

: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1981, p. 156.

77 For example: DÉCSY, Samuel. *Pánnóniai Fénix avagy hamvából fel-támadott magyar nyelv. (The Pannonian phoenix or the Hungarian language, which rose from the ashes.)*. Bétsben : Trattner, 1790.

78 CSÁKY, ref. 76, p. 241.

79 BENDA, ref. 47, p. 898. Martinovics on freedom of the press: [MARTINOVICS, Ignaz] *Discussio oratoria in eos, qui in librorum censuram ivehantur*. [s. l.] : [s. t.], [s. a.] Edícia: BENDA, ref. 47, p. 756-769.

80 BIERMANN, ref. 74, p. 190.

Informationen über bisher nicht veröffentlichten Diskussionsbeiträge der Abgeordneten. Sie analysiert den Widerstand der ungarischen Gespanschaften gegen die Auflösung sog. privaten Druckereien, ihre Argumentation wird an Hintergrund des ungarischen Konstitutionalismus wahrgenommen. Sie analysiert auch weitere philosophische, religiöse und politische Überlegungen, um auf ihren Kontext in der Philosophie der europäischen Aufklärung, des Konzepts des gesellschaftlichen Vertrags, Französischer Revolution und ihrer liberalen Ideen aufmerksam zu machen. In diese Ideenströme wurde auch das Konzept der Entwicklung der nationalen Kultur als Ausdruck des ungarischen Nationalismus eingebracht. Die intensive Debatte über die Presse- und Redefreiheit war Bestandteil des Unabhängigkeitskonzepts und der modernen Verteilung der gesellschaftlichen Macht. Gegen dieses Konzept stand jedoch im realen Leben die These der öffentlichen Ruhe und Sicherheit, die für Status quo sorgen sollte. Die intensive Debatte hatte keinen Einfluss auf den steigenden Zensurdruck als den Ausdruck der geschwächten politischen Macht. Die Vorstellung der fehlenden präventiven Zensur, obwohl legislativ erarbeitet, fand keine Reaktion und das Gesetz über die Pressefreiheit blieb nur als Zeugnis für das Durchdringen der liberalen Ideen in die ungarische Politik und als Zeugnis dafür, dass der politischen System kompensiert in der Krise die fehlende Macht durch die Zensur.

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“HE FLEW ON WINGS OF SLAVONIC FEELING TO SERBIA TO HELP
THE SERBS IN 1915”. THE SYMBOLIC INSTRUMENTALIZATION
OF M.R. ŠTEFÁNIK AND SLAVONIC COMMUNITY AGAINST
THE BACKGROUND OF THE INTER-STATE RELATIONS OF THE TIME

PETER MACHO

MACHO, Peter. “He flew on wings of Slavonic feeling to Serbia to help the Serbs in 1915”. The symbolic instrumentalization of M.R. Štefánik and Slavonic community against the background of the inter-state relations of the time. *Historický časopis*, 2016, 64, 5, pp. 809-843, Bratislava.

The study analyses the symbolic instrumentalization of the national hero M.R. Štefánik in the context of the modified form of Slavonic community in the 20th century. In the inter-war period, the symbol of Štefánik was used to strengthen the Czechoslovak – Yugoslav alliance on the basis of Slavonic brotherhood. The political representatives of independent Slovakia and Croatia during the Second World War refused to build their inter-state relations on the basis of Slavonic community. From the point of view of Zagreb, Štefánik appeared pro-Serb and pro-Yugoslav, so he was an undesirable symbol for the Croats. Emphasis on the strong Slavonic and Serbophil identity of Štefánik became an instrument for Slovak opposition oriented circles to articulate their resistance to the Ľudák regime and the Slovak state. Key words: Symbol. Slavonic reciprocity. Serbophilism. Czechoslovak-Yugoslav alliance. Milan Rastislav Štefánik. Slavko Kvaterník.

Authors of biographies of Štefánik often point to the fact that one of the factors shaping the identity of the future general from his early childhood was the Slovak and Slavonic feeling of his family home. For example, Ján Juríček wrote in his popularizing booklet on Štefánik about the general's father as follows: “*The verses of P. Štefánik [...] show a direct patriotism and unshakable faith that the powerful Slavonic brothers would save our nation from disappearance. Pictures of many leading Russian and other Slavonic personalities hung on the walls of the parsonage at Košariská.*”¹

A further illustration of the strong Slavonic or Russophil feelings of the Štefánik family in the memoir literature is a description of a children's game in the yard of the Košariská Evangelical parsonage, naturally with the participation of little Milan. The game based the French – Russian war usually ended with a lesson from father, who explained to the children with unconcealed pride that Napoleon had humbled almost all of Europe, but faced with the Russians he could only capitulate: “*At other times, the whole parsonage was filled with song. The boys – Igor, Lacko, Milanko and Paľko – took a fire shovel on which they hung a piece of cloth to use as a flag. The eldest Igor went in front with the other boys behind and this procession went through the room and garden, singing enthusiastically [a song of Slovene origin – P.M.]: Naprej zastava slave. (Forward flag*

1 JURÍČEK, Ján. *Milan Rastislav Štefánik*. Bratislava : Vydavateľstvo Q 111, 2006, p. 9. ISBN 8089092292

of glory) *They also often sang the Russian national anthem: God save the Czar! which the pastor had taught to his children at an early age.*"²

Information about how Pavel Štefánik gave his children programmatic Slavonic names is thematized even more frequently in biographies of Štefánik. Apart from historical reminiscences of the glorious Great Moravian past, he was also inspired by names of great figures from Czech, Polish and Russian history or the past of the South Slavs, especially the Serbs.³ In his publication aimed at school-age readers, Július Bodnár emphasized: *"the pan-Slavist spirit really dominated the father's thinking, when along with the name Milan he also gave the name Rastislav, and to his eldest son both Igor and Branislav, although he could not know that his son would revive the former state of King Rastislav"*.⁴

Pavel Štefánik mainly liked names that belonged to the Russian (Igor, Jaroslav, Fedor, Pavel, Alexander) and Serbian (Alexander, Dušan) dynastic traditions. The name Milan also came to Slovakia from the Serbian environment. Two bearers of this name sat on the throne of Serbia in the 19th century. In the second half of the 19th century and the period around 1900, Serbian names appeared relatively frequently in the circles of the patriotic intelligentsia.⁵ For example, in connection with Milan Hodža and his name the expert literature gives the following statement: *"The Evangelical pastor Ondrej Hodža of Sučany brought up his clever son in the spirit of Slavonic community with special*

- 2 [ZBAVITEL, Alojz]. *Milan Rastislav Štefánik*. Alojz Zbaviteľ wrote it for the young people of Slovakia on the 10th anniversary of the tragic death. Praha : Štátní nakladatel'stvo, 1929, p. 18. Children's games with Russian, Serbian, but also Boer motifs are also mentioned in the environment of Martin society by HRUŠOVSKÝ, Ján. *Obrázky starého Martina*. (Pictures of old Martin). Martin : Vydavateľ'stvo Matice slovenskej, 2010, p. 132. ISBN 9788081150296.
- 3 The children of Pavel Štefánik and Albertína Štefániková, born Jurenková: 1. Ľudmila Albertína, married Zmertychová (1872 – 1932); 2. Igor Branislav (1873 – 1940); 3. Oľga Ľudovíta Mária, married Hajtšová (1875 – 1943); 4. Pavel Svätopluk (1877 – 1920); 5. Elena Antónia, married Izáková (1878 – 1943); 6. Milan Rastislav (1880 – 1919); 7. Fedor Bohuslav (1882 – 1886); 8. Mária Želmíra (born 1884); 9. Ladislav Dušan (1886 – 1959); 10. Mojmír Alexander (1889 – 1892); 11. Jaroslav Sergej (1891 – 1891); 12. Kazimír Konštantín (1893 – 1971).
- 4 BODNÁR, Július. *Dr. Milan Rastislav Štefánik. Československý národný hrdina. (Dr. Milan Rastislav Štefánik, Czechoslovak national hero)*. Bratislava : Spolok pre postavenie pomníka gen. Štefánikovi, 1921, p. 10.
- 5 I will mention some specific names and their bearers, including some well known and less well known cases. 1/ MILAN: Milan Hodža, Milan Ivanka, Milan Michal Harminc, Milan Alexander Getting, Milan Botto, Milan Kohút, Milan Radlinský, Milan Žuffa; 2/ MILOŠ: Miloš Štefanovič, Miloš Alexander Bazovský, Miloš Svetozár Makovický, Miloš Janoška, Miloš Krno, Miloš Hodža, Martin Miloš Braxatoris, Miloš Vančo, Miloš Kolesár, Miloš Bůľovský, Ľudovít Miloš Mičátek, Miloš Kišš; 3/ DUŠAN: Dušan Makovický, Dušan Jurkovič, Dušan Fajnor, Dušan Halaša, Dušan Viest, Dušan Jaroslav Kardoss, Dušan Porubský; 4/ SVETOZÁR and MILUTIN (less frequent names of Serbian origin): Svetozár Hurban Vajanský, Milutin Kríško. They often occur in combination with other Slavonic or explicitly Russian names, for example: Vladimír Milan Daxner, Vladimír Milan Gustáv Jesenský. The god parents of M. R. Štefánik – Štefan Fajnor and Emília Fajnorová, born Jurenková – had three sons, who were given the names Štefan, Vladimír a Dušan; Ľudovít Clementis – a teacher in Tisovec – had three sons (Vladimír, Dušan, Miroslav), similarly, the Evangelical pastor Ivan Kolesár (his sons: Dušan, Vladimír, Ivan), or the notable patriot Ambro Pietor (sons Miloš, Vladimír, Igor). The Catholic priest and imitative poet from the second half of the 19th century Martin Medňanský used the pseudonym Dušan Sava Pepkin, which included the names of both the medieval Serbian monarch Dušan and the Serbian Orthodox saint Sava.

sympathy for the Serbian nation. Milan was apparently named after Prince Milan Obrenovič, ruler of Serbia."⁶

In many ways, the Slavonic feeling of P. Štefánik was influenced by Kollár's Slavism. It is necessary to perceive and interpret him not only against the background of the traditional Russophilia of the Slovak nationally engaged intelligentsia, but also in the context of the sympathy for the South Slavs in this period, especially for the Serbs and Croats. In connection with the general pro-Slavonic orientation of P. Štefánik and the atmosphere prevailing in the Košariská parsonage, it is possible to agree with Daniela Kodajová, who expressed the following view of the Russophilia of the Slovak patriots, namely that it is "*a positive emotional orientation towards Russia and the Russians with a particular idea of what the bearer of these feelings understood by the names Russia and the Russians*".⁷ Various authors also emphasize that the majority of admirers of Russia "the mighty oak" did not know it from their own experience. They had never visited it.

However, the relationship of the members of the patriotic community with the South Slavs, especially the Serbs and Croats had a very different dimension, resulting first of all from their long-term co-existence in the framework of the wider Kingdom of Hungary, contacts and mutual understanding.⁸ Where the Slovak – Serb axis is concerned, it is not possible to speak only about a one-sided orientation of sympathy or emotion, which we could describe as Serbophilia, but also of a higher, actively developed, more or less institutionalized form of cultural and political cooperation, which built on this Serbophilia.⁹ It grew from several sources in the Slovak environment, including the professional work of various Slovaks in Vojvodina and Serbia, for example Pavel Jozef Šafárik, Jozef Podhradský, Cyril Kutlík and Janko Šafárik, whose contributions to the development of mutual relations or the cultural and national life of the Serbs were positively reflected in the Serbian environment. The study of a number of future members of the Serbian intelligentsia in Slovakia, especially at the Evangelical Lycea and legal academy, where

6 KOPČOK, Andrej. Milan Hodža a dolnozemsí Slováci (K začiatkom politickej aktivity Milana Hodžu a o predpokladoch jeho volebného úspechu v rokoch 1905 a 1906). Milan Hodža and the Lowland Slovaks. (On the beginnings of the political activity of Milan Hodža and his electoral success in 1905 and 1906.). In PEKNÍK, Miroslav a kol. *Milan Hodža – štátnik a politik*. Bratislava : Veda, 2002, p. 76. ISBN 8022406902 .

7 KODAJOVÁ, Daniela. Fenomén rusofilstva v minulosti Slovákov. (The phenomenon of Russophilism in the past of the Slovaks). In IVANTYŠYNOVÁ, Tatiana – KODAJOVÁ, Daniela et al. *Východná dilema strednej Európy. (The eastern dilemma of Central Europe)*. Bratislava : SDK SVE in cooperation with the HÚ SAV, 2010, p. 134, 135. ISBN 9788097037611.

8 For more details see the publication KRAJČOVIČ, Milan. *Slovenská spoločnosť v Uhorsku. Slováci a Juhoslovania v národnoemancipačnom zápase v 30. až 70. rokoch 19. storočia (Slovak society in the Kingdom of Hungary. The Slovaks and Yugoslavs in the national emancipation struggle of the 1830s – 1870s)*, (= *Slovanské štúdie*, year 26, 1986, no. 2). Bratislava : Veda, 1986. D. Kodajová mentions that while the relations of Štúr and his followers with Russia were always more or less on the level of proclaimed but platonic relations, other inter-Slavonic including Slovak – Serb relations and contacts were cultivated and developed much more intensively, and were more often associated with authentic experience. KODAJOVÁ, ref. 7, p. 141.

9 More intensive support and cooperation between the Slovaks and Serbs on one side and between the Slovaks and Croats on the other occurred for the first time during the revolutions of 1848. This cooperation became more systematic and conceptual at the beginning of the 1860s in connection with the memorandum movement.

they attended lectures by Ľudovít Štúr, was equally important. Štúr “stimulated the creativity of many talented students, including [...] [future] Serbian ministers, headmasters of grammar schools, writers and scientists. He also influenced the [...] future politician Svetozar Miletić¹⁰ [...]. Štúr received essential support from the Serbs¹¹ and he repaid them with enthusiasm and Slavonic consciousness”.¹²

Slovak – Serb solidarity culminated in political cooperation in the second half of the 19th century, especially a joint approach to parliamentary elections with the election of Viliam Pauliny-Tóth in 1869 and Milan Hodža in 1905 and 1906 to parliament, as well as the organization of the Nationalities Congress in Budapest in 1895 and the creation of the Parliamentary Nationalities Party with representatives of the Slovaks, Serbs and Rumanians at the beginning of the 20th century.

Slovak sympathy towards the Serbs was mainly found in the patriotic community, but in the second half of the 19th century it spread to a wider range of people, although it was less widespread and less organized than in the Czech environment. These sympathies received long-term stimulation from positive perception of information about the national liberation struggle of the South Slavs against the Turks or the Ottoman Empire as well as the great power struggle for the Balkans. Specific impulses included the Russo – Turkish War, events in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913.¹³ Branislav Choma comments that “in the period 1876–1879 the Slovak newspapers and magazines are full of admiring reports and articles about the national liberation struggles of the South Slavs. Vajanský himself, after returning to his position as editor of the *Národné noviny* (National News), immediately after returning from Dalmatia in mid November

- 10 Although Svetozar Miletić’s relations with the Slovaks in the course of the 19th century were intensive and varied, he appears in the history of Slovakia mainly as the member of parliament, who questioned the Prime Minister Kálman Tisza in parliament about the property taken from Matica Slovenská after it was closed.
- 11 Michal Obrenović lived in political exile in the territory of the Austrian Monarchy after his removal from the throne of the Principality of Serbia in 1842. In the period 1838–1840 he supported Štúr’s university study at Halle. He also supported the Slovak Uprising of 1848, and after the revolution Štúr sometimes visited him at his seat in Ivanka pri Dunaji. In 1853, Štúr with financial support from Michal published *O národných piesňach a povestiach plemien slovanských*. (*On the national songs and stories of the Slavonic breeds*). CHOMA, Branislav. *Cesta na slovanský juh. I. časť. Južní Slovakia a Slováci. Eseje a štúdie*. (*Journey to the Slavonic south. Part 1. The South Slavs and the Slovaks. Essays and studies*). Bratislava : Trimédium, 1998, p. 28, 29. ISBN 8088676142.
- 12 CHOMA, ref. 11, p. 29.
- 13 KOVÁČ, Dušan et al. *Slovensko v 20. storočí. Prvý zväzok. Na začiatku storočia 1901 – 1914*. (*Slovakia in the 20th century. Volume 1. At the beginning of the century 1901 – 1914*). Bratislava : Veda, vydavateľstvo Slovenskej akadémie vied, 2004, p. 22 etc. ISBN 8022407763; DANGL, Vojtech. *Armáda a spoločnosť na prelome 19. a 20. storočia*. (*The army and society around 1900*). Bratislava : Veda, 2006, specifically in the chapter Antimilitarizmus vidieckeho obyvateľstva a slovanská idea v čase balkánskych vojen (Anti-militarism of the rural population and the Slavonic idea at the time of the Balkan Wars) (p. 156–186). ISBN 9788022409193. In connection with the Balkan Wars, the author identifies the growth of negative feelings towards the Habsburg dynasty and the Monarchy on one side with pro-Serb or pro-Russian sympathies among the Slovaks on the other. Money was collected among the Slovaks to support the Serbian, Montenegrin and Bulgarian Red Cross. The idea of Slavonic community associated with opposition to Austro-Hungarian militarism and especially to the anti-Serbian military plans also penetrated among Slovak soldiers.

1878 [that is at the time of the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which Vajanský himself participated as a member of the Austro-Hungarian army – P.M.], wrote several expert articles on the South Slav problem [...]. There were numerous collections for the Balkan Slavs in Slovakia at this time. Two young writers Jozef Bohuslav Bella and Adolf Svätopluk Osvald went to fight and die as Balkan volunteers in battles against the Turks, while various writers produced prose about the Balkan Slavs [...]. The South Slav theme was then in the centre of cultural attention, because a model for Slavonic action was sought there”.¹⁴

Thus, the sympathy of the Slovaks but also the Czechs for the Serbs and Montenegrins¹⁵ included the idea of the heroic South Slavs, who were actively fighting for their freedom from foreign oppression. These stereotype images spread in Slovakia by means of the journalism, travel writing and artistic literature of the time. In the Czech and secondarily in the Slovak environment, they were also strengthened by means of fine art, including pictures, illustrations and postcards. Slavonic – Ottoman antagonism was very often reflected and presented against the background of conflict between Christianity and Islam. The Serbian folk epic, especially the so-called heroic songs influenced the literary creation of the Romantic and to some degree also the following Realist generation.¹⁶

The literary historian Zlatko Klátik stated in this context that “*the followers of Štúr in their unusually difficult national situation were aware of especially the building and liberating mission of these songs, their moral-political role in centuries of national and social oppression, their really mobilizing character, which helped to maintain the militant spirit [...]. The existing situation of the Serbian nation, its anti-Turkish uprising and liberation struggle leading to the threshold of independence and liberty also contributed to this. The martial and freedom loving spirit of the heroic epic also contributed to all this. It was always enthusiastically received in the [Serbian] folk environment*”.¹⁷

These South Slav influences and inspirations were most clearly expressed in the poems of Ján Botto and Samo Chalupka. As an illustration it is possible to mention an extract

14 CHOMA, ref. 11, p. 43, 44.

15 A recent researcher states in this context: “*The harmony of Slovak and Czech interest in Montenegro and the Montenegrins [regarded as Serbs – note P.M.] flowed from the closeness and connection of our two nations, their cultures and common effort to achieve national emancipation. [...] Montenegro and the Montenegrins most strongly entered the Czech and Slovak social and literary context through the cult of military glory and the smallest Slavonic country. This interest of the Czechs and Slovaks culminated in the second half of the 19th century. [...].*” JANKOVIČ, Ján. *Boje Čiernohorcov a túžby Slovákov (1839 – 1914). Tri preklady básne Onamo, onamo! v kontexte slovensko-čiernohorských vzťahov. (The battles of the Montenegrins and the wishes of the Slovaks (1839 – 1914). Three translations of the poem Onamo, onamo! in the context of Slovak – Montenegrin relations).* S. l. : Juga, 2004, p. 201. ISBN 808903019X. For the Czech context of the pre-revolution era see the chapters on Czech – Serbian and Czech – Montenegrin in the framework of the publication HLADKÝ, Ladislav a kol. *Vztahy Čechů s národy a zeměmi jihovýchodní Evropy. (The relations of the Czechs with the nations and countries of South-East Europe).* Praha : Historický ústav, 2010, ISBN 9788072861712.

16 For example, Andrej Sládkovič published in the pages of *Orol tatranský* a poem with the title *Čierna Hora (Montenegro)* already in 1847. This small Slavonic country was “*the embodiment of the principle of freedom for the poet*”. JANKOVIČ, ref. 15, p. 28.

17 KLÁTIK, Zlatko. *Štúrovci a Juhoslovania. Príspevok k dejinám slovensko-juhoslovanských literárnych vzťahov. (Štúr's group and the Yugoslavs. A contribution to the history of Slovak – Yugoslav literary relations.)* Bratislava : Vydavateľstvo Slovenskej akadémie vied, 1965, p. 116.

from Botto's poem *Pochod juhoslovanský* (*Yugoslav March* 1868), which has a definitely martial "spirit" and strongly mobilizing aspect: "Rise up brothers, take up your weapons: / what has to happen, let it happen! / We've prayed enough – / now let's break forces! / Forward! forward! Don't waste time: better to die than to live under a yoke!"¹⁸

It is entirely logical that Slovak students – members of the secret society *Mor ho!*, who strengthened their national identity and Slavonic feeling precisely against the background of the national liberation struggles of the South Slavs and the Balkan Wars, read especially Botto's and Chalupka's verses from the field of Slovak romantic poetry.¹⁹ In the context of these findings, it is characteristic that when the young Štefánik went to study in Prague, he carried in his luggage not only the *Kralice Bible* and Kollár's *Slávy dcera* but also Botto's poems.²⁰

Štefánik himself as a real historical figure, his personality profile and his identity were, therefore, shaped by a patriotic atmosphere in which sympathy for the South Slavs persisted through almost the whole of the 19th century. However, eventually, after his death he was placed in the position of a symbol, which helped to maintain and strengthen this discourse to some degree.

In the course of the 19th century, it is also possible to speak of Slovak Croatophilism or of Slovak – Croatian national political cooperation, which was already expressed during the 1848 revolutions and Memorandum movement. However, the situation changed after the introduction of Dualism. On the basis of the Croatian – Hungarian compromise of 1868, Croatia gained limited autonomy in the framework of the Lands of the Crown of St. Stephen. As a result, solidarity and political cooperation of the Slovaks with the Serbs and Rumanians of the Kingdom of Hungary against Magyarization remained on the programme of the day. M.R. Štefánik also called for cooperation between the Slovaks and Serbs during his activity in Detvan in Prague.

After the First World War, successor states arose on the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, including the Czechoslovak Republic and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, from 1929 renamed Yugoslavia. Cooperation between these countries and Rumania in the framework of the Little Entente struck against various problems and disagreements, which flowed from different geographical positions, economic structures and traditions of public life, for example, republic against monarchy, from 1929 democracy against dictatorship.²¹

18 „Hor'sa bratia, do rúk zbrane: / čo sa má stať, nech sa stane! / Dost'sme sa už namodlili – / teraz nech sa lámu sily! / Napred, napred! Čas nemarme: / lepšia smrť, než život v jarme!“ Cited according to JANKOVIČ, ref. 15, p. 54. Precisely this poem was used during the anti-fascist struggle, as well as the famous verses from *Mor ho!* (*Crush him!*) and Botto's *Smrť Jánošíkova* (*Death of Jánošík*), apparently not only for its martial and mobilizing character, but also for its appeals to inter-Slavonic solidarity. It was published in the press and recited in the broadcasts of the *Slobodný slovenský vysielateľ* (Free Slovak Radio). KASÁČ, Zdenko. *Slovenská poézia protifašistického odboja 1938 – 1945*. (Slovak poetry of the anti-fascist struggle). Bratislava : Veda, 1974, p. 57, 125.

19 JANČO, Ľudovít (ed.). *Tajný spolok „Mor ho!“* (*The secret society “Mor ho!”*). Martin : Matica slovenská, 2004, p. 48. ISBN 8070907401.

20 JURÍČEK, ref. 1, p. 12.

21 CHROBÁK, Tomáš – TEJCHMAN, Miroslav – HRABCOVÁ, Jana. Československo-jugoslávské

Czechoslovak – Yugoslav relations could continue the long pre-revolution tradition of mutual sympathy, solidarity and cooperation, but the inter-war reality and mutual disputes led to a partial cooling of relations or decline of sympathy on both sides. The Czech publicist and historian Milada Paulová viewed this development with a critical eye when she stated in 1924: “*Generally during the five years since the revolution, our contacts with the Yugoslavs have developed through our official brotherhood in a way that can sometimes be called painful. Slavonic idealism has vanished to a large extent on both sides and the former lively friendship in the time of lack of freedom has often changed not into indifference but directly into dislike.*”²²

Several problems stood in the background of this cooling of mutual relations. The attitude of the Czechoslovak political elite and foreign policy towards the unsolved problem of Serbian – Croatian relations was the most prominent and sensitive problem.²³ Part of public opinion and the press in Czechoslovakia expressed sympathy with the Croatian opposition and criticized the Belgrade regime, which acted ruthlessly against the opposition. These critical positions intensified after King Alexander I established a dictatorship in 1929.

The symbolic gesture of President Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, who refused to make an official visit to Belgrade in 1930, was the most visible expression of disagreement with developments in Yugoslavia.²⁴ At first, however, the coup d'état in the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was accepted by the politicians and diplomats not only in Prague, but also in Paris, because they saw this solution as a defence against the complete destabilization of their Balkan ally.

One of the aims of installing a dictatorship was an attempt to marginalize individual nationalisms, which Alexander's new regime saw as undesirable particularisms threatening the unity of the state. The ruler and government circles supported the cultivation and development of the conception of an integral Yugoslavism. This official state ideology was to a considerable extent analogous to Czechoslovakism in our country. Although the sincerity of Alexander's effort to create an integral Yugoslav nation cannot be doubted, it is necessary to state that it was essentially counter-productive. It did not take into account the development in Balkans, which was really directed towards the formation of smaller national communities. The increasing national disputes contributed to the fact that the king's dictatorship began to be seen in the Croatian environment as a greater Serbian phenomenon and the term *Yugoslav* was entirely discredited in Croatia.²⁵

vztahy. (Czechoslovak – Yugoslav relations). In HLADKÝ, Ladislav a kol. *Vztahy Čechů s národy a zeměmi jihovýchodní Evropy*. Praha : Historický ústav, 2010, p. 169. ISBN 9788072861712.

22 Cited according to CHROBÁK – TEJCHMAN – HRABCOVÁ, ref. 21, p. 59.

23 For more details see HRADEČNÝ, Pavel. *Politické vztahy Československa a Jugoslávie v letech 1925–1928 v zahraničním i vnitřním kontextu. (Political relations between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia in the period 1925 – 1928 in the foreign and internal context.)*. Praha : Academia, 1988; CHROBÁK – TEJCHMAN – HRABCOVÁ, ref. 21.

24 PIRJEVEC, Jože. *Jugoslávie 1918 – 1992. Vznik, vývoj a rozpad Karadjordjevičovy a Titovy Jugoslávie. (Yugoslavia 1918 – 1992. The origin, development and break up of Karadjordjevič and Tito's Yugoslavia)*. Praha : Argo, 2000, p. 90. ISBN 8072032771.

25 RYCHLÍK, Jan – PERENČEVIČ, Milan. *Dějiny Chorvatska. (History of Croatia)*. Praha : Nakladatelství Lidové noviny, 2007, 262 pages. ISBN 9788071968853.

In spite of these problems, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia remained strategic allies through almost the whole of the inter-war period. Therefore it was entirely logical that both sides endeavoured to strengthen and legitimate this alliance. This involved official and unofficial initiatives by statesmen, political structures, various interest organizations, societies and the press. Events were organized with propagandist, cultural-political, economic, informative and educational dimensions. For example, Czechoslovak – Yugoslav community was cultivated by the Legionary and Sokol organizations,²⁶ but also by associations with this specific aim, namely the so-called mutual Czechoslovak – Yugoslav and Yugoslav – Czechoslovak leagues. Although their importance should not be overrated,²⁷ they were often the driving force in this direction and their activity occurred under the patronage of important politicians such as Milan Hodža²⁸ and Edvard Beneš. On the Czechoslovak side considerations sometimes appeared about the positive role of the Slovak and Czech or Czechoslovak according to the official vocabulary minority in Yugoslavia in relation to the cultivation of Slavonic brotherhood. According to these ideas, the minority was supposed to be a sort of bridge between the two states,²⁹ but this did not find official support in Yugoslavia.

The most visible expressions of this alliance and declared community were the official visits of politicians and celebrations of state holidays. Efforts to get to know each other led to the organization of exchange and educational visits on various levels by students, teachers, cultural workers and so on, the teaching of “brother” languages in some

26 On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the origin of the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav states a delegation from Sokol visited the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and the association's magazine printed the following statement of sympathy with the Yugoslavs: “*For us, who cannot adhere to the Poles with our hearts because of their aristocraticness, and for whom Russia is still a mysterious sphinx, the Yugoslavs are dear brothers for whom our blood flows, our hearts warm. We feel as if we really have to be and can be great together with them. In the whole world they are the only ones on whom we can rely and they on us [...].*” *Zájazd do Skopje a na Kosovo. (Visit to Skopje and Kosovo).* In *Bradlo. Vestník Sokolskej župy Masarykovej v Bratislave*, year 7, 1928, no. 10, p. 153.

27 According to P. Hradečný, the majority of activities organized by the mutual leagues were characterized by formalism, organizational shortcomings and limited public interest. The leagues struggled with very limited membership bases. HRADEČNÝ, ref. 23, p. 120. This can be illustrated by the fact that the Bratislava branch of the Czechoslovak – Yugoslav League had 220 members in 1934 and 300 in 1937. The figures are taken from the article *Odbor v Bratislavě, (The Bratislava Branch)*. In *Československo-jihoslovanská revue* (hereinafter: ČSJR), year 8, 1938, no. 3-4, p. 84.

28 Milan Hodža was chairman of the Czechoslovak – Yugoslav League for many years. In 1937 he was replaced by Petr Zenkl, but he remained honorary chairman.

29 However, relations between the Slovak minority and the majority population of Yugoslavia were not always without problems. The Slovak press in Yugoslavia repeatedly reported on the problems of the Slovak minority, namely expressions of contempt for the Slovaks from the Serbs. The reports emphasized that the Serbs often behaved towards the Slovaks as if they were not the descendants of Kollár and Šafárik, but some sort of Mongoloid race: “[...] *our brothers the Serbs know very little about how the Czech and Slovak legions did not fight only for the freedom of the Slovaks and Czechs but for the freedom of all the Slavs, that Masaryk – Beneš – Štefánik, when they worked for the break up of the old Monarchy, were not only laying the foundations of the Czechoslovak Republic, but also the foundations of our [Yugoslav] homeland,*” that the Slovak mutineers at Kragujevac were executed at the end of the war “*only for their sympathy with the oppressed Serbian nation. It is very strange that they know so little about us, their brothers*”. ZGÚTH, Ladislav. *Ako sa my málo poznáme. (How little they know us)*. In *Národná jednota [Báčsky Petrovec]*, year 5, no. 35, 28 Aug 1924, p. 1.

types of school, systematic support for Yugoslav students at Czechoslovak universities, organization of Yugoslav evenings and balls in both Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Care for military and prison cemeteries at Trenčín and Veľký Meder containing graves of Serbian soldiers from the time of the First World War formed a special chapter in mutual relations. They became places for politically motivated commemorations. The monument at Kragujevac commemorating Slovak soldiers from the Austro-Hungarian army, executed at the end of the war because they rebelled against the military machine and inhuman conditions and declared their sympathy with the Serbs, fulfilled a similar function on Yugoslav soil.³⁰

The efforts to strengthen Slavonic community and the Czechoslovak – Yugoslav alliance in the inter-war period was often presented as a continuation of tradition, as following in the footsteps of “our” great forerunners.³¹ This also concerned the symbolization of Štefánik in these relations on the verbal and ritual levels of speeches at ceremonies, lectures, celebrations and commemorations.

The notable Czech Slavist Frank Wollman emphasized in a lecture on 6 February 1932 at the Slavonic Institute in Prague, that the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav states were born “from blood and the spirit”. He mentioned the importance of the foreign policy activities of T.G. Masaryk, M.R. Štefánik and E. Beneš. His following words are interes-

30 HRONSKÝ, Marián. *Vzbura slovenských vojakov v Kragujevci. (The rebellion of Slovak soldiers at Kragujevac)*. Martin : Osveta, 1982, p. 69, 117. The Kragujevac mutiny and the commemorative rituals associated with it formed part of the range of symbolic instruments that aimed to consolidate the Czechoslovak – Yugoslav alliance while also symbolizing Slovak – Serbian community. See, for example, the contemporary reflection of this phenomenon in the form of the editorial: JANOŠKA, Jur. Považie – Šumadija. In *Národné noviny* (hereinafter: NN), year 55, no. 80, 12 Oct 1924, p. 1. It is a paradox that while the historical memory of the Kragujevac mutiny was officially supported, commemoration of another rebellion by Czech sailors at Kotor Bay was problematized by Yugoslav government circles. The authorities did not actually prohibit a commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the Kotor revolt, but they demanded that it should have a more intimate character. They rejected the planned mass participation of members of the Yugoslav Navy. The Belgrade Ministry of the Interior argued that “*military discipline should be glorified in front of our young navy, not an act of mutiny*”. Cited according to HRADEČNÝ, ref. 23, p. 110. It is also interesting to note that General Dobroslov Milenkovič, who contributed to erecting the monument at Kragujevac, was also an active promoter of the memory of Štefánik in Serbia and Yugoslavia. He also published on the theme of Štefánik in the Slovak press – see, for example, his editorial MILENKOVIČ, Dobroslov. Štefánik v srbskej armáde. (Štefánik in the Serbian army). In *Slovenský denník*, year 16, no. 103, 4. 5. 1933, p. 1.

31 The remembered and officially reflected common “national celebrities” also included the Archbishop of Zagreb and first Croatian Cardinal Juraj Haulik (1788 – 1869), who originated from Slovakia. A memorial tablet was unveiled on his family home in Trnava in 1929 with the participation of a large delegation from Yugoslavia. More details are given in the study MACHO, Peter. “Skvelej pamiatke veľkého syna slovenskej Trnavy.” *Oslavy odhaľovania pamätnej tabule Jurajovi Haulikovi roku 1929*. (“To the excellent memory of a great son of Slovak Trnava.” The celebration of the unveiling of the memorial tablet to Juraj Haulik in 1929.). In MICHÁLEK, Slavomír et al. *Slovensko v labyrinte moderných európskych dejín. Pocta historikovi Milanovi Zemkovi*. Bratislava : Historický ústav SAV v Prodaná s. r. o., p. 199-210. ISBN 9788089396283. On one side there were efforts to direct the celebrations towards Slovak – Croatian or Catholic solidarity and cooperation, but on the other, government representatives endeavoured to impress on this festivity the character of a Yugoslav – Czechoslovak event, in the framework of which inter-state alliance and Slavonic brotherhood were declared. Haulik was deliberately described as a great *Slavophil* or even as a *great man of Yugoslavia*. Paradoxically, according to D. Rapant, Haulik during his life reported Hungarian as his native language.

ting: *"The person of General Štefánik, who was a great-grandson of Ján Šulek, teacher of Kollár and so a grand-nephew of both martyrs for Slovak freedom of 1848³² and Bohuslav Šulek, connect the best Czechoslovak traditions and the best traditions of our [Czechoslovak – Yugoslav – P. M.] relations."*³³

In another contribution, F. Wollman compared views of Štúr's linguistic "split", starting his considerations from a positive view of Czechoslovakism and Yugoslavism. In his interpretation, the leading representative of the Croatian (Illyrian) national activists Ljudevit Gaj followed in the footsteps of Kollár's Slavism and supported the linguistic unity of the Croats and Serbs, while Štúr with his codification of written Slovak went against Kollár's conception of the four-tribe Slavonic nation. Wollman chose M.R. Štefánik as a symbolic and conceptual counter-weight to B. Šulek, who supported Štúr's linguistic and national political programme. Štefánik corrected the "mistakes" of his earlier relation:

*"While Gaj's idea put a great unifying and cultural mission into practice [in the Yugoslav environment – P.M.], Štúr's idea [of the linguistic and "tribal" independence of the Slovaks – P. M.] weakened the Slovak people and the political struggle of the Czechs. Šulek's grand-nephew General Štefánik corrected his forerunner. In the liberation struggle, he not only supported Czechoslovak unity, he spoke directly of a Czech state."*³⁴

Another, this time Yugoslav author, Risto Kovijanić integrated B. Šulek in this sense into the group of important personalities.³⁵ However, he constructed his version of the symbolic instruments in a different way to F. Wollman. Although Kovijanić mentioned B. Šulek and M.R. Štefánik, he did not connect them, but compared Štefánik with other symbolic personalities. In his texts about Czechoslovak – Yugoslav relations he emphasized the position of Slovakia and the Slovaks. For example, his publication from 1938 stressed that *"Slovakia gave Czechoslovak history two great world-famous statesmen: Milan Rastislav Štefánik and Milan Hodža"*, who also *"wrote themselves into our Yugoslav history"*.³⁶

In another publication connected with the battles on the Serbian front in 1915, Kovijanić emotionally emphasized: *"The Serbian soldiers retreated watering every patch of soil with their blood and leaving their family hearths and homeland to the enemy. Many*

32 Frank Wollman had in mind Ľudovít and Viliam Šulek, (brothers of Bohuslav Šulek), Slovak martyrs during the 1848 revolution. Ritualized commemoration of V. Šulek, hanged by the followers of Kossuth, formed an important part of the family tradition of the Štefánik family. MACHO, Peter. *Martyrium ako heroizačný inštrument v slovenskom nacionalistickom diskurze? (Martyrdom as a heroizing instrument in Slovak nationalist discourse?)* In KOŽIAK, Rastislav – NEMEŠ, Jaroslav (eds.). *Svätec a jeho funkcie v spoločnosti II*. Bratislava : Chronos, 2006, p. 193-198. ISBN 8089027202.

33 WOLLMAN, Frank. Československo-jihoslovenské kultúrne styky. (Czechoslovak – Yugoslav cultural contacts). In *ČSJR*, 1932, year 2, no. 6, p. 241.

34 WOLLMAN, Frank. Ilyrism a Čechoslováci. (Illyrism and the Czechoslovaks). In *ČSJR*, 1935, year 5, no. 6-7, p. 125-135.

35 Risto Kovijanić, „Černohorec rodom, Juhoslovan a Slovan presvedčením“ (”Montenegrin by birth, Yugoslav and Slav by conviction”) (description taken from NN, year 69, 11 June 1938, no. 69, p. 4). He worked as an assistant teacher of the Serbo-Croatian language at Comenius University in Bratislava.

36 KOVIJANIĆ, Risto. *Milan Hodža i Jugoslaveni. (Milan Hodža and the Yugoslavs)*. Bratislava : Československo-juhoslovenská liga, 1938, p. 9, 10. The author did not directly point in the text to the fact that these two important Slovaks had names of Serbian origin, but the Yugoslav reader probably noticed it.

old people, women and children went with them. The Slovak astronomer and future Czechoslovak hero Milan Rastislav Štefánik flew like a firey dragon in a French aeroplane so that he could share the catastrophe of the Serbian army and go with it through Golgotha to final victory."³⁷

He even connected Štefánik with one of the most important symbols of the Yugoslav state ideology, namely the person of King Alexander I the Unifier, who was assassinated in France in 1934. Their graves became national places of pilgrimage: "*The great king, warrior, martyr and unifier is already resting in peace in the heart of Šumadija in the church of St. George at Oplenac.*"³⁸ [...] *From the first days, Oplenac became a Yugoslav Mecca, a sacred place of pilgrimage. [...] A powerful legend will revolve around Oplenac, as around Avala – burial place of Serbia's Unknown Soldier,*³⁹*and around Štefánik's Bradlo. This legend will be a treasure of the Yugoslav spirit, a permanent source of enthusiasm for all the vital forces of future generations of the Yugoslav nation. It will be a beacon that will never burn out or lose its light.*"⁴⁰

If we disregard the bombastic emotional style of the author's writing and direct our attention to his "work" with symbols, we have to notice the interesting attempt to integrate Štefánik into a collection of symbols in which we find the name of a historical personality with the highest official social status, namely a monarch, but also of a historical non-personality from the point of view of this formal criterion, namely an anonymous soldier. By means of this schematic interpretation, Kovijanić emphasizes that through his death, understood as a heroic sacrifice for the good of the homeland and nation, the Unknown Soldier attained the same level as the King of Yugoslavia or the (Czecho-) Slovak national hero. In terms of their posthumous cult, all three are placed on the same

37 KOVIJANIĆ, Risto. *Juhoslovanská jednota. (Yugoslav unity)*. Bratislava : Roľnícka osveta, 1936, p. 25. A recent researcher also emphasizes the importance of Štefánik in the Serbian context: Štefánik played "an important role in Serbian history, especially in the second half of 1915 when he operated as a military pilot in an Allied squadron on the very threatened Serbian front until the collapse of this front under the impact of Mackensen's offensive, after which he followed the Albanian Golgotha of the Serbian army, state institutions, diplomatic corps and part of the nation until he was flown to Italy to be treated for illness. The role of Milan Rastislav Štefánik during his presence and struggle on the Serbian front is honoured in Serbia as the decorations awarded to him show [...]" .NJEGOVAN, Drago. Milan Rastislav Štefánik – pilot dobrovoľník na srbskom fronte v roku 1915. (Milan Rastislav Štefánik – volunteer pilot on the Serbian front in 1915). In ČAPLOVIČ, Miloslav – FERENČUHOVÁ, Bohumila – STANOVÁ, Mária (eds.). *Milan Rastislav Štefánik v zrkadle prameňov a najnovších poznatkov historiografie*. Bratislava : Vojenský historický ústav, 2010, p. 26. ISBN 9788097043407. For more details on Štefánik's presence on the Serbian front see the study KŠIŇAN, Michal. Milan Rastislav Štefánik a francúzska letecká misia v Srbsku. (Milan Rastislav Štefánik and the French air mission in Serbia.). In *Vojenská história*, 2006, year 10, no. 1, p. 46-56. ISSN 1335-3314.

38 Šumadija – a traditional region in western Serbia centred on Kragujevac, was the base for the activities of the Karadjordjević dynasty. In the Serbian national story it is associated with the first uprising against the Ottoman Empire in 1804. Oplenac – a locality with a mausoleum / Orthodox church containing the graves of members of the Karadjordjević dynasty including Alexander I. The final resting place of the King of Yugoslavia is described in a contemporary publication: *Crkva Sv. Djordja na Oplencu*. Karadjordjević. (*The Church of St. George at Oplenac*). Beograd : Državne Štamparije Kraljevine Jugoslavije, 1935.

39 Avala – a hill above Belgrade on which stood the Monument to the Unknown Soldier from the Serbian army during the First World War, a work by the famous Croatian sculptor Ivan Meštrović.

40 KOVIJANIĆ, ref. 37, p. 61.

level – graves with their bodily remains are placed above, on the top of hills to emphasize their dominant meaning for the life of the nation.

It is noteworthy that the initiative for the first visit to the final resting place of the Yugoslav monarch came from the Bratislava branch of the Czechoslovak – Yugoslav League.⁴¹ The official Czechoslovak mission to Yugoslavia was preceded by great folk ceremonies at three important symbolic places in Czechoslovakia. Soil was collected in June 1935 at Tábor in Bohemia, Velehrad in Moravia and Bradlo in Slovakia. It was brought together and mixed at the Old Town Hall in Prague.⁴² A Czechoslovak delegation headed by the deputy chairman of the Czechoslovak – Yugoslav League Petr Zenkl visited Yugoslavia and deposited the urn with the symbolic soil on Alexander's grave in the mausoleum at Oplenac on 14 October 1935.⁴³ As a matter of interest, it is possible to mention the fact that the Bratislava branch of the Czechoslovak – Yugoslav League was represented in this delegation by Jur Janoška junior, a notable personality from Slovak public life.

A year later, on the occasion of the visit of a delegation from the Yugoslav – Czechoslovak League to the Monument to the Struggle at Žižkov in Prague, one of the members of the delegation, Colonel Milan K. Ristić stated:

*"I am pleased that as an officer in the invincible army of Serbia and now Yugoslavia, I can express my admiration and brotherly solidarity at this memorial to the military greatness and heroism of the recent liberation struggle of the Czechoslovak nation, a history that so much resembles ours. Three great men: Masaryk, Beneš and Štefánik stand out from the generation that led the nation to freedom through sacrifices of life and blood. Yugoslavs bow before them because they are an example of how it is necessary to love our homeland and of how to work for the good of the whole nation [...]."*⁴⁴

Štefánik was also used as a symbol on various levels in relations between the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav Sokol organizations.⁴⁵ The gifts that the Sokol members from Trenčín gave to the Yugoslav Sokol members from Kragujevac included a bronze bust of the national hero Štefánik. When Yugoslav representatives participated in the tenth pan-Sokol gathering in Prague in 1938, they presented an album of photographs from the 1938 jubilee celebrations in Kragujevac, dedicated to the memory of the 44 executed

41 Various notable personalities were involved in the Bratislava branch of this league in the course of the whole inter-war period. They included Pavel Varsík, Ľudovít Okáňik, Metod Bella, Milan Ivanka, Jur Janoška jun., Aurel Styk and Dušan Porubský.

42 BERINGER, Antonín. Činnost Československo-jihoslovanské ligy v roce 1935. (Activities of the Czechoslovak – Yugoslav League in 1935). In *ČSJR*, 1936, year 6, no. 1-2, p. 26.

43 Čechoslováci na Oplenci. (Czechoslovaks at Oplenac). In *Národní jednota* [Báčsky Petrovec], 19 Oct 1935, year 14, no. 42, p. 3.

44 Zájezd poselstva Jihoslovansko-československých lig a jejich Svazu do Československé republiky a do Prahy. (Visit by a delegation from the Yugoslav – Czechoslovak League and their Union to the Czechoslovak Republic and Prague). In *ČSJR*, 1936, year 6, no. 8-10, p. 161, 162.

45 Frank Wollman pointed to the mutual influences: *"Thus, the [Yugoslav/Serbian] heroism was prepared [before the revolution of 1918] by our Sokol movement, the struggle of the Serbs and Montenegrins for freedom is its model and on the other hand our Sokol movement is spontaneously accepted in the Slavonic south and acts especially as a part of conceptual culture."* WOLLMAN, Frank. Československo-jihoslovanské styky kulturní do války. (Czechoslovak – Yugoslav cultural contacts before the war). In *ČSJR*, 1934, year 4, no. 7, p. 158.

Slovak soldiers.⁴⁶ The pious commemoration of the Kragujevac revolt grew into a great demonstration by the Yugoslav public in support of Czechoslovakia. The Sokol gathering in Prague with the participation of more than two thousand Sokol members from Yugoslavia looked like an expression of determination to defend the republic.⁴⁷

In the context of numerous rituals, it is necessary to mention the gathering in Slovakia of Sokol delegations including Yugoslavs. During this gathering, representatives of the Czechoslovak, American-Czechoslovak and Yugoslav Sokol organizations paid homage to the memorials to Milan Rastislav Štefánik on Bradlo and to Jozef Miloslav Hurban at Hlboké.⁴⁸ The choice of these two historical personalities was entirely logical – in an atmosphere of threat to the republic, when defence preparations and the military traditions of Czechoslovak society were increasingly emphasized, Štefánik and Hurban embodied the most important heroic figures in the Slovak environment. The First Republic's historical-ideological discourse often used a construct deliberately emphasizing an illusory continuity between the struggles of Hurban and Štefánik for the freedom of the nation. What Hurban started in 1848, Štefánik successfully completed in 1918.⁴⁹

It is entirely possible to say that Štefánik formed part of the range of symbolic instruments, which was given the role of strengthening the Czechoslovak – Yugoslav alliance, but he did not have an unambiguously dominant position in the developing hierarchy of symbols.⁵⁰

46 Události. Sokol z Trenčína. (Events. Sokol in Trenčín). In *ČSJR*, 1938, year 8, no. 8-10, p. 261. A Czechoslovak delegation headed by General Rudolf Viest participated in the celebrations at Kragujevac on 19 June 1938. HRONSKÝ, ref. 30, p. 134.

47 Further details are given in the study UHLÍŘ, Jan B. X. všesokolský slet roku 1938 a podíl sokolstva na zápase na obranu republiky. (The tenth pan-Sokol gathering of 1938 and the share of the Sokol movement in the struggle to defend the republic.). In *Historie a vojenství*, 1997, year 46, no. 4, p. 47-70. ISSN 0018-2583. The exceptional position of the Yugoslav Sokol members among the foreign delegations is illustrated by the fact that immediately on the first day of the gathering, 3 July 1938 the individual exercise performances at Strahov were preceded by a public ceremony in which representatives of Czechoslovak and Yugoslav Sokol exchanged gifts. Ibid. p. 56.

48 State Archives Bratislava, Skalica branch, fund of the district notary's office in Brezová pod Bradlom, carton (hereinafter c.) 24, no. 2114/1938 adm.: 1/ X. všesokolský slet v Praze 1938. Slavnostní zájezd Sokolstva a delegací zahraničních Čechů a Slováků na Slovensko ve dnech 9. – 10. července t. r. [Program]; 2/ Rukopisný program slávnosti na Bradle [Bradlo 1938 – návštěva PEN-klubu a zájezd sokolských delegací]; Sokolstvo zakončilo svoj slet na Slovensku. (The Sokol movement completed its gathering in Slovakia). In *Slovenský Sokol*, 28 July 1938, no. 30, p. 12. Miloš Radančević from Osijek spoke in the name of the Yugoslav delegation on Bradlo and at the memorial tablet to Ľudovít Štúr in Bratislava.

49 For more details see the publication MACHO, Peter et al. *Revolúcia 1848/49 a historická pamäť*. (The 1848/49 Revolution and historical memory.). Bratislava : Historický ústav SAV, 2012, p. 165 etc. ISBN 9788089396191.

50 To illustrate this ambivalent relationship with Štefánik it is possible to mention a publication produced for the Yugoslav public in 1932 by the Slovanská beseda (Slavonic Club) of Bratislava. The Slovaks are presented in this publication as a "noble nation" with which the Yugoslavs are connected by common history and which gave them Šafárik, Kollár, Štúr and Štefánik. One of the chapters, structured as a tourist guide to different regions of Slovakia, mentions not only Štefánik's birthplace and monument on Bradlo, but also the site of his tragic death near Vajnory and Ivanka, where the well-known monument by Jurkovič stands today. However, these localities are not ideologized or symbolically raised above other places of cultural and historical interest. They are only stops on a recommended tourist route. It is

A tendency prevailed to place him in the group of “our” important forerunners, which included symbolic figures from the shared history, coming from various confessional and ethnic environments, but with the selection of personalities varying between different authors. In spite of the fact that it is impossible to speak of any consistent and unified propagandist – historical narrative with the aim of legitimizing the existing Czechoslovak – Yugoslav alliance, we can state that a relatively stable group of historical personalities gradually crystallized and was placed before the public as shared symbols. The Slovak personalities in this imaginary pantheon were especially Ján Kollár, Pavel Jozef Šafárik, Ľudovít Štúr and Bohuslav Šulek, but also Juraj Haulík, Štefan Moyses and others. These personalities came from both the Evangelical and Catholic environments, and they also significantly influenced the lives of the South Slavs, especially the Croats and Serbs.⁵¹

The approach of the above mentioned Risto Kovičanić in this area was interesting. As we already stated, he connected Štefánik with Serbian narratives and symbols, doing so in accordance with the official Yugoslavism and the alliance between Prague and Belgrade. He did not ignore the Czech and Croatian layers of the historical narratives and personalities, and we find Slovaks, Czechs, Serbs, Croats, Montenegrins and Slovenes as well as member of the Orthodox, Protestant and Catholic confessions in his joint Czechoslovak – Yugoslav symbolic pantheon, but the tradition of Slovak – Serbian community is placed in the foreground. The core of his argumentation comprised two small but notable stories, namely 1) the study of Serbs at the Evangelical lycea in the 19th century with the narrative symbolically concentrating on the image of Ľudovít Štúr as the teacher and educator of young Serbs; 2) the pre-election cooperation of the Slovaks and Serbs in Vojvodina during elections to the Hungarian Parliament, symbolized by the member of parliament Milan Hodža representing both Slovaks and Serbs.⁵²

equally characteristic that the publication contains illustrations with the aim of bringing to the Yugoslav public the beauty and interest of Slovakia. Castles and stately homes, the Vysoké Tatry Mts., spas and folk architecture appear, but Bradlo with the monument to Štefánik does not. *Slovačka Jugoslavenima / Slovensko Juhoslovanom. (Slovakia to the Yugoslavs)*. Bratislava : Slovenská beseda, 1932, p. 7, 168, 181.

51 At the celebrations of the 300th anniversary of Trnava University, R. Kovičanić emphasized: “*With the nation of the great native of Trnava Cardinal Haulík, the bishops Alagovič and Moyses, the famous Pavel Šafárik and Bohuslav Šulek, Janko Šafárik and Jozef Podhradský, who all lived and worked among us Yugoslavs, we Yugoslavs will always celebrate every festive moment and historical event of our closest brother Slavonic nation.*” 1635 – 1935. In *Kultúra*, 1935, year 7, no. 11, p. 469. The chairman of Matica Slovenská in Yugoslavia Ján Bulík emphasized the Slovak historical personalities of both Catholic and Evangelical origin, who contributed to community between the Slovaks and South Slavs, when a delegation from the Slovak minority was received by King Alexander I in 1929. JOVANKOVIČ, Samuel. Poradný výbor Slovákov Dunajského bánstva. (The advisory committee of the Slovak of the Danubian Banat.). In BAJANÍK, Stanislav – DENDÚROVÁ-TAPALAGOVÁ, Viera (eds.). *Dr. Janko Bulík – vlastenec, demokrat a martýr*. Kovačica 19. 5. 2007. Zborník z vedeckého sympózia k 110. výročiu narodenia, 65. výročiu tragickej smrti, 75. výročiu založenia Matice slovenskej v Juhoslávii a jej prvého predsedu Janka Bulíka. (Papers from the academic symposium on the occasion of the 110th anniversary of the birth of Ján Bulík, 65th anniversary of his tragic death and the 75th anniversary of the establishment of Matica Slovenská in Yugoslavia with Bulík as its first chairman.). Martin : Vydavateľstvo Matice slovenskej, 2007, p. 67, 68. ISBN 9788070908600.

52 In 1938, a Slovak Evangelical pastor from Yugoslavia, J. Štrba pointed to this symbolic aspect of Slovak – Serbian relations at the general assembly of the Union of Evangelical Youth (UEY). He expressed his

In this context, it is necessary to mention that Kovijanić's publication about Yugoslav unity from 1936 was produced by Roľnícka osveta (Agrarian Enlightenment). This organization was associated with the Agrarian Party and headed by M. Hodža. The booklet was officially dedicated to the memory of M.R. Štefánik according to text on the endpaper. Therefore, this fact can also be interpreted as an effort by the strongest government party, namely the Agrarians or the political group concentrated around M. Hodža, to use the symbol of Štefánik as an instrument for strengthening Czechoslovak – Yugoslav brotherhood in accordance with the official ideology. However, in every case, Kovijanić's interpretation deliberately constructed the prehistory of the birth of the alliance between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia mainly in terms of the tradition of Slovak – Serbian community, relying on the historical memory of the Evangelical Slovaks and Orthodox Serbs.

In 1931, the *Československo-juhoslovanská revue* published an article in which the author endeavoured to refute the contemporary views on the confessional background of Slovak Croatophilia or Serbophilia. The article stated that an idea had become fixed among the public that *"the formation [...] of relations between the Slovaks and Croats was conditioned by local confessionalism. There is a sort of fixed conviction that Slovak Catholicism converged from the beginning only towards Zagreb, while Protestantism was allegedly directed towards Orthodox Belgrade"*.⁵³

Clearly, this orientation and connection cannot be absolutized, but confessional identity and solidarity undoubtedly belonged to the factors that could influence their development in specific situations. However, in the case of the alleged one-sided Serbophilia in Slovak Protestant circles, it would be a mistake to speak of any special sympathy with Orthodoxy. The prevailing orientation towards the Serbian environment derived not only from the fact that a large community of Evangelical Slovaks lived among the mainly Serbian population of Vojvodina, but also from the tradition of Slovak – Serbian cooperation in the 19th century. However, this grew primarily from the idea of Slavonic brotherhood, not from inter-confessional solidarity.

After the break up of the Czechoslovak Republic, the Slovak state succeeded in establishing correct diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia, which corresponded to German interests in the Balkans, but more intensive cooperation between Bratislava and Belgrade did not develop.⁵⁴ According to Miroslav Tejchman, for a long time the Yugoslav

conviction that "[...] *The Yugoslavs love the Slovaks. They regard Hodža as the greatest man, they have not forgotten that Štúr educated people from Yugoslavia*". Central Archive of the Evangelical Church of the Augsburg Confession in Bratislava, fund of the Zväz evangelickej mládeže (Union of Evangelical Youth) c. 1. Valné zhromaždenia. Spisový obal Brezová pod Bradlom, 30. 6. 1938. Zápisnica z valného zhromaždenia SEM na Brezovej 30. júna 1938.

53 HUSKA, Mir. A. Dve spomienky na Zahreb so Slovenska. (Two memories of Zagreb and Slovakia). In *ČSJR*, 1931, year 2, no. 3, p. 97.

54 For more details see the works PETRUF, Pavol. *Zahraničná politika Slovenskej republiky 1939 – 1945 (Náčrt problematiky)*. (The foreign policy of the Slovak Republic of 1939 – 1945 (Outline of a problem)). Bratislava : Historický ústav SAV, 2011, p. 210-214. ISBN 9788089396153; JARINKOVIČ, Martin. *Pohľad slovenskej tlače na srbskú otázku v r. 1941 – 1944 (od porážky Juhoslávie do Povstania)*. (A review of the Slovak press on the Serbian question, 1941–1944 (from the defeat of the Yugoslavia to the Uprising), p. 432. Accessible at http://www.pulib.sk/elpub2/FF/Chovanec1/pdf_doc/36.pdf.

government did not want to go beyond the framework of this formal recognition. The reserved or explicitly negative attitude of the Yugoslav public to independent Slovakia was also documented by the reports from the Slovak diplomat in Belgrade Jozef Cieker, according to whom wide groups in the population as well as politicians sympathized with the former Czechoslovakia: *"They are convinced that the Slovaks politically contributed to its fall. This is heard in the speech of both simple people and intellectuals"*.⁵⁵

Some degree of distrust prevailed on both sides. It flowed not only from the preceding 20 years of cooperation between Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, but also from the contradictory reflections and evaluations of Czecho – Slovak and Serbo – Croatian relations. From the point of view of Belgrade, especially of the general public, the break up of Czechoslovakia and the formation of the Slovak state was a product of the aggressive great power policy of Germany in Central Europe. The analogy between former Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia was perceived and this was accompanied by a feeling of threat.

From the point of view of Bratislava and the Ľudák leadership, which sympathized more with the Croatian national movement, Yugoslavia was perceived as a centralized state with a regime that oppressed "our" brothers the Croats. The Ľudák identification and solidarity with Zagreb was more along Catholic confessional lines. The Slavonic phenomenon was presented in propaganda as an instrument deliberately used by Prague and Belgrade government circles to dominate smaller nations, namely the Slovaks and Croats.

Ľudák circles welcomed the origin of an independent Croatia on 10 April 1941. From the point of view of its orientation and regime, it looked like a more natural ally for Slovakia than the former Yugoslavia. Pavol Petruf comments that the official relations between Bratislava and Zagreb were good during the existence of both states. In his view several factors contributed to mutual understanding:

*"Both states and their political leaders were favourable to the Axis powers and took every opportunity to express their unreserved gratitude to the Axis leaders for their independent statehood and 'freedom', as well as for helping to liberate them from foreign [understand: Czech or Serbian] 'domination'. [...]. Both states applied anti-Jewish legislation and both states signed the Tripartite Pact [...]. In the ruling circles of both states, the dominant conviction was that their gaining of independence was part of the building of a more just European and world order, symbolized in Bratislava and Zagreb especially by the idea of a 'new Europe', which had to become one of the basic building blocks for a new power political organization of the world."*⁵⁶

According to Miroslav Michel, the conservative – Catholic group in the Ľudák leadership headed by Jozef Tiso was oriented more towards the Catholic nationalist orien-

55 Cited according to TEJCHMAN, Miroslav. Československo-jugoslávské vztahy v letech druhé světové války. (Czechoslovak – Yugoslav relations during the Second World War). In *Slovanské historické studie 14*. Praha : Academia, 1984, p. 86. M. Jarinkovič points to the tactical and two-faced attitude of the Yugoslav government towards the Slovak state: in spite of establishing diplomatic relations it also maintained contacts with representatives of the Czechoslovak government in exile and it tolerated or even supported the activity and organization of the Czechoslovak resistance struggle in its territory. JARINKOVIČ, ref. 54, p. 91.

56 PETRUF, ref. 54, p. 241.

tation represented by the Croatian Peasants' Party, in which numerous representatives of the Croatian Catholic clergy also engaged.⁵⁷ The pro-Nazi oriented Ľudák representatives associated with the Hlinka Guard sympathized more with the radical Ustaše movement: They wanted to develop a Slovak – Croatian alliance based on cooperation between two similar organizations: the Hlinka Guard and Ustaše.⁵⁸

The Ustaše was an organization with a record of involvement in sabotage and terrorism. It was founded in 1930 by Ante Pavelić with the aim of breaking up the Yugoslav state and creating an independent Croatia. It had training camps in the territories of Italy and Hungary, and it cooperated with Austrian and Hungarian intelligence. The Ustaše participated in the assassination of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia in 1934.⁵⁹

Martin Jarinkovič points to another common feature of wartime Slovakia and Croatia, namely official rejection of the Slavonic idea and Pan-Slavism, including Illyrianism / Yugoslavism and Czechoslovakism, in the Croatian and Slovak press, in propaganda and in government circles. They were perceived and presented as ideologies foreign and hostile to both nations.⁶⁰

A typical expression of this rejection of Slavonic community is found in a speech by Vojtech Tuka to the Slovak Parliament in July 1939: “[...] *I must protest in this place against those who still talk about Slavonic community. Slavdom and the unity of all Slavonic nations is a philological fact, but it is no longer an ethnographic fact because the Slavonic nations mixed their blood with various other races, so that even the racial unity of the Slavs no longer exists, and this makes Slavonic community even less a historical fact. Let us say sincerely that up to now Slavonic politics has meant that Slavonic nations fight first of all with each other. [...] And when no other Slavonic nation follows a Pan-Slavist policy, why do we have to start? Who helped us gain our freedom? The Slavonic nations? Great Germany and its noble Führer Adolf Hitler helped us gain our freedom. [...] At this historical moment, whether we like it or not, we are in alliance with the great German nation*”.⁶¹

Alexander Mach expressed similar views. At a general meeting of the Slovak – Croatian Society in January 1942, he stated that Slovak – Croatian cooperation “*is not based on the pharisaic chimera of the notorious Slavonic community*”, which, in his view,

57 As a matter of interest, it is possible to mention that a representative of this party Vladimír Maček participated in the funeral of Andrej Hlinka in 1938.

58 MICHELA, Miroslav. K otázke slovensko-chorvátskej kultúrnej spolupráce v rokoch 1941 – 1945. (On the question of Slovak – Croatian cultural cooperation in 1941–1945.). In *Slavica Slovaca*, 2003, year 38, no. 2, p. 118, 119. ISSN 0037-6787.

59 ŠESTÁK, Miroslav et al. *Dějiny jihošlovanských zemí. (A history of the Yugoslav Lands)*. Praha : Nakladatelství Lidové noviny, 1998, p. 419. ISBN 8071062669.

60 JARINKOVIČ, Martin. Pohľad slovenskej dennej tlače na chorvátsku otázku v rokoch 1941 – 1944. (Views of the Slovak daily press on the Croatian question in 1941–1944.). In SOKOLOVIČ, Peter (ed.). *Od Salzburgu do vypuknutia Povstania. Slovenská republika 1939 – 1945 očami mladých historikov VIII*. Bratislava : Ústav pamäti národa, 2009, p. 273. ISBN 9788089335213.

61 Spoločná česko-slovenská digitálna parlamentná knižnica, Snem Slovenskej republiky 1939 – 1945. (Joint Czecho – Slovak digital parliamentary library, Parliament of the Slovak Republic 1939 – 1945.). Shorthand record of the 6th session of the Slovak Parliament in Bratislava on Friday 21 July 1939, speech by minister Dr. Vojtech Tuka. Accessible on the web site <http://www.nrsr.sk/dk/Download.aspx?MasterID=135154&Type=DocVar&DocVarID=28638&DocID=286861>.

had meant only humiliation, suffering and disappointment for both nations in the recent past.⁶²

However, until the Salzburg talks of 1940 pro-Slavonic or Russophil feelings continued to appear in Slovak government circles, originally in connection with the establishment of diplomatic links between Bratislava and Moscow, but also with the conclusion of the Ribbentrop – Molotov Pact. Government and diplomatic circles in Germany and Hungary watched these “Pan-Slavist” tendencies with some degree of fear and nervousness. The intervention of Berlin in the internal affairs of the Slovak state in 1940 completely suppressed the previous sporadic flirtation with the Slavonic phenomenon. Dagmar Čierna-Lantayová also came to the conclusion that *“the damnation of Pan-Slavist ideas in statements by the leading figures of the Slovak state and by official propaganda had a mainly foreign policy function, as a preventive measure against the continually expected intrigues from Horthy’s Hungary”*.⁶³

This view can be illustrated by a statement by A. Mach, who declared in connection with the developing alliance between Slovakia and Croatia in July 1942: *“Today we cannot be suspected of reviving some sort of Little Entente and we cannot be accused of cultivating Pan-Slavist feelings. First we went [into battle] by the side of the Germans against the Poles, so-called Slavs, when it was in our [interests]. And we are among the first to fight alongside the German nation, against the [Russian Bolshevik] enemies of European culture, also so-called Slavs.”*⁶⁴

However, Martin Jarinkovič observes in this context that there was still a difference between the two states: While government circles in Bratislava, considering the relatively widespread Slavonic feeling of the Slovaks, could not entirely negate the idea of Slavonic community, so they endeavoured to interpret it in a way that was in harmony with the ideology of Slovak nationalism and with the pro-German foreign policy orientation of the state, in Croatia leading figures declared open war. In an effort to support their argumentation on the separateness of the Croatian nation in the struggle against integral Yugoslavism, they came up with the thesis of the non-Slavonic, allegedly Gothic origin of the Croats. According to the highest representative of the Croatian state Ante Pavelić, the Croats and Serbs were not different only in culture, language and religion, but also in race.⁶⁵

The initial phase of establishing the Ľudák regime in Slovakia was not only accompanied by ambivalent or directly rejectionist attitudes towards Slavism, but also by the avoidance or ignoring of Štefánik as an important national symbol. However, the effort of the new government elite to restructure the national symbolic pantheon, on one side

62 MICHELA, ref. 58, p. 116.

63 ČIERNA-LANTAYOVÁ, Dagmar. *Tradícia a dejiny. Výbrané otázky zo slovensko-maďarských a slovensko-ruských vzťahov (1934 – 1949). Tradition and history. Selected questions from Slovak – Hungarian and Slovak – Russian relations (1934–1949).*. Bratislava : Historický ústav SAV vo vydavateľstve TY-POSET Print, spol. s r. o., 2009, p. 238. ISBN 9788097030209.

64 Srdečná rozlúčka s maršalom Kvaternikom. (A sincere farewell to Marshal Kvaternik.). In *Slovák*, 18 July 1942, year 24, no. 161, p. 3.

65 JARINKOVIČ, ref. 60, p. 273.

giving the most important place to Andrej Hlinka, while on the other “forgetting” M.R. Štefánik,⁶⁶ struck against the dislike, incomprehension or even direct opposition of part of the Slovak population.

The initial attempt of the government circles to ignore Štefánik and his memory was eventually replaced by an effort to exploit the Štefánik tradition in favour of the regime. Dušan Kováč has stated in this context that “[...] acceptance of Štefánik and his adaptation to the ‘new Slovakia’ had its limits. Štefánik was not in the foreground of the interest of Ľudák propaganda, where other personalities and their ideals dominated. Statues gradually disappeared, celebrations were narrowed down to Bradlo in May. And finally, when war broke out, Štefánik as a French general and active fighter against Germany, was not the most appropriate personality to represent a model German ally. The Ľudáks were mainly concerned with appropriating Štefánik, putting him at the service of their propaganda, and making him into an [...] authoritarian and anti-Czech politician and a victim of Czech intrigues against the Slovaks. There were clear limits for the Ľudáks considering that deeper study and knowledge of Štefánik’s personality would threaten their image of him”.⁶⁷

The following lines and passages of this study also indicated that apart from the official Štefánik festivities held under Ľudák direction, many local Štefánik celebration sometimes stood on a platform of expressing non-conformist or explicitly resistance views and positions.

Jur Janoška junior gave a speech at celebrations in honour of Štefánik held at Liptovský Sv. Mikuláš on 3 May 1939.⁶⁸ Among other things, he struck a Slavonic note, when he critically addressed the new ruling group or the representatives of the Ľudák regime:

“We know that today the Slavonic idea is ridiculed among us, belittled, disparaged, ignored, that it allegedly has no viability, no reality. [...] And nevertheless we believe in the future of Slavdom, because the effort to achieve Slavonic community and connections comes from the bottom, from the people, from the wide circles of society. We believe that

66 On specific examples of the official, verbal and ritual ignoring of Štefánik and his memory see my publication MACHO, Peter. *Milan Rastislav Štefánik v hlavách a v srdciach. Fenomén národného hrdinu v historickej pamäti. (Milan Rastislav Štefánik in heads and hearts. The phenomenon of a national hero in the historical memory.)*. Bratislava : Historický ústav SAV, 2011, p. 131 etc. ISBN 9788089396139. I also include the message to the nation of President Jozef Tiso from October 1939, which placed Hlinka on the pedestal as the most important national and state symbol. Although Tiso mentioned the merits of various national heroes and celebrities, namely Pribina, Sts. Cyril and Methodius, Anton Bernolák, Ľudovít Štúr, Štefan Moyses, Karol Kuzmány and Svetozár Hurban Vajanský, surprisingly, the name of Štefánik was not heard. Spoločná česko-slovenská digitálna parlamentná knižnica, Snem Slovenskej republiky 1939 – 1945. Shorthand report on the 13th session of the Slovak Parliament in Ružomberok on Tuesday 31 October 1939, speech by President Dr. Jozef Tiso. Accessible on the web site <http://www.nrsr.sk/dk/Download.aspx?MasterID=135161>.

67 KOVÁČ, Dušan. *O historiografii a spoločnosti. (On historiography and society.)*. Bratislava : Historický ústav SAV; Prodama, 2010, p. 220. ISBN 9788089396092.

68 Jur Janoška junior worked as public notary in Trnava from 1923 to 1938, when he was transferred to Liptovský Sv. Mikuláš. In Trnava he not only engaged in the Evangelical Church congregation, but also as deputy chairman of the local branch of Matica Slovenská. He often gave ceremonial speeches at celebrations, including those in honour of Štefánik. The article Rozlúčka s dr. Janoška v Trnave (Farewell to Dr. Janoška in Trnava) informs us about his almost 20 years of work in Trnava. In NN, 22 Jan 1939, year 70, no. 18, p. 5.

when the 'fullness of time' comes, the Slavonic idea will become a reality and prove its healthy, natural, living reality."⁶⁹

In connection with Štefánik, he directly proclaimed that the national hero was not only a Slovak, but also a Slav: *"He flew on wings of Slavonic feeling to Serbia to help the Serbs in 1915, in the most critical, most desperate struggles against much stronger forces."* He stated that Štefánik's memory could be celebrated most beautifully in such a way that *"we instil into our hearts his noble principles, his deep national, Slovak and Slavonic feelings"*.⁷⁰

Although Janoška did not idealize the relations between the Slavonic nations or states in the Balkans, he stated that efforts to cooperate were appearing, even the vision of the unification of all the South Slavs. In the context of emphasizing the Slavonic and Serbophil dimension of Štefánik's personality, he also reached into memories of the First World War, when in the middle of an official campaign against Pan-Slavist "traitors", the leaders of the Slovak National party proclaimed their loyalty to the Monarchy, but also unambiguously declared their solidarity with all the Slavs, including the Serbs: *"At the beginning of the World War, Matúš Dula issued to the Slovaks a declaration that they were loyal to the existing Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, but he added: 'But still as a nation belonging to the Slavonic stock, we do not renounce and cannot renounce our closer blood relationship to all the Slavonic nations.' These were brave words in those manly times. They were pronounced when marchers swarmed through the streets of Slovaks towns with shouts of: Long live the war, when broken windows clattered in the houses and flats of Slovak national activists and leaders, but wild terror and the threat of internment prevailed... And we still were not afraid to declare allegiance to Slavdom. We still profess this idea today. We still occupy the Slavonic position. Nobody can tell us it is wrong!"*⁷¹

Another author, A. Benko interpreted Štefánik a little differently, when he published his impressions of the Štefánik celebrations at Liptovský Hrádok on the pages of the *Cirkevné listy*. Although he also expressed support for Slavonic community, he brought

69 JANOŠKA, Jur. Štefánik – bohatier. Reč na Štefánikovej oslave dňa 3. mája 1939 v Liptovskom Sv. Mikuláši. (Štefánik – the hero. Speech at the Štefánik celebration on 3 May 1939 in Liptovský Sv. Mikuláš.). In *Cirkevné listy*, 12 May 1939, year 53, no. 10, p. 189.

70 JANOŠKA, ref. 69, p. 189. It is necessary to emphasize that J. Janoška jun. already participated in spreading ideals of Slavonic community or Czechoslovak – Yugoslav brotherhood during the inter-war period. I remind you of his activity in the Bratislava branch of the Czechoslovak – Yugoslav League. It included participation in the delegation to the grave of Alexander I at Oplenac, and activities in Trnava. For example, on 9 December 1937 he participated in the celebration of the Yugoslav state holiday organized by the municipal enlightenment committee in Trnava. R. Kovijanić gave the main speech. Unfortunately, the newspaper report does not mention whether either Janoška or Kovijanić mentioned M.R. Štefánik in the course of the celebrations. We only learn that Kovijanić also pointed *"to common traditions and shared suffering"*. According to the newspaper article, Janoška, who *"has good personal knowledge of the South Slavs"*, recited several Slovak poems with Yugoslav themes but also extracts from Yugoslav poetry in the original language. The author stressed that Janoška *"also spoke in Serbian of the brother country and its struggle for freedom and unification very warmly and sincerely"*. Oslava Jugoslávie v Trnave. (Celebration of Yugoslavia in Trnava.). In *Nové Slovensko* [Trnava], 18 Dec 1937, year 14, no. 50, p. 4.

71 JANOŠKA, ref. 69, p. 189.

into the foreground the confessional identity of the national hero, namely his Protestant origin. He spoke of Štefánik as follows: “*You our hero stand in the living memory of the Slovak Evangelicals, because a Slovak [...] Evangelical parsonage gave you to the [nation], because your father was an Evangelical pastor, because your parents taught you to pray to God by means of the Kralice Bible and three hundred year old Tranoscius to love God, by means of Biblical Czech to love your nation, to work and to die for it.*” In the conclusion to his article the author proclaimed: “*I recall and remind you that we Evangelicals should keep our heads and not serve foreign idols [sic!]... Concerning history, we should not forget that Štefánik was a great son of the Slovak nation, but also a son of mother Sláva and a son of an Evangelical mother!*”⁷²

It may appear at first sight that the statements of Janoška and Benko about Štefánik are not comparable. In the first case, Slavism and Serbo-philía are placed in the foreground and articulated very intensively, while in the second, these phenomena are marginalized to some degree or pushed into the background by Lutheran confessionalism. However, I think that from the side of A. Benko it was only a sort of confessional camouflage for a form of the Slavo-phil tendency similar to that found in the case of Janoška. Today’s reader, who usually is not able to understand texts of this type against the background of the atmosphere, mentalities and identities of the time because he does not have the lived experiences and feelings of Janoška’s and Benko’s contemporaries, may not grasp that references to the *Kralice Bible* and *Tranovský’s Cancional* or to Biblical Czech did not only have the function of confessional identification in this context.

In reality they also referred to Czecho – Slovak community, and to some degree also to a wider understanding of Slavonic community in the framework of the Central European region present in the Protestant environment. Participants in the Štefánik celebrations, members of the Evangelical community could decipher these messages in precisely this way. They would have remembered the recent celebrations of the 300th anniversary of the first publication of Juraj Tranovský’s hymnbook, the *Cithara Sanctorum*, also called *Tranoscius*. The celebrations in 1936 were held under the patronage of the Czechoslovak government and regional president. The President of Czechoslovakia Edvard Beneš and his wife also honoured the event with their presence. Beneš emphasized in his speech that Juraj Tranovský’s hymnbook has not only religious and spiritual but also national importance: “*Your hymnbook is a symbol of the old tradition of Czechoslovak contacts, of Czechoslovak community.*”⁷³

72 BENKO-ELČIN, A. Momentky (Písané pod dojmom Štefánikových osláv v Liptovskom Hrádku). (Moments (Written under the influence of the Štefánik celebration in Liptovský Hrádok).). In *Cirkevné listy*, 12 May 1939, year 53, no. 10, p. 194. The author was probably Adam Benko, an Evangelical teacher, publicist, editor and former functionary of the Slovak National Party, who joined the civil resistance during the Second World War.

73 In the context of these celebrations, for example, in posters, Juraj Tranovský was presented as “*by origin a Pole, by language a Czech, by work a Slovak*”. The Evangelical orphanage in Liptovský Sv. Mikuláš produced 100,000 promotional stickers depicting the hymnbook in the form of an open book from which grow three lime twigs symbolizing the “*three branches of the Slavonic family, namely Slovaks, Czechs and Poles, to which Tranovský’s Cithara has brought spiritual renewal through the centuries*”. ŠENŠEL, Ľudovít (ed.). *Tranovského jubilejné slávnosti. (Celebrations of Tranovský’s jubilee)*. Liptovský Sv. Mikuláš : Tranoscius 1937, p. 44, 45, 52.

Obviously, the relatively strong Czechoslovak dimension of the identity of members of the Protestant community cannot be associated only with these celebrations. Various influences and factors continually pushed them in this direction, but positive reflection of the shared Czecho – Slovak Reformation traditions had an important role among them.

From this point of view, the celebration sermon by Samuel Štarke, a Slovak Evangelical bishop from Yugoslavia was also characteristic. In connection with *Tranoscius* he emphasized: “*The Lord gave us in this book a spiritual bond, powerful and tested, which can sustain us through the strongest attacks and tests. [...] For us and especially for you here in our dear old homeland it is like a sign from God, who shows us where, with whom and on what basis you have to maintain concord, brotherhood and love in honour of the name of God and for support in evil days, such as these times are for your lives and existence, for your dear homeland, Czechoslovakia.*”⁷⁴

The bishop’s words corresponded to the views and attitudes of the Slovak, mostly Evangelical intelligentsia in Yugoslavia, which was pro-Czechoslovak oriented and persisted in this orientation after the break up of the Czechoslovak Republic.⁷⁵

The words of Janoška and Benko about Štefánik were heard in May 1939, about three years after the Tranovský celebrations, and halfway through the disintegration process. Czechoslovakia had broken up, but Yugoslavia still existed. It was a time when it was rather unwelcome to speak positively about Czechoslovakia, the Czechs, Czecho-Slovak community or Slavonic brotherhood. Perhaps this was why A. Benko chose the strategy that could be understood at first sight as emphasizing the confessional identity of the national hero.

However, in spite of this, Štefánik’s Serbo-philic and sympathy for the emerging Yugoslav state during the First World War as emphasized by Janoška was difficult to doubt and attack in the changed constitutional circumstances of 1939, because to a large extent they corresponded to the existing foreign policy orientation of Slovakia, which was endeavouring to normalize relations with Yugoslavia. However, both statements about Štefánik were decipherable as expressions of distance or even opposition to the Ľudáks and their regime.⁷⁶

Janoška’s reference to the public declaration of Matúš Dula, chairman of the Slovak National Party to “our” Slavonic brothers at the beginning of the First World War, was

74 ŠENŠEL, ref. 73, p. 68.

75 Štarke’s Czechoslovak and wider Slavonic orientation and identity was probably also influenced by the fact that he came from Mošovce, native village of Ján Kollár. Štarke was not only a church representative, but also chairman of Matica Slovenská in Yugoslavia. In June 1938, during a visit to Bratislava, he openly expressed his views on the German threat, declaring that in the event of threat, the Slovaks in Yugoslavia would send a unit of volunteers to help Czechoslovakia. This declaration agreed with the general atmosphere in Yugoslav society. During the crisis of September 1938 about 60 thousand Yugoslavs volunteered to help Czechoslovakia.

76 In the case of J. Janoška, who was politically involved in the Slovak National Party, this is not surprising. He had already declared his critical view of the Ľudáks during the inter-war period. JANOŠKA, Jur. Osvedčenie. (Testimony.). In *NN*, 1936, year 67, no. 49, p. 2. According to unconfirmed information Janoška was “on the night of 27 June 1939 taken [...] to the detention camp at Illava for the speech he had given at the regional youth congress at [Liptovská] Porúbka and at the Štefánik celebration in [Liptovský] Hrádok”. OSUSKÝ, Samuel Štefan (ed.). *Služba národu II. (Service to the nation II.)* Liptovský Mikuláš : *Tranoscius*, 1947, p. 311.

extremely interesting. The description of the atmosphere of 1914, which resembled in many ways the events of 1938–1939 with breaking of windows and intimidation or actual imprisonment of opponents of the emerging Ľudák regime, accompanied Janoška's bitter realization that they would also endeavour to regiment and liquidate this party.

Obviously, Janoška and his public at the Štefánik celebration in May 1939 could not guess that developments about three years later would strengthen anti-Serbian and anti-Yugoslav rhetoric. The break up of Yugoslavia and the formation of an independent Croatia created a similar situation to that of 1914, when hatred of the Serbs appeared in the Ľudák press in connection with the Sarajevo assassination. During the Second World War Ľudák propaganda expressed solidarity with the Croats and Croatia. It followed a view in which Croatian – Serbian antagonism was interpreted against the background of the quarrels between Catholicism and Orthodoxy or Christianity and Bolshevism. In Slovak, as in Croatian propaganda, the Serbs were depicted as an inferior element.

Croatia became independent after the German attack on Yugoslavia in April 1941. The Ustaše headed by General Slavko Kvaternik declared independence when the Wehrmacht entered Zagreb. After the establishment of the new regime, S. Kvaternik was promoted to field marshal, and he became the deputy (doglavnik) to the Croatian leader (poglavnik) Ante Pavelić.⁷⁷

Not only strong anti-Semitic policies, but also open discrimination and mass killing against the Serbian population, were characteristic of the Ustaše regime in Croatia: *“Use of Cyrillic was prohibited, Serbian churches and schools were closed, Serbs in towns could not go out of their homes at night, in Zagreb they had to move out of the better quarters in the north of the city. They were forcibly dispossessed and dismissed from*

77 Since this Croatian personality is little known in the Slovak environment, I will provide a more extensive review of his life: Slavko Kvaternik (1878–1947) studied at a military academy, then served as a staff officer in the Austro-Hungarian army. During the First World War, he gained the German Iron Cross First Class. In 1918 he commanded Croatian units in the struggle against the Hungarians in the Međimurje, which became part of Yugoslavia after the war. In 1921 he was pensioned with the rank of colonel, but after the assassination of King Alexander I he was imprisoned. After the Croatian declaration of independence in April 1941 he formed a provisional government. After the return of the Ustaše leader A. Pavelić from exile in Italy, Kvaternik was one of his closest associates and deputy leader. Among other things, he held the post of minister of defence. In July 1942 he visited Slovakia, where he was received by the highest state representatives, and President J. Tiso honoured him. On the occasion of the first anniversary of Croatian independence in April 1942, the Slovak embassy in Zagreb gave him a symbolic gift: a silver axe of the Hlinka Guard. In the course of the year, conflict arose between the two most important representatives of Croatia, and the Germans supported A. Pavelić, who endeavoured to strengthen his own position. He tried to get rid of Kvaternik. He justified his position with Kvaternik's responsibility for the bad situation in the Croatian armed forces. At Pavelić's request, Kvaternik was officially sent on a medicinal visit to the spa of Piešťany in Slovakia on 5 November 1942. During this period he was removed from political life. He returned to Croatia on 22 December 1942, but he lived abroad until the end of the war. The American army captured him in 1945 and handed him over to the Yugoslav authorities. They condemned him to death and in 1947 he was executed by gun fire in Zagreb. Information taken from the following sources: Slavko Kvaternik. Accessible on the website < http://hr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slavko_Kvaternik >, 10. 2. 2011; TKÁČ, Ján: Chorvátsko v politike Slovenskej republiky v rokoch 1941 – 1945. (*Croatia in the politics of the Slovak Republic, 1941 – 1945.*). In *Historický časopis*, 2010, year 58, no. 4, p. 659–683. ISSN 0018-2575; RYCHLÍK, Jan. Slovensko-chorvátské vzťahy v letech 1941 – 1945. (Slovak – Croatian relations, 1941 – 1945.). In *Slovenské historické studie* 26. See ed. Miroslav Šesták. Praha : Historický ústav Av ČR 2000, p. 265–283.

employment. In some towns, Serbs had to wear blue or white bands with a large P for Pravoslavac (Orthodox). [...] At the same time, there was forcible re-Catholicization of Serbs with the active assistance especially of Franciscans. Many Serbs had a choice: either become Catholic or have your throat cut or in a better case be shot. Two hundred thousand people were baptized like this. The Ustaše justified forcible baptism with the argument that in the 14th century under the [Serbian] Tsar Dušan many Croats were forced to convert to Orthodoxy under threat from the sword. [...] Not only the Vatican, but also some Croatian bishops protested against forcible conversion.”⁷⁸

As we have seen, in the Croatian, but also the Serbian environment, they were not satisfied with historical arguments, but progressed from words to deeds in the true sense of the word. Appeals to the ancient Christian past played an important part in both nationalist discourses.⁷⁹

Martin Jarinkovič mentions that censorship in Slovakia blunted the sharp anti-Serbian rhetoric of representatives of the Ustaše regime, so that the Slovak public would more easily accept the official alliance between Bratislava and Zagreb.⁸⁰

Censorship and propaganda could massage public opinion in Slovakia, but, at least from August 1942, the government leaders were informed by the Slovak ambassador in Zagreb about the real situation in Croatia. Jozef Cieker included in a secret report information about Ustaše excesses: discrimination against Serbs and Jews, killing of members of these groups, and even about persecution of members of the Croatian Peasants' Party, regarded by the conservatives in Hlinka's Slovak People's Party as their natural partners.⁸¹

The Slovak diplomat regarded Eugen Dido Kvaternik, son of the above mentioned Marshal Slavko Kvaternik, as the greatest evil. E.D. Kvaternik was the chief of the secret police, and J. Cieker wrote of him: “*They call him the bloodthirsty. He bathes in blood and goes beyond blood.*”⁸²

78 ŠESTÁK, ref. 59, p. 455, 456, 457. In this context J. Pirjevec mentions an extermination plan: A third of the Serbs would be killed, a third driven out of the country and the remaining third would be forced to convert to Catholicism. PIRJEVEC, ref. 24, p. 129.

79 For analysis of modern Croatian and Serbian state mythologies in the context of traditional confessional – Catholic and Orthodox – narratives, see, for example, the studies PERICA, Vjekoslav. Uloga crkava u konstrukciji državnostvornih mitova Hrvatske i Srbije. (The role of the churches in the construction of the state-forming myths of the Croats and Serbs.). In KAMBEROVIČ, Husnija (ed.). *Historijski mitovi na Balkanu. Zbornik radova*. Sarajevo : Institut za istoriju u Sarajevu, 2003, p. 203-223. ISBN 995896421X.

80 In this context, he points, for example, to the additional censorship of the speech of the Croatian ambassador in the Slovak press. The diplomat spoke at the general meeting of the Slovak – Croatian Society in Bratislava in 1943 about the inferiority of the Serbian Orthodox element, which had to be destroyed because it was a disgrace to civilized Europe. JARINKOVIČ, Martin. Spolkový život v prvej Slovenskej republike na príklade Slovensko-chorvátskej spoločnosti v rokoch 1942 – 1944. (Society life in the first Slovak Republic, using the example of the Slovak – Croatian Society in 1942–1944.). In SOKOLOVIČ, Peter (ed.). *Život v Slovenskej republike 1939 – 1945 očami mladých historikov IX*. Bratislava : ÚPN, 2010, p. 319. ISBN 9788089335374.

81 GREČKOVÁ, Kristína. Dr. Jozef Cieker a jeho úloha v diplomacii prvej Slovenskej republiky. (Dr. Jozef Cieker and his role in the diplomacy of the first Slovak Republic.). Bachelor's diploma work. Brno : Masarykova univerzita – Historický ústav FF UK 2011. Accessible on the website http://is.muni.cz/th/263332/ff_b/Posobenie_Dr._Jozefa_Ciekera_v_diplomacii_prvej_Slovenskej_republiky.

82 GREČKOVÁ, ref. 81, p. 16.

Kvaternik had an extraordinarily rich past behind him: For example, he was one of the organizers of the assassination of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia at Marseilles in 1934.⁸³

The poet Janko Jesenský pointed to this connection from the position of commentator and critic of the Slovak – Croatian alliance. In satirical verses with the appropriate title *New brotherhood*, he confronted the positions of the past and present leaders of the Slovak and Croatian nations:

*“Hurban, Štúr / rhyme with Tuka úr;⁸⁴ /
but with a small difference: /
Hurban, Štúr; / unlike Tuka úr, /
never betrayed the Slavs, ///*

*Jelačić, Starčević⁸⁵ / rhyme with Pavelič, /
but with a small difference: /
Jelačić, Starčević, / unlike Pavelič, /
did not kill a king.”⁸⁶*

In another poem, from July 1942, with the title *Kvaternik's journey through Slovakia*,⁸⁷ Jesenský deliberately directed the sharpness of his pen against Kvaternik senior, the second highest man in independent Croatia:

*“To Piešťany they went,
to Teplice for a whole day,
to Martin, Ružomberok,
where the eternal leader sleeps.*

83 RYCHLÍK – PERENČEVIČ, ref. 25, p. 426.

84 “*Tuka úr*”, Hungarian for Mr. Tuka, refers to Tuka's alleged pro-Hungarian views.

85 Josip Jelačić (1801 – 1859), Ban of Croatia, during the 1848 revolutions one of the commanders of the Austrian Imperial Army, a Croatian national hero and symbol of the struggle for national freedom from the Hungarians. Ante Starčević (1823 – 1896), Croatian nationalist politician, founder of the Croatian Party of Rights.

86 Slovak National Library in Martin – Literary Archives (hereinafter SNK LA), Janko Jesenský collection, sign. 130 BP 5: *Premeny* (Changes) [Satirical and resistance poetry]. *Báseň Nové bratstvo* (The poem New Brotherhood), (11 April 1942). The poetic text was published in the collection *Hnev svätý. Sbíerka z veršov odbojného Slovenska, sv. II. (Sacred anger. A collection of verses from the Slovak resistance, Vol. II.)*. Ed. Vladimír Clementis. Londýn : Kruh priateľov československej knihy v Londýne, 1944, p. 90. Understandably, also in this case the satirical poem reflects only some aspects of the historical reality, not the reality in its full complexity. The assassins from the ranks of the Ustaše movement did not regard Alexander I as their king, just as they did not regard Yugoslavia as their own nation state. They saw Croatia as a country occupied by the Serbs. In their eyes, Alexander I was a usurper and enemy. They were convinced that they had the right to carry on a violent armed struggle against Belgrade. RYCHLÍK – PERENČEVIČ, ref. 25, p. 266.

87 SNK–LA, Janko Jesenský collection, sign. 130 BP 5: *Premeny*, báseň *Cesta Kvaternikova po Slovensku* (31 July 1942).

*Tatras, Bystrica and Sliač,
everywhere plenty of food,
brotherhood of hearts and brotherhood of weapons,
about the New Europe gossip.*

*Army leader, doglavník,
marshal, victor Kvaterník,
you forgot the cairn,
where lies Štefánik!*

*You know gentlemen, I'll tell you,
why Slavko was not there:
Štefánik was a great Pan-Slavist
and he an old Austrian."*

Jesenský added to his poem the following commentary: "*Kvaterník wandered here [in Slovakia] until December 1942. He did not risk going home until they informed him that he had to go there. They pensioned him and he returned at the end of December last year, allegedly to the 'independent state of Croatia'.*⁸⁸ *His son or brother, who was police commissioner in Zagreb and had 80,000 Serbs slaughtered, is still in Slovakia – in a safe place.*"⁸⁹

Thus, the poet also reacted to the reverse side of Slovak – Croatian relations, which remained hidden from a large part of Slovak society, especially from people who did not follow the radio broadcasts from London or Moscow. Jesenský pointed to the fact, now confirmed by the archive research of various historians, that the Slovak government gave refuge or asylum to representatives of the Ustaše regime who had committed crimes against humanity.

According to K. Grečková, the Slovak ambassador in Zagreb "*Cieker later strongly criticized this trend in a report delivered personally into the hands of the head of the*

88 Jesenský's formulation gives the impression that S. Kvaterník made one uninterrupted visit to Slovakia. However, in reality, Kvaterník came to Slovakia for an official state visit in summer 1942. In the following months he had an enforced period of health treatment at Piešťany from which he could return to Croatia, but only as a private person. Kvaterník's medical visit to Slovakia, which was actually a euphemism for a sort of temporary exile, and the political-diplomatic games behind the scenes concerning this important Croatian figure have been mapped in detail and described by KRIZMAN, Bogdan. *NDH između Hitlera i Mussolinija. (The Independent State of Croatia between Hitler and Mussolini).* Zagreb : Globus, 1986, p. 422-441. ISBN 8634301540.

89 SNK LA, JESENSKÝ, ref. 87. The cited commentary does not appear in the published versions of this poem. Cesta Kvaterníkova po Slovensku. (Kvaterník's journey in Slovakia.). In *Hnev svätý. Sbíerka z veršov odbojného Slovenska, sv. II.* Ed. Vladimír Clementis. London : Kruh priateľov československej knihy v Londýne, 1944, p. 92; Cesta Kvaterníkova po Slovensku. In JESENSKÝ, Janko. *Na zlobu dňa. Básne II.* (= Sbrané spisy Janka Jesenského. Sv. 12). Liptovský Sv. Mikuláš : Tranoscius, 1945, p. 322. In relation to Jesenský's comments on the E.D. Kvaterník's presence in Slovak safety I will only add the information, that like his father, he was officially receiving health treatment in Trenčianske Teplice and Piešťany. During his stay, he also met the minister of national defence General Ferdinand Čatloš. KRIZMAN, ref. 88, p. 440.

political section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the President [Jozef Tiso]. He was reacting to information that the former commander of the most feared concentration camp [...] at Jasenovac, Luburić and his family had applied for a Slovak visa. Addressing the cases of Luburić and [Eugen] Kvaternik, Cieker said that 'in the [Croatian] nation they have gained the title of professional killers'. Therefore, he recommended that people active in the [...] [Ustaše] movement should not be given Slovak visas or their visas should not be extended".⁹⁰

Therefore in the eyes of Janko Jesenský, the Croatian state and Ustaše regime had discredited itself also through the prism of the activities and positions of the Kvaterniks, both the father Slavko and his son Eugen.

S. Kvaternik's official visit to Slovakia happened on 12–16 July 1942. One of its aims was to discuss Slovak deliveries of military cloth and weapons for the Croatian home defence force. According to J. Rychlík this Croatian government figure wanted to strengthen his power in conflict with A. Pavelić.⁹¹ Kvaternik's second visit to Slovakia, essentially an enforced medical visit to Piešťany, was intended to benefit Pavelić, who wanted to remove Kvaternik's son from Croatian public life while the father was absent.⁹²

However, to understand Janko Jesenský's poetic statement and its contextualizing of Kvaternik and Štefánik, it is necessary to be aware of the following facts: Slavko Kvaternik was present in Slovakia twice in the course of 1942, but he did not visit the monument to Štefánik during his official visit and probably not during his medical stay at Piešťany, although he was staying only several tens of kilometres from Bradlo. However, the poem and information published in the press at the time state that during his summer visit as an official representative of Croatia, he was welcomed not only at several spas, but also at Malacky, Stupava, Dubnica, Považská Bystrica, Trenčín, Tatranská Lomnica and Javorina. However, he also visited Turčiansky Sv. Martin seat of Matica Slovenská, and Ružomberok, where Andrej Hlinka, the main symbol of the Slovak state and the Ľudák regime was buried.

The daily press reported his visit to Hlinka's mausoleum at Ružomberok accompanied by minister General Ferdinand Čatloš and the Croatian ambassador Josip Berković, with the following words: Kvaternik "*laid a wreath with ribbons in the Croatian colours on the grave of the eternal Leader of the Slovak nation Andrej Hlinka, and he bowed to the memory of the greatest hero of the Slovaks*".⁹³

90 GREČKOVÁ, ref. 81, p. 16.

91 Jan Rychlík comments on the S. Kvaternik's official visit to Slovakia as follows: "*Kvaternik's visit to Slovakia was clearly connected with internal developments in [...] [Croatia]. In 1942 Kvaternik [...] came into a publicly concealed conflict with Pavelić, and evidently wanted to strengthen his position with a trip to Slovakia. In September 1942 Pavelić told the German ambassador in Zagreb Siegfried Kasch that he was dissatisfied with Kvaternik's work at the Ministry of Defence and had decided to remove him. The criticism also extended to Eugen Dido Kvaternik [...], Slavko's son, who commanded the [...] Ustaše police. The Germans supported Pavelić in his dispute with Kvaternik, and so the Kvaterniks' fate was sealed. Pavelić dismissed Kvaternik senior and took control of the armed forces himself. Then Pavelić sent Kvaternik on another journey to Slovakia, apparently so that in the father's absence he could also dismiss the son, as happened on 13 October 1942.*" RYCHLÍK, ref. 77, p. 278, 279.

92 RYCHLÍK, ref. 77, p. 279.

93 Cesta Kvaternikova po Slovensku. In *Slovák*, 16. 7. 1942, year 24, no. 159, p. 1-2.

Ignoring and avoidance of the monument to Štefánik in the framework of the symbolic policy of the Ľudák regime on the level of official Slovak – Croatian relations is also evident in the case of other visits to Slovakia from Zagreb. However, for the sake of objectivity, I note that this fact also needs to be interpreted against the background of inter-war practice. Although delegations from Yugoslavia visited the monuments at Bradlo and the village of Ivanka, the Štefánik cult as part of the symbolism of Czechoslovak – Yugoslav relations was cultivated more on the verbal than on the ritual level. To put it simply, putting wreaths on the monument to Štefánik was not a regular feature of visits from Yugoslavia.⁹⁴

The first Croatian ambassador to Slovakia, Dragutin Toth had his introductory audience with President Jozef Tiso on 1 August 1941, and in the following days he visited leading government and political figures. *“In the framework of these official activities, on 6 August he visited Ružomberok, where ‘he laid a beautiful wreath on the grave of the eternal leader Andrej Hlinka and bowed to his undying memory’.* The newspaper added that *‘the ambassador and plenipotentiary minister already knew Slovakia and had been a personal friend of our eternal leader Andrej Hlinka, so he considered it his duty [...] to come and bow to his undying memory’.*”⁹⁵

In this case we can regard the visit to the grave of Andrej Hlinka at Ružomberok as partly a personal initiative of the Croatian diplomat. At first sight it may appear that we cannot automatically deduce from this fact any direct intention to officially ignore Štefánik’s monument. However, the visits of other representatives of the Croatian establishment to Slovakia confirm this initial trend. For example, according to Ján Tkáč, the Croatian minister of education Mile Budak visited Slovakia in October 1941: *“As was already usual, he started by visiting the interior minister Alexander Mach and then other state figures. He also visited the Society of St. Vojtech in Trnava, Matica Slovenská in Turčiansky Sv. Martin and the grave of Andrej Hlinka at Ružomberok.”*⁹⁶

The arguments that Bradlo was too far from Bratislava can be relativized by pointing to the fact that monuments to Štefánik were also located in Ivanka near Bratislava and in the capital city itself. The latter was de-Czechoslovakized in 1940 by removing the sculpture of a lion, which was seen by the Ľudáks as the embodiment of the national oppression of the Slovaks and Czech overlordship.⁹⁷

In the case of Kvaterník’s visit to Slovakia, it is also necessary to mention the fact that he visited not only Bratislava, but at least two other towns that had monuments to Štefánik at the time, namely Trenčín and Považská Bystrica.⁹⁸

94 Obviously it is necessary to consider various factors here: During the existence of the First Republic, the majority of official visits on the highest level went to Prague, the capital of Czechoslovakia.

95 PETRUF, ref. 54, p. 235.

96 TKÁČ, ref. 77, p. 668.

97 For more details see the works FUSKA, Ján et al. *Pamätník Milana Rastislava Štefánika v Bratislave. Vznik a znovupostavenie.* (The monument to Milan Rastislav Štefánik in Bratislava. Origin and re-erection.). Bratislava : s. n, s. a., p. 29. ISBN 9788085331615; MACHO, ref. 66, p. 148. I took the term de-Czechoslovakized (in Slovak: *odčeskoslovenčený*) from L. Lipták – LIPTÁK, Ľubomír. Rošády na piedestáloch. (Changes on pedestals.). In LIPTÁK, Ľubomír. *Storočie dlhšie ako sto rokov. O dejinách a historiografii.* Bratislava : Kalligram, 1999, p. 331. ISBN 8071492620.

98 For further details on monuments to Štefánik see MANIAČEK, Ján. *Posol hviezdnych diaľav 1. časť.*

In addition, Kvaternik spent his five day visit to Slovakia in the company of the minister of national defence General Ferdinand Čatloš, who greatly honoured the memory of Štefánik and maintained it in the field under his authority. Therefore, it may appear surprising that these five days did not include an official ritual of laying a wreath on Štefánik's grave or other monument. In larger localities, a tour of the town formed part of a well-planned programme apart from the obligatory official acts, so we cannot speak of any shortage of time. During Kvaternik's visit to Trenčín, planes flew over the town, and precisely in this period, Štefánik was also presented as the symbolic founder and "patron" of Slovak aviation.⁹⁹ To conclude these counter-arguments, it is also possible to mention the fact presented in the press at the time, that the second most important man in Croatia "visited the regions of greatest interest to him as a politician and a great friend of our nation", as he stated himself in an interview for the press.¹⁰⁰

Precisely the avoidance of Štefánik's memory in the inter-state relations between Slovakia and Croatia, as expressed in the ignoring of Štefánik's monuments on Bradlo and elsewhere, while the memory of Hlinka and honouring of his mausoleum at Ružomberok were emphasized became the main theme of Jesenský's poem. The poet suggests to the reader an unambiguous answer to the question of why the Croatian marshal did not visit Bradlo in spite of the fact that like Štefánik he was a soldier and warrior.¹⁰¹ According to Jesenský's ironic comments, expressed in the concluding verses of the poem, Kvaternik professed different values to Štefánik. By unmasking Kvaternik, placing him in sharp contrast to Štefánik (*Pan-Slavist against Austrian*), Jesenský held up a mirror to the Slovak state and its allies.

In this context, it is interesting to note that General Glaise von Horstenau, representative of the Wehrmacht in Zagreb described the effort of Pavelić and clearly also Kvaternik to create an independent Croatia under the patronage of the Italian fascists

Osudy památníků Milana Rastislava Štefánika na Slovensku. (Messenger of the cosmic distances, Part 1. The fates of monuments to Milan Rastislav Štefánik in Slovakia.). Brezová pod Bradlom : Spoločnosť Milana Rastislava Štefánika, 2012. ISBN 9788097116224.

99 During his visit to Turčiansky Sv. Martin Kvaternik also visited the Slovak National Museum, where "the honoured guests looked with great interest at [...] at the ethnographic collections and the Štefánik section". Cesta Kvaternikova po Slovensku. (Kvaternik's visit to Slovakia.). In *Slovák*, 16 July 1942, year 24, no. 159, p. 2. This is essentially the only mention of Štefánik in connection with Kvaternik's visit on the pages of the daily newspaper *Slovák*. The Štefánik section comprised objects from Štefánik's possessions, which had belonged to the Memorial to the Liberation in Prague between the wars. After the break up of Czechoslovakia, they were brought to Slovakia by the director of the Slovak National Museum J. Geryk after agreement with the German authorities and at the suggestion of Čatloš. SNK LA, Ferdinand Čatloš collection, sign. 129 J 1: Čatloš with Štefánik and about Štefánik, p. 6.

100 Maršal Kvaternik odchádza do Záhrebu. (Marshal Kvaternik goes back to Zagreb.). In *Slovák*, 17 July 1942, year 24, no. 160, p. 1.

101 According to the commentaries of the time S. Kvaternik came on an official visit to Slovakia as "the first soldier of his nation [who] emphasizes the heroic and valiant genius of the Croats". Náš osud je spoločný. (Our fate is shared.). In *Slovák*, 14 July 1942, year 24, no. 157, p. 1. Another editorial described him as a soldier in body and soul, who "knew that sometime the homeland would need uncompromising warriors with weapons in their hands defending the idea flowing from the depths of the heart of every Croat – the idea of freedom". V ústrety novej Europe. (Awaiting the new Europe.). In *Slovák*, 15 July 1942, year 24, no. 158, p. 1.

and German Nazis, as “*a revolution of old men and former imperial officers*”,¹⁰² which essentially corresponded to Kvaternik’s military past. From this point of view, Jesenský’s counter-posing of Štefánik and Kvaternik as Pan-Slavist versus Austrian was very accurate. The formulation used by the poet, namely Kvaternik = “*old Austrian*”, needs to be understood as an expression of Kvaternik’s sympathy for *old Austria*, meaning the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.¹⁰³ Therefore in Jesenský’s eyes Slavko Kvaternik embodied not only the brutal Ustaše regime of independent Croatia, which was guilty of violence against “our” Slavonic brothers, the Serbs, but also the worst of the former monarchy, against which Štefánik had fought and risked his life, also on the Serbian front beside the Serbs.

Authors of comprehensive histories of the Yugoslav lands point to the fact that the chauvinism and anti-Semitism that formed the backbone of the Ustaše programme was more the heritage of the extremist tendencies in old Austria-Hungary than a reflection of fascist or Nazi influences.¹⁰⁴ In relation to this revealing fact, I will point to an apparently insignificant detail in the text of Jesenský’s poem: In the original manuscript, the author used the formulation “*old Austrian*”, but in the published version we find a different formulation – “*great Austrian*”, so that Štefánik is a “*great Pan-Slavist*”, while Kvaternik is a “*great Austrian*”. However, I think that, for the reader of the time, this intervention in the text weakened the poetic reflection of the absolute contrast between Štefánik as a fighter against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Kvaternik, who originally supported and admired it.

Since domestic censorship did not allow information about the brutality and excesses of the Ustaše regime and the Slovak – Croatian alliance was often presented by the propaganda of the time as an expression of brotherhood between two Christian, or more specifically Catholic nations, the majority of the Slovak population could scarcely get a more comprehensive idea of the real nature of the regime in Croatia. Therefore, Jesenský could not base his poetic message on condemnation of the horrors of this regime and so indirectly cast doubt on the legitimacy of the regime in Slovakia, which liked to declare itself Christian. However, thematizing the ignoring of Štefánik’s monument was understandable to every Slovak reader. A significant part of the population was very sensitive to something like this. Moreover, at the time Jesenský wrote this poem, Slovakia already had concrete experience with official “forgetting” of Štefánik, and with revitalization of the memory of Štefánik, but in the Ľudák spirit. In the Protestant environment, from which Janko Jesenský also came, such symbolic policy of the Ľudák regime evoked opposition and became one of the factors influencing the attitude of the population towards the Slovak state and its regime.

In this context, we are faced with the question of whether the Slovak population, part of it or some individuals knew or read this poem, for example, in copies, or read it at the time of its origin in 1942. The poem about Kvaternik and Štefánik, this “biting” satire on

102 ŠESTÁK, ref. 59, p. 458.

103 As a poet, Jesenský also used the formulation *Austrian* (in Slovak *Rakušan*) for another literary – aesthetic reason: the pejorative word forms *rakušák* or *rakušiak* simply did not fit into the rhyme structure of his poem (AABA).

104 ŠESTÁK, ref. 59, p. 454.

the Slovak – Croatian alliance was certainly published in exile in London in the poetic collection *Hnev svätý* (*Holy anger*), which includes Jesenský's texts. However, they only appeared in 1944.¹⁰⁵ In spite of this, we can understand it as evidence of the author's attitude towards the symbolic policy of the Ľudák regime and the Slovak state. However, we can also interpret it from a slightly different point of view, namely as evidence that Jesenský assumed that for a significant part of Slovak society, Štefánik was a symbolic source of legitimacy for political power, and that the intensity of loyalty to the regime and state in certain sections of the Slovak population depended on how the specific regime related to this symbol.

The current Slovak – Croatian alliance, which had its prehistory, also reflected in the middle of the 20th century and appealing not only to common traditions and symbols from the national emancipation struggle of the Slovaks and Croats in the 19th century, but also to symbols from the period of the Slovak and Croatian struggles for autonomy in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia respectively. Although it is necessary to distinguish between official propaganda and the activity of cultural activists, who clearly retained some degree of autonomy and did not succumb so easily to the pressure to select symbols, it is impossible to avoid noticing the strong trend to prefer symbols coming from the Catholic environment. This meant emphasizing iconic figures from the common past, who could be interpreted mainly as part of the Catholic confessional discourse.¹⁰⁶

They were symbols that represented not only a national Slovak or Croatian, but also a Catholic identity. They were usually personalities, who came from the Croatian or Slovak environment, but in some way had established themselves or engaged in the other environment, or positively written themselves into the history of the other nation. They were often reflected and presented as a symbolic tie, connection or bridge between the Slovaks and Croats. Thus the propaganda of both states could appeal to the message of "our" great forerunners.

Miroslav Michela observes that the Slovak press emphasized "*especially persons closely connected with the national emancipation struggles, Ustaše and Hlinka Guard, or historic personalities such as Ľudvík Gaj, Ban Jelačić or Ante Starčević, with especially Ján Kollár, Štefan Moyses and Andrej Hlinka on the other side*".¹⁰⁷ but he does not specify or analyse this use of symbols more closely.

The list of historical personalities may suggest that there was continuity of symbols of Slovak – Croatian relations from the inter-war period, in which ideology, propaganda and the associated popular historical writing did not work primarily with confessionally, but with the ideologically motivated and structured phenomenon of Slavism. This is also

105 CLEMENTIS (ed.), ref. 89, p. 92. The little book has the subtitle *Sbierka z veršov odbojného Slovenska, sv. II. (Collection of verses from defiant Slovakia, vol. II.)*. A collection of poems including texts by various Slovak poets under the title *Pred ohnivým drakom (In front of the fiery dragon)* from 1941 is presented as the first volume in the series. The titles of both collections, including *Hnev svätý* are taken from the poems of Karol Kuzmány, and among other things they illustrate how the resistance structures used a Slovak literary classic to discredit the Ľudák regime. This was clearly one of the sources of cultural resistance.

106 This is illustrated in an article by a Croatian author ŽIC, Nikola. Primjeri slovačko-hrvatskoga bratstva. (Examples of Slovak – Croatian brotherhood.). In *Tatré i Velebit*, 1943, year 2, no. 1-2, p. 20-22.

107 MICHELA, ref. 58, p. 113.

shown by the presence of Ján Kollár in the list. In reality, however, Kollár as an Evangelical and strong exponent of the Slavonic idea, was an inconsistent element disturbing the “de-Slavized” conception and idea of the cooperation and brotherhood of two Catholic nations: the Slovaks and Croats. Kollár was thematized mainly on the pages of the *Národné noviny* (*National News*), which maintained a relatively independent position in the Slovak state, even to some degree oriented towards the opposition.¹⁰⁸

The new constitutional situation, as well as the new political-ideological atmosphere brought with it a change in the content of the shared Slovak – Croatian symbolic pantheon, although it partly continued the symbolism of the preceding regimes. The change process occurred in at least two ways:

1) As acceptance of older symbols, which were re-interpreted in the sense of a shift from Slavism to Catholicism. For example, this involves the Catholic ecclesiastical dignitaries Juraj Haulik,¹⁰⁹ Alexander Alagovič and Štefan Moyes.

2) As the isolation and avoidance of the original symbols, which could not be re-interpreted in the spirit of Catholic confessionalism, for example Ján Kollár, Pavel Jozef Šafárik, Bohuslav Šulek, but also Milan Rastislav Štefánik.¹¹⁰

Vladimír Clementis exiled in London shed light on this politically and ideologically motivated selection with his critical pen: “[...] *names like Kollár and Šafárik are hardly ever mentioned in Slovakia today. And the names of these great men were banned, as they were not excluded from the nation in times when they were pursued, often violently, forgotten sons of a scattered nation. However, this tactic could not succeed. The historicizing tendency, originally so supported by the regime, turned [...] against it. The whole Slovak past and especially its richest part, is so closely inter-connected with the*

108 Kollár's name appears sporadically and marginally in these contexts also on the pages of the *Ľudák* press, as can be seen in an article by a Slovak historian BOKES, František. Z minulosti chorvátsko-slovenských stykov. (From the past of Croatian – Slovak relations.). In *Slovák*, 10 April 1942, year 24, no. 81, p. 6. The author emphasized that “*the Illyrian idea, which [...] [was] promoted during the Napoleonic Wars and later by the Pan-Slavist J. Kollár, also has a parallel in Slovakia*”. Similarly, he also mentioned the Croatian bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer, who supported the Slovaks in the Imperial Council in Vienna at the beginning of the 1860s. According to Bokes' interpretation, he was a “*South Slav patriot*”. (According to the official inter-war understanding, he was a pioneer of Yugoslav integration. On one side, we see that Bokes – in harmony with historical reality – did not ignore the phenomenon of Slavism, but on the other hand, he rigidly avoided the fact that this thematization of Slavism was connected with the inter-war practice of official instrumentalization and manipulation, or that it could be contextualized with the preceding state formations, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia (see his distinction between the terms *juhoslovanský* referring to the state and *južnoslovanský* referring to southern Slavs in general, but also his concealment or failure to state his own view on what was the parallel to Illyrianism in the Slovak context.) He deliberately avoided any evaluation of Czecho-Slovak community or Czechoslovakism.

109 PÖSTÉNYI, Ján. Na zajedničkoj šahovnici. In *Tatré i Velebit*, 1942, year 1, no. 2-4, p. 81-82; Proslava godišnjice Nezavisne Države Hrvatske u Slovačkoj. In *Tatré i Velebit*, 1942, year 1, no. 2-4, p. 164-165.

110 It is a paradox that even in 1938 the opposite tendency of appropriating shared (Czechoslovak) personalities prevailed in the *Ľudák* press. See the article Ján Kollár je náš! (Ján Kollár is ours!). In *Slovák*, 15 May 1938, year 20, no. 112, p. 9. “Reclaiming” Kollár, but also Šafárik for the Slovaks and for Slovak nationalism in this text bears the marks of definition against the Czechs. The author does not mention more broadly conceived Slavism in connection with these two historic figures.

Czechoslovak and Slavonic worlds, that it had to lead to the revival of Czechoslovak and Slavonic consciousness, especially among the young [...]".¹¹¹

Again I stress that in the inter-war period the Catholic and Croatian personalities, including Slovaks working in Croatia were included in the Yugoslav national story and the story of the common struggle of Czechoslovaks and Yugoslavs on the basis of their engagement in the Illyrian national movement, which was seen as a step on the way to achieving Yugoslav state and national unity.¹¹² The Slovak Bohuslav/Bogoslav Šulek (*"scientist and politician, first secretary of the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences, a great thinker and fighter for Yugoslavism"*)¹¹³ was also added to the group of important Slovaks, who worked in the Croatian environment and engaged in the Illyrian movement in the 19th century, as a symbol embodying the Czechoslovak – Yugoslav alliance. In spite of the fact that Šulek's contribution to Croatian national – political and cultural life in the 19th century was really great, his name gradually retreated from the updated common symbolic pantheon, intended to give historical and ideological backing to the official relations between Bratislava and Zagreb. The avoidance and marginalization of this historical figure is made more paradoxical by the fact that he was the brother of Štefánik's grandmother. The name of Bohuslav Šulek often appeared in biographies of the Slovak national hero and formed part of the argumentation emphasizing the patriotic and pro-Slavonic or Pan-Slavist milieu of Štefánik's extended family. The factor that weighed against B. Šulek was probably precisely the Slavonic dimension of his activities.¹¹⁴

It was similar in Štefánik's case. Although we cannot unambiguously state that during his life Štefánik was exclusively Serbophil and therefore anti-Croat oriented, during the First World War he fought on the Serbian front and to some degree engaged in the formation of the modern Yugoslav state, which embodied foreign domination in the eyes of Croatian nationalists and Ustaše. Moreover, after his death he functioned as part of the range of symbols, used to strengthen the alliance between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia on the basis of declared Slavonic brotherhood. Since the official Ustaše ideology placed great emphasis on rejection of everything Serbian, Yugoslav and Slavonic, and presented struggle against the Serbs as the basic reason for the existence of the Croatian

111 CLEMENTIS, Vladimír. *Nové slovanské uvedomenie*. (The new Slavonic consciousness.). In CLEMENTIS, Vladimír. *Slovanstvo kedysi a teraz*. Praha : Orbis, 1946, p. 53.

112 The term Illyrianism was originally connected with the conception or rather vision of the national unity of the South Slavs, which had resonance especially in the Croatian environment. In Croatian inter-war historiography, Illyrianism was seen as a *"movement that mainly aimed at raising the cultural level of the South Slavs, but at the same time had the character of Pan-Slavonic community"*. There were views that interpreted Illyrianism and Yugoslavism as different but parallel components. In the period of existence of Yugoslavia, Illyrianism was regarded as an integrating force directed towards the creation of a Yugoslav state. BEDNÁROVÁ, Marcela. *Symboly a mýty chorvátskeho národného hnutia. Fenomén ilyriizmu*. (Symbols and myths of the Croatian national movement. The phenomenon of Illyrianism.). Bratislava : Veda, vydavateľstvo Slovenskej akadémie vied, 2012, p. 21, 24. ISBN 9788022412537.

113 KOVIJANIĆ, ref. 36, p. 12.

114 In 1887, Jozef Škultéty already stated: *"Šafárik and Kollár tied us more to the Czechs, Šulek to the Croats. It is enough for us Slovaks to at least pursue Pan-Slavism like this."* [ŠKULTÉTY, Jozef]. Dr. Bohuslav Šulek. In *Slovenské pohľady*, 1887, year 8, no. 12, p. 283.

state,¹¹⁵ it is clear that from the point of view of Zagreb, Štefánik was perceived as an unwanted, literally “enemy” symbol.

I conclude this article by stating that, in relation to the rejection or acceptance of various forms of ideologized Slavism, the literary contrasting of Slavko Kvaternik and Milan Rastislav Štefánik as *Austrian* versus *Pan-Slavist*, which we find in Janko Jesenský’s poem, and the strong emphasis on Štefánik’s *Slavonic feeling* by Jur Janoška junior, can also be understood as instruments for expressing disagreement with the regime, corresponding to the propaganda and symbolism of the opposition and resistance structures. Against the background of Slovak – Croatian or wider Czechoslovak – Yugoslav relations during the Second World War, such opposition contrasting was entirely logical. Its aim was not only to convict the Ľudák regime of betraying the patriotic ideals of the 19th century,¹¹⁶ but also to promote the idea of the revival of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. It was situated in the complex of identifications and loyalties, in the framework of which we can trace the deliberate packaging of other connotation layers, namely Slav versus German, West versus East, culture versus barbarism and so on.

Research into the processes of instrumentalization and manipulation of the historical memory of the Slovaks, in which the symbol of the national hero M.R. Štefánik and the idea of Slavonic community played important parts, is challenging and interesting work for the historian. It is a complex and many layered problem, which cannot be solved in the framework of one study, so this article is directed only to the context of the Czechoslovak – Yugoslav and Slovak – Croatian alliances, which were confronted with the traditional Slavophil orientation of the Slovak national elites from the 19th century. The powerful communist centre in Moscow also worked with the politically and ideologically motivated phenomenon of Slavism during the Second World War. However, I will mention that the Slovak communist structures preferred a different symbol to the members of the civil resistance, namely the outlaw Juraj Jánošík: His story and image corresponded much better with the social radicalism of this component of the Slovak resistance.

115 RYCHLÍK – PERENČEVIČ, ref. 25, p. 280.

116 President Jozef Tiso also reacted to the fact that anti-German feelings in the Slovak environment led to Slavonic illusions. In a speech to university students in 1942 he defended the policies of government by emphasizing that “*we have not betrayed either Christendom or Slavdom*”. ČIERNA-LANTAYOVÁ, ref. 63, p. 228.

„AUF DEN FLÜGELN DES SLAWISCHEN GEFÜHLS FLOG ER IM JAHRE 1915
NACH SERBIEN DEN SERBEN ZUR HILFE“
SYMBOLISCHE INSTRUMENTALISIERUNG VON M. R. ŠTEFÁNIK
UND DIE SLAWISCHE WECHSELSEITIGKEIT AUF DEM HINTERGRUND
DER ZEITGENÖSSISCHEN ZWISCHENSTAATLICHEN BEZIEHUNGEN

PETER MACHO

Das Persönlichkeitsprofil und die Identität von M. R. Štefánik wurden durch die nationalistische Atmosphäre des 19. Jahrhunderts mitgeprägt, als die Sympathien zu den Südslawen andauerten. Nach seinem Tod 1919 wurde dieser Held zum Symbol, das den nationalistischen und slawophilen Diskurs in der modifizierten Form zu halten verhalf: nach der Entstehung der Tschechoslowakischen Republik und des Königreichs der Serben, Kroaten und Slowenen wurde nämlich zum Bestandteil des symbolischen Instrumentarium, das die Vertiefung des zwischenstaatlichen tschechoslowakisch-jugoslawischen Bündnisses auf der Basis der slawischen Bruderschaft unterstützte. Es geschah in Übereinstimmung mit der offiziellen Ideologie (Tschechoslowakismus, bzw. integrales Jugoslawentum). Štefánik wurde nicht nur mit den großen Persönlichkeiten der gemeinsam reflektierten Geschichte kontextualisiert, sondern auch mit dem jugoslawischen König Alexander I. 1935 fand die Fahrt der tschechoslowakischen Delegation zum Grab von Alexander statt, die dort die Erde von drei symbolischen Orten: (dem tschechischen) Tabor, (dem mährischen) Welehrad und (dem slowakischen) Bradlo legte. 1938, Zur Zeit der Gefährdung der tschechoslowakischen Staatlichkeit, kam die Delegation vom jugoslawischen Sokol auf Bradlo, um sich dem Andenken an Štefánik zu verbeugen. Nach der Zerschlagung der Tschechoslowakei und Jugoslawien weigerten sich die neuen Staatsgebilden, selbstständige Slowakei und Kroatien, bzw. ihre politische Repräsentation, ihre Beziehungen auf der Basis der slawischen Wechselseitigkeit zu bauen; das Phänomen des Slawentums wurde als Zweckinstrument von Prag und Belgrad zur Beherrschung und Unterdrückung der Slowaken und Kroaten präsentiert. In Folge der ideologisch motivierten Selektion der gemeinsamen historischen Persönlichkeiten wurden katholische Persönlichkeiten bevorzugt; andererseits wurden die Persönlichkeiten protestantischer Herkunft, die dazu noch stark slawophil orientiert waren, gemieden (Ján Kollár, Pavel Jozef Šafárik, Bohuslav Šulek, aber auch M. R. Štefánik). Am deutlichsten machte sich die Ignorierung von Štefánik 1942 während des offiziellen Besuchs des Ministers der Kroatischen Heimwehr, des Marschalls und Doglawniks, Slavko Kvaternik bemerkbar. Aus der Perspektive Zagrebs und der Vertreter der Ustascha-Bewegung wurde Štefánik als ein nichterwünschtes (proserbisches / projugoslawisches) Symbol wahrgenommen. Im Gegenteil, in den oppositionell orientierten Kreisen in der Slowakei wurde eben das slawische (und serbephile) Element in der Štefániks Identität zum Mittel, um die Missbilligung des regierenden Ludakenregimes auszudrücken. Die slawische Wechselseitigkeit, kontextualisiert mit der Geschichte des Nationalhelden Štefánik korrespondierte mit dem propagandistischen und symbolischen Instrumentarium der Oppositions- und Widerstandsstrukturen.


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LUDOVÍT ŠTÚR

NA HRANICI DVOCH VEKOV

život • dielo • doba
verzus
historická pamäť



VYDAVATEĽSTVO SLOVENSKEJ AKADEMIE VIED

KOVÁČ, Dušan. How Europe Went to War in 1914. *Historický časopis*, 2016, 64, 5, pp. 845-871, Bratislava.

The study is devoted to the question of the outbreak of war in August 1914. The author analyses the imperial aims of the individual great powers and their war aims. He takes a critical view of the attempts of some authors to transfer the blame for the war to all the participants. According to the author, having imperial aims and starting a war are two different things. The Central Powers played the key role in starting the war in the summer of 1914. Germany used various channels to put pressure on its ally Austria-Hungary to start the war quickly.

Key words: First World War. Outbreak of war. War aims.

Problems of Interpretation

The centenary of the outbreak of World War I, has sparked discussions – and not just professional ones – concerning the causes of the war. Once again, people ask whether the War was necessary, whether it was impossible to avoid. Much has been written and said about the failure of diplomacy. When talking about the “failure of diplomacy”, a popular misconception, which should not be found in literature written by experts, often appears: it says, that the role of soldiers is to fight wars, whereas the role of diplomats is to avoid wars. Obviously, this has never been true, and still is not true. The discussion about who to blame for the War taking ten million lives and the health, possessions, etc. of an unprecedented number of people, had started as early as during the peace negotiations in the suburbs of Paris. Articles 227-230 dealt with the war crimes that Article 231 defined in a way to identify Germany as the only entity to be blamed for starting the War. Even during the peace negotiations the German delegation protested against the definition of the German guilt, saying this was irreconcilable with the honour of the German nation.¹ The peace conference did not take German objections into account. In post-war Germany, the articles of the Treaty of Versailles were perceived very sensitively, and became the subject of more debates than the tragic reparation measures. German society influenced by pre-war nationalistic propaganda obviously was not capable of much self-reflection. It is nearly incredible how German official propaganda, the Emperor and government were able to influence German society. Wilhelm II and the politicians around Bethmann Hollweg were and are partly to our days identified with the German nation and its honour. This situation changed partially only after World War

1 MICHAELIS, Herbert – SCHRAEPLER, Ernst – SCHEEL, Günter (eds.). *Ursachen und Folgen. Vom deutschen Zusammenbruch 1918 und 1945 bis zur staatlichen Neuordnung Deutschlands in der Gegenwart*, vol. III., Berlin 1958, pp. 373-384, 386-388.

II, when Karl Jaspers became, with his moral urgency, the first to publicly encourage German society to face the question of guilt² - this time guilt for Nazi crimes. However, for German society it was a challenge to reconsider the role of Germany in the history of the 20th century. It was a challenge to deal with their past and their nationalism. It was not easy. In the 1960s, the Hamburg historian, Fritz Fischer, stirred up German public opinion. Via his two publications, Fischer took a decisive step in German historiography to deal with the guilt for World War I.³ Fischer's books, based on thorough investigations of primarily German archives, their critical analysis and precise reasoning, were, however, accepted only by some experts. Fischer immediately faced harsh criticism. This gave rise to the lengthy controversy known as the "Fischer-Kontroverse". This controversy is not well-known nowadays, as it was overshadowed by the so-called Historikerstreit – a more recent controversy of the 1980s concerning the Holocaust. Nonetheless, the centenary of the outbreak of World War I revived German society's historical memory on the events of the summer of 1914.

Therefore, from the beginning, the question of guilt for unleashing World War I was targeted at Germany. To a lesser degree, and less dramatically, an analogous dispute took place within Austrian historiography. Such dispute has been absent in Hungarian historiography – with the reasoning that the Hungarian Prime Minister, István Tisza, had opposed the War at the beginning. Within the historiographies of the Entente countries, the question of the proportion of the Entente's guilt for the War was of minor importance. Soviet historiography was a peculiar exception, drawing from Lenin's evaluation of the War as a struggle for a new division of the world.

In 2012, a book by an Australian historian, Christopher Clark appeared – *Sleepwalkers*.⁴ As the centenary of the outbreak of World War I was getting closer, the book drew public attention, and soon it became almost a best-seller. Naturally, given the author's reasoning, the book was translated into German immediately, and Clark enjoyed an uncommonly large amount of attention in the German media. He became so popular because he had once again addressed German nationalism. So many years after the "Historikerstreit", German nationalism had died away, and it had been in decline in terms of historical topics. Although Clark does not entirely deny German responsibility for unleashing the War, in fact he distributes the responsibility by blaming all of the participating countries, including both the politicians and soldiers in these countries, for starting it. This conception is morally questionable, as it likens the aggressor and the victim. Thus, Serbia, having been attacked, and Austria-Hungary, having been an aggressor, are both characterized as "sleepwalkers". Similarly, France and Belgium, which were attacked, bear the same share of responsibility as their aggressor, Germany. From the point of view of morality, the title of the book is the most questionable, because sleepwalkers, as is generally known, are ill people not responsible for their deeds. Therefore, all in

2 JASPERS, Karl. *Die Schuldfrage*. München 1946.

3 FISCHER, Fritz. *Griff nach der Weltmacht. Die Kriegsziel Politik des Kaiserlichen Deutschlands*. Düsseldorf 1961; FISCHER, Fritz. *Krieg der Illusionen. Die deutsche Politik 1911 bis 1914*. Düsseldorf 1969.

4 CLARK, Christopher. *Sleepwalkers. How Europe Went to War in 1914*. London 2012. In 2014 this title was published in Czech (*Náměsíčníci. Jak Evropa v roce 1914 dospěla k válce*).

all, it is useless to discuss the issue of guilt. In Clark's reasoning, an exceptional term appears here: the events should be seen from a pan-European perspective, or, as he states precisely, the War was the fruit of a shared political culture⁵. Clark does not define what he means by this. In the historical context the term is not precise, it is almost incomprehensible, as if he was whispering to the reader in his/her ear: all of Europe has its share of guilt. Clark says that he does not focus on the question of guilt, but rather describes the development of the situation leading to the War.⁶ Thus, he avoids the question, as if it was not important at all.

Besides the moral point of view, which many might find prosecuting, which is no longer fashionable, there is one more problem. This problem concerns working with documents. Clark admirably gathered many documents in his research.⁷ However, the problem is, he makes almost no distinction between them. He freely includes both documents of primary importance together with those which were obviously a perfidious diplomatic game made for "deceiving the public". So it happens, when describing the events, that Clark often contradicts himself. In addition to the contradictions, he often avoids thinking about the meaning of some documents and statements thoroughly. Thus, various problematic issues may be found in the book. And in talking about the "sleepwalkers" themselves, Clark mentions them, but also denies them elsewhere: "Why did the men whose decisions took Europe to war behave and see things as they did?"⁸ So, the book is also about "conscious sleepwalkers". Naturally, one hundred years later, some tendencies of historians and even of the public to revise existing historiography have been occurring, trying to present new views and evaluations. Of course, this is a legitimate effort, but within professional historiography this must be based on solid reasoning, which makes it a bit more complicated. Striving for originality sometimes sounds strange. Although in his book, *July 1914*⁹, Sean McMeekin states that he just presents information and lets the reader find order in the historical information, which is a bit of an obsolete alibi, on the other hand he claims that the Germans started the War, knowing they were going to lose it. This thesis, however, is quite difficult to justify.

The most conceptual reaction to Clark's book has been a more extensive work by British historian, Margaret MacMillan, *The War That Ended Peace*.¹⁰ This book also provides a broad panorama of events, beginning in the early 20th century. The events form not a simple, but a very distinct context, whereas the most important events are highlighted and used to build a framework. MacMillan was inspired by efforts to ascertain how the War started and how wars have started throughout history – not just to get to know the

5 Ibid, p. 560.

6 Ibid, p. 558.

7 However, it is difficult to understand why he did not explore the most relevant archive with many significant documents – the Deutsches Bundesarchiv, Reichskanzlei.

8 CLARK, ref. 4, p. 28.

9 McMEEKING, Sean. *July 1914. Countdown to War*. New York : Basic Books, 2013. ISBN 9780465031450.

10 MACMILLAN, Margaret. *The War that Ended Peace. The Road to 1914*. London : Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2013, paperback edition 2014. ISBN 9780812980660

historical context in detail, but also with the aim of preventing war.¹¹ The forthcoming centenary of the outbreak of the War inspired many historians; thus, it is difficult to cover all of the resulting published works. A number of historians focused on so-called new topics: the influence of the War on life in the hinterland, everyday life at the front and in hinterland, issues relating to prisoners of war, the question of the position of women and children during the War. If we focus on the causes of the War and its outbreak, of the many recent publications, Austrian historian, Manfred Rauchensteiner's *Der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Habsburgermonarchie 1914–1918*¹² deserves mention. Rauchensteiner's is a revised and significantly extended book which was originally published in 1993 as *Das Tod des Doppeladlers. Österreich-Ungarn und das Erste Weltkrieg*. The book is written predominantly from the point of view of Austria-Hungary, and it gives detailed insight into the process of decision making, refuting all doubts that a local war could be considered in the territory of Vienna. It was clear from the beginning that if a war started, it would be a "great war"; "Gott sei Dank, das ist der große Krieg!" (Thank God, it is a great war!) – this is how Rauchensteiner titles chapter five in his book.¹³

The Imperial Aims of Great Powers

No doubt, all of the states which participated in the War had unique imperial aims before the War broke out. At that time, the world's biggest imperial power dominating the world's seas – Great Britain – was, paradoxically, "the humblest" in this respect. However, this is just an apparent paradox, as London was satisfied with its great empire, not pursuing any further territorial gains. At the beginning of the century the British had subdued the rebellious Boers in South Africa in the cruel Boer War, and British foreign policy was primarily focused on conserving the imperial status of Britain. At the same time, the military and diplomatic defeat of France after the battle near Sudanese Fachoda in the late 19th century contributed to satisfying British ambitions, since a realistic political line eventually won in France, bringing France and Great Britain closer and leading to the Entente Cordiale agreements. This inspired Britain to feel secure even against the danger that was resulting from the traditional Anglo-French rivalry. However, British politicians were worried about Germany gaining power on the European continent, in particular German naval armaments threatening British imperial and colonial positions. London apprehensively watched the systematically organized building of the German navy by Alfred von Tirpitz. Yet, in the summer of 1914, British politics still did not consider this danger dramatic enough to organize a preventive war against Germany. Rather, the strategy of befriending Germany to eliminate their potential threat rather prevailed here.¹⁴

11 "We need to think carefully about how wars can happen and about how we can maintain the peace." MACMILLAN, ref. 10, p. XXII. What is interesting about her book is that it is not based on any original archive research at all.

12 RAUCHENSTEINER, Manfred. *Der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Habsburger monarchie 1914–1918*. Wien; Köln; Weimar : Böhlau Verlag, 2013. ISBN 9783205782834.

13 Ibid, pp. 163–202.

14 See MAC MILLAN, ref. 10; FRENCH, David. *British Strategy and War Aims 1914–1918*. London : Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1986. ISBN 0049421972; ROTHWELL, Victor H. *British War Aims and Peace*

Generations of French had held on to the memories of the humiliating defeat in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 and the coronation of the German Emperor in the Hall of Mirrors of the Palace of Versailles orchestrated by Otto von Bismarck. Revenge for the humiliation and a pursuit of the restoration of French Alsace-Lorraine, which had been seized by Germany in the war, were undoubtedly still a living part of the plans of French society even after the passing of a generation. However, France feared another war with Germany, being aware of the military and economic power of the Germans. Naturally, this was a good reason to befriend Tsarist Russia in 1894, and to eventually conclude an Agreement with Great Britain. France was readying itself for a war with Germany and therefore kept seeking strong allies. French President, Raymond Poincaré, a native-born Lorrainian who had experienced the German occupation of Lorraine, was known for his resentment towards Germany. By visiting Russia shortly before the War broke out he demonstrated the French-Russian alliance, proving a determination to not allow any further German conquests in Europe. However, neither France nor Russia were ready to enter a new military conflict with Germany at that time.¹⁵

Of all of the Entente countries, Russia might have had the greatest imperial ambitions. These concerned Central Europe, where Russia wanted to gain more territory at the expense of Germany and Austria-Hungary. In the Balkans, Russia engaged in supporting the uprisings and national liberation wars of the Balkan nations against Turkey. The aims of this were twofold: strengthening the Russian position in the Balkans, but mainly weakening Turkey and achieving an ancient Russian goal: to dominate the Black Sea straits and gain free access to the Mediterranean. Russian policy had been pursuing this aim since the Crimean War of 1853–1856. However, Russia was isolated in trying to achieve its ambitions, and it did not implement them in either the Crimean War or in the later war against Turkey in the Balkans. Russian policy became dominated by the belief that these objectives could be achieved only via agreement with other European powers. As Russian interests in the Balkans were colliding with the plans of Austria-Hungary, as well as Germany, Russia gradually started to befriend France and Great Britain. Eventually, also resulting from its defeat in the war with Japan, Russia joined the Entente in 1907. For the sake of imperial aims, even an aversion to republican France had to be overcome in the Russian tsar's court, and old "grievances", which the Russians had been forced to put up with during the Crimean War and the Berlin Congress of 1878, which deprived them of a military victory in the Balkans, had to be forgotten. The Russian policy of alliance was based on a lesson learnt from the cooperative attitudes of the Great European powers. Whereas in the Congress of Vienna it seemed that Russian policy was pursued in Europe, the following years were full of diplomatic defeats for Russia. During the Crimean War, both Great Britain and France opposed Russian power ambitions, later followed by Austria and Prussia. During the Congress of Berlin in 1878, Russia once again found itself in isolation. This motivated Russia to not rely solely on its military force, but also to seek allies in Europe. Their diplomatic defeat at the Congress of Berlin

Diplomacy 1914–1918. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1971. ISBN 9780198223498.

15 See STEVENSON, David. *French War Aims against Germany 1914–1919*. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1982. ISBN 9780198225744; RENOUVIN, Pierre. Die Kriegsziele der französischen Regierung 1914 – 1918. In *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht*, 1966, Vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 129–168.

caused a feeling of injustice to prevail in St. Petersburg, which was unsatisfied with the way the former allies of the Holy Alliance stood against Russia. The diplomats of that time still remembered the odd procedure whereby Russia was deceived by Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Lexa von Aehrenthal in the case of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908. As Germany supported its ally in the annexation, and France and Great Britain limited their actions to formal protests, Russian diplomacy again remained isolated and St. Petersburg really believed that Russia could not afford another diplomatic fiasco.¹⁶

Italy, having been a formal member of the Triple Alliance, had, paradoxically, the most severe territorial disputes with another member of the Alliance – Austria-Hungary. As a new state having been formed in the continent of Europe on the basis of the idea of the “nation state”, Italy was claiming large territories, primarily in areas where ethnic Italians were living – the area of the North Adriatic with Trieste, Trentino, and South Tyrol. This “hunger for new territories”, typical of the newly formed states of the 19th century, could be satisfied chiefly at the expense of Austria. So when the War broke out, Italy, on the pretext of the fact that Germany and Austria-Hungary had not been attacked, declared neutrality, and then, under the Treaty of London of April 1915 which promised Italy desired territory at the expense of Austria-Hungary, Italy entered the War on the side of the Entente.

Some books, including that by Christopher Clark, as well as some popular writings, have recently claimed that Serbia was guilty for starting World War I. Of course, Serbia being a new Balkan state had far-reaching plans. After the assassination of Alexander Obrenović and his wife Draga in June 1903, the House of Karađorđević came to power and King Petar I introduced an anti-Austrian policy based on supporting Russia. Although Serbia was a small state and could not afford great power ambitions, the establishment of state autonomy in 1878 had inspired imperial plans. The new state did not want to be a small state and tried to expand its territory. The unification of all southern Balkan Slavs under Serbian leadership could be the ultimate goal. Yugoslavia was, in fact, just another name for Greater Serbia. Greater Serbia should become a dominant power in the Balkans. The Balkan wars brought this plan nearly to fruition, but some regions still remained autonomous or were dominated by the Habsburgs. However, Serbia realized, it was not and could not be a world power, and that it could not wage war against Austria-Hungary and its ally – Germany. Russia promised comprehensive support, but in the summer of 1914 it encouraged its Balkan protégé to be as open towards Austro-Hungarian requests as possible. In addition, although Serbian nationalism in the Balkans was strong and organized, Austrian authorities, in spite of their best efforts, did not manage to prove that the Serbian government had had its share in the Sarajevo assassination committed by Austro-Hungarian nationals. In this situation, Serbia was undoubtedly a victim of aggression, and it is thus absurd to blame the country for starting the War.

Austria-Hungary did not have any specific territorial requirements until the war broke out. Therefore, it seems illogical that it was Franz Joseph I who triggered the first

16 See LINKE, Horst-Günther. *Das zaristische Rußland und der Erste Weltkrieg. Diplomatie und Kriegsziele 1914 – 1917*. München : Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1982.

shot and thus unleashed the War. However, we must understand that Austria-Hungary was facing serious domestic issues, as it was not able to solve the problem of modern political nationalism disintegrating the monarchy. In fact, the federation plan of Franz Ferdinand was also not a solution, as it was not supported by the most powerful nationalistic groups – not the Austrian Germans, Hungarians, or Czechs. Even the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was a “poisoned gift”, which the monarchy did not handle very well, and it also failed to solve the monarchy’s position within the dualist system. However, Austria-Hungary did have an ambition to become a dominant power in the Balkans, where it would have a decisive influence and force Russia out. Therefore, Serbia’s Karađorđević-led policy was a red flag for Vienna as well as Budapest. The Serbian policy started to influence Austro-Hungarian Slavs as well, and this became another reason for Austria-Hungary to try to defeat the Serbian policy and deprive it of its influence in the Balkans as well as in the monarchy itself. When the war broke out, a further goal was established – that of conquering Poland. The so-called Austro-Polish solution assumed the restoration of a Polish statehood, but under Habsburg “protection”. Interestingly, Austro-Hungarian aims in the Balkans and Poland collided with Germany’s interests, creating tensions between Germany and Austria-Hungary during the war.¹⁷ One more problem concerning the military aims of Austria-Hungary was the fact that there was no unified opinion on what territorial gains should follow. In particular, István Tisza from the Hungarian side supported neither further annexations nor a so-called Austro-Polish solution, as both would have weakened the Hungarian position in the monarchy. Therefore, the Habsburg Monarchy was not able to make its military aims public.¹⁸

Germany undoubtedly had the greatest imperial goals. On one hand, Germany was a strong European power with an immense economic and military potential; on the other hand, it was a “new state” with extra territorial requirements. Firstly, a large part of the German public was not satisfied with the so-called Lesser German solution; large territories with German-speaking people were left outside of the unified empire, in particular in the Habsburg Monarchy. Their annexation was proclaimed by both the extremely nationalistically oriented Pan-German League (*Alldeutscher Verband*),¹⁹ as well as by liberally oriented politicians and media. The German aim was to factually, if not constitutionally, conquer the entirety of Central Europe or bring it under German influence. Therefore, Bismarck’s prognosis, claiming that there are no treaties between equal sides or equally strong partners because sooner or later one side becomes the horse and the other the rider, was to be fulfilled. Germany’s primary goal was, therefore, aimed against its own ally, with some of the German unofficial press failing to even hide it. Upon gaining control over Central Europe, including Poland and the Balkans, Germany would have become a dominant continental power, controlling even the Benelux coun-

17 See KOVÁČ, Dušan. *Od Dvojšpolku k politike anšlusu. Nemecký imperializmus a Rakúsko do r. 1922* (*From Dual Alliance to the Anschluss Policy. German Imperialism and Austria until 1922*). Bratislava : Veda, 1979, pp.75-142.

18 See also GALÁNTAI, József. *Hungary in World War I*. Budapest : Akadémiai Kiadó, 1989. ISBN 963054878X; BRIDGE, Francis Roy. *The Habsburg Monarchy among the Great Powers 1815–1918*. New York; Oxford; Munich : Bloomsbury Academic, 1990. ISBN 9780854963072.

19 KRUCK, Alfred. *Geschichte des Alldeutschen Verbandes 1890 – 1939*. Wiesbaden : Steiner, 1954.

tries. A militarily defeated France would thereafter only play a minor role on the continent. Subsequently, Germany would also take control over the French colonies, at the same time expanding its influence in the colonies controlled by Great Britain. This was conditioned by building a strong military fleet able to defeat and eliminate the British naval forces. Thus, Germany would become a world power.²⁰ Germany was also preparing for war against Russia, which would remove it from European politics, as well as gaining control over the entire area of east Europe with its rich raw material base. These were not just the plans of German Emperor Wilhelm II and politicians; the German press wrote about such goals openly. It was written that Germany needed “a place in the sun” (Platz an der Sonne), and that other territories could stand to unburden their “overpopulated territory”. The German press openly wrote that a war between the Germans and the Slavs, finally resulting in German supremacy on the European continent, was inevitable.

Naturally, all of the imperial aims of the great powers had the potential to unleash a war. However, for a war to actually break out, mere aims and potentiality are insufficient. Unleashing a war is a specific act in a specific period and a specific situation. Therefore, an analysis limited to imperial aims cannot answer the question of why World War I started and why it broke out in the summer of 1914. To answer this question, a thorough critical analysis of the generally known documents, which have not always been subjected to critical analysis, is necessary.

Discussing the War's Aims

The imperial aims of great powers are typically involved in long-term programs, which may, depending on specific situations, differ from the aims defined by the fighting parties after war has actually broken out. When World War I started, individual countries were expected to publish their military aims. Regarding the political strategy in the initial stages of the War, the published and discussed military aims were, naturally, not entirely consistent with what the great powers had been pursuing before the outbreak of war. For comparison's sake, it is interesting to note how the great powers' war aims were formed and discussed in the first months of the War, and in what way they were identical with and different from their pre-war aims.

Interestingly, in the first stage, there was a strict ban on any public debate regarding German war aims within Germany. However, the Pan-German League refused to respect this ban and started to hold discussions related to Germany's military goals. German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg harshly criticized Heinrich Class, chairman of the Pan-German League, stating that his propaganda was not only hindering the German government and its policy, but also directly harming German war aims.²¹ Eventually, however, Bethmann Hollweg had to, under public pressure, privately prepare a “pro domo” program of war aims. The so-called *Septemberprogramm* of 1914, sent to German Headquarters, included all German imperial requirements, except those directly

20 FISCHER, *Griff*, ref. 3, pp. 46-86. See also FISCHER, Fritz. *Der Erste Weltkrieg und das deutsche Geschichtsbild: Beiträge zur Bewältigung eines historischen Tabus*. Düsseldorf : Verlag Droste, 1977, especially the chapter *Deutsche Kriegsziele*. ISBN 9783770004782.

21 Deutsches Bundesarchiv, Berlin, R 43 – Reichskanzlei, 2.II. Kriegsakten 1914 – 1918, Verschiedenes, 2402, Bd.6.

concerning its ally - Austria-Hungary. According to Bethmann Hollweg, the aim of the War was “*security for the German Empire for the conceivable future*”.²² Above all, this meant the defeat of France, the annexation of the French eastern areas, the elimination of Belgium and the annexation of parts of its territory, annexing Luxembourg to the German Reich, subordinating the Netherlands, and forming a large colonial empire called German Mittelafrica. However, all of these aims were based on the creation of a German Mitteleuropa controlled by Germany.²³ Over time, the *Septemberprogramm* had details of its contents changed, although the changes were never substantial.

In Austria-Hungary, a lively debate about war aims was launched at the beginning of the War, even though the emperor as well as the government officially continued to emphasize that Austria-Hungary was leading a defensive war against Serbian and Russian claims directed against the monarchy, and that the monarchy was not pursuing any territorial annexations. When discussing Austro-Hungarian war aims, the public was mostly interested in the question of Poland or the formation of a Polish state controlled by Austria.²⁴

Russia was the only country which had made its War aims public from the beginning. Foreign Minister Sergei Dmitrievich Sazonov declared the Russian program, consisting of 13 points, on September 14, 1914. The program was made public shortly afterwards, however point 13, concerning war reparations, was omitted from the published document. The Russian program focused on the withdrawal of Germany from large territories, referring to the nationality principle. According to Russia's aims, Germany should withdraw from Niemen (Memelland) province for the sake of a newly formed Polish kingdom. In Russia's view, Niemen should be created under Russian control, based on the Russian occupation of Poland. Poznań and Upper Silesia, as well as Western Galicia, which should be separated from Austria, also should be added to the kingdom; Eastern Galicia should be annexed to the Russian Empire directly. Other withdrawals of the Germans should take place in favour of the allies: Alsace-Lorraine was to be returned to France, Belgium was to have the city of Aachen with its hinterland, Schleswig-Holstein was to be returned to Denmark, and the Kingdom of Hanover would be restored. Austria-Hungary was perceived as transitioning into a triple-state; a Czech kingdom including Moravia and Slovakia would have been formed, whereas Hungary would have to come to an agreement with Romania regarding Transylvania. Serbia should have Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dalmatia, and northern Albania; the German colonies would have been divided. As Turkey was not yet at war with the Entente at that time, the Russian program excluded the occupation of the Black Sea straits. Immediately after Turkey entered the war, this requirement was reflected in the Russian war aims.²⁵

22 Ibid. R 43 – Reichskanzlei, 3 III, Großes Hauptquartier 1914 – 1918, 2477, Grundlegende Besprechungen über Kriegsziele usw. (Handakten).

23 Ibid.

24 For more information about the Austria-Hungary's war aims, see RAUCHENSTEINER, ref. 12, pp. 294-306.

25 LINKE, ref. 16, pp. 38-42; ABRASH, Meritt – DALLIN, Alexander. *Russian Diplomacy and Eastern Europe 1914-1917*. New York 1963, pp. 124-14.

In France, the return of Alsace and Lorraine, as well as a weakening of Prussian militarism in general, was considered the primary aim of the war. Requirements for advancing the border to the Rhine and the restoration of the Kingdom of Hanover also appeared throughout the war.²⁶

Great Britain did not submit any territorial demands during the war. The restoration of Belgium and establishing a European balance following the defeat of Prussian militarism remained the main requirements expressed by Britain.²⁷

Of course, the various war aims changed throughout the War – depending on the development of events. The means by which militaristic plans were formulated in peacetime was different as well. This is demonstrated by archived documents and in the press where a public discourse took place and public opinion could be observed, even though it was naturally diversified and in line with the nature of the particular press and war aims that started to be formulated after the War began. To understand the causes of the War breaking out, and to evaluate the procedures of individual politicians and governments of the countries involved, it is necessary to know the imperial aims of the various powers as well as their historical and often even psychological backgrounds.

Nationalism and War Plans

Aggressive plans, wars, seizures of foreign territories, depredatory expeditions – these are the phenomena that have accompanied human history from the very beginning. These phenomena are present in the history of World War I, too. But this war and its nature, as well as the accompanying events, could not be entirely comprehensible and explainable if we do not consider the fact that the new ideology of nationalism pervaded this war. In the past, ideology always accompanied religious wars – and these were extremely cruel wars. Nationalism, however, became the new mass religion of the 19th century, significantly influencing the course of World War I and the peace conference following the conclusion of the war as well.

During the 19th century, European nationalism reached a political stage, when the elites of individual nations developed political programs. The idea of the “nation state” was the climax stage of these political programs, literally dominating European political thinking. The nation state, in its simplified form, meant that each nation was entitled to form a “nation state”. In line with the doctrine of the “nation state”, a nation should become a sovereign of such a state. Until this point in history, a ruler or dynasty had been the sovereign of a state. During the French Revolution, citizens became the sovereigns of the state for a short period of time. However, the citizen’s state quickly retreated and was replaced by the nation state. Yet, such a state had to be formed and established. On this basis, political national movements started to create modern “nation states”. In this way, new states were established in Europe – Germany, Italy, as well as new states in the Balkans. The new state sovereign was, to a certain extent, virtual, since a nation is a set of people that cannot meet in one place and cannot make decisions in the same way as emperors could before. The doctrine of the nation state included the formation of

26 See RENOUVIN, Pierre. *La Première Guerre mondiale*. Paris, réed. 1998.

27 See FRENCH, ref. 14.

the idea that a nation, which means a set of people who identify with each other solely through symbols – national colours, anthems, etc. – is entitled to a concrete territory. This territory – “our” territory – must be protected against the claims of other nations, or “the other”. However, any territories not yet “ours” could be won in battle. The problem with the development of Europe at this stage was that one territory was often claimed by two or more nations. In this way, modern nationalist conflicts began to arise.²⁸ A good example of this was the dispute between Germany and France over Alsace-Lorraine, as well as the conflicts leading to the Balkan wars. Russian imperial plans of the 19th century were, moreover, based on religious grounds. Russia proclaimed itself to be the protector of Christianity (the Orthodox religion in this case) against Turkish, “pagan” oppression. However, this religious context started to combine with nationalist ideology, as the Orthodox religion had become one of the elements participating in the formation of the Balkan nations. This was particularly the case in Serbia, the most important protégé of Russia.

If a monarch was a state sovereign, then, according to the well-known statement of the French King Louis XIV, wars over additional territories were the matter of the monarch, his/her retinue and his/her mercenaries. Other members of the state were concerned with such matters only if their towns and municipalities became the focus of war or if either the monarch or enemy troops required their property as spoils of war or as material needed to wage war. Modern nationalist wars, such as World War I, became the matter of all state members, as it was “their nation state”. For this reason, problems during World War I in Austria-Hungary, which lacked a dominant nation, occurred in a much more obvious way than in other states at war.

Monarchs ruling “by the will of God” and politicians could end a war and start peace negotiations at any point they considered necessary. Similarly, regarding the great fighting powers in World War I, royal courts and politicians imagined that they would be able to end the war at a certain point and start peace negotiations. However, when the nations started to move, it was not easy to give “national territory” to a rival. Already at that time, in a number of countries, including monarchies such as Germany, there was the pressure of public opinion restricting and limiting both governmental actions and emperors themselves. Therefore, all of the many attempts at peace attempts during World War I failed, and the war was fought until a final victory, or final defeat, was achieved.

Thus, World War I was not a war of emperors, politicians and dukes, but a war of nations. It was the first war of this kind; therefore, it differed from previous wars fundamentally. Naturally, certain elements of a national war were also manifested during the formation of nation states in Europe. However, those were short wars, since one of the fighting parties always prevailed remarkably – as in the Franco-Prussian war. No doubt, the initiators of the war that started in the summer of 1914 imagined a similar course of events. However, this time the opposing forces had long been equivalent.

28 For more details see KOVÁČ, Dušan. Nationalism, the Idea of the Nation-state and the Habsburg Monarchy. In *Formation et décomposition des États en Europe au 20^e siècle. 10. L'Europe et les Europes 19 et 20 siècles*. Eds. Antoine Fleury, Franz Knipping, Dušan Kováč, Tomasz Schramm. Bruxelles/Brussels : P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2012, pp. 109-122.

A national war meant that soldiers were not fighting for their emperor, who in wars past would have paid them a wage for it, but they were fighting for themselves – for the nation they were a part of. Even in this respect, Austria-Hungary was a kind of anachronism in this war. Austrian-Hungarian soldiers were expected to fight for their ruler, the emperor and king, but he did not pay them; he required sacrifices of them – including the ultimate one – only by virtue of his apostolic majesty. This could only work in a short war; such sacrifice began to lose sense in a long and cruel war. In cases where the “national idea” was in action, soldiers influenced by national agitation were able to withstand combat deployment much longer. This characteristic feature of World War I has been largely disregarded by historians thus far. Yet, when the war started, this characteristic was decisive, as already at that time the rulers and their politicians had in many cases not been making decisions only for themselves; national honour and the very existence and future of the “nation state” were all at stake as well.

Nationalism at the turn of the 20th century was supported by widespread social Darwinism. Darwin’s book of 1859 on the origin of species gradually became globally well-known, significantly influencing human thinking. A number of scientists, and most of the print media, were applying natural selection principles originally described with regard to the animal kingdom, to the social sphere. According to these opinions, a struggle for survival was taking place even amongst people and the “human species”. In line with the natural selection principle, only the fittest would survive, while the weaker were doomed to extinction. German theories of “a place in the sun”, and the territories to where Germany needed to “export” their surplus population, were topics often debated in the press – and not only in Germany. The anticipated war between the “Germans” and the “Slavs” was also to determine who would continue making decisions on the fate of Europe and the world. Thus, the nationalism of the great nations, typical of nationalism’s aggressive nature, found social Darwinism to be an important ally.

Fin de Siècle – the Golden Age of Peace and Security?

Some of the literature concerning the outbreak of World War I claims that the war broke out suddenly, unexpectedly – out of the blue – with no one in Europe expecting it. There are a number of works presenting such a viewpoint; they include Stefan Zweig²⁹, first of all, and continue with a romantic praising of the so-called fin de siècle up to the present. The cultural atmosphere of the turn of the century was truly exceptional; politics, however, was much more prosaic. Statements about the surprising nature of the outbreak of the war are based on the fact that there was peace in Europe and all the emperors and politicians were seemingly looking forward to summer fun. It is true that during the July crisis Francis Joseph was at his summer resort in Bad Ischl. From here he travelled to Vienna for a while, and then returned to his summer resort; during the Sarajevo assassination, German Emperor Wilhelm II was at the Kiel regatta. He returned to Berlin and Potsdam, but then left again for a summer tour through the Nordic countries. His foreign minister, Gottlieb von Jagow, was on his honeymoon, which he did not interrupt, even after the assassination; British foreign secretary Edward Grey, an amateur ornithologist,

29 ZWEIG, Stephan. *Die Welt von Gestern*. Stockholm : Erstdruck, 1942.

was observing birds. Indeed, the assassination happened when summer was beginning and both the emperors and politicians were getting ready for their summer holidays. Nevertheless, they were not too surprised by the assassination. However, a serious political crisis emerged – and this was another story altogether.

Nonetheless, the surprising nature of the moment did not mean that the world had no clue regarding the threat of war. It could be said that Europe had not known war in the decades preceding World War I – if we perceived the war only from the viewpoint of Paris, Berlin or Vienna – and did not consider the Balkans as part of Europe. It is true that between the Congress of Berlin in 1878 and the first Balkan War, there was no war on the European continent alone, even though European super powers were waging wars elsewhere: the British in South Africa, and the Russians were tremendously defeated by the Japanese in 1904. However, the most important fact in this regard is that from the turn of the century, Europe had been on the brink of an armed conflict several times.

If we analyse only the international relations of the early 20th century, we will find several serious crises. The international situation was very complicated and the division into two hostile military-political groups – the Entente and the Triple Alliance – was in no way steady and unchangeable. Finally, when war broke out, only Italy left the Triple Alliance and Romania, though it had allied contracts with Germany and Austria-Hungary, did not enter the war on the side of the Triple Alliance. However, this did not mean that other variants and potentially allied groupings did not occur. The Dual Alliance of Germany and Austria-Hungary appeared to be the most stable.

The Moroccan crisis of 1905 was the first serious political crisis of the 20th century which threatened a war. At that time, mainly the Spanish and the French were seeking to dominate and influence Morocco. In the early 20th century the French, having won influence over the Sultan Abdülaziz, started to strengthen their influence in Morocco; the Spanish did not oppose the French strongly, thus Morocco gained the status of a French protectorate. Both Germany and Wilhelm II himself reacted strongly, as Germany was interested in Northern Africa too, attempting to expand its colonial dominion in line with the doctrine of the “place in the sun”. On March 31, Wilhelm II came to Tangier on his yacht. There he delivered a fiery and combative speech, demanding the preservation of Morocco’s independence and promising the Sultan his protection, although the Sultan did not care for it too much. Germany demanded that an international conference be convened regarding Morocco, believing that such a conference would succeed in establishing an independent and “open” Morocco, which would have had got the attention of Italy, Great Britain, Russia and the USA. When threatened, the French began to retreat, and Wilhelm II made his cousin, Nicholas II, who had been devastated by a disastrous defeat to Japan, sign a treaty of alliance that would virtually destroy any possible alliance between Russia and the Entente. Wilhelm II triumphed and in his message to Chancellor Bernard von Bülow he wrote, with typical euphoria, that the treaty with Russia was a divine work and he, Wilhelm, had been led by the hand of God when making it.³⁰ The treaty was obviously aimed against Great Britain and its King – who was perceived much

30 *Die Große Politik der Europäischen Kabinette 1871 – 1914*. Eds. Johannes Lepsius, Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, Friedrich Thimme. Vol. XIX, part II., Berlin 1927. Wilhelm II to Bülow, 24. VII. 1905, doc. no. 6220, p. 459.

like an uncle whose relatives called him unlovely names when meeting him.³¹ However, Wilhelm's euphoria soon vanished, as Russian politicians, mainly foreign minister Vladimir Lamsdorff and Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, persuaded the Tsar to refuse the document immediately after getting acquainted with it. The frail Tsar gave in. He wrote to Berlin expressing that the treaty could enter into force only after France gave its opinion on the new continental coalition. Thus, Russia and France remained together, as well as the Entente Cordiale. Eventually, the international conference on Morocco, which had been demanded by Germany, ended in 1906, defeating Germany diplomatically. Germany, seeking to apply an "open door" policy in Morocco, was supported only by Austria-Hungary; the rest of the great powers, including the German ally in the Triple Alliance – Italy – sided with the French.

Great Britain observed Germany's almost frenzied naval armaments with concern and tried to stop them by means of an international conference as well. In the summer of 1907, an international conference was convened in the Netherlands at The Hague. Yet, despite almost four months of negotiations, it did not deliver any results. Germany refused to submit to any disarmament limits. These unsuccessful negotiations brought Britain and Russia closer – with Russia entering the Entente block. However, concerns about the threat of war were growing, as Germany, having rejected both disarmament and a possible limited armament, inspired other countries to rearm. Armament potential was increasingly dangerous in Europe. Wilhelm II got so outraged over the alliance of the "Bear and Whale" that he did not hesitate to call his uncle, King Edward VII, a devil. Subsequently, during a meeting of Wilhelm II with his "devilish" uncle Edward VII at Kronberg in Hesse, Germany rejected other British deals concerning the limitation of armaments. Wilhelm did not miss this opportunity to threaten that if Britain prevented Germany's armament, it would mean war.³²

During the Bosnian crisis of 1908, Europe found itself on the brink of war once again. Russia, offended by the way Austro-Hungarian foreign minister, Lexa von Aehrenthal, deceived his Russian colleague, Alexander Izvolsky, during negotiations in Buchlovce, rejected the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and threatened an armed conflict. At that time, war was avoided only thanks to Germany, which clearly supported its ally, while Great Britain and France protested against the annexation formally but were not willing to enter a conflict. At the same time, France sent a message to St. Petersburg saying that French public opinion was against France entering a war, as the Bosnia affair was not putting Russian vital interests at risk.³³ Under this pressure, Russia eventually did not dare to start a war against Austria-Hungary and Germany by itself; thus, no war began in 1909.

However, Russian politics had learnt a lesson. St. Petersburg realized that it could not always and under any circumstances rely on its Entente allies. In October 1909, the Russian Tsar and his escort came to Italy, where he managed to make an agreement with the Italian king. The agreement eventually signed by the foreign ministers of both

31 Ibid.

32 *British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898–1914*. Eds. G.P.Gooch and H. Temperley. Vol. VI., London 1927, documentary No. 116–117.

33 TAYLOR, Alan John Percivale. *The Habsburg Monarchy 1809–1918*. London 1960, p. 455.

countries assumed that both countries would jointly support the international status quo in the Balkans and if this proved impossible, they would encourage the development of independent Balkan states under the national principle.³⁴

In 1911, Europe once again found itself on the threshold of an armed conflict with the out break of another Morocco crisis. Civil war was unleashed in Morocco and the Sultan asked France for help against the rebels. France welcomed this opportunity to finally subject Morocco and sent a military expedition. At the same time, the Spanish were occupying their Moroccan zone. A massive anti-French campaign started in Germany. Wilhelm II decided to take action and sent the gunboat SMS Panther to the Moroccan post of Agadir. Such action was no longer mere words; it was an action to which the Entente had to react. The French were willing to retreat and suggested some compensation to Germany in Central Africa; but Great Britain stood firmly against any concessions to Germany. British Foreign Secretary, Edward Grey, strictly warned Germany not to take any reckless action. Chancellor of the Exchequer, David Lloyd George, delivered a public speech in which he openly threatened war.³⁵ Naturally, this public speech provoked a remarkable and negative response in Germany. German Foreign Secretary, Alfred Kiderlen-Wächter, asked the German ambassador in London to interpret a strict and uncompromising attitude to Edward Grey: the Germans would defend their great power interests by any means, and if necessary, they would do so alone, without allies.³⁶ The debate of Grey and Ambassador Metternich eventually ended in a “diplomatic quarrel” without any result. In the end, Metternich announced to Grey that “*the greater the pressure put on Germany, the harsher their response would be*”.³⁷ The British fleet was preparing for a military encounter; part of the fleet was ordered to move to France. Once again, Europe was on the brink of an armed conflict; however, war was getting really close this time. Germany eventually retreated, as it found itself in complete isolation. Even Austria-Hungary proclaimed neutrality in this conflict. Germany had to accept the French protectorate in Morocco and received two areas in the French Congo as compensation. This compromise averted war for the moment.

The Italian – Turkish War broke out in September 1911, dragging all of the European great powers into conflict again. The Balkan states made use of the conflict as well and started a war against weakened Turkey, defeating it quickly. However, the great powers could not put up with the fact that affairs in the Balkans would be decided without them; therefore, peace negotiations were finally arranged in London, eventually resulting in the peace treaty of May 30, 1912. Although this treaty ended the First Balkan War, conflict broke out again; this time, between Serbia and Bulgaria – former victors of the First

34 *Die Große Politik*, ref. 30, vol. XXII, part I, doc. No. 9885, p. 415. Ambassador Tschirschky in Vienna to chancellor Bethmann Hollweg on October 30, 1909. Tschirschky quoted the information received from Aerenthal. The second point of the agreement, according to him, read: “*Les deux états favoriseront le développement des états balkaniques suivant le principe de la nationalité.*” This was not in absolute compliance with the agreement’s wording, but the meaning was preserved.

35 *British Documents*, ref. 32, vol. VII., document No. 412. The speech of D. Lloyd George in Mansion House.

36 *Die Große Politik*, ref. 30, vol. XXIX, doc. no. 10 625, Telegram of Kiderlen –Wächter to Metternich as of July 26, 1911, p. 214.

37 *Ibid.*, doc. no. 10626, p. 459.

Balkan War. The Balkan conflict was not just a local one. There was the risk that a huge war could burst out here, as the great powers' interests were colliding in the Balkans – primarily the interests of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia.

This permanent tension in Europe definitely was not a period to be called a long idyllic period of European peace. The conflicts of those days did not only concern soldiers and diplomats; they were massively invaded by public opinion driven by the press. To only glance at the contemporary daily newspapers from all countries would be enough to understand that the European public was living in the shadow of war. This shadow had many forms, but European nationalism as an influencing factor on people's minds must have influenced political actions as well.

Various pacifist organizations had been warning against the danger of war; pacifism had started to be popular among the European intelligentsia. The Socialist International also started to intensively concentrate on the defence of peace during its congresses. With this aim in view, it even convened a special, so-called anti-war conference at Basel in Switzerland in 1912. Such strong anti-war movements definitely would not have had a place in a peaceful and flourishing Europe. However, there was no permanent peace in Europe. Rather, the threat of war had been ever increasing. Nothing is inevitable in history created by people, but the situation in the early 20th century in Europe had been progressing step by step, and still more dynamically, towards a massive European conflict, eventually becoming a world conflict.

The Sarajevo Assassination

The assassination at Sarajevo was not the cause of the War. But it was misused as a pretext for unleashing the War. Indeed, it is very difficult to vindicate an assassination as being such a serious international event that it could cause a war to break out. Therefore, it is hard to understand why in the book by Christopher Clark we find the statement: *“that the Balkan setting was central to the outbreak of war may seem self-evident, given the location of the assassinations that started the crisis”*.³⁸ Still, an irrefutable fact is that Austria-Hungary declared war against Serbia without any relevant proof of the Serbian government having been implicated in the assassination. I will get back to this question when dealing with the report of Friedrich Wiesner.

Firstly, the assassination was committed by citizens of Austria-Hungary. The Austrian offices were not able to prove that the Serbian government had taken part in the assassination, even though they tried very hard; moreover, the offices were very quick to “roll out” the entire background of the assassination for investigators, so that all the basic facts were already available in the first few days of the investigation. The fact that the assassins were Greater-Serbian nationalists and that they had some connection with Serbia, from where they also supposedly smuggled their weapons, is no proof of Serbia having participated in the assassination. The investigation revealed that the assassins got their weapons from the so-called Black Hand, but they demanded them themselves, committed the assassination on their own and in line with their own plan. From the point of view of international law, the assassination was an Austria-Hungarian national affair. If

38 CLARK, ref. 4, p.557.

they wanted to draw consequences of the assassination in Vienna, which was, of course, expected, the consequences should have concerned Bosnian and Herzegovinian authorities and should have led to Oskar Potiorek's withdrawal from office, stricter monitoring of the Serbian nationalist movement in Bosnia, and stricter Serbian border control. These would have been the only logical and legally justifiable actions.

For a moment, let us not concentrate on the fact that Franz Ferdinand's death was barely mourned by anyone in the monarchy. Slovak representatives laid a wreath at his grave with a ribbon reading that Slovaks were "deeply grieved". This inscription was true. The death of the heir to the throne was mourned by some other representatives of the nations oppressed in Hungary as well: they had likely hoped to improve their positions if the reforms under preparation by Franz Ferdinand would have come into force.³⁹ Naturally, there was also some reform potential in a few of the Austrian German representatives loyal to the monarchy. Yet, the crucial players in the monarchy had a rather negative relationship with Franz Ferdinand. Emperor Francis Joseph and the governing authorities surrounding him had a negative attitude towards him. Moreover, Franz Ferdinand's political plans were not too popular among German nationalists in Austria-Hungary either. Francis Joseph wanted to benefit from his morganatic marriage and kept putting pressure on him to give up his throne succession as he clearly did not want him to succeed. Magyar politicians and, as a result of the influence of the press, a large part of the Magyar public as well, literally hated Franz Ferdinand and feared his accession to the throne. It was known that Franz Ferdinand had a bad relationship with Magyars, he did not plan to let himself be crowned Hungarian king, and his reforms were focused on the decentralization of Hungary and the destruction of the dualist system. Czech politicians were also not delighted with Franz Ferdinand's idea of empire federalization on the ethnic principle.

These are all well-known facts. However, it is clear that Vienna and Budapest could not reveal their true feelings; they had to maintain decorum and draw consequences from the assassination. Still, there was no formal reason for dragging Serbia into the assassination. Vienna did not have a single reason to denounce war on Serbia because of the assassination. The fact that anti-Austrian propaganda was spreading in the country was no reason for a war. After all, Austrian and Magyar anti-Serbian propaganda did not lag behind. There was no reason for declaring war on Serbia. Thus, if Austria-Hungary gave Serbia an unacceptable ultimatum, and it was clear that Serbia could not accept it, it meant that regardless of the assassination, someone in Vienna wanted war. And it must have been someone within the circle of decision-making power. They wanted war and they must have wanted it badly, considering that they decided to start it despite a lack of evidence of Serbian guilt.

Relevant Facts

In the conclusion of his book, Christopher Clark quotes British author, Rebecca West, who told her husband in Sarajevo that she could not understand how that could have

39 Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Haus-Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Wien (hereinafter referred to as ÖStA, HHStA), Nachlaß Franz Ferdinand, Thronwechsel.

happened. She claimed that she could not understand it not because there had not been enough material, but because there was too much material.⁴⁰ It seems that this is the case with Clark's book also. He really gathered a lot of material and explored a number of archives (although he did not uncover many relevant documents), but still, in his book, relevant documents intertwine with irrelevant ones, propaganda statements are often taken seriously, and so on.

Clearly, if we want to understand the entire process of the War breaking out, it is necessary to repeat basic facts and subject them to analysis.

A key role in the process must have been played by the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, as the successor to the throne died in the assassination. Shortly after the assassination in Sarajevo, Governor Oskar Potiorek declared that the assassination was organized in Belgrade.⁴¹ One of the reasons Potiorek spread this rumour was that he needed to draw attention away from his own responsibility for the poorly-organized protection of the heir to the throne. The Chief of General Staffs of the Austro-Hungarian Army, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, who was not in Sarajevo at all, immediately commented on the situation saying that the assassination was not a matter of one fanatic, but it was a well-organized scheme, and in fact, it was Serbia's declaration of war on Austria, to which Austria could only reply with war.⁴² These opinions were accepted within the political circles around the emperor in Vienna, and shortly after they decided to react to the assassination with war. This reaction was not because of the assassination itself, and not because of Franz Ferdinand, but because of the maturing idea that Serbia had been an obstacle to Austro-Hungarian policy in the Balkans. The idea was that Serbia was giving signals to other Slavic nations in the monarchy via anti-Austrian and pro-Russian attitudes, and therefore it had to be subdued militarily, weakened, and eventually bound to the monarchy, so that it would no longer be an obstacle to Austro-Hungarian plans in the Balkans. The Austrian Charge d'Affaires in Belgrade, Wilhelm Ritter von Storck, also sent a message saying that the assassination movers were in the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁴³

In the first stage, during the first days following the assassination, the pro-war party was clearly leading; Francis Joseph, having returned to Vienna from the resort of Bad Ischl, favoured it as well. In contrast to the soldiers in the War Department and the General Staff, Foreign Minister Leopold Berchtold was more cautious. Although he was not against war, he held it necessary to sufficiently justify the Austro-Hungarian attitude as well as support it diplomatically. Therefore, Berchtold wanted to wait until the assassination could be investigated thoroughly. Prime Minister Karl Stürgkh supported Berchtold in this opinion. On July 1, Prime Minister Istvan Tisza entered the scene. He sent a letter to Francis Joseph, stating his anti-war opinion. His rationale was that until then there had been no evidence disclosed which proved Serbian responsibility for the assassination. The whole world could perceive Austria-Hungary as the aggressor. Tisza also considered

40 CLARK, ref. 4, p. 554.

41 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes Bonn (hereinafter as PAAA), I A, Deutschland, Österreich 86, I b, Bd. 10. Telegram of the German Consul General Rudolf Eiswaldt, June 28, 1914.

42 HÖTZENDORF, Franz Conrad von. *Aus meiner Dienstzeit 1906 – 1918. Bd. 4.* Wien; Leipzig; München 1925, pp. 17-18, see also RAUCHENSTEINER, ref. 12, p. 91.

43 ÖStA, HHStA, Politisches Archiv I. Serbien, K. 810, Bl. 17 – 18. to Storck Berchtold, June 29, 1914.

provoking war as inappropriate due to the attitudes of Romania and Bulgaria. He believed that it was necessary to wait for a better opportunity, "*Casus belli could be found anywhere*". More importantly, it would have been wise to find out whether Germany was willing to resolutely support the monarchy.⁴⁴

Vienna thus began to hesitate. First of all, they sent Friedrich Wiesner from the Foreign Ministry to Sarajevo to investigate the background of the assassination. Naturally, he was expected to bring evidence of the assassination having been organized in Belgrade. However, on July 13, Wiesner sent Berchtold a negative report. In accordance with all of the material available, there was no proof that the Serbian government had organized the assassination, much less that it even knew about it. On the contrary, according to Wiesner, there was much evidence proving that Serbian participation was out of the question. The only fact he managed to confirm was that the Serbian government had tolerated anti-Austrian propaganda. In fact, Wiesner's task was to find Serbia's share of the blame, so he mentioned in the following section of his report that Serbian Railways civil servants had participated in the assassination and the weapons originated from an arsenal in Kragujevac. However, this was not sufficient evidence for declaring war on the neighbouring country. Wiesner was forced to classify most of the remaining indictments as only "open"⁴⁵, which was not enough to simply declare war. The pro-war party in Vienna had neither rationale nor the support of the Hungarian prime minister; still, it was not giving up. In this context, it must be noted that Christopher Clark used a quotation from a book written by American historian, B. E. Schmitt, to support his thesis of the Balkan origin of the war. In 1930 (!) Schmitt interviewed Wiesner, who said that his report had not been understood correctly and that he had believed in the "moral guilt of Serbia"; yet, the nature of the evidence had not been satisfactory enough to stand up in court.⁴⁶ This reasoning is really perplexing, considering that it was written by a professional historian. Next, to support his Serbian "line", Clark states that the Austrians missed the Black Hand organization while investigating (which is, of course, not true) and if they "*had more information, they would no doubt be even more convinced about the legitimacy of the steps they were about to take*".⁴⁷ It is really difficult to comment on such rationale, as it could not stand ground in serious print media either. One way or another, even Clark's reasoning must convince the reader that **at the time of issuing the ultimatum** and declaring war on Serbia, Austria-Hungary had no relevant evidence of Serbian guilt. Nevertheless it took steps and unleashed war because it wanted to.

However, Austria-Hungary understood very well and Tisza emphasized that they needed the support of their German ally, as the "criminal expedition" against Serbia had become complicated, because Serbia was a protégé of Russia. Vienna might not have realized it at the time, but Berchtold, being an expert in Russian policy, as he had worked in Russia as an ambassador and had witnessed the way Lexa von Aerenthal deceived

44 ÖStA HHStA, Kabinettsarchiv, Geheime Akten, K.20, Bl. 103 – 106.

45 *Österreich-Ungarns Außenpolitik von der Bosnischen Krise 1908 bis zum Kriegsausbruch 1914*. Diplomatische Aktenstücke des Österreichisch-Ungarischen Ministerium des Äußeren, Bd. VIII. Wien; Leipzig 1930, pp.252-253, Wiesner Berchtoldovi 13. July 1914.

46 CLARK, ref. 4, p. 460.

47 Ibid.

Izvolsky during the annexation of Bosnia⁴⁸, knew that Russia would in no way be willing to suffer another diplomatic fiasco. They had not known much in Vienna about the German attitude until July 4. Shortly after the assassination, German ambassador Heinrich von Tschirschky proactively, and without the knowledge of his emperor and his minister, tried to bring calm and peace to Vienna. Vienna needed to know how this situation was perceived in Berlin. They needed to get their documents there and the section head of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Count Alexander von Hoyos, offered to go to Berlin and examine the situation, just like he had done during the Bosnian crisis. Francis Joseph and Berchtold agreed.

Hoyos was in Berlin on July 5.⁴⁹ He handed over the documents he brought with him to Ambassador László Szögyény. Hoyos negotiated with Arthur Zimmermann who was acting as substitute of absent Foreign Minister Gottlieb von Jagow. He was also received by Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg. Thus, the answer to Szögyény and Hoyos' question accompanying the files – if Germany was militarily and economically ready for a great war on several fronts – **was clearly yes**. Bethmann Hollweg literally told Hoyos that Germany would cover their ally's back in any case and that the moment to engage in war was favourable.⁵⁰ Wilhelm II repeated the same to the Ambassador: *"However, if we really deemed a military operation against Serbia necessary, he would find it regrettable if we did not seize the present moment, which was so favourable for us."*⁵¹ Not only did Germany provide Austria-Hungary with a so-called blank cheque, it also encouraged Austria-Hungary vigorously to start the war. However, there is nothing like a blank cheque in diplomacy. What they call a blank cheque is nothing but a form of forcing the ally to act and engage in war.

Therefore, we need to look at what was going on in Berlin and Potsdam. Wilhelm II learnt the news regarding the Sarajevo assassination during a regatta in Kiel, together with the report of Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg, which in the end stated that the political consequences of that twist of fate would have a far reaching impact.⁵² Wilhelm II decided to return to Potsdam. On July 3, once back in Potsdam, he received the report sent by the Ambassador from Vienna, Heinrich von Tschirschky. Wilhelm II read the report carefully while making notes in the text. Commenting on the statement that Vienna was seriously considering the possibility to reckon with Serbia definitively, Wilhelm II wrote, on the edge of the report *"Now or never!"*⁵³ At the same time, as a reaction to Tschirschky stating that he had tried to influence Vienna so that matters would

48 The negotiations took place in Berchtold's castle at Buchlovce in Moravia.

49 About Hoyos' mission see FELLNER, Fritz. Die «Mission Hoyos». In *Recueil des travaux aux assises scientifiques internationales: Les grandes puissances et la Serbie à la veille de la première guerre mondiale*, 4, no. 1, Belgrade 1976.

50 „...jetzige Zeitpunkt (sei) besser als ein späterer.“ RAUCHENSTEINER, ref. 12, p. 99.

51 *Österreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik*, ref. 45, doc. 4. 10058, Szögyény to Berchtold on July 6, 1914.

52 „Die politischen Nachwirkungen dieser Schicksalsfügung werden von der größten Tragweite sein.“ Bethmann Hollweg to Wilhelm II, June 28, 1914. PAAA, I A Deutschland, Österreich 86, 1b, vol. 10.

53 „Jetzt oder nie!“ Dokumente zur deutschen Geschichte 1914 – 1917. Ed. Dieter Fricke. Red. Willibald Gutsche. Berlin 1976, doc. no. 1, pp. 21-22. Tschirschky to Bethmann Hollweg, June 30, 1914. Interestingly enough, Christopher Clark does not cite this document, mentioning the Tschirschky's report only marginally, in regard to the report of the Serbian ambassador in Berlin.

be considered more calmly and wisely, Wilhelm II wrote: “*Who empowered him to do so? – This is silly... Let Tschirschky stop these stupidities!*”⁵⁴ According to the reports from the German general staff, Russia had commenced with a reorganization and new radical armament of its army that was to end in 1917. Afterwards, the Central Powers would no longer be able to count on a successful war.⁵⁵

From the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tschirschky received instructions to take any action against Serbia, as Germany would fully support Austria-Hungary. Moreover, the sooner it would begin the better. Tschirschky passed this information to the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs⁵⁶. At the same time, a harsh campaign against Serbia started on July 4.⁵⁷

In this situation, Hoyos arrived in Berlin and Potsdam. He returned with a clear message: Austria-Hungary was to start a war against Serbia – as soon as possible.⁵⁸ Thus, the pro-war party in Vienna got the green light. After this message from Berlin, István Tisza eventually resigned and agreed to the war against Serbia. However, he did not fully do so until the ministerial council on July 19. Even so, he still maintained certain reservations. It was clear – for both Berlin and Vienna – that the war would not remain at a local level. When attacking Serbia, a European war had to be expected – in the first stage, a war against Serbia and Russia at least, as it was obvious that Russia would not leave its Balkan ally without help this time. German pressure was noticeable and getting even stronger. This time, the pressure originated from Ambassador Tschirschky, as the formal decision was in the hands of Austria-Hungary.

A ministerial council met in Vienna on July 7. The Chief of the General Staff of the Austro-Hungarian Army, Conrad von Hötzendorf, participated as well. Before the meeting, Berchtold met Tschirschky and was clearly instructed: war should start as soon as possible.⁵⁹ Everything in the meeting was focused on the idea of starting a war. István Tisza was influenced by the German attitude as well, although he required that the combat be prepared more thoroughly in terms of diplomacy. It was also clear, and it was clearly stated, that most likely this would not be an isolated Austro-Serbian war, but a European war.⁶⁰ However, as proposed by Tisza, before engaging in combat, there should be requirements formulated and sent to the government of Serbia. Yet, in line with the ministerial council deliberations, the requirements would have to be formulated in a way that the Serbian government could not accept them.⁶¹

54 Ibid.

55 GUTSCHE, Willibald. *Sarajevo 1914. Vom Attentat zum Weltkrieg*. Berlin : Dietz Verlag, 1984, p. 52.

56 ÖStA, HHStA, PA I, Deutschland, K. 496, Bl. 186-187.

57 RAUCHENSTEINER, ref. 12, p. 98.

58 Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf clearly confirmed this in his memoirs: “*Deutschland riete uns zum Losschlagen*” (HÖTZENDORF, ref. 42, p. 42), although his statement should be taken with considerable doubt, as he was a person involved, bearing much of the responsibility.

59 RAUCHENSTEINER, ref. 12, p. 101.

60 *Protokolle des gemeinsamen Ministerrates der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie*. Ed. Miklós Komjáthy. Budapest 1966, Ministerrat vom 7. 7. 1914, pp. 141-150.

61 Ibid.

Thus, the decision to engage in war had already been made in the ministerial council. On July 9, Foreign Minister Berchtold had an audience with Francis Joseph in Bad Ischl to inform him of the decision. The Emperor had no objections and also agreed to gather documents that would justify the decision of Austria-Hungary and cast blame for the war upon Serbia. The Ambassador in Belgrade, Wladimir von Griesl, was instructed by Berchtold to abandon diplomatic relations and leave, regardless of the Serbian reaction. The war was a must.⁶² Therefore, it must be noted, that the decision to start the war was made before Vienna had any relevant evidence of Serbian guilt for the assassination. These documents were only to be gathered and an “unacceptable” ultimatum for Serbia was to be formulated. The procedure took sixteen days.

For this reason the commission headed by Friedrich von Wiesner was established – to gather documents proving Serbia’s guilt in the assassination. However, this initiative did not bring a positive result. As investigations later revealed, the origins of the assassination were in fact connected to Serbia more than had been expected; this is, however, irrelevant for the purposes of clarifying the causes of the war. What is important is that in July 1914, a decision to start the war was made in Vienna, even though members of the government and military did not have any relevant evidence of Serbia’s guilt, therefore having no solid reason for unleashing the conflict.

Why Did Attempts at Mediation Fail?

The final piece that was needed was to formulate the text of the ultimatum. On July 19, the common ministerial council met in Vienna again. There it was decided that the ultimatum would be given to Serbia on July 23, demanding its unconditional acceptance within the period of 48 hours.⁶³ Based on a recommendation from St. Petersburg, the Serbian government responded in a very conciliatory manner; they were willing to accept the terms of the ultimatum apart from point 6, demanding the participation of Austro-Hungarian authorities in the investigation of the assassination in Serbia. Even so, Serbia was willing to negotiate about this point as well. However, the Austro-Hungarian leadership, headed by the Emperor and Berchtold had already decided to start the war. On July 28, the Austro-Hungarian Empire declared war on Serbia and began military operations. Claims that all of the parties had a share in the outbreak of the war, and that the cause of the war was the failure of European diplomacy or “sleepwalkers”, are speculations not taking into account the most relevant historical documents concerning the so-called 1914 crisis.

The key to understanding the causes of World War I lies in German documents. A thorough analysis of these documents indicates that the German documentation is of two kinds, and they are contradictory. The German documents can be divided into two groups: firstly, those addressed to the countries of the Entente, namely St. Petersburg, Paris, and London and pro domo. In this group Germany is presented as a peaceful country, which, though standing firmly behind its ally, does not wish war, especially a European or a world war. The second group is comprised of documents addressed to

62 RAUCHENSTEINER, ref. 12, p. 104.

63 *Protokolle des gemeinsamen Ministerrates*, ref. 60, pp. 150-154.

Vienna, that is, to its ally. They unequivocally claim that the Austro-Hungarian Empire ought to and must engage in war as soon as possible. These documents are characterized by firm pressure exerted on the ally. The Hoyos mission in Berlin and Potsdam was of a similar nature. Proposals for mediation treaties were sent from Berlin to Vienna with an intentional delay and, moreover, with comments that they were not to be taken seriously. No doubt, it is these latter documents that reflect the true politics of Germany in the summer of 1914.

During the July crisis, Germany started a game where, on one side, it was forcing the Austro-Hungarian Empire to declare war, and, on the other side, it sought to persuade the European public and the Entente diplomacy that the whole matter was just a local affair of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Serbia. After that, German diplomats had to explain these efforts in Vienna again.

Germany had several reasons for starting the war in the summer of 1914. First of all, there was the aforementioned military reason. Russia was to complete its military reform in 1917. After that, Germany would be much less likely to succeed in a war on two-fronts. However, there were also political reasons. The assassination of Franz Ferdinand and his wife was no doubt a contemptible terrorist act. Thus, Germany could use Serbian and Slavic terrorism and barbarism for propaganda purposes. This intensified anti-Slavic agitations, which had already been taking place in Germany. Masses of indignant “people” in Berlin protested vigorously before the Russian and Serbian consulates. Thus, the domestic political scene and public opinion were ready to accept the war as a righteous act. German politicians could expect a so-called “Burgfriede” (“castle truce”), which meant the agreement of the German public with war, even from anti-war social democrats. On the outside, however, Germany could still appear to be a country that “had nothing to do with it”, only genuinely defending its ally. This was the main reason behind the German game, when, on one hand, they incited the Austro-Hungarian Empire for the war and, on the other hand, tried to act like a “faithful ally” in the eyes of the rest of Europe.

The assassination did not concern the Entente countries. The most involved country was Russia, which was Serbia’s protector. After the ultimatum was made public, however, the Entente powers had to react. Russian Foreign Affairs Minister, Sergei Dmitrievich Sazonov, summoned Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, Friedrich Szápary, and criticized him strongly for the fact that the Austro-Hungarian Empire wanted war and had burned all of its bridges.⁶⁴ At the same time, however, he notified German Ambassador, Friedrich Pourtalès, that Russia would by no means leave Serbia to the mercy of the Austrians. He suggested that Germany appeal to its ally to extend the ultimatum period, so that the other Entente powers would have the opportunity to study the background documents concerning the assassination and organize an international conference.⁶⁵

The French response to the ultimatum, too, was directed towards preventing the war. The French government advised Vienna to negotiate with Serbia concerning particular

64 *Österreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik*, ref. 45, doc. 10619, p. 648. Szápary to Berchtold, July 24, 1914.

65 GUTSCHE, ref. 55, p. 98.

points of the ultimatum whilst advising Serbia to accommodate to the terms of the ultimatum as much as possible.⁶⁶

British Foreign Minister, Edward Grey, said on July 24 to German Ambassador, Karl Max Lichnowsky, that the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum went beyond anything he had read until then. If the Austro-Hungarian Empire were to cross Serbian borders, one could hardly prevent a European war. He suggested that Great Britain and Germany appeal together to the Austro-Hungarian Empire to extend the ultimatum period and that the European powers get involved in the mediation.⁶⁷

In the following hours, Berlin did everything it could to make mediation attempts impossible. Merely 35 minutes before the ultimatum deadline, German Foreign Minister Gottlieb von Jagow sent the mediation proposal of British Foreign Minister Grey to Vienna, where his telegram reached Ambassador Tschirschky on the morning of July 26, i.e. when the ultimatum period was over. Jagow attached a comment to the telegram stating that the proposal was in any case delayed and it was not to be taken seriously.⁶⁸ With regard to the Russian mediation proposal, Jagow received the Russian chargé d'affaires in Berlin just an hour before the ultimatum was over. Hence, this mediation proposal failed as well.⁶⁹

On July 25, shortly before the deadline of the ultimatum, Serbia delivered its response to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It was a very accommodating response and Serbia was willing to negotiate concerning even the most sensitive point of the ultimatum. However, Austria-Hungary wanted war. It discontinued its diplomatic relations with Serbia. Even in this moment, Berlin was impatient and insisted on the speedy inception of war. Conrad von Hötzendorf, very much keen on war, wanted time for military preparations, but due to Berlin's insistence, the date of the beginning of war was set on July 28.⁷⁰

As mentioned, Germany at that time was engaging in perfidious double politics. On one hand, Berlin was strongly forcing Austria-Hungary into beginning the war as quickly as possible; on the other hand, the German government sought to appear to the European public as a peacemaker. Thus, they had to explain to Vienna repeatedly that these efforts were not to be taken seriously and were only a part of their tactics. The German leadership circles did what they could to not appear to the world public as the aggressor. At the time of the first serious military crisis, when in September 1914 the Russian army approached the Carpathian Mountains and threatened to invade Hungary, István Tisza strongly demanded that Berchtold remind Germans of the fact that the Austro-Hungarian Empire declared war precisely due to German pressure and that it was necessary that Germany, in this critical moment, provide the Empire with effective military support.⁷¹ This statement received no denial from Germany. Similar reminders to Germany concerning its

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid.

68 *Die deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch 1914*. Ed. Max Graf Montgelas and Walter Schücking. Bd. 1, Berlin 1927, doc. no. 171, p.167, Jagow to Tschirschky, July 26, 1914.

69 GUTSCHE, ref. 55, p. 99.

70 GUTSCHE, ref. 55, p. 102.

71 ÖStA, HHStA, Politisches Archiv I, k. 500, fol. 65, Tisza to Berchtold, September 11, 1914.

attitude during the July crisis were heard from Austro-Hungarian politicians later during the war on several occasions. Germany never responded to them with a denial.

Edward Grey knew that Germany was throwing the offer to mediate “out of field”. Nevertheless, on July 26 he tried to propose an international conference once again. Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov appealed to the Austro-Hungarian government to agree with negotiations and mitigate some formulations in the ultimatum. On July 27, German Foreign Minister von Jagow summoned the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in Berlin, Szögyény, to inform him that he would send British mediation proposals to Vienna, but the German government did not adopt them – on the contrary, it was resolutely against them, but did so only in order not to break the contact between Germany and England.⁷² Bethmann Hollweg explained the German tactic to the Ambassador in Vienna, Tschirschky. According to this tactic, Germany could not officially reject all of the mediation proposals, because it could not give the impression to the world, as well as to its home public, that it was initiating war.⁷³ In a report to Wilhelm II, however, Bethmann Hollweg controversially claimed that they had to do all they could to make Russia appear like the aggressor.⁷⁴

On July 28, the day when Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, one event took place, which is still the subject of discussions. This event cannot be understood without a deeper acquaintance with the mental state of Wilhelm II, the German Emperor. As a person, Wilhelm II was very unstable. On one hand, he was exalted and lofty; he liked using big words and gestures. He presented himself as a great commander and he disliked it when his decisions were opposed. On the other hand, he was a deeply insecure person, which was related to his innate bodily handicap. On July 27, Wilhelm II returned from the Kiel regatta and on the morning of July 28 he received the Serbian response to the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum in Potsdam. After reading it, he stated – to the surprise of Reich Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg as well as Foreign Minister von Jagow – that the response was excellent and there was no longer a reason to declare war.⁷⁵ He communicated his decision to von Jagow, stating that Germany could occupy part of Serbian territory, possibly Belgrade as a guarantee, but based on the Serbian response he was ready to mediate a truce in Austria.⁷⁶ In essence, there was still time left to stop the Austro-Hungarian Empire, on the basis of Wilhelm’s decision. Without German support, they certainly could not start a war which they already knew would be not only against Serbia, but which would be a major European war because of Russia’s unequivocal stance. But Bethmann Hollweg with von Jagow decisively came into the play. Bethmann Hollweg sent the Emperor’s message to Vienna in the late evening, that is, once he knew that the declaration of war had already taken place. In the telegram to Tschirschky, who

72 *Österreich-Ungarns Außenpolitik*, ref. 45, doc. no. 10793, pp.778-779. Szögyény to Berchtold, July 27, 1914.

73 *Die deutschen Dokumente*, ref. 68, Bd.1, doc. no. 277, pp.240-241. Bethmann Hollweg to Tschirschky, July 27, 1914.

74 *Politisches Archiv Bonn*, Preußen I – 1d, 23. Bethmann Hollweg to Wilhelm II, July 26, 1914.

75 *Die deutschen Dokumente*, ref. 68, Bd. 1, doc. no. 271, pp. 233-235. Wilhelm II about the response of Serbia. July 28, 1914.

76 *Ibid*, Bd. 2, doc. no. 293, pp. 16-17. Wilhelm II to Jagow., July 28, 1914.

came along with this message, Bethmann Hollweg noted that they had to prevent Vienna from interpreting the message in the sense that Germany wanted to stop Austria.⁷⁷

The illogical behaviour of the German Emperor – who initially stated clearly that war had to be started now or never – remains open to interpretation. On the other hand, one must ask the question, if Wilhelm II truly wanted to stop the war, why did he not directly address his partner Francis Joseph? This possibility was still available. Though Francis Joseph had already signed the declaration of war, it had not yet been delivered to Serbia. Though one could blame Wilhelm II for many things, he definitely was not a naïve or obtuse politician. He knew very well that once the war was declared, it could not be stopped. Therefore, he could have taken a decisive step to stop the war, and he did not. He only put on some kind of “home performance” with which he shocked his Chancellor and Minister. Later, everything followed according to the agreed plan. When the war was declared and the Russians began to mobilize, on July 29 Wilhelm II sent a telegram to his cousin Tsar Nicholas II, urging him to stop the mobilization and expressing hope that a treaty between Vienna and St. Petersburg could be made.⁷⁸ If we analyse this telegram, it is clear that at that moment Wilhelm II already knew that a treaty between Russia and Austria-Hungary was impossible. Though the Tsar hesitated for a moment and changed the general mobilization into a partial one, the politicians around him eventually convinced him that Russia could not afford to do this. Officially, the Russian mobilization was explained as a defence of Serbia, but it is clear that the defence of Serbia meant the defence of Russian interests in the Balkans. Still, the fact is that in the summer of 1914, it was Austria-Hungary that was attempting to violently, militarily change the status quo in the Balkans, and Russia was thus forced to take countermeasures.

The events that took place after the declaration of war on Serbia are well-known. Russia thus began to mobilize. Though the mobilization was stopped for a short while, it was resumed shortly after. Germany did not respond to the Russian mobilization with a counter mobilization, as one would expect under normal circumstances, but directly with a declaration of war on Russia on August 1. However, Germany did not immediately begin to fight Russia. On August 3, Germany declared war on France and invaded neutral Belgium to bypass French fortifications. Quite certainly, neither France nor Belgium had anything to do with the assassination in Sarajevo. Great Britain, which until the last moment had offered mediation and an international conference, declared war on the aggressor after Belgium was invaded. A worldwide conflict had thus begun. Thus, to write about “sleepwalkers” or to say that all of the participating countries had an equal share in the outbreak of the war clearly means to distort the entire process leading to the war. All of the participants had aggressive and imperialist goals, but in the summer of 1914, the war was unleashed solely by the Central Powers.

77 Ibid., Doc. no. 323, pp. 37-38. Bethmann Hollweg to Tschirschky on July 28, 1914.

78 CLARK, ref. 4, p.513.

WIE 1914 DER KRIEG IN EUROPA AUSBRACH

DUŠAN KOVÁČ

Die Studie befasst sich mit der Frage des Weltkriegsausbruchs im August 1914. Hundertjähriges Jubiläum des Kriegsausbruchs rief erneut weltweit Diskussionen über die Ursachen des Krieges hervor und vor allem wer ihn entfesselte. Der Autor analysiert die imperialen Ziele der einzelnen europäischen Großmächte und vergleicht sie mit den Kriegszielen, die veröffentlicht wurden. Inwiefern das Attentat von Sarajevo als Vorwand für die Kriegserklärung diene, den Schlüssel zum Kriegsentfesseln hatte zweifelsohne Österreich-Ungarn und sein Verbündeter - Deutschland. Zahlreiche Dokumente, die es zum Kriegsausbruch gibt, sind nicht immer zum Vorteil des Forschers, da sie sich oft widersprechen. Widersprüchlich sind hauptsächlich die Dokumente deutscher Herkunft. Es sind auch solche Dokumente zu finden, die besagen, dass Deutschland sich auf keinem Fall einen großen europäischen Krieg wünscht, und andererseits Dokumente, die deutlich davon sprechen, dass Deutschland sich solch einen Krieg wünscht und zwar möglichst bald. Der Schlüssel zum Verständnis dieses Dilemmas sieht der Autor darin, dass die Dokumente, die den Krieg ablehnen an die Regierungen der Entente – nach Paris, London, Petersburg gerichtet sind und die Dokumente, die auf den Kriegsausbruch dringen, an den deutschen Verbündeten – Österreich-Ungarn. Zweifelsohne haben eben die Dokumente, die an den Verbündeten gerichtet sind, einen starken Aussagewert, während die, an die potentiellen Gegner gerichteten Dokumente, nur Täuschungsmanöver sind. Der Autor betrachtet kritisch die Versuche um die Schuld am Kriegsausbruch an alle Beteiligten zu übertragen, einschließlich des kleinen angegriffenen Serbiens. Imperiale Ziele hatten zwar alle beteiligten Länder, jedoch den Finger auf dem Auslöser hatten im Sommer 1914 die Zentralen Großmächte.

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
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THE HUNGARIAN COMMUNIST EXILES AND THEIR ACTIVITIES IN THE YEARS 1919–1921

JURAJ BENKO

BENKO, Juraj. The Hungarian communist exiles and their activities in the years 1919–1921. *Historický časopis*, 2016, 64, 5, pp. 873-897, Bratislava.

The study is concerned with the activities of the Hungarian communist exiles in the period immediately following the fall of the Hungarian Soviet Republic in summer 1919. The term Hungarian communist exiles designates the specific ethno-political group composed of representatives and adherents of the fallen regime, who left Hungary after their military defeat and engaged in organizing the communist movement in other countries. They became important figures in building up the communist movement in Central Europe, especially in the former territories of the Kingdom of Hungary.

Study of the broad theme is limited to the transmission of the communist ideology, organizing of the communist movement and the movement and activity of members of the Hungarian communist exile group in the Central European region, Czechoslovakia and especially Slovakia in the years of the so-called revolutionary wave, namely 1919–1921.

Key words: Hungarian communist exiles. Communist movement. Third Communist International. Communist Party of Hungary. Marxist left. Slovakia. Transfer of ideologies. Frontiers.

Introduction

The first day of August 1919 was the last day of the existence of the Hungarian Soviet Republic (21 March – 1 August 1919, hereinafter HSR). On this day, the political representatives of the disintegrating socialist regime called a plenary session of the Budapest Council of Soldiers and Workers. The turbulently welcomed Béla Kun gave a farewell speech. He did not conceal his disillusionment over the failure of the political experiment in which he had played a substantial part. He stated that the dictatorship of the proletariat in Hungary had been defeated economically, politically and militarily. He attributed a substantial share in the defeat of the socialist regime in Hungary to the working class and its unwillingness to defend the revolution. For this reason he saw no sense in the leaders of the so-called Hungarian commune building barricades against the advancing troops by themselves without mass support. He said that the proletariat had not betrayed its leaders, but itself, and “*needs a most inhuman and cruel dictatorship of the bourgeoisie to make it revolutionary*”.¹

1 MOMMEN, André. *Jenő Varga and the economic policy of the Hungarian Soviet Republic*. Occasional papers. Maarsen : CEPS, 2009, s. 46. ISBN 9789079885046. <https://www.scribd.com/document/24514637/Jeno-Varga-and-the-Economic-Policy-correct>.

After the end of the session, Kun and some of the representatives of the HSR quickly organized their departure to Vienna. They were discussing the granting of political asylum with the Austrian government. Two special trains to Vienna left Budapest late in the evening of the same day carrying Kun and other former people's commissars of the soviet republic, together with their families and adherents.² They entered the territory of Austria on the next day.

The lives in exile of the leading representatives of the fallen HSR and a further part of their political biographies began on the Hungarian – Austrian border. A nomadic destiny awaited those who remained faithful to the cause of world revolution also outside their homeland and entered the service of the Communist International (CI). This was associated with organizing the communist movement across the frontiers of existing states. Their activities significantly effected territories in Central Europe, especially Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, where they left significant traces in the histories of the local communist parties. The lives of the majority of exiled Hungarian communists, who left their homeland in 1919, ended in the Stalinist purges of the mid 1930s in their final asylum – the bastion of revolution, the Soviet Union.

In this study I aim to describe the activities of the Hungarian communist exiles in the first years after the fall of the HSR. Analysis of a broad theme is limited to the context connected with the problem of frontiers, the spread of communist ideology, organization of the communist movement, as well as the movements and activities of communist exiles in Central Europe and especially in the territory of the Czechoslovak Republic. I attempt to evaluate the function, place and importance of the Hungarian communist exiles in building up the communist movement in Slovakia and Central Europe.

The study is based on archive materials of Slovak, Czechoslovak and Russian origin, as well as secondary literature in the form of studies and books concerned with the problem of the beginnings of communism in Central Europe and the Hungarian communist exiles.

The Hungarian communist exiles

By the term Hungarian communist exiles, I mean the representatives and adherents of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, who left Hungary after its military defeat and participated in the work of organizing and promoting the communist movement in other countries.

The communist exiles formed part of a wave of political exiles, who left their homeland in the period of revolutionary political changes in 1918–1919.³ The wave of emigration culminated in connection with two significant political events: the declaration of the HSR on 21 March 1919 and its fall on 1 August 1919. The flow of emigrants significantly weakened after 1921 in connection with strict emigration legislation, population policy and the general nationalist climate of Horthy's regime.⁴

2 MOMMEN, ref. 1, p. 47. HANAK, Tibor. Politik und Geistesleben der Ungarn in Wien 1918–1924. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Ungarn in Wien. In *Ungarn-Jahrbuch*, 1986, vol. 14, p. 47. ISBN 3929906473.

3 HANAK, ref. 2, p. 41.

4 KOSA, John. A Century of Hungarian Emigration, 1850–1950. In *American Slavic and East European Review*, 1957, year 16, no. 4, p. 508. ISSN 1049-7544.

In spring 1919, after the socialist – communist coalition took power, various leading Hungarian politicians with varied orientations, aristocrats, landowners, businessmen, officers, churchmen and ordinary citizens left the country as a result of the sharp radicalization of society.⁵ Another wave of political emigration came after the 133 days of existence of the Hungarian communist regime. The threat and soon also the harsh reality of persecution by the new regime against those who cooperated with the fallen socialist – communist government was the main reason for leaving the country. The fear of revenge and persecution was justified. The gradual taking of power by the ultra conservative circles around Admiral Miklós Horthy was associated with sharpening repression from the government, army and terrorist groups.⁶ It affected not only the active participants but anybody in any way connected with the fallen regime. Apart from thousands executed and tens of thousands imprisoned or interned, the persecution by the new regime and terror by its supporters also led to about a hundred thousand emigrants.

Part of the leadership of the regime, leading representatives of the communist – socialist coalition including future leading members of the exiled Communist Party of Hungary fled across the frontier immediately after the fall of the soviet republic in the first days of August. Péter Ágoston interior minister in Gyula Peidl's new government made an agreement with the Austrian side that the representatives of the soviet government (Béla Kun, Jenő Landler, Jenő Varga, József Pogány, Béla Vagó, Ernő Pór, Ferenc Rákos, Gyula Lengyel, Emil Madarász, Zsigmond Kunfi, Béla Szántó, Dezső Bokányi, Zoltán Rónai, Ferenc Bajáki and others) could cross the Austrian frontier.⁷

However, some social democratic people's commissars including the already mentioned Péter Ágoston, Sándor Garbai, Antal Dovcsák and József Haubrich⁸ also appeared in the new government. Other communist representatives of the defeated regime such as Georg Lukács, János Hirossik, Tibor Szamuely, Ottó Korvin, Gyula Alpári, Gyula Hevesi, László Rudas and József Révai remained in Budapest, where they attempted to rebuild the organization of the Communist Party and adapt it for functioning in the new conditions of illegality.⁹ If they did not fall into police hands, the ground under their feet soon began to burn and they followed their comrades into exile.

5 HANAK, ref. 2, p. 41.

6 The recent works concerned with the nature of the so-called White Terror, its actors and groups include: BODÓ, Béla. Militia Violence and State Power in Hungary, 1919–1922. In *Hungarian Studies Review*, 2006, year 23, no. 1-2, p. 121-156. ISSN 1705-8422.

7 HAUTMANN, Hans. *Verlorene Räterepublik. Am Beispiel der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschösterreichs*. Wien-Frankfurt-Zürich : Europa Verlag, 1972, p. 200-201; GRÄFE, Karl-Heinz. Von der Asterrevolution zur Räterepublik. Ungarn 1918/19. In *UTOPIE kreativ*, 2004, part 168, p. 899. ISSN 0863-4890. Accessible on the internet: <http://www.rosalux.de/fileadmin/rls_uploads/pdfs/Utopie_kreativ/168/168.pdf>

8 G. Peidl's so-called trade unionist government only lasted a few days from 1 to 6 August 1919. On this theme see: TÓTH, Andrej. "Peidlovo intermezzo" – zmařený pokus o návrat k lidové republice po 133 dnech vlády maďarské socialisticko-komunistické vlády Sándora Garbais (srpen 1919), ("Peidl's intermezzo" – a failed attempt to return to a people's republic after 133 days of rule by Sándor Garbai's Hungarian socialist-communist government (August 1919).). In *Slovanský přehled*, 2009, year XCV, no. 4, p. 433-470. ISSN 0037-6922.

9 DUTSCHKE, Rudi. *Versuch, Lenin auf die Füße zu stellen. Über den halbasiatischen und den westeuropäischen Weg zum Sozialismus. Lenin, Lukács und die Dritte Internationale*. Berlin : Verlag

A representative of the commissariat for internal affairs O. Korvin was already arrested in August and later executed. The people's commissar for the armed forces T. Szamuely committed suicide after being arrested while crossing the Hungarian – Austrian border. G. Lukács fled to Vienna at the end of September 1919 after the arrest of other comrades. He was arrested in Austria, but an appeal by the German and Austrian literary community led to his release in December.¹⁰

The representatives who left Hungary immediately were followed during the next few months by thousands of additional refugees. The threatened groups included members of the Social Democrat and Communist parties, members of the Hungarian Red Army, Jews, trade unionists and supporters of Károlyi's regime. The intelligentsia formed an important group among the refugees. The shocks of the First World War, the post-war revolution and unfulfilled expectations from the Aster Revolution of autumn 1918 as well as the promising slogans from the October 1917 Revolution in Russia contributed to almost the whole Hungarian intelligentsia participating in the life of the Hungarian communist regime in some way, either with or without directly joining the Communist Party.¹¹

In Vienna

The majority of refugees crossed the frontier into Austria. Their nearest and most sought after destination was Vienna. It was a gateway through which the emigrants could continue further, especially to the capitals of Central and Western Europe.¹² On the other hand, as the former capital of the Monarchy and current social democrat bastion of the new Austrian Republic, it was not only a stopping place, but also a natural refuge and centre of activity for political exiles from Hungary. A colony of several tens of thousands of Hungarian migrants with the most varied possible political and social characteristics lived here. It also had a favourable political climate for leftist emigrants ranging from moderate socialists to communists. The city was in the hands of the Social Democrats after the 1919 elections and the young Austrian Republic granted political asylum to most of the Hungarian immigrants.¹³ In "red" Social Democrat Vienna, refugees could find the necessary conditions to continue their political and intellectual activities.¹⁴ This

Klaus Wagenbach 1974, p. 197. ISBN 9783803110534.

- 10 LÖWY, Michael. *Georg Lukács From Romanticism to Bolshevism*. London : NLB 1979, p. 154. ISBN 860910032.
- 11 FORGÁCS, Éva. In the Vacuum of Exile: The Hungarian Activists in Vienna 1919–1926. In NEUBAUER, John – TÖRÖK, Borbála Zsuzsanna. *The Exile and Return of Writers from East-Central Europe: A Compendium*. Berlin : de Gruyter, 2009, p. 109. ISBN 9783110217735.
- 12 Berlin became the most important capital of the inter-war period for Hungarian emigrants, especially artists and intellectuals. It was the cosmopolitan cultural centre of Central Europe. On this see: GANTNER, Eszter B. *Budapest - Berlin: Die Koordinaten einer Emigration 1919-1933*. Franz Steiner Verlag 2011, p. 12. ISBN 9783515099202.
- 13 The Social Democrats gained 54% of the votes in communal elections in Vienna in May 1919. They gained the majority of votes in local government elections until 1934.
- 14 ZOLTÁN, Péter. Stellungen und Stellungnahmen. Die Rolle der Wiener Ungarischen Zeitung und ihr intellektuelles Umfeld (1919 – 1923). In *Kakanien revisited*, 2005, no. 12, p. 2. Accessible on the internet: <<http://www.kakanien.ac.at/beitr/fallstudie/ZPeter1.pdf>>

also applied to the communist part of the exiled community. Large groups of political asylum seekers from the Balkan countries and Poland also lived here temporarily or permanently. Communist exiles from the countries of the former Monarchy could work here in close contact with German, French, Italian and other communists.¹⁵

After the representatives of the HSR gained temporary political asylum and arrived at the Eastern Station in Vienna, they were detained and interned “in the interest of their own security”.¹⁶ They were moved from Vienna to the castle at Karlstein an der Thaya not far from the Czechoslovak frontier, but in spite of their isolation in a frontier district, their political work was not interrupted.¹⁷ They adapted to the unfavourable conditions and limited possibilities. In Austrian exile the leaders of the HSR quickly reoriented themselves and sounded out the situation in the leftist part of the socialist movement. Then they continued their missions and careers as professional revolutionaries. As well as reflecting on recent events and analysing the causes of the successes and especially of the failures of the HSR, they formed new groups and alliances, intended as the basis for a revitalized Communist Party.

Brisk correspondence with the representatives of the movement abroad, publication in the press, meetings and reception of delegations represented the beginning of reviving their party structure in exile and relaunching their organizational work. Above all, they strove to secure the publication of propaganda materials for the movement in Hungary. The Austrian Communist Party gave the Hungarian communist exiles space in their newspaper *Die Rote Fahne*, which produced a supplement *Vörös Újság* in Hungarian,¹⁸ and the news bulletin *Ertesítő* devoted to the communist youth.

Already in December 1919, Kun could write a letter informing the leader of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (hereinafter RCP (b)) Vladimir I. Lenin about the building up of illegal organizations in Hungary and the growth of revolutionary feelings among the working class, about a new magazine, the preparation of a “*colossal quantity of brochures*” for propaganda in Hungary and the preparation of a large international magazine. He reported the establishment of relations with radical socialist groups in Europe. Above all, he asked for more finance to develop wider activities.¹⁹ Paradoxically,

15 LUKÁCS, Georg. *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein. Studien über marxistische Dialektik*. Vorwort zum zweiten GLW Band, p. 8. Neuwied; Berlin; Darmstadt : Hermann Luchterhand Verlag, 1968. Accessible on the internet: <http://de.scribd.com/doc/72298792/Georg-Lukacs-Geschichte-und-Klassenbewusstsein>. See also: MCLOUGHLIN, Barry – LEIDINGER, Hannes – MORITZ, Verena. *Kommunismus in Österreich*. Innsbruck : StudienVerlag, 2009, p. 153-174.

16 About 20 internees included especially the leading functionaries of the Hungarian Communist Party: B. Kun, J. Landler, E. Pór, E. Seidler, B. Vágó, J. Varga, G. Lengyel, J. Pogány, B. Szántó, Mátyás Rákosi, Ferenc Rákosi, Jenő Hamburger, József Lengyel, Emil Madarász. MOMMEN, ref. 1, p. 48.

17 As M. Rákosi wrote, the Waldviertel region was one of the most isolated parts of the country at the time. A train came once every two days, post rarely, radio was not available and the internees received Hungarian newspapers only once a week. Rákosi Mátyás. *Visszaemlékezések 1892–1925 (Memoirs 1892–1925)*. Vol. II. Budapest : Napvilág Kiadó, 2002, p. 461. ISBN 9639082902.

18 The Hungarian emigrants L. Rudas, B. Szántó, G. Lengyel and J. Révai published articles in it. HANAK, ref. 2, p. 73; DUTSCHKE, ref. 9, p. 229.

19 See e.g. Letter from Béla Kun to V.I. Lenin on the financing of propaganda from 7 Dec 1919. In *Komintern i ideja mirovoj revolucii. Dokumenty. (Comintern and the idea of world revolution. Documents.)*. Ed. DRABKIN, Jakov S., Moskva : Nauka, 1998, document no. 26, p. 154-155. ISBN 5020096237.

in the first quarter of 1920 various former colleagues no longer counted on him when seeking a new way of running the Hungarian communist movement, blamed him for the fall of the socialist regime and attempted to exclude him from the movement in exile.²⁰

At the beginning of March 1920 the Hungarian communists who remained in internment were transferred to the Steinhof Sanatorium in Vienna where they had a regime of limited movement.²¹ The possibilities for cooperating with other, already free communist exiles and to carry out general organizational work directed towards revival of the Communist Party, were widened in the new environment. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Hungary in Exile headed by B. Kun, J. Landler, J. Hirossik, B. Szántó and G. Lukács was formed in the Austrian capital.²² Together with the Bavarian communists, the Hungarian exiles formed a numerous group in the Communist Party of Austria and played a significant part in the emerging Young Communists' International (YCI). With their hands freed, the veterans of the HSR joined in building up the communist movement in Central Europe and forming a cadre support for the emerging regional centre of the Communist International in Vienna, established by the end of 1919.

The Vienna node of the Comintern was strengthened in June 1920 by the arrival in the Austrian capital of a Soviet mission headed by Mieczysław Broński-Warszawski²³ and in autumn by the establishment of a branch of the information agency of Soviet Russia ROSTA, later called TASS.²⁴ The regional bureau of the Comintern, Soviet embassy and ROSTA agency also used the services of many Hungarian communist exiles and enabled them to make a living.²⁵ At the same time, they represented three basic elements bringing the representatives of the Communist Party of Hungary (CPH) into contact with the centre of the communist movement in Moscow.

The Hungarian communist exiles found a new purpose in life in the service of the Comintern, while the Third International found determined and capable organizers in the dozens of exiled Hungarians.²⁶ They occupied a significant part of the Comintern

20 SAKMYSTER, Thomas. *A Communist Odyssey. The life of József Pogány / John Pepper*. Budapest; New York : Central European University Press, 2012 (Kindle Edition, location (hereinafter loc.) 1024). ISBN 9786155225086.

21 National Archives of the Czech Republic (hereinafter NACR), fund (hereinafter f.) PMV, carton (hereinafter c.) 51, signature (hereinafter sign.) IV/K/44/1. Communist Party of Austria from 1918.

22 HANAK, ref. 2, s. 73.

23 On the question of relations between Vienna and Moscow: LEIDINGER, Hannes – MORITZ, Verena. Der Weg zur Anerkennung. Die Beziehungen zwischen Wien und Moskau 1918 bis 1924. In *Österreichische Osthefte. Zeitschrift für Ost- Mittel-und Südosteuropaforschung*, 2004 year 46, part 3, p. 361-390. ISSN 0029-9375

24 The central figure in the ROSTA (Rossijskoje telegrafnoje agentstvo), was Sándor Radó. Thanks to radio, he made communication with Moscow much faster. LEIDINGER, Hannes – MORITZ, Verena. *Gefangenschaft, Revolution, Heimkehr. Die Bedeutung der Kriegsgefangenenproblematik für die Geschichte des Kommunismus in Mittel- und Osteuropa 1917–1920*. Wien; Köln 2003, p. 551. ISBN 3205770684.

25 MOMMEN, ref. 1, p. 50.

26 ŠUCHOVÁ, Xénia. „Heslo autonómie alebo právo na odtrhnutie?“ (Komunistické ponímanie národnostnej a „slovenskej“ otázky do polovice 20. rokov). (“The slogan of autonomy or the right to secede?” (The communist view of the nationality and the “Slovak question” up to the mid 1920s).). In ŠUCHOVÁ, Xénia (ed.). *Ludáci a komunisti. Súperi? Spojenci? Protivníci?* Prešov : Univerzum, 2006, p. 30. ISBN 808904638X.

apparatus especially in the first years of its existence.²⁷ The majority of them had experience not only from the Hungarian revolution of 1919, but also from Russia in 1917. Their intellectual potential and linguistic competence, both greatly needed by the new International in its first years, were significant assets. They mastered German, before the war the universal language of communication of the socialist movement in Central Europe and still the main language for contacts between the Comintern apparatus and the individual communist parties. Some of the Hungarian communists had the possibility to learn Russian during years of captivity and revolution in Russia. Their mother tongue, in addition to German, was the socialist lingua franca in the territory of the former Kingdom of Hungary.

The Hungarian communist exiles brought important intellectual capital to the emerging Central European communist movement. Participation in the HSR of 1919 and experiences from the Russian revolution gave their experience and views considerable weight. Their theoretical and popular writing in exile was an important part of the crystallizing discourse of the movement on the European as well as the Central European levels. From its refuge in Vienna using the Comintern apparatus and with the support of Moscow, the leadership of the exiled Communist Party of Hungary was able to insert itself into the work of building up the communist movement in Central Europe.

In the years of the “revolutionary wave”

The period 1919–1921 is described in histories of the communist movement as the period of the rise of a “revolutionary wave” in Europe. The expectations of representatives of the communist parties also corresponded to this. The wave reached its zenith in the summer of 1920. The Russo – Polish War culminated and the Red Army approached Warsaw. The second congress of the Comintern was meeting in an optimistic mood with the expectation that no serious obstacles stood in the way of the advance of the revolution into Europe and especially to its heart – Germany. It was a question of only a few weeks. The congress adopted 21 strict conditions for joining the Comintern. They were binding for all parties joining the Third International and laid the foundations for its position as a vassal of Moscow.

The Hungarian communist exiles had the strongest influence on the formation, functioning and direction of the movement in Central Europe in precisely this key period. They continued to have strong influence in the Moscow centre of the communist movement. The Hungarian communists maintained their position in the leadership of the “prisoners’ international” or Central Federation of foreign groups after the departure of the core of the Hungarian section of the Russian Bolshevik Party to Hungary in November 1918.²⁸ Kun was then replaced in the leading position by Endre Rudnyánszky

27 During the existence of the Comintern about 300 Hungarian political exiles applied themselves at all levels in its apparatus. SZÉKELY, Gábor. Hungarians in the Comintern. Some results of a research project. In *The International Newsletter of Communist Studies (INCS)*, 2004, year 10, no. 17, p. 33. ISSN 1862-698X. Accessible on the internet: <http://newsletter.icsap.de/home/data/pdf/INCS_17_ONLINE.pdf>

28 From its origin in May 1918 to its dissolution in February 1920 the Central Federation of Foreign Groups was responsible for coordinating foreign communist groups formed by foreigners concentrated in the territory of Russia, especially prisoners of war, but also immigrants, evacuees and colonists. On this

and the Hungarian section remained an influential centre of the communist movement among prisoners of war. Apart from organizational activities, the Hungarian communists also excelled among the foreign groups in the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) in number of members, and in the extent of organizational and agitation work among their compatriots in Russia.²⁹

The federation was an important centre for the preparation of political cadres and the formation of the communist movement in Central Europe. The Hungarian section took care of the former territory of the Kingdom of Hungary. Party workers were trained from among the prisoners of war and repatriated to the successor states in the former Hungarian part of the Monarchy with political and organizational missions. They had mandates, letters for party representatives at home, qualification certificates from the agitation school or courier authorizations with which they had to contact communist groups at home.³⁰ The symbolic weight of these documents was also shown by the fact that their bearers secured important positions in party organizations and in the illegal structures of the movement in their homelands.³¹

In the apparatus of the Comintern

Although the prisoners of war were still returning home from Russia, after August 1919 the elite of the Hungarian Soviet Republic went back to Soviet Russia and penetrated to the highest levels of the organizational hierarchy of the young Communist International (CI).³² Some of the Hungarian exiles left Vienna to travel to Moscow in mid July 1920 on the basis of a diplomatic agreement between Austria and Russia.³³ The central figure in this group was Béla Kun.³⁴ The part of the party that remained in Vienna was concentrated around his ever more obstinate opponents: J. Landler and G. Lukács. Two parallel political and organizational centres of the Communist Party of Hungary arose as a result of the move of part of the party to the capital of Soviet Russia.

The Moscow centre of the CPH was linked with the Hungarian section of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik). Kun, Pogány and Varga began to lecture at the party

theme see: ISLAMOV, T. M. Vengerskije komunisty na zaščite zavojevanij Oktjabra. (The Hungarian communists in defence of the achievements of October.). In MANUSEVIČ, A. J. et al. *Internacionalisty trudjaščiesja zarubežnych stran – učastniki borby za vlast' sovjetov*. Moskva : Nauka, 1967, p. 334-375.

29 VÖLGYES, Ivan. Hungarian prisoners of war in Russia, 1916–1919. In *Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique*, 1973, year 14, no. 1/2, p. 79. ISSN 1252-6576.

30 Mandates for organizers of the movement in Europe, like letters for party representatives, qualification certificates for graduates from the school of agitation and authorizations for couriers were written on white silk “15 cm long and 7 cm wide usually carried sown under the lining at the back of trousers”. Slovak National Archives Bratislava (hereinafter SNA), f. Policajné riaditeľstvo (Police Directorate) – Bratislava (hereinafter PR-B), c. 255, sign. 2673/pres., mat 155/9.

31 On this theme see: BENKO, Juraj. *Bolševizmus medzi Východom a Západom. (Bolshevism between East and West.)*. Bratislava : Historický ústav SAV, 2012, p. 115-128. ISBN 9788089396184.

32 It was no longer only a matter of former prisoners of war, but also of members of other radical socialist groups, who joined the CPH after November 1918.

33 SAKMYSTER, ref. 20, loc. 1107.

34 Kun's supporters in the CPH included: J. Pogány, B. Szántó, J. Varga, E. Pór, B. Vágó, F. Rákosi, M. Rákosi, Endre Rudnyánszky.

school in Moscow.³⁵ At the same time, the Hungarian exiles in Bolshevik Russia joined in the work of the Comintern apparatus. The “Russian” group of the CPH in Moscow was rather isolated from the movement in Hungary but more integrated into the apparatus of the CI. Like the representatives of other exiled communist parties from Central and South-Eastern Europe, its representatives were entirely dependent on Moscow resources and at the disposal of Comintern politics. They worked in cooperation with the leadership of the Comintern or the RCP (b) and its directives.³⁶ Kun’s adherents soon found places among the managing cadres of the Comintern apparatus and from their new positions they helped to apply the current Comintern policy also in the Central European communist movements.

The Moscow representative of the HSR and chief organizer of the prisoners of war in Russia E. Rudnyánszky already became a member of the inner leadership of the global organization – the Little Bureau of the Executive of the Communist International (hereinafter ECI) in July 1919.³⁷ He also remained there after the second congress of the Comintern, held in the middle of 1920. Former people’s commissars of the HSR, especially the famous leader of the Hungarian revolution Béla Kun, already began to establish themselves in the apparatus in this period.³⁸

In January 1921 he became a member of the secretariat and of the Little Bureau of the ECI. M. Rákosi already also participated in sessions of the Little Bureau. In July 1921 he was also appointed to the Secretariat of the ECI.³⁹ Another commissar from the HSR, the expert economist J. Varga became a valuable addition to the Comintern apparatus. After coming to Moscow, he received authorization to establish and lead the economic section of the magazine *Komunistická internacionála* and in November 1920 he was appointed to head the Statistics and Economics Department of the CI.⁴⁰ From summer 1921 Gyula Alpári became head of the Comintern press agency *Inprekorr* (*Internationale Presse Korrespondenz*).

One of the reasons leading to the relatively rapid inclusion of the Hungarian communists among the leaders of the Comintern apparatus was support from the offensive wing of the Russian Bolshevik Party led by Grigorij Zinoviev and Nikolaj Bucharin. Although Lev Trockij and after him also Lenin after the second congress of the Comintern inclined to the view that the communist parties in Europe needed “time to breathe”, the hawks among the Soviet leaders judged that it was the best time “to attack”.⁴¹ This approach

35 MOMMEN, André. *Stalin’s Economist, The economic contributions of Jenő Varga*. New York : Routledge, 2011, p. 46. ISBN: 9780415575164

36 LEIDINGER – MORITZ, ref. 24, p. 372.

37 ADIBEKOV, Grant M. – ŠACHŇAZAROVA, Eleonora N. – ŠIRIŇA, Kirill K. *Organizacionnaja struktura Komintern 1919–1943. (The organizational structure of the Comintern, 1919–1943)*. Moskva : ROSSPEN, 1997, p. 8. ISBN 5860041128.

38 Rudnyánszky voluntarily ended his activity in the Comintern shortly before the third congress of the CI. In summer 1921 he disappeared without trace during a secret mission to Europe with a large amount of Comintern money.

39 ADIBEKOV – ŠACHŇAZAROVA – ŠIRIŇA, ref. 37, p. 22.

40 MOMMEN, ref. 35, p. 46.

41 The theoretical basis for the “attack theory” was an article by N. Bucharin published in autumn 1920. BUCHARIN, Nikolaj, I. O útočnej taktike. (On offensive tactics.). In *Komintern i ideja*, ref. 19,

was close to the Hungarian communists, who were among the leftist radicals of the movement even before they came to Moscow. They were impatiently waiting for a reversal of the situation in Hungary, and they promoted a policy of offensive in Europe by means of articles in the newspapers *Proletár* produced by the CPH and the review *Kommunismus* published in Vienna.⁴² They claimed that Central Europe and especially Germany were ripe for revolution, which could be triggered by a series of smaller isolated actions leading to increased tension and the outbreak of a massive uprising.⁴³

The offensive tactic dominated the policies of the Comintern between the second and third congresses. A stubborn orientation towards stimulating revolution in Germany, radicalization of the mass socialist parties and their rapid transformation into communist parties was characteristic. The leadership of the Comintern headed by Zinoviev entrusted Hungarian communists with important political missions in connection with the offensive tactic. In the role of Comintern emissaries they became agile promoters of the CI offensive in Central Europe. Béla Kun, Mátyás Rákosi and József Pogány were plenipotentiaries of the CI Executive in Europe and through the Western European secretariat of the Comintern in Berlin, they aggressively intervened in the affairs of domestic socialist and communist parties especially in Germany, Czechoslovakia and Italy.⁴⁴ They organized conspiratorial meetings with representatives of socialist parties and pro-communist factions, participated in party congresses at which they promoted acceptance of Moscow's 21 conditions, organized and financed communist opposition, persuaded party leaders and did not hesitate to bribe functionaries and discredit opponents in the name of the revolution. Their conspiratorial methods provoked resentment from the official representatives of domestic parties.⁴⁵

The influence of the Comintern offensive and of the revolutionary adventurism of the Hungarian communists in its service culminated in Central Europe in the first quarter of 1921. The pressure to stimulate revolution in Germany led to the unsuccessful so-called March action. It was organized under the direction of Comintern emissaries led by B.

p. 223-227.

42 SAKMYSTER, ref. 20, loc. 1134-1137. The political theory review *Kommunismus* was published from 1 February 1920 in Vienna in the German language. Representatives of the Hungarian communist exile community played a large part in preparing the individual issues and they were among the regular writers for this weekly magazine. G. Lukács can be considered the chief theorist. Members of the so-called leftist current in the Comintern, concentrated around the Amsterdam and Vienna bureaus of the Third International published articles in the review. Its ideological line soon became the target of criticism from Moscow and from Lenin himself. LENIN, Wladimir, I. „Kommunismus“. Zeitschrift der Kommunistischen Internationale für die Länder Südosteuropas“ (in deutscher Sprache), Wien, Heft 1/2 vom 1. Februar 1920 bis Heft 18 vom 8. Mai 1920. In LENIN, Wladimir I. *Werke*. Band 31, Berlin : Dietz 1978, p. 153-155.

43 SAKMYSTER, ref. 20, loc. 1145.

44 BROUÉ, Pierre. *The German Revolution 1917-1923*. Leiden; Boston : Brill, 2005, p. 477-505. ISBN 9004139400; HÁJEK, Miloš – MEJDROVÁ, Hana. *Vznik III. internacionály. (The origin of the Third International.)*. Praha : Karolinum, 2000, p. 339-433. ISBN 8071848840.

45 FAYET, p. 107; LEVI, Paul. Our Path: Against Putschism. In FERNBACH, David (ed.). *In the Steps of Rosa Luxemburg. Selected Writings of Paul Levi*. Leiden; Boston : Brill, 2011, p. 161-163. ISBN 9789004196070.

Kun.⁴⁶ The hasty and unsuccessful attempt at a communist coup resulted not only in a large number of victims, harsh persecution and a large decline in the number of members of the German Communist Party, but also in sharp criticism of B. Kun and his associates within the Comintern.⁴⁷ The third congress of the CI brought general criticism of the theory of attack, and a change in tactics and prognoses for further development. Kun's group pragmatically accepted the conclusions.⁴⁸

In the environment of the German and Czech Marxist Left in Czechoslovakia

In spring 1921 the Comintern increased its pressure for the establishment of a Communist Party in Czechoslovakia. Apart from Kun and Rákosi, another veteran of the HSR Gyula Alpári applied himself. He was one of the leading members of the Hungarian exile group in Czechoslovakia. He was in direct contact with B. Kun, at that time representative of the Berlin bureau of the Comintern. After the fall of the HSR and a short stay in Austria, Alpári went to Czechoslovakia in November 1918. He organized a communist movement among the so-called Liberec Left in the German speaking environment of northern Bohemia. "*He did brilliant work*"⁴⁹ in Liberec. He worked as editor of *Vorwärts*, instructed and trained the local functionaries of the German speaking Marxist left and participated in unifying the pro-communist groups as intended by the programme of the CI.⁵⁰ He participated in working out the resolution by which the German left declared its support for the programme of the Third International and the dictatorship of the proletariat at the Liberec conference of May 1920.

In relation to the fact that transformation of the Czech Marxist left had primary importance for the establishment of a Communist Party in Czechoslovakia, Alpári received the task of leading the work in the Czech movement. It was done in close coordination with the Berlin bureau of the CI, which represented the main node of the Comintern apparatus in Central Europe at this time. It also "*morally and materially*" supported Alpári's mission in Czechoslovakia.⁵¹

46 A delegation of Comintern plenipotentiaries came to Berlin at the beginning of March 1921 with the aim of pushing the German communists to organize an uprising. Apart from Kun it included J. Pogány and the Pole August Guralski. BROUÉ, ref. 44, 493; SAKMYSTER, ref. 20, loc. 1160.

47 SERŽ, Viktor. *Ot revolucii k totalitarizmu. Vospominania revolucionera. (From revolution to totalitarianism. Memoirs of a revolutionary.)*. Moskva : NPC „Praksis“; Orenburg: „Orengburskaja kniga“, 2001, p. 167-168. ISBN 5901606051.

48 SAKMYSTER, ref. 20, loc. 1251.

49 Rossijskij gosudarsvennyj archiv social'noj i političeskoj istorii, (Russian State Archive of Social and Political History) Moscow (hereinafter RGASPI), f. 495, opis (hereinafter op.) 71, delo (hereinafter d.) 34., list (hereinafter l.) 7. Copy of one of the letters "from various persons" for the ECI on the organization of the CP of Czechoslovakia. Dated 26 April 1921.

50 BOROS, Ferenc. K vzťahom maďarskej komunistickej emigrácie a československej marxistickej ľavice. On relations between the Hungarian communist exiles and the Czechoslovak Marxist left.). In *Historický časopis*, 1959, year 7, no. 4, p. 529, note 22. ISSN 0018-2575. Ferenc Boros wrote the most extensive work on the theme of relations between the Hungarian and Czechoslovak communist movements in Czechoslovakia after 1918: BOROS, Ferenc. *Magyar-csehszlovák kapcsolatok 1918–1921-ben*. Budapest : Akadémiai Kiadó, 1970.

51 RGASPI, f. 495, op. 71, d. 34, l. 7. The CI secretariat in Berlin (the co-called Berlin bureau) had key importance in the distribution of finance from Moscow in Central Europe in the first years of the formation

Apart from their authority, Comintern emissaries had considerable amounts of money with which to gain adherents among editors and functionaries of the movement, radicalize the situation in county and district organizations and provoke a massive campaign in the press in support of the party joining the Comintern.⁵² Alpári developed his activity not only in Prague, but also in other centres of the radical Marxist left such as Kladno, Brno and Hodonín.⁵³ An effort to isolate the leader of the Czech Marxist Left Bohumír Šmeral led to the financing of a campaign to discredit him, in which the Comintern emissaries endeavoured to gain the support of other leading representatives of the movement.⁵⁴

The solution of the “Czechoslovak question” culminated on German soil in two secret meetings between representatives of the Czech party and Hungarian communist exiles with the role of plenipotentiaries of the CI, held in Berlin and Dresden. According to the memories of a participant, the second, an illegal meeting of representatives of the Marxist left with Béla Kun in April, already only “clarified the details”: the date of the congress, composition of the executive committee of the new party, the editors of the main newspapers and magazines and actions in the trade union.⁵⁵

Although the activity of the Hungarian communists in the role of Comintern emissaries contributed to accelerated development of the Czech Marxist left, which finally culminated in the establishment of a Communist Party in Czechoslovakia, their influence was limited to the top level of the organization and elite functionaries of the movement. The influence of the Hungarian communist exiles was much wider, more fundamental and visible in the eastern part of Czechoslovakia. A further regional centre of the communist movement – Vienna – already intervened in developments here. Berlin had a direct and radicalizing influence on the German social democratic movement of northern and western Bohemia through the permeable Czechoslovak – German frontier. Similarly, Vienna with its Hungarian communist community had an even stronger and more direct impact on the movement in Slovakia.

of the communist organizational system. On this: BENKO, Juraj. *Sovietske Rusko, Komintern a financovanie komunistického hnutia v strednej Európe (1917 – 1922)*. (Soviet Russia, the Comintern and financing of the communist movement in Central Europe (1917–1922)). In KALOUS Jan – KOCIAN Jiří (eds.) *Český a slovenský komunismus (1921–2011)*. Prague : Ústav pro soudobé dějiny AV ČR : Ústav pro studium totalitních režimů, 2012, p. 317–332. ISBN 9788072851560

- 52 Letter from a commercial representative of Soviet Russia Pavel N. Mostovenko to Grigory V. Čičerin. RGASPI, f. 495, op. 71, d. 15, l. 22–26.
- 53 RGASPI, f. 495, op. 71, d. 34, l. 7; HÁJEK – MEJDROVÁ, ref. 44, p. 408.
- 54 RGASPI, f. 495, op. 71, d. 15, l. 22–26. B. Šmeral attempted to preserve the greatest degree of autonomy in development in the decision making of the Czechoslovak Marxist left, but the 21 conditions for joining the Communist International significantly reduced the autonomy of affiliated parties. He preferred a mass, self-sufficient party and delayed the establishment of a Communist Party to an extreme degree until May 1921. He was seen as a serious obstacle by the leadership of the Comintern in spring 1921.
- 55 Alpári and Karl Kreibich represented the German Marxist left in Czechoslovakia at the meeting. GOROVSKÝ, Karel. O založení KSČ – drážďanská konference v dubnu 1921. (On the establishment of the CPC – the Dresden conference of April 1921. In *Revue dějin socialismu*, 1968, year 1, no. 2; HÁJEK – MEJDROVÁ, ref. 44, p. 430, note 402.

Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia

The operating space

The central interest of the exiled Temporary Central Committee of the CPH formed in Vienna early in 1920 was the revival of the movement in Hungary, overthrow of the Horthy regime and resurrection of the revolution. In comparison with the surrounding states Horthy's Hungary had the most difficult conditions for any political and organizational work and the most severe persecution not only of the communists but also of other socialists. In spite of this, the Hungarian communist exiles regarded Hungary and its capital Budapest as the traditional heart of the workers' movement and the natural centre for the coming socialist revolution in the territory of the former Kingdom of Hungary. They were convinced that revolutionary outbreaks would soon come in the whole of Central Europe, and they interpreted developments in their homeland from this point of view. Millenarian expectations were widespread in the whole communist movement in the first post-war years, and the metaphor of the quickly spreading revolutionary fire in Europe had extraordinary influence on the imagination and discourse of the communist revolutionaries.⁵⁶

In a period of unclear frontiers but clear revolutionary visions, the Trans-Leithanian space represented an undivided territory for the representatives of the Hungarian communist exiles. The range of activity of the exiled CPH also corresponded to this. It extended deep into the territory of the successor states in the years following the defeat of the HSR and the brief consolidation of forces in exile. The Hungarian communists approached the whole of the former territory of the Kingdom of Hungary as a single field of operations. Apart from the new post-war Hungary, it included territories beyond the recently drawn frontiers, especially Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, Slovakia and part of Rumania.

The views of the Hungarian communists on the current situation and revolutionary possibilities in the territories that belonged to the Kingdom of Hungary up to 1918 had weight and considerable influence in Moscow. In the Comintern they gained a reputation for expertise on Central European matters. Their perception of the former Kingdom of Hungary as a compact and "natural" unit, predestined to be revived in a future federal socialist Europe, also influenced the chairman of the ECI G. Zinoviev.⁵⁷

In spite of this vision, one of the primary strategic aims of the Moscow leadership of the Comintern was to create a united communist party in each existing state. In the end, the activity of the Hungarian communist exiles in the successor states of the former Kingdom of Hungary faced a dilemma. On one side, the frontiers of the new states were nothing other obstacles in the work of reuniting the historic Hungarian territory, but on the other, the Hungarian exiles became leaders of the process of creating united, multi-national parties in each of the hated successor states – Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia – in accordance with Comintern instructions from the beginning of 1920.⁵⁸

56 The novel with biographical elements by Béla Illés gives eloquent testimony to the millenarian atmosphere prevailing among the Hungarian communist emigrants during the first years of exile. ILLÉS, Béla. *Hoří Tisa. (The Tisa is burning.)*. Praha : SNPL, 1960.

57 ŠUCHOVÁ, Heslo, ref. 26, p. 30.

58 MCLOUGHLIN – LEIDINGER – MORITZ, ref. 15, p. 235-236.

Tasks and aims

Signs of increased political activity began to appear among the Hungarian exiles in Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia at the end of 1919. This was directly connected with the revived activity of the centre of the Communist Party of Hungary in Vienna, which was attempting to stimulate and coordinate the organization of the communist movement in this region.

Encouragement of the communist exiles scattered across Central Europe was one of the essential tasks of the exiled CPH. Its programme included building up connections with the communist or social democrat organizations in the territories of the surrounding states and ideologically directing the socialist movement in its places of activity towards the programme of the Third International.⁵⁹ On the last day of 1919 a representative of the Vienna bureau of the CI József Krasny wrote about the first results of the CPH centre in exile in the conclusion of a report on the situation in Central Europe: *"They ask me to report that a Communist Party is being organized in Slovakia and it will cooperate with the Hungarians."*⁶⁰

The Vienna leadership of the CPH entrusted the work in Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia to its representatives who had their birthplace or right of residence there. This secured their authorization to reside and move in the republic, which was an important pre-condition for activity within the frontiers of the state.⁶¹ It gave them basic cover for their activity and some security against the efforts of the Czechoslovak authorities to free themselves from troublesome radicals by the familiar methods: deportation, internment or imprisonment.⁶² According to the memoirs of Dezider Pór, personal documents confirming citizenship in Slovakia enabled penetration into the structures of the social democratic organizations. People with the right qualifications also gained party or trade union functions, and as Pór adds "there were more than a few of them".⁶³

Many representatives of the HSR and the CPH in exile had birthplaces or rights of residence in the territory of the newly formed Czechoslovakia. They included B. Illés, E. Seidler, E. Pór, D. Pór, G. Krausz, Ármin Seiden, Ivan Mondok, Rezső Fiedler, Ferenc Hajtai, László Sajó, József Kázmér and János Mácza. After short stays in Vienna, whether interned or free, they began to appear in Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia with instructions and in connection with the CPH.⁶⁴

59 Emigrants fell under the Vienna centre of the Communist Party of Hungary. It did not have Austrian members. According to reports of a representative of the Vienna bureau B. Szántó addressed to the ECI, it had 61 groups in Austria, Germany, Italy, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia in 1921. RGASPI, f. 498, op. 1., d. 23, l. 51.

60 RGASPI, f. 498. op. 1, d. 3.

61 On the relations between citizenship, and right of residence after the formation of Czechoslovakia see: GABZDILOVÁ, Soňa. Maďarská menšina a štátne občianstvo Československej republiky (1918–1926). (The Hungarian minority and citizenship of the Czechoslovak Republic (1918–1926).). In BENKO, Juraj et al. *Občan a štát v moderných dejinách Slovenska*. Bratislava : Historický ústav Slovenskej akadémie vied, 2010, p. 111. ISBN 9788089396085.

62 NAČR, f. PMV-AMV 225, c. 278, a. j. 12, sign. 9592/1920.

63 NAČR Prague, f. František Dezider Pór, c. 3.

64 After being released from internment E. Seidler organized the sending of Hungarian communist exiles from Vienna to Slovakia. In October 1920 he also went to Užhorod, where he had right of residence. He

At first the state apparatus was not sufficiently consolidated to effectively map, identify and deal with the “anti-state activity” of the communist immigrants. Even in the first half of 1920 there was not an adequate overview of their activities or records of them, although after August 1919 further leaders of the exiled CPH appeared for longer or shorter periods in the territories of Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia apart from those mentioned above. They included E. Landler, J. Pogány, G. Lukács, Ede Chlepkó, J. Hirossik, B. Vagó, Deszö Szilagyí, János Gyetvay, Károlyi Garai and János Lékai.⁶⁵

The background

The emissaries from Vienna found a firm social and ethnic background for their activities especially in the strong and influential Hungarian and Hungarian – German social democratic organizations.

The Vienna centre secured for its emissaries problem-free merging into their new environment also by means of mandates and directives for the local organizations, on the basis of which communist exiles succeeded in placing themselves in factory trade unions, political organizations and editorial offices of the party.⁶⁶ After infiltrating the domestic organizations, they remained in close contact with the Vienna communist centre, and especially they followed its tactical directives. The representatives of the Vienna CPH strove to use their authority and their intellectual and organizational abilities to radicalize the social democratic movement in the spirit of the programme of the Third International.

The centres of socialist radicalism in which Hungarian communists in exile made themselves at home and quickly gained influence, namely Bratislava, Komárno, Lučenec, Košice and Užhorod, were exactly the towns where the main part of the socially uprooted Hungarian exiles had settled. They were also the influential centres of German and Hungarian social democracy. These towns immediately became the main centres for the spread of the principles of the communist programme to the periphery of the movement, to Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, eastern, southern and south-western Slovakia and beyond.

Regular communication by courier was established between the Vienna regional centre and the Hungarian exile centres in Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. Communist newspapers, magazines and brochures, organizational and political directives and not least financial resources came from Vienna to the periphery of the movement in this way. Mainly information flowed back.

Ideological cohesion

The constellation of publications, which the Vienna centre of the CPH published and illegally distributed to the neighbouring states, secured the ideological cohesion of the communist movement in the former territory of the Kingdom of Hungary. The newspa-

participated in organizing the communist movement in Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia and stayed there until March 1923. SNA Bratislava, PR-B, kr. 1152, spis Seidler Arnošt.

65 PROVAZNÍK, Dušan. *K dejinám robotníckeho hnutia v Bratislave 1918 – 1929. (On the history of the workers' movement in Bratislava 1918–1929)*. Bratislava : s. n., 1969, p. 103.

66 BOROS, K. *vzt'ahom*, ref. 50, p. 535.

pers, leaflets, magazines and brochures published under the patronage of the CPH in exile became an authoritative source of the communist ideology in the territory of the former Kingdom of Hungary. This applied especially to the fortnightly magazine of the Communist Party of Hungary in Vienna *Proletár*. It began to appear in June 1920 with J. Pogány, B. Kun, J. Landler and G. Lukács as its editors. It became the ideological centre of the communist movement also for Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. Considerable attention was devoted to its maintenance whether it was printed in Vienna or in Kladno.⁶⁷ The discourse it presented was spread further by means of the domestic Hungarian and German language publications of the social democratic left, especially the *Kassai Munkás* of Kosice, *Népszava* or *Volkstimme* of Bratislava and *Munkáslap* of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia.⁶⁸ The authors of the articles in *Proletár* (B. Kun, L. Rudas, E. Varga, B. Szántó, J. Pogány, E. Landler) were revolutionary veterans of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, who belonged not only to the authorities of the communist movement in Central Europe, but already also to the active members of the Comintern apparatus.

In spite of the narrow circle of publishers, the *Proletár* had an international impact. It was transported into Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Rumania, where it found readers mainly among the numerous Hungarian speaking population. Slovakia, especially its south-western, southern and south-eastern parts with urban centres such as Bratislava, Komárno, Nové Zámky, Lučenec and Košice, represented both a transit country and a destination for the distribution of the *Proletár*.

Apart from the *Proletár*, other brochures by Russian or German authors translated into Hungarian as well as works written by the exiled Hungarian communists themselves flowed from Vienna into the eastern part of the Czechoslovak Republic. The ideological contraband came by various routes and methods, also according to the degree to which individual titles were banned from transport by rail or post and from sale. However, they were most frequently transported on the shoulders of selected couriers, chosen and paid directly by the Vienna centre or by trusted people in Czechoslovakia.⁶⁹ Transportation through the territory of Czechoslovakia had its bases with people in south Moravia, Bratislava and other towns mostly in the south and east of Slovakia. Publications reached Hungary and Rumania through the frontiers of Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. The transportation channels and illegal distribution network were discovered by the police from time to time and had to be created again.

The *Proletár* remained an influential instrument of the exiled Hungarian communists in spite of prohibition from January 1921 and the establishment of the Communist Party

67 At a time when distribution of the *Proletár* was prohibited in Czechoslovakia (11 Jan 1921) it was already printed in Kladno. It was typeset in Vienna, asbestos proofs were made from the type and smuggled to Kladno, where the magazine was printed. According to the reports of a police informer in Bratislava in January 1921: The *Proletár* is now prepared under the responsibility of the editor and publisher L. Kreutz in Liberec. PR-B, c. 254, sign. 388, mat 77/1.

68 The leftist oriented socialist magazines in the Hungarian and German languages in the period of growing differentiation of the Hungarian-German socialist movement in summer 1920 still included the weekly or fortnightly publications *Népakarat* of Lučenec and *Testvériség* of Nitre. DUHAJOVÁ, Zuzana. Tlač marxistickej ľavice na Slovensku v rokoch 1918 – 1920. (The Marxist press in Slovakia, 1918–1920.). In *Otázky novinárstva*, 1959, p. 226.

69 NAČR Prague, f. PMV-AMV 225, k. 1455, a. j. 4.

of Czechoslovakia. Smuggling it across frontiers was a frequent offence for which communist couriers were arrested. They included relatively unknown persons, but also functionaries of the movement in Slovakia and members of the Hungarian communist elite.⁷⁰

Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia 1920–1921

The strategic importance that the Vienna centre of the CPH attributed to Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia also corresponded to the geopolitical perception of the Trans-Leithania region and the revolutionary expectations. It had an important place in the plans of the Hungarian communists in Vienna. A conference of the so-called south-eastern bureau of the Comintern was held in the Austrian capital at the beginning of 1920. Among other things, the participants were concerned with the question of establishing a propagandist centre “in the north-eastern corner of Hungary”. As the representatives of the bureau reported to Moscow, *“the Hungarian party has comrades who know the place and people and are skilled in agrarian agitation, from which they have developed the aim of creating a small centre there from which to operate in Hungary, Transylvania, Slovakia and Galicia. Communication with Vienna is easily organizable through Košice and Pressburg. Great agitation has not been organized there already only because of the limited resources of the Hungarian party”*.⁷¹

The eastern tip of Czechoslovakia was also the nearest to Soviet Russia. At a time when the idea of revolutionary expansion to the west strongly resounded not only among Hungarian communists, but also among Russian Bolsheviks, work in Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia had a strategic justification. From early spring 1920 representatives of the exiled Hungarian communists such as E. Chlepkó, B. Illés, L. Sajó and I. Mondok attempted to develop intensive political activity here. They found an organizational basis in the local centres of the Social Democratic Party. In relation to the expectation of the early arrival of the revolution, the work centred on a propaganda campaign by the Third International and cooperating with local Hungarian, Ukrainian or Russian radicals to build up centres capable of participating in a coup or uprising. Organizations founded under the name International Socialist Party in towns such as Užhorod, Mukačevo and Berehovo or industrial centres such as Perečany, Svaljava and Dlhé,⁷² promoted, as in Slovakia, a programme based on slogans of immediate revolution, dictatorship of the proletariat, workers’ and peasants’ councils. The feverish expectation of the arrival of revolutionary armies from the east culminated especially in August 1920. Artillery from Galicia

70 NAČR, Prague, f. F. D. Pór, c. 3.

71 Report from the Vienna bureau to the Executive Committee of the Third International from 19 January 1920. RGASPI, f. 498, op.1, d. 1, l. 4. The share of the Hungarian communist exiles in shaping the communist movement in Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia was covered in most detail by: KREMPA, Ivan. *Za internacionálnu jednotu revolučného hnutia v Československu. Podiel slovenského a zakarpatského robotníckeho hnutia na utvorení KSČ (1919–1921)*. (For the international unity of the revolutionary movement in Czechoslovakia. The share of the Slovak and Sub-Carpathian workers’ movement in creating the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (1919–1921).). Bratislava : Pravda, 1975, 424 pages.

72 More were added after the departure of the Rumanians from the eastern part of the territory in summer 1920: Akna-Slatina, Veľký Bočkov and Huszt. RGASPI, Moscow, f. 495, op. 71, d. 30, l. 5n. Newsletters from the Communist Party of Trans-Carpathian Ukraine May – Dec 1921.

accompanying the Red Army offensive into Poland could be heard every day in the north of the territory.⁷³

The building up of solid bases for the party and trade unions played a secondary role.⁷⁴ For this reason, continuity in building up the party suffered from considerable fluctuations in this initial period.⁷⁵ Military dictatorship continued here until 1923, and the Czechoslovak authorities used its possibilities and instruments in the struggle against the local communists and nationalists. They quickly expelled from the territory of the republic the incoming radicals from the CPH, who often had false identity documents, as “subversive exiled elements”.

Frequent interruptions in the flow of financial subsidies also threatened the existence of the communist movement in Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. As a result of its weak economic base, it was dependent on support from Moscow, Vienna and later Prague. The fragmented movement could not be centralized in 1920. Mutual communication was limited in the relatively difficult conditions. It was strongly affected by factional tension and cooperation between the individual centres was weak.⁷⁶ After extensive arrests after a strike in December 1920, the communist movement in this eastern tip of the republic practically ceased to exist.

A turnaround in organization came during a second wave of activity of the Hungarian communist exiles in Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. E. Seidler took over leadership of the communist movement in May 1921. He endeavoured to build up a centralized and disciplined organization in harmony with the organizational principles of the Third International.⁷⁷ However, Seidler’s plans struck against the basic limitations of this outlying region: shortage of qualified and organized cadres, small number of industrial workers who formed only a tiny percentage of the population, chronic shortage of finance and information as well as total isolation from other parts of the Czechoslovak movement. Although in autumn 1921 Seidler expressed the hope that “*in relation to its geographical position Ruthenia had not lost its international importance*” in the communist movement,⁷⁸ the situation was already different to that in 1920. Prague became the centre for organizing the communist movement in the whole republic even before the merging congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in autumn 1921. Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia suffered the fate of a periphery in the new strategic constellation of 1921.

Slovakia 1920–1921

The possibilities for organizing a communist movement in Slovakia were different to those in Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. Although nationally divided into Czecho-Slovak and Hungarian-German parts, the social democratic movement had more solid organizational foundations here. On the other hand, a freer political regime prevailed here at the time of

73 NAČR, f. PMV-AMV 225-101-35, sign. 17863/1920.

74 NAČR, f. PMV-AMV 225, c. 101, a. j. 17, sign. 27101/21. Letter from E. Seidler to B. Kun.

75 RGASPI, Moskva, f. 495, op. 71, d. 30, l. 5n. Newsletters from the Communist Party of Trans-Carpathian Ukraine May – Dec 1921.

76 Ref. 75.

77 NAČR, f. PMV-AMV 225, c. 101, a. j. 17, sign. 27101/21. Letter from E. Seidler to B. Kun.

78 Ref. 77.

the penetration of the former representatives of the HSR. Assembly was also facilitated here with the approach of the parliamentary elections of April 1920 and the relaxation of the military dictatorship.

From early spring to late autumn 1920, the Hungarian communist exiles became the most important and most agile group of representatives of the programme of the Third International in Slovakia.⁷⁹ They initiated many assemblies and substantially influenced the programme and aims of the domestic social democrat movement, especially in the Hungarian and German speaking environments. The development of events followed more or less the same scenario in the individual regional centres. The programme and slogans of the communist movement actively presented by leading Hungarian exiles at meetings, assemblies and in the press, gained adherents among the local industrial workers and small farmers. They offered a way forward from the difficult social situation expressed in the radical communist vocabulary and a revolutionary programme representing the Moscow Third International.⁸⁰ Strategy was also subordinated to the revolutionary aim. Coercive strikes and wage disputes not only in industry, but also in another important sphere of wage labour in Slovakia – agriculture – dominated the strategy.

Among the domestic population, the radical vocabulary and revolutionary programme addressed especially the youngest generation of workers. The rapid formation and organization of the Communist Youth League in 1920 was one of the most significant successes of the Hungarian communist exiles.⁸¹ Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia fell under the responsibility of the sub-secretariat of the Young Communists' International (YCI) in Vienna.⁸² It closely cooperated with the Hungarian secretariat for young communists headed by József Kázmér and János Léka.⁸³ The representative of the league in Slovakia was Georg Krausz. Krausz together with J. Kázmér, L. Rudas and Károly Garai founded the organization in Košice, which became the centre for the youth movement in Slovakia.⁸⁴ The youth organizations did not have official autonomy but were attached to the political organizations of the Social Democratic Party. They operated in public as a firm part of the party, but the young members formed a large pressure group. They most enthusiastically supported adoption of the programme of the Third International brought by the Hungarian radicals.

79 SNA Bratislava, f. The Marxist left in Slovakia, collection no. 5, a. j. 58, Kommunismus na Slovensku od prevratu do konce května 1921 (Communism in Slovakia from the revolution to the end of May 1921), (worked out by O. Liška, typescript, photocopy).

80 ZELENÁK, Peter. Maďarská sociálna demokracia na Slovensku. (Hungarian social democracy in Slovakia.). In *Kapitoly z dejín sociálnej demokracie na Slovensku*. (col. auth.). Bratislava : T.R.I. Médium, 1996, p. 181.

81 The communist youth movement in Slovakia existed in the years 1920–1921 under the name Ifjumunkások Szlovenszkói Szövetsége (Zväz socialistickej robotníckej mládeže Slovenska – League of Socialist Workers Youth of Slovakia).

82 Apart from the central executive committee of the YCI in Berlin there were four sub-secretariats situated in Moscow, Basel, Stockholm and Vienna. The Balkan and Central European countries including Poland and eastern Galicia fell under the Vienna branch. MCLOUGHLIN – LEIDINGER – MORITZ, ref. 15, p. 134.

83 NAČR, f. PMV, c. 51, sign. IV/K/44/1. The Communist Party of Austria from 1918.

84 RGASPI Moscow, f. 495, op. 71, d. 37.

The attempt at a “palace coup” at the centre of the Social Democratic Party in Košice in April and May 1920 was a typical event in the development of socialist radicalism in Slovakia. It represented the culmination of the growing influence of the Hungarian exiles such as Á. Seiden, L. Sajó, D. Szilagyí and J. Gyetvay in the local organization. Some of them established themselves directly in the leadership and Seiden was elected political secretary of the party. In June 1920 the Košice Social Democratic Party was renamed the Košice Socialist Party. The change of name was intended to express a change of political orientation. The party defined itself against the reformist social democratic policy and parliamentary democracy.⁸⁵

A similar seizure of the leadership and fundamental change of programme also happened at the other end of Slovakia, namely the Bratislava centre of the Hungarian-German Social Democrats, as well as in southern Slovakia at Komárno. The decisions of the centres of the Hungarian and German social democratic movement on joining the Moscow centre had a far-reaching influence on regional and local meetings of the party in eastern, southern and south-western Slovakia.

The influence of the Hungarian exiles in the Hungarian-German communist movement in former northern Hungary rapidly increased until autumn 1920. It was manifested especially at congresses of the radical left from the whole of Slovakia. The revolutionary International Socialist Party was established at a conference in Košice at the end of June with the ideological assistance of the Hungarian radicals. It aimed to unite behind a new platform all the nationalities in the territory of Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia as far as they supported the programme of the Third International. The new party with its centre in Košice, organizational base mainly in eastern Slovakia and sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, ability to influence a large part of Slovakia and position under the influence of the Vienna CPH represented a strong and influential alternative to the Czech Marxist left, which had difficulty establishing itself as leader of the radical socialist movement in the eastern part of the republic. The congress of the Slovak Marxist left at Martin in September 1920 only confirmed its influence. Apart from the fact that the congress represented the culmination of the division in the social democrats of Slovakia, it also showed the position to which Hungarian radicals had taken the revolutionary left in Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia in the course of 1920. Some of the Slovak participants, including the Slovak national leadership of the Social Democrats walked out of the congress in protest over singing of the Internationale in Hungarian. They did not succeed in getting discussions organized in separate nationality sections and so preventing the “Hungarians and German asserting their majority position among the supporters of communism”.⁸⁶

The Hungarian communist elite ignored the post-war organization of Central Europe with the establishment of Czechoslovakia, and they did not establish much connection with the Prague centre of the Czechoslovak Marxist left. Like the representatives of the

85 SNA Bratislava, f. The Marxist left in Slovakia, collection no. 5, a. j. 58, Kommunismus na Slovensku od prevratu do konce května 1921.

86 ŠUCHOVÁ, Xénia. Sociálna demokracia na Slovensku v prvých rokoch Československa (1918 – 1920). (Social Democracy in Slovakia in the first years of Czechoslovakia (1918–1920).). In *Kapitoly*, ref. 80, p. 134.

Comintern, they considered it not “revolutionary” enough, too “centrist” and “opportunistic”. Břetislav Hůla, an organizer of the communist movement among the prisoners in Russia and one of the representatives of the Czech communists in Moscow, informed the Comintern about the weak influence of the Prague centre on developments in Slovakia and about the conflict between the two strategies in this former Hungarian territory, in a letter from 9 November 1920 after his return to Czechoslovakia. He also pointed to a change in this situation: *“Thanks to the special conditions of the proletariat in Slovakia, workers are going from one strike to another. Recently there was a general strike in reaction to the act on exiles, but it failed and the exiles are being expelled from Slovakia. As a result of the fact that almost all actions start without the knowledge of the Marxist Left, with which they maintain hardly any contact, the Marxist Left proposes to the ECI or to the Little Bureau that they should solve the question of whether it would be desirable to have an authoritative statement on the responsibility of the Marxist Left also for the Slovak movement and the Czechoslovak movement in general, rather than the present situation in which the Hungarian comrades do not consider the movement in the Czech Lands and pursue their own aims. In my view a paper signed by Kun, Varga and Rudnyánszky in the spirit of the wishes of the Marxist Left would help to clarify all the disputed questions.”*⁸⁷

As Hůla pointed out, the failure to organize an extensive strike represented a turning point in this development. The ambitious strike action was declared at the beginning of October 1920. It was provoked by state interventions against foreign citizens and their expulsion from Slovakia. The centres of strike unrest in south-western Slovakia were isolated and neutralized by the already relatively consolidated state authorities before they could spread to the whole territory. The centres of the communist movement in the Czech Lands remained restrained. They refused to support the strike.⁸⁸ The failure of the October strike seriously shook the position the Hungarian communists had gained in Slovakia. It pointed to the limits of the focus of communism in the east of the Czechoslovak Republic and the limited potential of the Vienna centre to further unite the radical socialist movement in Slovakia. An excessively autonomous political group oriented towards the “Hungarian world” began to be confronted during the autumn and winter with a Prague centred movement committed to a Czechoslovak conception. Ružomberok became the Slovak centre of this movement, and the Regional Trade Union Council (RTUC) took up the role of coordinating further Slovak actions in cooperation with the Czech Marxist Left. In the second half of 1920, Ružomberok and Banská Bystrica represented a Prague oriented centre of leftist opposition among the social democrats of Slovakia. From September 1920 Ružomberok was the seat of the newspaper of the Slovak Marxist Left *Pravda chudoby* (Truth for the Poor) and later also of the Regional executive committee

87 RGASPI, f. 495, op. 71, d. 5, l. 8.

88 Brno was the only centre in the Czech part of the republic where the declaration of a general strike found a response. In Prague a courier from Bratislava who asked for strikes in Prague and Liberec was rejected. The Brno paper *Rovnost* (Equality) published the full text of an appeal to all the socialist parties in Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia to join the Bratislava strike. The strike organized by the radical exiled elements did not gain support from the more moderate Czech Marxist Left. PROVAZNÍK, ref. 65, p. 119-120.

of the Marxist Left. With the aim of uniting the communist movement in Slovakia, the RTUC organized a congress of organizations declaring a communist programme in Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. It was held at Ľubochňa on 16 January 1921. The delegates to the congress accepted the 21 conditions for joining the Third International. Although the participants in the Hungarian section generally surpassed the other participants in their organizational and theoretical competence,⁸⁹ this event, which actually represented the establishment of the Communist Party of Slovakia, was already fully under the control of the Slovak Marxist Left, which became the leader of the communist movement in the country.⁹⁰

In any case, the movement formed and led by the Hungarian communist exiles maintained its significant influence and autonomous position in the territory of Slovakia practically until the achievement of one of its main aims, namely the definitive merging of the autonomous communist organizations into a united Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in autumn 1921. The Hungarian communist exiles made an essential contribution to the establishment of a multi-national Communist Party in Czechoslovakia, whether in the function of elite cadres of the Comintern or in the position of active agitators and organizers, who significantly contributed to the rapid radicalization of the social democratic movement in the eastern half of the Czechoslovak Republic.

Conclusion

In 1920–1921 the Hungarian communist exiles successfully attempted to transfer the communist programme of the Third International from the outside environment into the domestic socialist movement in Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. By means of illegal communication and distribution channels, conspiratorial connections, local organizational and agitation work, the Hungarian radicals brought it into public discourse and party discussion in the areas of their activity. They found fertile ground for the programme of communist revolution and a strong background especially in the Hungarian and German socialist movements. With a little exaggeration it is possible to say that a foreign anti-state ideology was “recycled” in domestic organizations, which became the bearers and spreaders of the imported communist programme in the network of social democratic organizations and among the general public. The Vienna centre of the CPH spread

89 As Z. Holotíková stated after decades of flourishing research into the history of the CPC, “*the preparation and course of the Ľubochňa congress [...] relatively faithfully reflected the state of the Marxist outlook and level of the different ethnic components of the movement. The Hungarian members of the Marxist Left were undoubtedly the most alert organizers and agitators, and they had also reached a relatively high level in the field of theoretical education. [...] The Ľubochňa congress directly showed the initiative of the Hungarian delegates in the level of the resolution they prepared for their section. The resolution became the basis for a proposed resolution of the whole congress on the organizational work of the party.*” *Prehľad dejín KSČ na Slovensku. (General history of the CPC in Slovakia.)* (scientific ed. Viliam Plevza). Bratislava : Nakladateľstvo Pravda, 1971, p. 114.

90 I have not been concerned in this study with details of the Slovak radical socialist and communist movement. Its formation and radicalization had parameters, centres, assumptions and leaders different from those of the Hungarian – German movement. However, this did not mean that there was no communication and connection between them.

its influence through the centres of the communist movement to the whole territory of Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia.

However, the great period of influence of the Hungarian exiles in Czechoslovakia and Central Europe ended in 1921. The revolutionary wave was retreating and the new system in Central Europe becoming consolidated. The Bolshevik leaders in Moscow reflected this. The relations between Soviet Russia and the West warmed and the policy of the Third International also changed. The failure of the uprising in Germany in March 1921 meant the defeat of the “theory of attack”. The years of the revolutionary offensive ended and the strategy changed from spontaneous revolutionary struggle to patient siege. The centres of the communist movement in Central Europe shifted. The Comintern organizational system was forced to take into account the post-war status quo with new states and frontiers. On the basis of the principle declared by the CI of “one state – one party”, a united party for the whole of Czechoslovakia was formed in 1921. Prague became the organizational and political centre for the communist movement in the whole republic. The representatives of the Hungarian communists in exile had to accept the new situation whether they liked it or not. However, they remained a principled opposition to the “opportunist” leaders in Prague and Bucharest.⁹¹ The influence of the Vienna CPH definitely weakened in Slovakia. At the same time, the Czechoslovak regime was freed from the disturbance of the post-war crisis and provisional arrangements. The security apparatus strengthened and post-war migration stopped. Members of the Hungarian communist exiled community became naturalized in their places of residence and adapted to the existing movement, or they ended their journeys after a time in the Soviet Union.

Change did not happen only in the environment where the Hungarian communist exiles worked. There were also significant changes in its political centre. Factional struggles with deep roots in the CPH had long marked the existence of the party in exile. At the beginning of 1921, the latent ideological, political and personal disputes, existing within the CPH from the beginning, began to be expressed more clearly in the leadership and functioning of the party. There were two main opposing factions: one concentrated around B. Kun and the other led by J. Landler, and after his death in 1928 by his close associates Georg Lukács and József Révai.⁹² From autumn 1921, the dispute also raged on the pages of the party press – the Moscow *Vörös Ujság* and Vienna *Proletár*.⁹³

The conflict was primarily manifested in the sphere of theory and political strategy. It was directed towards the question of an adequate approach to building up the party in Hungary. Kun’s “Russian” group demanded the transfer of the centre of the party to Hungary and directing illegal work there in close connection with Moscow.⁹⁴ Kun demanded the transfer of the Central Committee from “polluted” and “decadent” Vienna

91 MCLOUGHLIN – LEIDINGER – MORITZ, ref. 15, p. 236.

92 CHASE, William J. Microhistory and Mass Repression: Politics, Personalities, and Revenge in the Fall of Béla Kun. In *The Russian Review*, 2008, year 67, no. 3, p. 463. ISSN 1467-9434.

93 SAKMYSTER, ref. 20, loc. 1048-1049.

94 PALMER, Bryan D. James P. Cannon and the Origins of the American Revolutionary Left: 1890–1928. Urbana : University of Illinois Press, 2007, s. 221-222. ISBN 0252077229.

to Hungary.⁹⁵ For Landler's group, this approach represented, in the words of G. Lukács "bureaucratic sectarianism", which did not take into account the situation in Hungary and risked the lives of party members. On the other hand, Landler's Vienna faction was applying an organizational conception that corresponded to the actual conditions in the country. It involved combining legal and illegal work.⁹⁶

Kun's group, which was in Moscow and had considerable influence there, had the upper hand in the factional struggle. The Moscow centre placed Kun in the editorial office of the Comintern magazine – *Komunistická internacionála*.⁹⁷ Kun's supporter J. Pogány was entrusted with running the party magazine *Proletár* in Vienna. On the other hand, publication of the "heretical" review *Kommunismus* was stopped in October 1921. The attempt of Landler's group to publish its own periodical with the traditional title *Vörös Újság*⁹⁸ also failed. Its first and last issue appeared in November 1921.

The Executive Committee of the Comintern repeatedly endeavoured to decree solutions to the disputes and split in the Hungarian party,⁹⁹ but without success. The long-term internal split in the party led to a general weakening and especially to loss of members and influence in the country that was its main subject of interest. It became a small exiled sect.¹⁰⁰

In spite of the disputes and personal animosities, the fates of members of the elite of the Hungarian Soviet Republic were again linked in the second half of the 1930s. If we look at the places and dates of death of this generation of Hungarian revolutionaries, the differences and disputes between them are overlaid especially by political trials, imprisonment and the labour camps of the Soviet Union, where the majority of them ended their revolutionary careers. They became victims of Stalin's purges. They were either condemned to death or to long sentences in the gulag. Hardly anybody, who had not already died, escaped investigation.¹⁰¹

95 MCLOUGHLIN – LEIDINGER – MORITZ, ref. 15, p. 237.

96 REES, John. Introduction. In LUKÁCS, Georg – ŽIŽEK, Slavoj. *A Defence of History and Class Consciousness: Tailism and the Dialectic*. London; New York : Verso, p. 33. ISBN 1859843700.

97 DUTSCHKE, ref. 9, p. 299.

98 *Vörös Újság* carried the sub-title *Magazine of the opposition group in the Communist Party of Hungary (section of the Third Internationale)*. HANAK, ref. 2, p. 52.

99 In December 1921 the Executive of the CI instructed the leadership of the CPH to end its quarrels and to stop writing about factional struggles and publishing political articles about them. Distribution of newspapers, leaflets and brochures other than the magazine *Proletár*, which was under the control of the Moscow group, was prohibited. RGASPI, f. 498, op. 1, d. 5, l. 10.

100 CHASE, ref. 92, p. 463.

101 The people mentioned in this study, who were at least imprisoned in the Soviet Union in the 1930s included: B. Kun, J. Pogány, E. Chlepkó, R. Fiedler, E. Pór, L. Sajó, B. Vágó, I. Mondok, B. Szántó, E. Seidler, K. Garay, L. Rudas, G. Lengyel, E. Bettelheim, D. Bokányi, A. Benkő.

UNGARISCHE KOMMUNISTISCHE EMIGRATION UND IHRE AUSWIRKUNGEN IN DEN JAHREN 1919 – 1921

JURAJ BENKO

Ungarische kommunistische Emigration versuchte während der sog. Revolutionswelle der Nachkriegszeit (1919 - 1921) mit Erfolg das Programm der III. Internationale vom Außen (Moskau, Berlin und Wien) in die heimische sozialistische Bewegung in der Slowakei und Karpatenukraine zu transferieren. Mittels illegaler Kommunikations- und Distributionskanäle, konspirativer Vernetzungen, lokaler Organisations- und Aufklärungsarbeit brachten es die ungarischen Radikale in den öffentlichen Diskurs und die Parteidiskussion in ihren Wirkungsstätten. Den Nährboden für das Programm der kommunistischen Revolution und einen starken Hintergrund fanden sie vor allem in der ungarischen und deutschen sozialistischen Bewegung. In dieser Umgebung formten sich wichtige Herde der kommunistischen Bewegung, wodurch die Wiener Zentrale der KPU seinen Einfluss auf die ganze Slowakei und Karpatenukraine ausübte und politisch und organisationsmäßig dem Prager Zentrum der marxistischen Linken konkurrierte. Der Einfluss der ungarischen Emigration in den Zentren der ungarisch-deutschen Demokratie nicht nur in der Ostslowakei, sondern auch in der West- und Südslowakei war sehr stark und die tschechischen marxistischen Linken konnten sich nur schwer durchsetzen.

Die große Einflussperiode der ungarischen Emigration in der Tschechoslowakei, sowie in Mitteleuropa beim Aufbau der kommunistischen Bewegung ging jedoch 1921 zu Ende. Die Revolutionswelle klang nach und das neue System in Mitteleuropa konsolidierte sich. Die Beziehungen zwischen Sowjetrussland und dem Westen verbesserten sich und schließlich änderte sich auch die Politik der III. Internationale – misslungener Aufstand in Deutschland im März 1921 bedeutete eine Niederlage der „Angriffstheorie“. Die Zeit der Revolutionsoffensive endete und in der Strategie wechselte man vom elementaren revolutionären „Drang“ zur geduldigen „Belagerung“. Die Zentren der kommunistischen Bewegung in Mitteleuropa verschoben sich. Das kominterne Organisationssystem wurde gezwungen, das Nachkriegs-Status-Quo mit den neuentstandenen Staaten und Staatsgrenzen zu akzeptieren. Aufgrund des von der KI erklärten Prinzips „ein Staat – eine Partei“ formte sich in der Tschechoslowakei 1921 eine einheitliche gesamtstaat-liche Partei. Zum politischen Organisationszentrum der kommunistischen Bewegung für die ganze Republik wurde Prag. Die ungarische kommunistische Partei im Exil versank zugleich tief in die Fraktionsstreitigkeiten, die in der 20er Jahren ihre Abschwächung zur Folge hatten und vor allem zu Mitgliedschafts- und Einflussverlusten in dem Land, an das sich ihr Hauptinteresse richtete – Ungarn, führte.

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SLOVAKIA

A EUROPEAN STORY

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GUSTÁV HUSÁK – FIRST SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA (1969–1970)

MICHAL ŠTEFANSKÝ

ŠTEFANSKÝ, Michal. Gustáv Husák – First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (1969–1970). *Historický časopis*, 2016, 64, 5, pp. 899-916, Bratislava.

The study analyses the political decisions of Gustáv Husák from his election to the position of first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in April 1969 until December 1970. On the basis of the original sources, it evaluates the development, in which important normalization measures were applied in the political leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The position on the so-called anti-socialist forces in the Communist party, rehabilitations, expulsion from the Communist Party, the policy of the “ultra-leftist forces” and evaluation of the developments before and after January 1968 were changed. G. Husák’s Normalization policy was carried out under pressure from Moscow, which supported the domestic conservative forces.

Key words: Gustáv Husák. Normalization. Presidium of the Central Committees of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and Communist Party of Slovakia. Ultra-leftist forces in the CPC. Expulsion from the CPC in 1970.

The commitments of Gustáv Husák given to Brežnev at Mukačevo before his election to the function of first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CC CPC) on 17 April 1969 and the support for his candidacy from the conservatives in return for being freed from suspicion of treason in August 1968, were two important factors defining the space for G. Husák’s decision making in his activity. In this way, the first man in the leadership of the Communist Part of Czechoslovakia was actually a man being tested. His position was not stable because he did not have the full support of the members of the presidium of the CC CPC. He was opposed by a strong conservative group of people like Vasil’ Biľak and Alojz Indra, who were allied with Moscow. Apart from this, the Soviet leadership sent its commissars Kuznecov, Semjonov and later Katušev to oversee the Normalization process. The representatives of the Central Group of the Soviet armies were constantly monitoring the situation and they became representatives of the united armed forces of the Warsaw Pact. Frequent visits to Czechoslovakia “in a framework of friendship” by Soviet trade union, youth and other organizations also fulfilled a function of monitoring the situation.

We do not know the specific content of the commitments to Brežnev at Mukačevo because the meeting was held on the initiative of Brežnev and considered strictly secret. A sort of picture of the commitments can be derived from Husák’s political measures in his new position. Brežnev probably agreed with the tactic of gradual steps without a rapid and radical solution to the question of Normalization, especially with regard for the meeting of communist and workers’ parties in June 1969. G. Husák’s words in the

conclusion of a speech after he was elected to the function of first secretary of the CC CPC can also be judged in this context. He said: *"We don't want to change our political conception, we don't want to change our political line, but we must significantly change our approach to this line and its implementation, we must organize the struggle for its fulfilment"*.¹ At the same time he denied abandoning the post-January policy, implementation of which was obstructed by forces, which sharpened the state of crisis.

Election of G. Husák with the support of members of the CC CPC did not provoke an unfavourable response from the public also because Alexander Dubček remained a member of the presidium of the CC CPC and held the function of chairman of the federal parliament. Only a small percentage of the population expressed support for the new secretary. People regarded protests as useless and dangerous, and the silent majority got bigger. The session of the CC CPC in April 1969 abolished the executive committee of the presidium of the CC CPC and elected an 11 member presidium of the CC CPC in which G. Husák could count on the support of Petr Colotka, Štefan Sádovský and Lubomír Štrougal, but the support of the others was no longer unambiguous.

G. Husák's first visit after his election as first secretary of the CC CPC was to Moscow for talks of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), where he received extraordinary of respect. He participated in talks with Soviet representatives together with Oldřich Černík and A. Indra. Moscow's satisfaction with Husák was expressed in a promise of economic assistance in the form of credit for the construction of the Prague metro and the introduction of colour television. Soviet helpfulness was expressed in stopping of the publication of *Správy (News)* – the newspaper of the Central Group of Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia, which contained sharp criticism of the pro-reform forces. In return for the promised assistance, Husák had to strive for unity with the conservatives in the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPC), intervene against the media and refuse to discuss the Czechoslovak question at the international meeting of communist and workers' parties. Husák convinced the Soviet representatives that a viable way to normalization could be "salami tactics", meaning the gradual silencing and normalization of the media and other social spheres according to Soviet ideas.

Gustáv Husák's views on the situation and further progress towards normalization can be found in the records of his discussions with János Kádár during his visit to Budapest on 15–16 May 1969.² Husák spoke of the causes of the political crisis in Czechoslovakia, which included the mistakes of Antonín Novotný and *"in 1968–69 Dubček and his associates further deepened the errors"*. Rightist and leftist factions appeared in the CPC. He thought that the presidium of the CC CPC elected at the session on 17 April

1 Zasedání Ústředního výboru Komunistické strany Československa 17. dubna 1969, Závěrečné slovo G. Husáka. (Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on 17 April 1969, Concluding words by G. Husák). In VONDROVÁ, Jitka – NAVRÁTIL, Jaromír. *Komunistická strana Československa, 9/4*. Praha; Brno : ÚSD, Doplněk, 2003, p. 343. ISBN 8072391544.

2 J. Kádár had a mediating role in the relations of the Soviet leadership to Czechoslovakia in 1968. He did not implement Soviet instructions and some of his views and evaluations of the situation did not agree with Soviet views. He met Dubček six times in 1968 and on 17 August immediately before the invasion he warned Dubček that he did not know the Soviets. After the invasion Kádár's mediating role ended. One of the reasons for this lay in the condemnation of Biľák for inviting the invasion.

1969 was able but the problem was that every member of the presidium “*wanted to go in a different direction,*” in other words the presidium was not united in views on the way forward. The leadership of the party should purge the regional and district committees of the party. Husák asked Kádár for advice on how to solve the following questions: Compromised leftist politicians had lost their credit and discredited socialism and themselves, but after January 1968 these politicians belonged to the opposition to Dubček, welcomed the arrival of the Soviet armed forces and claimed that development had proved them right. They escaped from responsibility for the deformation before 1968, and the leftists proposed mass expulsions from the party as the main solution to the crisis. According to Husák the military invasion happened because “*the brother parties did not have a deep knowledge of the situation in Czechoslovakia and got their information from a narrow group of Czechoslovak citizens*”. However, the situation had not matured to an evaluation of this question. The Soviet troops remained in Czechoslovakia and relocation to the frontier zone with the Federal Republic would make the real reason for their stay clearer.³

In his reply, J. Kádár stated that the Hungarian situation in 1956 and that of Czechoslovakia had both identical and different features. He described not participating in the Warsaw meeting of July 1968 as the greatest mistake with the negative consequences of deepening rightist tendencies and putting the Czechoslovak leadership in open opposition to the brother parties. Already during a meeting with Czechoslovak representatives in 1968, Kádár considered struggle on two fronts to be an important way to solve the crisis. He also spoke of this method in discussions with the Soviet representative Jurij Andropov in December 1968. Husák also proposed struggle on two fronts in May 1969, when he stated that “*it is necessary to struggle against the rightists, while also rejecting dogmatic ideas and sectarian methods. A new grouping and new unity had to be created on a new platform*”.⁴ According to Kádár, conservative and leftist forces provided fertile ground for rightist forces. Therefore he considered it very important to struggle against dogmatic and sectarian forces. J. Kádár also mentioned a tactical policy of struggle on two fronts during a visit to Czechoslovakia on 17–18 December 1969.⁵ Kádár condemned Biľak and his adherents for inviting the armies in August, but he did not want to express himself publicly. He considered rightist opportunism in the party dangerous for internal development. It was necessary to oppose it in principle at the prepared session of the CC CPC by expelling leading representatives from the Central Committee of the CPC.

The former adherents of A. Novotný and the conservatives, namely Indra, Biľak and others, criticized the reformist communists (Oto Šik, František Kriegel, Jiří Hájek and

3 Report to the political bureau on the talks with Comrade Gustáv Husák on 15–16 May 1969 in Budapest. In *Slovensko v rokoch 1967–1970*. Komisia vlády SR pre analýzu historických udalostí z rokov 1967–1970, výber dokumentov (*Slovakia in the years 1967–1970*. Commission of the Slovak government for analysis of the historical events of the years 1967–1970, a selection of documents). Bratislava : Politologický kabinet SAV, 1992. Edited by Michal Štefánský, p. 478–483.

4 *Slovensko v rokoch 1967–1970*, ref. 3, p. 483–487.

5 BOROS, Ferenc. Rok 1968 a kádárovská politika (The year 1968 and Kádár’s policy). In „*Spoznal som svetlo a už viac nechcem tmú... Pocta Jozefovi Jablonickému*“. Bratislava : Veda, 2005, p. 246. ISBN 8022408158.

Jozef Smrkovský) at a session of the CC CPC on 29–30 May 1969, for their positions in 1968–1969. The criticisms and attacks were directed against the signatories of the *2,000 Words*, the authors of the *Black Book*, the members of parliament who refused to sign the treaty on the temporary stationing of Soviet troops and those who held high office in 1968 but departed to the diplomatic service in 1969, namely Dubček, Čestmír Císař and Viktor Pavlenda. At the May session of the CC CPC people like Šik, Kriegel and Pavlenda were still allowed to defend themselves and the post-January development. In spite of the scathing attacks on the reformist communists, exclusion from the CC CPC and dismissal from functions was delayed until autumn 1969. This apparently happened with regard for the preparation of an international conference of communist parties in Moscow and fear that exclusion could be a subject of criticism from some communist parties.

At the May session of the CC CPC, G. Husák gave assurances that there would be no mass screening, no violation of legality and no return to the situation in the fifties and sixties. In this context he stated: *“We will not force anybody to remain in our ranks, and we will not harm anybody if he leaves our ranks... People will screen themselves by their attitude to the political platform of the CC, by their engagement, by their participation in implementing our policies. The cadre measures must certainly not be about revenge, personal factors or changes for the sake of change.”*⁶ Husák did not exclude screening, but he was not personally inclined to it. In his view screening was wanted by the dogmatists, who compromised the Communist Party and himself. He even admitted that people excluded from the CC CPC could work as ordinary members of the party.

The May session of the CC CPC represented an important step towards the renewal of the bureaucratic – directive system because it approved the political line of the new presidium of the CC CPC. It was contained in the implementation directive with tasks for the coming period, including renewal of the unity of the Communist Party on the principles of Marxism-Leninism (the Leninist principle of construction and life of the party, ability to act and struggle); to renew the leading role of the Communist Party in society and the components of the National Front; to solve economic problems; strengthen the functions of the socialist state; and solve relationships with the communist parties of the socialist states. Implementation of these tasks in the years 1969–1970 meant return to the political regime of the 1950s.

The report of interior minister Jan Pelnář at the May session on the Prague Spring as an extensive international conspiracy engineered by Western intelligence services represented a sort of preparation for the official interpretation of the military intervention as an action to save socialism from counter-revolution. The report started a long-term propaganda campaign to discredit the Prague Spring with disinformation articles about representatives of reform (Šik, Ivan Sviták and others) and the hostile activities of Western journalists and diplomats striving to subvert the socialist system.

The leadership of the CPC had already endeavoured to control the media soon after the military invasion in 1968. In spite of the measures adopted by the censorship bodies

6 Zasedání Ústředního výboru Komunistické strany Československa 29. – 30. května 1969. Vystúpenie G. Husáka. (Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on 29–30 May 1969, Speech by G. Husák). In VONDROVÁ – NAVRÁTIL, ref. 1, p. 422–423.

on both the federal and national levels, the dismissal of chief editors and other administrative measures, the Soviet leadership criticized the media at every meeting with Czechoslovak representatives and the criticism served as an “argument” that Normalization was not proceeding according to Soviet ideas. The leadership of the CPC strove to subordinate the party press by replacing chief editors, stopping the publication of some magazines and controlling the activities of the censorship bodies. Apart from this, the appeal to journalists *Words to our own ranks* appeared on 17 May 1969. It was supposed to lead to the joint responsibility of journalists for observing the party line. 350 journalists signed this appeal soon after it appeared. On 26 May 1969 Czechoslovak Radio issued a declaration apologizing for accusing “honourable comrades” of treason and “collaboration”. The relationship of the leadership of the CPC with the Central Group of the Soviet Armies also changed. On 7 May 1969, before the anniversary of the liberation, the leading representatives of the CPC (G. Husák, L. Svoboda, O. Černík, L. Štrougal and Š. Sádovský) gave thanks for the liberation at Milovice. Control of the press by the leadership of the CPC also applied to the military press, but it happened only with some delay, after the minister of defence Martin Džúr visited the USSR in February 1969.

A party commission headed by Jan Piller prepared the rehabilitation of innocent people convicted in political trials and the closure of this sad chapter with identification of political responsibility of specific communist representatives for the trials and for obstructing rehabilitation. The report on these facts had to be discussed by a session of the CC CPC. At the May session G. Husák said that the report on rehabilitation was not sufficiently prepared for discussion and so would be delayed into the second half of 1969. At the same time he observed that “*We will not make rehabilitation into a banner for the anti-socialist forces, which will blacken all the ideas of socialism and the whole Communist Party.*”⁷ These words showed an unambiguously negative attitude to concluding the rehabilitation and stating the political responsibility of Klement Gottwald, Antonín Zápotocký, Viliam Široký, Novotný, Karol Bacílek and others. In the end, the report on the political trials and rehabilitations was not submitted to a session of the CC CPC in the second half of 1969 or ever. The shocking facts in Piller’s report reached the public only by various illegal channels from books published abroad. According to the memories of L. Štrougal, Husák succumbed to strong pressure from Brezhnev and did not submit the report to a session of the CC CPC in spite of a protest from the chief prosecutor Ján Feješ and the prime minister.⁸ Husák admitted that after “*intensive urging from the first man of the USSR, he had complied*”.⁹ Rejection of the report on political trials had its consequences. The “building of socialism” in the 1970s was a continuation of the general line from the beginning of the 1950s, and the Stalinist K. Gottwald, who bore the most blame for illegality, was depicted as a devoted Marxist, to whom statues were erected in cities. These facts were a great political defeat for Husák because they

7 VONDROVÁ – NAVRÁTIL, ref. 1. Závěrečné slovo G. Husáka na májovom zasadaní ÚV KSČ (G. Husák’s concluding words at the May session of the CC CPC), p. 463.

8 ŠTROUGAL, Lubomír. *Paměti a úvahy (Memories and considerations)*. Praha : Epoque, 2009, p. 135. ISBN 9788074250862.

9 ŠTROUGAL, ref. 8, p. 135.

meant failure for a politician who had been imprisoned for nine years, six of them in solitary confinement, a man who had resisted an unjust accusation at his trial, then demanded justice in letters to A. Novotný from prison and after his release. In spite of this personal experience with socialist security and justice, he refused to justly conclude this sad chapter, and even told people demanding justice that enemies were “*misusing*” the report of Piller’s commission. A political defeat of such dimensions was a reason to resign from the position of first secretary of the CC CPC. Husák allegedly threatened to resign, but did not. According to the memories of Viliam Plevza: “*He was afraid of the possible escalation of repressive measures against those who did not agree with the evaluation of the counter revolutionary threat and the need for international assistance*”.¹⁰ It is impossible to entirely reject the danger of the conservative and ultra-leftist forces, but it is also necessary to say that there are boundaries that a politician should not cross, and the path of resignation would have documented his democratic character and justice.

The May session of the CC CPC pushed forward normalization on three levels:

- The targeting of propaganda against the Prague Spring and its representatives. The internal and external enemies of socialism had participated;
- Control of the media by establishing the party line to help journalists;
- The revival of Stalinism associated with rejection of Piller’s report on rehabilitation.

G. Husák played a leading role in introducing all these normalizing measures, or they were implemented with his agreement also on an internal level. On almost every occasion he verbally denied a return to the past, but actually he implemented a return to the methods of the 1950s and 1960s on the pretext of reviving “*Leninist methods*”.

The first great test for G. Husák was the preparation and mastering of an extraordinary situation – the demonstrations and protests on the first anniversary of the invasion and occupation. The armed forces: army, police and people’s militia were prepared for this task. The plans for security measures were prepared several months in advance and comprised a wide range of repressive measures and variants for suppressing unrest. The chief of the Central Political Administration of the Soviet army General Alexej Jepišev came on 6 August 1969 to monitor the preparations and stayed until 20 August. The army was the main repressive component because attention was devoted to its normalization even before G. Husák became first secretary of the CC CPC. The stay of a Czechoslovak military delegation headed by M. Dzúr in the USSR at the end of February 1969 had fundamental importance, especially when Brezhnev and Soviet representatives received it. The recommendations of the Soviet leadership were reflected on two levels, namely the dismissal of 2,000 professional soldiers from the army for political reasons with the justification of changes in military cadres in the framework of a new macro-structure for the Czechoslovak army, and an obligation of M. Dzúr to apply normalizing measures against military journalists. The Bureau of the Central Political Administration was created to carry out the normalization of the army. At the end of May it decided to deal with “*rejection of the internal role of the army as a power instrument in the class war*”.

10 PLEVZA, Viliam. *Vzostupy a pády. (Rises and falls)*. Bratislava : Tatrapress, 1991, p. 128.

With this decision, the army's role was returned to its pre-January function with regard to possible interventions against the internal enemy. Husák relied on the normalized army, which would suppress any unrest on the first anniversary of the occupation, since otherwise the Soviet forces stationed in the territory of Czechoslovakia, especially close to the large cities, would intervene.

Before the first anniversary of the August invasion and occupation, G. Husák often attended various communist activities. At an event attended by 10,000 communists in Prague, he warned against participation in demonstrations with the words: *"Everybody will write his own cadre report, and as he writes it, so we will read it."* The security measures included a proposal from Husák approved by the presidium of the CC CPC on the adoption of an extraordinary act by the presidium of the Federal Assembly on punishment for participation in anti-government unrest during the first anniversary of the occupation. The act was signed on 20 August by Dubček, Svoboda and Černík and acquired validity. The signing of the extraordinary act by three representatives of the Prague Spring meant that public confidence in the reformist communists was substantially weakened.

The international conference of communist and workers' parties in June 1969 was preceded by various preliminary meetings. An international secretariat was created with V. Biľak as representative of the CPC. Apart from this, representatives of the CPC met representatives of various other parties before the conference. The aim of the activities of the representatives of the CPC, especially with the representatives of Western communist parties, was to achieve an agreement that the "Czechoslovak question" would not be opened at the conference. This aim was successfully achieved also by the appearance of G. Husák at the conference, where he said that August 1968 was an internal question between the CPC and the other communist parties of the Warsaw Pact states.¹¹ In his speech he obediently kept his promise to Brezhnev that he would not open the Czechoslovak question. Naturally, refusal to discuss the relations between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the other communist parties of the Warsaw Pact at the international conference had its reasons in the wider context for the whole communist movement.

Apart from not opening the Czechoslovak question at the international conference, the Soviet leadership considered that other questions were also urgent tasks for normalization before the first anniversary of the military invasion. They were contained in the so-called Memorandum on some basic questions concerning the internal political situation in Czechoslovakia and Soviet – Czechoslovak relations, and were submitted to the Soviet leadership in July 1969 by the Soviet Ambassador in Prague Stepan V. Červonenko. According to the document, the presidium of the CC CPC was not united. It stated that Husák and Biľak could be regarded as principled Marxists and internationalists in the presidium. Other members are internationalist in foreign policy questions but closer to liberalist, centralist tendencies in internal policy (Ludvik Svoboda, Evžen Erban, Š. Sádovský, P. Colotka). Černík holds a rightist position and Dubček is even further to the right. The other members of the presidium (Štrougal, Piller and Karel Poláček) have not

11 V. Biľak spoke about the results of the international conference of communist parties in June 1969 at a meeting of regional and district secretaries of the Communist Party. SNA, f. ÚV KSS, c. 1231.

freed themselves from the “August complex”. The presidium of the CC CPC elected at the May 1969 session would be able to lead the party and the state out of the crisis “if it has firm and consistent support in the internationalist leftist forces of the party and state”, because “distrust of the new leadership towards internationalist and leftist forces would lead to a serious worsening of the situation”.¹² The new leadership should also be free from the accusation of the collaboration of another 11 important representatives, if the letter of the Moscow protocol was to be fulfilled. Dissatisfaction with the composition of the CC CPC was coming from the regional and district committees of the Communist Party, because rightists (Július Turček, Bohuslav Graca, Anton Ťažký, Jozef Zrak, V. Pavlenda, Milan Strhan) have important positions in it. According to the document, unwillingness from the side of Husák to listen to the voices from the regions and districts by excluding rightist representatives could weaken his authority in Slovakia, his “Slovak base”. “Husák is forced to manoeuvre because he still has not gained a strong position in the party and state.”¹³ The indefinite view of the leadership of the CPC on 21 August and the Declaration of the presidium of the CC CPC condemning the military invasion obstructed the strengthening of the leftist forces. Various regional and district committees of the Communist Party withdrew their declarations, but the CC CPC did not withdraw them. This question had to be solved after a discussion between Husák and the Soviet leadership at a meeting in Warsaw in July 1969 on the occasion of celebrations commemorating the liberation of Poland. In the Soviet view, the development in Czechoslovakia showed a conflict between the evaluation of 21 August contained in the declaration of the presidium of the CC CPC and later approved in documents from the CC CPC on one side, and the Moscow protocol from 26 August 1968 and the Treaty on the temporary stationing of Soviet forces from 16 October 1968 on the other. The memorandum on the internal political situation and Soviet – Czechoslovak relations demanded that the Czechoslovak leadership designate 21 August as international assistance, withdraw the declaration of the presidium of the CC CPC, produce an analysis of the post-January development with criticism of the Action Programme, strengthen the position of the CC CPC by excluding rightist representatives and strengthen the federal and centralized institutions.¹⁴ Directive centralized planning of the economy would have to be revived in 1970.

After his consultations with Brezhnev in Poland on 23 July and during a holiday in Crimea at the beginning of August, Gustáv Husák fulfilled Soviet expectations and decided to declare the invalidity of the document from 21 August 1968. It happened on 19 August at a large assembly in the Congress Palace in Prague. Husák expressed his agreement with the military invasion of August 1968 decided by the Warsaw Pact states. He spoke in a similar spirit at the celebrations of the 25th anniversary of the Slovak National Uprising in Banská Bystrica. He did not use the expressions “international assistance”

12 VONDROVÁ, Jitka. *Mezinárodní souvislosti československé krize 1967–1970. (The international context of the Czechoslovak crisis of 1967–1970)*, 4/4. Praha : ÚSD; Brno : Doplněk, 2011, p. 462. ISBN 9788072392742.

13 VONDROVÁ, ref. 12, p. 464.

14 VONDROVÁ, ref. 12, p. 477.

or “counter revolution”, but he expressed the content of the words indirectly.¹⁵ However, a month later, at the September session of the CC CPC, he already openly spoke of the threat of counter revolution. The Soviet leadership made clear to Husák that cancellation of the declaration from 21 August was followed by the question of composition of the presidium of the CC CPC, because retaining its existing state prolonged the state of “political nonsense”, which was misused by the rightist, revisionist and anti-socialist forces.¹⁶ This concerned removing O. Černík from the presidium because the Soviet leadership did not trust him. The Soviet pressure to implement important normalization measures was also associated with a timetable for fulfilment – for example, cancellation of the declaration from 21 August by the middle of August. The possibilities for manoeuvre were minimal and related only to the method of fulfilment or delays with the pretext that the time was not yet right, and not to the actual substance of the normalization decisions. The Soviet leadership agreed with the creation of a commission to analyse the political developments of the years 1967–1970. It was formally established by a resolution of the presidium of the CC CPC on 1 September 1969 with the composition: G. Husák, V. Biľák, Josef Kempný, O. Černík, Š. Sádovský.¹⁷ Naturally, a commission with this composition could not work on the document later known as *Lessons from the crisis development*. The reasons for this included the fact that two of the members were dismissed from their functions and expelled from the CPC.

Identification of the military invasion and subsequent occupation with international assistance also placed the post-January development in a new light. Gustáv Husák did a U-turn and denied the previous evaluation of 21 August as a “*tragic misunderstanding*” with far-reaching consequences. He identified with the evaluation in the interpretation of the conservative – dogmatic forces. Therefore his public assurances about continuation of the post-January became an empty phrase to disorient the public. Even before the declaration by G. Husák about evaluation of the invasion as international assistance, some regional and district committees of the CPC developed activities aimed at cancellation of the resolution from August 1968. It happened where the conservative forces gained dominance. For example, in Ostrava the local CPC organization already cancelled all the resolutions from August 1968 on 16 May 1969.¹⁸ Before the September session of the CC CPC on 8 September 1969, the Presidium of the CC of the Communist Party of Slovakia (CPS) also cancelled the resolutions from August 1968.¹⁹ The declarations of the regional and district committees of the CPC set off a chain reaction of cancellation of documents from 1968 condemning the military invasion and other documents of the CPC, which did not identify with the evaluation of the event by the states of the Warsaw

15 SIKORA, Stanislav. *Po jari krutá zima : Politický vývoj na Slovensku v rokoch 1968 – 1971. (After spring a cruel winter : Political development in Slovakia, 1968–1971)*. Bratislava : HÚ SAV, 2013, p. 184. ISBN 9788097030292.

16 VONDROVÁ, ref. 12, p. 472.

17 VONDROVÁ, ref. 1, p. 503.

18 DOSKOČIL, Zdeněk. *Duben 1969 : Anatomie jednoho mocenského zvratu. (April 1969 : Anatomy of a reversal of power)*. Brno : Dolnák, 2006, p. 329. ISBN 8072392042.

19 Československo 1968. 2. díl, *Počátky normalizace. (Czechoslovakia 1968, part 2, The beginnings of normalization)*. Praha : Ústav mezinárodních vztahů, 1993, p.76. ISBN 8090133789.

Pact five. These questions were raised for approval at the sessions of the CC CPC on 25-26 September and CC CPS on 2 October.

The September session approved extensive cadre changes in the composition of the CC CPC, federal government, parliament and national governments. Nineteen members were dismissed from membership of the CC CPC. The session dismissed A. Dubček from the presidium of the CC CPC and proposed his dismissal from the position of chairman of the Federal Assembly.²⁰ J. Smrkovský was dismissed from the CC CPC with a proposal to dismiss him from the position of deputy chairman of the Federal Assembly. Apart from them, the session also dismissed the following members of the CC CPC: Václav Prchlík, Václav Slávik, Mária Miková, Alfréd Černý, Milan Hübl, Zdenek Vokruhlický and Zdenek Mlynář. They were replaced by new members co-opted from the ranks of the dogmatic conservative forces: Pavel Auersperg, Jan Fojtík, Bohuslav Chňoupek, Jaroslav Havelka, František Hamouz, Václav Hůla, Josef Kempný, Ján Marcko, Miroslav Moc.

The subsequent session of the CC CPS approved the exclusion from the CC CPS and other functions of: Július Turček, Ladislav Košťá, Samuel Falťan, Róbert Harenčár, Anton Ťažký and others, while co-opting V. Biľak, Herbert Ďukovič, František Hagara, Miroslav Hruškovič, Matej Lučan and Václav Vačok. The composition of the CC CPS, presidium and secretariat of the CC CPS and the chief secretaries in the regions were also changed by this. Various criticized members of the CC CPS spoke in the discussion and rejected accusations of rightist opportunism. The session of the CC CPS shifted into the foreground the merits of V. Biľak in the struggle against the rightist and anti-socialist forces. The first secretary of the CC CPS Š. Sádovský stated in a report that *"the leadership of the CPS headed by Biľak had not given up positions to the rightist and anti-socialist elements and did not allow shooting of cadres on the basis of entirely unjustified slander and attacks. We approved new people so that they will not be burdened by old conceptions, old practice..."*²¹ The substantial thing was that the composition of the CC CPC and CC CPS changed. The conservative – dogmatic forces gained dominance in them and started mass purges under the pretext of screening all the members of the CPC.

By the end of 1969 Gustáv Husák abandoned the Hungarian method of solving the crisis and adopted Soviet methods of controlling the party with an emphasis on struggle against rightist opportunism and playing down the danger of leftism. Interest in support from the members of the CPC and general public faded out of his approach, and he reduced the political struggle to only one part of the opposition. The conservative part of

20 After he was dismissed from the position of first secretary of the CC CPC on 17 April 1969, Alexander Dubček was subjected to attacks in the media without the possibility to defend himself. In a letter to G. Husák on 26 August 1969, he stated that the public campaign is *"a sort of reckoning with the aim of preparing future conclusions"*. A copy of the letter with the date 26 August is found in the archives of the Institute of Political Science of the Slovak Academy of Sciences in Bratislava. J. Smrkovský made a similar complaint to the September session of the CC CPC, that as a constitutional figure, he had no possibility to publicly defend himself against critics who aimed to undermine him.

21 Stenografický záznam zo zasadania Ústredného výboru Komunistickej strany Slovenska 2. októbra 1969, I. časť, (Stenographic record from the session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia, 2 October 1969), SNA, f. ÚV KSS, no. c. 1887.

the leadership of the CPC had the support of Moscow, so struggle with it was out of the question. The conservative forces, which were considered to include: A. Indra, V. Biľak, Miloš Jakeš, Drahomír Kolder, Jozef Kempný, Jozef Lenárt, Karel Hoffman, Václav David, Antomín Kapek, Emil Rigo and Oldřich Švestka, had the support of Moscow and did not intend to accept a secondary role in implementing their own concept of normalization. The realist wing in the leadership of the CPC composed of Husák and his adherents (P. Colotka, Š. Sádovský, L. Štrougal and K. Poláček gave attention to gradual and calculated progress in the rejection of reform.

They did not differ from the conservatives in views on their overall aim, but only in the choice of a more moderate approach. Also for Husák, it was only a matter of some degree of modernization of the system from around 1960, but not of substantial change to the system. The radical method of solving the crisis by means of mass purges of the CPC, returning to neo-Stalinism by rejection of political responsibility for political trials and rehabilitation, designation of the military intervention of August 1968 as international assistance and finally the ultra-leftist interpretation of post-war history contained in the document *Lessons from the crisis development* of December 1970 was not a result of their own internal convictions, but arose under pressure from domestic and foreign forces. In my view, the sources of his methods of normalization need to be sought there.

After the cadre changes in the presidia of the CC CPC and CC CPS involving the removal of O. Černík, K. Poláček and Š. Sádovský and the appointment of representatives with a conservative orientation Kapek, Jozef Korčák and Lenart weakened the position of Husák in the presidium of the CC CPC. J. Lenárt was elected first secretary of the CC CPS at the session of the CC of the CPS at the beginning of February 1970. V. Biľak gained a decisive influence over cadre changes, and Brezhnev, who devoted his attention to the Czechoslovak question from the Soviet Politbureau, also intervened in the cadre changes through Biľak. The position of G. Husák was substantially weakened in this way, because apart from the conservative forces with positions in the presidia of the CC CPC and CC CPS or other institutions, there were growing attacks on him from the side of the ultra-left (Otakar Rytíř, Karel Mestek, Soňa Peningerová).

The ultra-leftist forces activated themselves in Slovakia at assemblies of communist – internationalists held in December 1968 and again on 13 December 1969 at Kovarce near Topolčany. Here they passed a resolution stating that the forces standing at the head of the counter revolution such as Pavlenda, Zrak, Graca, Ťažký, Sedláková, Dubček, Falťan, Harenčár, Kočtúch, Laluha, Strhan, Uher and others still remained in high party and state functions after January 1969. The resolution also demanded that A. Dubček should be deprived of all functions and not proposed for diplomatic services. They demanded screening of every party member on obtaining a new party membership document, and that V. Biľak should be chairman of the screening commission.²² The assembly thanked the Soviet newspaper *Správy* published by the Central Group of Soviet forces. According to the resolution it had played an important part in the consolidation of truthful information about life after the invasion of August 1968, and they proposed giving it a state

22 SNA, f. ÚV KSS, no. c. 1246, also *Slovensko v rokoch 1967 – 1970*, ref. 3, p. 553-559.

award. The resolution also demanded the dismissal from the function of member of the Slovak National Council of Štefan Brenčič, who had been elected for this region.²³

Another assembly was held as a district activity of the Czechoslovak – Soviet Friendship Union at Zvolen on 22 December 1969. It was attended by about 480 members of the union with the participation of the chief secretary of the district committee of the CPS in Zvolen and representatives of the Soviet armed forces Major Metevisian and Major Čeba.²⁴ The meeting demanded that A. Dubček, A. Ťažký, V. Pavlenda, B. Graca and M. Sedláková be removed from leading positions, that nine functionaries should step down from party and economic positions in the district²⁵, and so should the member of parliament Š. Brenčič. Discussion at the meeting was characterized by personal attacks on district functionaries for their positions in 1968. The meeting sent a letter addressed to the CC CPC, CC CPS, the Central Slovak Regional Committee of the CPS and Zvolen District Committee of the CPS. The Presidium of the CC CPS told the first secretary of the CC CPS Š. Sádovský and the chief secretaries of the RC CPS of the western and central regions of Slovakia to tell the chief secretaries in Topoľčany and Zvolen that such assemblies harmed the effective struggle against the rightists. We do not exclude that other similar assemblies were held in Slovakia, but cannot be confirmed from the documents.

The attacks of the “ultra-leftists” also continued in the course of 1970, culminating in the autumn of that year. The Left Front (Levá fronta) organization was created within the CPC with about 6,000 strictly selected members in almost all the districts of the Czech Republic. Gustáv Husák endeavoured to incorporate this organization into the Socialist Academy to develop propagandist activity. On 3–4 October 1970, Left Front organized a conference of delegates with the participation of guests from the representative offices of the Warsaw Pact states and foreign journalists. The Left Front published magazines, which were also distributed at the Military Faculty of Politics in Bratislava.²⁶ The ultra-leftist forces developed a considerable amount of activity in the Ostrava region. The members of the Federal Assembly around Penningerová and Jaroslav Trojan demanded political trials of the leaders of the CPC in 1968. Penningerová also strove to gain the support of the member of the CC CPC D. Kolder for the campaign against Husák.²⁷

The activities of the Left Front and the ultra-leftists, who presented themselves as communist internationalists or under the protection of the Czechoslovak – Soviet Friendship Union (Zväz čs.-sov. priateľstvo) were not accidental in 1970. The radicalism, which

23 In the first days of the occupation, member of the Slovak National Council Štefan Brenčič demanded from the Soviet military representatives that the withdrawal of the occupation forces from radio should relate to the territory of the whole state, not only Slovakia.

24 The headquarters of the Irkutsk – Pinsk division established itself in Zvolen. It had garrisons of regimental or battalion strength stationed throughout Slovakia. The headquarters and base for the air forces in Slovakia was located at Sliač airport near Zvolen.

25 Resolution of participants in the district meeting of the ZČSP in Zvolen. In *Slovensko v rokoch 1967 – 1970*, ref. 3, p. 559-560.

26 MADRY, Jindřich. *Sovětská okupace Československa a jeho normalizace v letech 1969–1970 a role ozbrojených sil. (The Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia and its normalization in the years 1969–1970)*. Praha : ÚSD AV ČR, 1994, p. 146.

27 MADRY, ref. 26, p. 148.

spread against the leadership of the CPC and especially against G. Husák pursued the aim of shifting developments further to the left, perhaps also leading to political trials of leading reformist communists. This did not happen, but the mass screening carried out from January 1970 in connection with replacement of Communist Party membership documents deeply intervened in the lives of hundreds of thousands of Czechoslovak citizens. Denial of “*struggle on two fronts*” by Husák and Lenárt at the beginning of 1970 was also a verbal confirmation that the Hungarian method of dealing with both rightist and ultra-leftist forces would not be the Czechoslovak route out of the crisis. G. Husák described his moderate tone towards the ultra-left at a meeting of chief secretaries of the CC CPC and district committees of the CPC from the whole state on 17 April 1970 as follows: “*Some comrades call meetings on the horizontal level, even of a whole-state character, that the leadership is hesitant, when it does not press, it is doing nothing. We do not blame people when they criticize us, but action cannot be taken in conflict with legislation, to spread illegal leaflets and even various conspiratorial actions... what was correct against Dubček is not necessary in the present situation. I do not want to open a struggle on two fronts.*”²⁸ According to J. Lenárt, the question of “*a struggle on two fronts*” is rather schematic and unclear. The main danger is and remains rightist opportunism.²⁹

The party screening associated with the replacement of membership documents from January to mid April 1970 brought results that did not satisfy the leadership of the CPC, in spite of the fact that the cadre changes effected almost half the functionaries in the nomenclatura cadres (48.6%), from which 62% of the cadres in the power organs of the state and 30% in the regions and districts were replaced. The leadership of the CPC regarded interviews in the base organizations as a new phase with difficulties that allegedly lay in the fact that in the past the party had been “*joined by hundreds of thousands of former members of other political parties... People in the CPC were not communists, but often held positions directly opposed to our party. The enemy with a party membership document is the enemy within the party*”.³⁰ G. Husák evaded giving a concrete answer to the questions of membership or to the interview commissions about how many people had to leave the party because “*I did not get permission to speak here [at the meeting of chief secretaries of regional and district committees of the CPC – M. Š.] about any numbers... but perhaps about 10 – 20% or 150 – 300 thousand people, perhaps more, perhaps less*”.³¹ Husák also avoided talking about the recommendations from Brezhnev, who had sent a file on Soviet experiences.

The low percentage expelled up to mid April 1970 was considered a result of liberalism in the screening. According to the chairman of the central control and revision commission M. Jakeš, variations in the number expelled and differences between districts

28 SNA, f. ÚV KSS, c. 1255. Prejav prvého tajomníka ÚV KSČ na porade vedúcich tajomníkov KV a OV SČ 17. apríla 1970, (Speech by the first secretary of the CC CPC at a meeting of leading secretaries of the regional and district committees of the CPC on 17th April 1970, p. 10.

29 SNA f. ÚV KSS, c. 1888. Stenographic record of the CC CPS session on 5–6 February 1970.

30 SNA f. ÚV KSS, c. 1225. Speech by the first secretary of the CC CPC Gustáv Husák, ref. 25 p. 12.

31 Ref. 30, p. 18.

resulted from the undecided struggle with the right and not from different conditions in different districts.³² František Tesář from the Eastern Bohemia Region considered it realistic that up to 30% of members should leave the CPC. Tesář criticized the low percentage expelled from the central organs, where only 18% were expelled from 71% who were screened. He considered this situation a result of unsatisfactory work in comparison with the results in the Eastern Bohemia Region. Criticism was directed towards the Federal Assembly, Czech National Council and Central Commission for People's Control. The causes lay in liberal tendencies. At the session of the CC CPC in June 1970, O. Rytíř another member of the ultra-leftist forces demanded "*consistent washing away of the rightist plague*" also using coercive means. In his concluding words, G. Husák rejected Rytíř's views on coercive means.

Brezhnev's recommendations on expulsions sent to Husák and his visit to Czechoslovakia in May 1970 encouraged the conservative and ultra-leftist forces, and this was expressed in pressure for a high percentage of expulsions from the CPC. Apart from screening, they did not exclude further cadre changes, which the presidium of the CC CPC was authorized to apply when co-opting new members of the CC CPC from the ranks of the conservative forces (Miroslav Hruškovič, Jan Baryl, Čestmír Kožušník, Michal Kudzej, Miroslav Mamula, Matej Lučan, Zdeněk Zuzka).

Gustáv Husák denied that there was any division in the presidium of the CC CPC. Only enemies from the West spoke about so-called distrust of Moscow: "*They speculate about who Moscow trusts more.*"³³

The fact that G. Husák spoke indirectly at the meeting of regional and district secretaries of the CPC about the distrust of Moscow indicates that the period of testing the loyalty of Husák to Moscow had still not ended. The frequent explanations that mass screening is not necessary and needs to be approached sensitively so that people would not be harmed, and rejection of administrative procedures was in conflict with the actual realization of the screening by interview commissions. The academic Ondrej Pavlík spoke about the misuse of party interviews at the July session of the CC CPS as follows: "*some people spend a long time collecting materials to shoot down others... such people get into the so-called party core [he apparently had in mind the interview commissions – M. Š.], which includes too many people known for their zeal, their participation in the deformations of the 1950s... Sectarian machinations with people exist not only at the bottom but also higher up... the old-new sectarians or dogmatists claim that all evil, all the difficulties facing us today arose in 1968, and that rightist opportunists are to blame for everything*".³⁴ In the screening of the base organizations, the causes of expulsion were often reduced only to verbal disagreement with the military invasion and occupation. Therefore it was problematic to point to the causes of expulsion from the party in the concluding evaluation. The Central Control and Revision Commission of the

32 Československo roku 1968. 2.díl : Počátky normalizace, ref. 19, p. 112.

33 Speech by G. Husák to a meeting of chief secretaries of regional and district committees of the CPC, ref. 30, p. 20.

34 SNA, f. ÚV KSS, c. 1889. Contribution to discussion by O. Pavlík at the session of the CC CPS on 9 July 1970.

CC CPS prepared material on the results of the interviews in Slovakia with the causes of expulsion given in the following order: rightist opportunist and anti-Soviet activities; disagreement with the present policy of the party; religious entanglement; criminal activity. According to this evaluation, 55-60% of expelled members were excluded for rightist and anti-Soviet activities and the rest for other reasons. Religious entanglement of members varied between regions in Slovakia. In Eastern Slovakia, 17.6% of excluded members were expelled for religious reasons.³⁵ Even a brief look at these percentages shows that the greatest number of people were expelled for reasons of disagreement and passivity of membership of the CPC.

Only individuals notable for their authority in society could oppose the intimidation and intrigue methods of the dogmatic-sectarian forces of the initiated party organs – the Presidium of the CC CPC and its first secretary G. Husák. In this context it is possible to mention the appearance of the Slovak cultural figure Vladimír Mináč on Slovak television on 21 May 1970 on the occasion of the anniversary of the anniversary of the foundation of the CPC. After talking *“about today’s careerists, loudmouths, posers and pots calling the kettle black,”* who disparage and rape history *“by always turning to the facts and connections that suit them, while ignoring the facts and connections that would convict them of telling lies,”* Mináč asked the question: *“Where do the new screeners, who condemn before a verdict, come from? What is the origin of their self-appointed punishing hands? What is the most limited of historical human types, namely the unlimited owner of truth, doing here?”* The conclusion of his statement made a prediction: *“the self-appointed judges, well masked gunmen, old-new clans of politicians can only create more and more crises and dangers”*.³⁶

The sharp words addressed to the screening commissions, the uncomplimentary adjectives and condemnation of the methods of those who had gained power and were using it to figuratively speaking *“break heads like clay pots”* did not remain unnoticed by the ideologues. The Presidium of the CC CPS directly concerned itself with the V. Mináč’s television appearance. Stenographic records of the discussions in the presidium were not produced, so we cannot reconstruct the discussion,³⁷ but it is impossible to exclude criticism of V. Mináč by the members of the CC CPS.

Gustáv Husák was not directly involved in economic questions. The unfavourable development resulting from the rejection of economic reform and various measures of a reformist character connected with the conceptual change of renewing the leading role of the CPC in the economic field as required by the programme of the new Presidium of the CC CPC headed by G. Husák set out in a directive from May 1969.

The screening of the Communist Party, state apparatus and organizations of the National Front with replacement of functionaries in 1969–1970 pushed into the background

35 SNA, f. ÚV KSS, 03, c. 1890. Súhrnná správa o priebehu a výsledkoch pohovorov spojených s výmenou členských legitímácií v roku 1970 v KSČ, (Summary report on the course and results of interviews associated with replacement of membership documents of the CPC in 1970), p. 24.

36 *Slovensko v rokoch 1967–1970*, ref. 3, p. 598-603. The statement of Vlado Mináč on television on 21 May 1970.

37 V. Mináč also later changed and began to defend the normalizers of cultural politics.

the solution of economic questions. Economic imbalances deepened, the financial demands of unit production increased, structural problems persisted and management inadequacies grew. The Prime Minister O. Černík pointed to these and other problems on 26 June 1969 at a meeting of chief secretaries of the regional and district organizations of the CPC and chair persons of the regional and district councils.

Proposed short term measures were intended to stop inflation, increase supplies of demanded goods to the market and improve the management of the economy by strengthening price, wage and work discipline. At the meeting of representatives from the whole state, Černík denied that the economic problems had the character that would demand a currency reform. According to O. Černík, general and unobjective criticism of the economic results achieved in the past “*deeply afflicted the Czechoslovak economy*”. He regarded application of the leading role of the CPC to the management of the economy and strengthening of central control as a starting point from the unfavourable economic situation.³⁸ Specifically this meant rejection of economic reform, which was considered an expression of revisionism. Creation of workers’ councils was described as destruction of the economic structure, breaking up the planning system and creating opposition to the party organizations in enterprises. An ideological campaign was carried on in the media against revisionism in the economic sciences and collections of articles were published. The campaign included purges of the personnel in the economic institutes of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, Slovak Academy of Sciences and universities. All these measures led to a return to the administrative – directive methods and direct control of enterprises by the annual indicators of the plans.

The on-going economic measures and conceptual aims prepared as part of the five year plan returned the Czechoslovak economy to the preceding period. The implementation directive from May 1969 as a programme for the renewal of the leading role of the Communist Party in the old form also brought the old problems of economic development.

The results of the party screening concluded the December sessions of the CC CPC and CC CPS. A total of 326,817 members, 21.7% of the members in the whole of Czechoslovakia were expelled. In Slovakia, 52,947 or 17.6% did not get new party membership documents. In Slovakia as in the western part of the state, the expelled members came especially from the ranks of the intelligentsia educated in the humanities at the universities, the Slovak Academy of Sciences and in the editorial offices of newspapers and magazines.

The formation of a working group to evaluate the developments of the years 1968–1969 was already mentioned at the sessions of the CC CPC and CC CPS after G. Husák became first secretary. In Slovakia this task was entrusted to the Central Control Commission of the CC CPS, which produced a report: “*Findings so far on the activities of the main centres of rightist opportunism and revisionism in Slovakia in the years 1968*

38 SNA, f. ÚV KSS, c. 1889. Statement by O. Černík to the meeting of chief secretaries of the regional and district committees of the CPC and chair persons of the regional and district councils on the economic tasks of the party on 26 June 1969.

–1969.”³⁹ A second report of the political – organizational department had the title: “*On the development in the party and society after the XIII congress of the CPC.*”⁴⁰

Both reports had to prove the existence of counter revolution in Slovakia and so of a threat to the foundations of society. The document *Lessons from the crisis development in the party and society after the XIII congress of the CPC* was approved at the session of the CC CPS on 18 December 1970. It was prepared by a group headed by V. Biľak.⁴¹ G. Husák did not agree with its content, but after approval by Moscow he submitted.⁴² Various facts are striking in this document: Already at first sight it is clear that the text comes from members of the conservative – dogmatic wing of the leadership of the CPC, which had imposed its views. The whole document is based on the falsification of facts and in this way it “documents” the rightist – opportunist activities of the representatives of reformist socialism. Parts of the text of the “Lessons” also came from the ultra-leftist view of the Soviet newspaper *Správy* and the activities of the “international left”.⁴³

GUSTÁV HUSÁK – DER ERSTE SEKRETÄR DES ZENTRAALKOMITEES DER KOMMUNISTISCHEN PARTEI DER TSCHECHOSLOWAKEI (1969 – 1970)

MICHAL ŠTEFÁNSKÝ

Die Position von Gustáv Husák nach seinem Amtsantritt als der Erste Sekretär des Zentralkomitees der Kommunistischen Partei der Tschechoslowakei (KSČ) war nicht stabil, da er keine volle Unterstützung der Präsidiumsmitglieder des Zentralkomitees der KSČ hatte und in der Opposition gegen ihm waren auch die konservativen, aus Moskau unterstützten, Vertreter der KSČ. Zu den wichtigsten dieser Vertretern zählten: A. Indra, V. Biľak, D. Kolder, O. Švestka, die hohen Posten innerhalb der KSČ verkleideten. Außerdem gegen G. Husák waren auch die „Ultralinken“ und „Kommunisten-Internationalisten“, die zusammen mit den Politruken der, auf dem Gebiet der Tschechoslowakei dislozierten Sowjetischen Armee, Husák kritisierten, dass er nicht hart genug gegen die ehemaligen Reformkommunisten vorgeht.

G. Husák lehnte die Empfehlung des ungarischen Führers J. Kádár „den Kampf auf zwei Fronten“ zu führen, d.h. sowie gegen die Rechten als auch gegen die Linken, ab. Husák, auch unter dem Druck aus Moskau, richtete den Kampf gegen die Vertreter der Reformen und ihre Politik. Unter seiner Führung und mit seiner Zustimmung wurden radikale Maßnahmen umgesetzt, mit denen er zwar nicht ganz einverstanden war, er protestierte jedoch nicht und verhinderte auch nicht ihre Umsetzung. Zu solchen Maßnahmen gehörten: Massensäuberungen

39 SNA, f. ÚV KSS, c. 1890.

40 Ref. 39.

41 V. Biľak mentioned this in his memoirs with the title *Až po mé smrti. (Only after my death)*. Praha : BVD, 2014, p. 307. ISBN 9788087090817.

42 PLEVZA, ref. 10. p.127. This is how G. Husák expressed himself on approval of the “Lessons” in a conversation with V. Plevza.

43 *Poučenie z krízového vývoja v strane a spoločnosti po XIII. zjazde KSČ. (Lessons from the crisis development in the party and society after the XIII congress of the CPC)*. Bratislava : Pravda, 1973, p. 42.

mit sozialen Folgen, Repressionen gegen die Reformkommunisten und Reformbefürworter, Einstellung der Rehabilitierungen der unschuldig Verurteilten, die Qualifizierung der Invasion und der Intervention als internationale Hilfe und die Annahme des Dokuments Belehrung aus der Krisenentwicklung im Dezember 1970, das auf grobe Weise die Nachkriegszeitentwicklung verzerrte und die Wiederherstellung des neostalinischen Regimes in der Tschechoslowakei bedeutete. Diese Tatsachen bedeuteten eine große Niederlage von G. Husák, da er als Politiker versagte und dessen einziger ehrenhafter Ausweg nur sein Rücktritt wäre.

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REVIEWS

DVOŘÁKOVÁ, Daniela et al. *ČLOVEK A SVET ZVIERAT V STREDOVEKU. (PEOPLE AND THE ANIMAL WORLD IN THE MIDDLE AGES.)*. Bratislava : Veda, vydavateľstvo SAV, 2015, 576 pages. ISBN 9788022414234.

The collective monograph *People and the animal world in the Middle Ages* is divided into 8 thematic fields and 25 chapters. The introductions to the book and to each of the thematic fields were written by the editor Daniela Dvořáková, and the individual chapters by 23 other authors from the Czech Lands and Slovakia.

The introduction (p. 7-19) informs us about the state of knowledge and research. Especially medievalists with an interest in cats, dogs, horses, birds of prey and other birds, economic animals and fish showed an interest in the relationship between people and animals. The introduction mentions the natural science encyclopaedia from the 2nd century AD *Physiologus*, various bestiaries, mentions in charters and other sources of information. We learn about cruelty and violence against animals, about absurd court trials of animals, but also about their great popularity.

The first thematic field: ***The animal as a symbol*** has 7 chapters. In the introduction to them (p. 20-24) D. Dvořáková writes about how people can regard animals as symbols, metaphors and comparisons. An animal as a symbol was negative or positive, it had virtues and vices. The lion, bear, wolf, wild boar, eagle, raven, deer, horse, bull and others became heraldic figures. The rise of knightly culture enriched animal symbolism with the unicorn, griffin, basilisk, centaur, dragon and other mythical animals.

Chapter 1.1. *Animals in the pictorial legends of the Middle Ages* (p. 25-38) written by Ivan Gerát, is mainly based on hagiography and fine art. It takes an interest in the horses of warrior saints, especially St. Ladislav, St. George and St. Martin. The Holy Spirit was depicted as a dove. Animals were attributes of saints. The Evangelist John has an eagle, the Evangelist Mark a winged lion, St. Jerome a lion, St. Aegidius a deer, St. Anthony the Hermit a camel, St. Paul of Thebes a raven. A she-wolf led Anthony to Paul. St. Martin drove demons out of both people and animals. Animals could also have supernatural abilities.

Chapter 1.2. *Musca, creatura minima. What can a fly mean in a medieval painting?* (p. 39-52) was written by Milada Studničková. She took an interest in humanist painters, who could paint a fly so faithfully that they gave the impression of a real fly sitting on the picture. This proved the painter's virtuosity.

Chapter 1.3. *Animals as a means of abuse in medieval and early modern times. Sheep head, German dog, ox and St. Sebastian* (p. 53-73) written by Marie Malivánková Wasková, examines the various animal-based insults, especially in late medieval and early modern times in the Czech Lands. They are found in court documents, in the work *Groom and pupil* and the works of Petr Chelčický. Humorous names for human settlements after pigs, donkeys, goats and other animals are also noted.

Chapter 1.4. *Animals in humanist art* (p. 74-92) by Eva Frimmová brings us natural science books about animals from the mid 15th to beginning of the 17th centuries. Ján Dubravský wrote a book *On fishponds and the nature of the fish that live in them* (1559) and the book *On fishponds and fish*. Peter Fradelius wrote *Galli gallinaei encomium* and gathered a collection of natural science verses by 26 authors called *Laus luscinae ex elegantiarum poetarum flosculus (In praise of the nightingale composed from the elegant flowers of selected poets)* (Prague 1920). Johannes

Sambucus (1531–1584) devoted himself to veterinary medicine. The Italian vet Lorenzo Rusio (1228–1347) wrote in the book *Opera del arte del mascalco* about the breeding, diseases and treatment of horses and on bites by horses. The travel book *Hodoeporicon* by Richardo Bartolini and the *Diarium* by Ján Kuspiniáno describe the double engagement of the young Habsburgs and Jagiellos in Bratislava and Vienna in 1515. They devote great attention to the horses at these celebrations. Martin Rakovský from Rakovo wrote a poem on crabs *Lusus de cancris* (1555) and Daniel Basilius from Nemecká Lupča (1585 – 1628) wrote poetry about bees. Martin Rakovský wrote the poem *De phoenice* on the ancient myth of the phoenix bird.

In chapter 1.5. *The cuckoo's young in ancient and medieval expert texts* (p. 93-110) Hana Šedinová looks at the cuckoo in ancient and medieval texts. Aristotle already took an interest in the cuckoo. Around 200 AD Ailianos devoted attention to it in his work *De natura animalium*. It was mentioned in medieval encyclopaedias and works on the behaviour and habits of the cuckoo. They include symbolic interpretations of the behaviour of the cuckoo. Some long-held views on the cuckoo mixed the truth with fantasy.

Chapter 1.6. *The blood of animals in the Middle Ages: from art history to heraldry and back* (p. 111-129), written by Dušan Buran and Radoslav Ragač, deals with animals stylized into religious and heraldic symbols on altars, wall paintings, shields and seals. These animals include the deer, dove with a halo, raven with a ring in its beak, horse carrying St. Martin, dove or other bird with an olive branch, magpie with a stolen ring, the dragon killed by St. George, Easter lamb (Lamb of God), pelican, griffin (half eagle and half lion), fish, bear, stork, duck, deer and leopard. We also read about bleeding, wounded and hunted animals. Together with parts of the animal body, they get onto coats of arms, for example, the head of the bison, ostrich or eagle, claws, feet, teeth of the wolf or dragon, ostrich feathers, trunk, wing, half of an animal, an animal or part of one pierced by an arrow, stabbed or cut by a weapon, armed animals. The Hunting Book by Gaston de Phoebus (1331–1391) interested the authors of this chapter.

Chapter 1.7. *The dog at the feet of King Ahasuerus. An attempt to interpret the dog on the tapestry Story of Esther* (p. 130-144) written by Angelika Herucová, interprets the dog on a Renaissance tapestry of the *Story of Esther*. It includes ten pictures, which are exhibited in Bratislava Castle. The author has uncovered the symbolic meaning of five white dogs. The first two dogs indicate the behaviour of Queen Vashti, at first obeying her husband but then disobeying. The third dog has a collar, it looks unfriendly and accompanies the meeting of Mordecai and Haman. The fourth dog rest quietly close to Ahasuerus' bed and the fifth dog accompanies Mordechai's triumph.

The second thematic field *Horse and dog, the most valued animals of the Middle Ages* has three chapters. In the introduction to them (p. 145-150), D. Dvořáková summarizes the importance of the domestication of the dog and horse in human history and their position in medieval society. She points to the positive and negative evaluations of the dog by various medieval authors.

Chapter 2.1. *Contradictory perceptions of the dog in history* (p. 151-165) by Peter Bystrický, deals with dog comparisons and insults and the relationship of various nations to dogs from the earliest times. The Semitic nations and the Hittites had an opposition to dogs. The Bible, with the exception of the Book of Tobit, also has a negative evaluation of the dog. Medieval Christendom combined the negative Biblical and positive European views. The Moslems disliked dogs. The Zoroastrian Persians divided animals into good and evil. They had great respect for dogs. A person who killed or injured a dog was strictly punished. The Indians considered dogs unclean. The ancient Egyptians valued dogs because they guarded homes and cattle and helped with hunting. The Greeks and Romans liked dogs. Celts had dog names. Dogs and horses participated in battles from ancient times. Ancient and medieval authors wrote about the abilities of dogs and told stories about their faithfulness.

Chapter 2.2. *The black dog* (p. 166-196) written by Peter Bystrický, is about a two-sided perception of the dog in history, in Indian, Greek, Roman, Celtic and Germanic mythology and in folklore. A dog, usually black was messenger of death and guardian of the underworld. The devil could take the form of a black dog. Among Zoroastrians, the dog had a great role at the time of death and after. The apparition of a sinister black dog arose from a combination of Celtic, Germanic or Nordic and Christian traditions. It haunted England and also appeared in Normandy, Brittany, Germany and Scandinavia. The Egyptian god Anubis, who had the head of jackal is the most important of the black dogs associated with the underworld and graves. The Finns, Laps, Greenland Inuits, Mari, Mordvins, Komi-Permyak, Chuvash, Irkutsk Tofalar, Tuvins, Selkups, Amur Nanays and Udegeys, Sachalin Oroks, Nivkhs living by the Sea of Okhotsk, Chukotski Chukchi, Kamchatka Koryaks, Yukaghirs, Ainu, Manchurians and many Native American tribes also associated dogs with death. The dog stands on the boundary between animals and people, between nature and civilization. Therefore, precisely the dog guarded the frontier between the world of the living and the world of the dead.

Chapter 2.3. with the title *Dogs and their breeding in medieval society* (p. 197-217). Its author Michal Pírek presents two works on medieval hunting. The oldest expert work on hunting *Le livre du roy Modus et la royne Racio* was written by the Norman nobleman Henri de Ferrières about 1370. The second work on hunting *Le livre de chasse de Gaston Phoebus* was dictated by Count Gaston de Phoebus in 1387–1389. Gaston Phoebus devoted great attention to the training of hunting dogs and of gamekeepers, who headed the hunting profession. M. Pírek looks at the dog handlers (*caniferi*), who served the kings of Hungary. Their settlements were always separate from the settlements of other royal servants. The dog handlers in Smižany were leading dog breeders in the Kingdom of Hungary. The author informs us about breeds of dog in Gaston de Phoebus' work, and finds out which of them lived in Hungary.

The third thematic field *The medicinal power of animals* has only one chapter. In her introduction (p. 218-221) D. Dvořáková mentions medicines of animal origin. The recipes of Hildegard of Bingen also mention materials from animals. Like other ancient and medieval recipes they are often very curious.

Chapter 3.1. *Dogs as healers* (p. 222-247) is by Peter Bystrický. He informs us about a large number of ancient and medieval medicinal procedures, recipes, rituals and other documents, mostly very bizarre and about healing with the help of dogs. We learn how the dog was associated with healing, with healing gods and later with saints.

The fourth thematic field *Economic animals* had two chapters. In the introduction to them (p. 248-252) D. Dvořáková emphasizes that economic animals were important property. Horses and cattle also served as a labour force. Trade in cattle also flourished. At the end of the 15th century, live animals made up 55 – 60% of exports across the western frontier of Hungary with hayduks driving herds to distant markets. Meat, leather and wax formed only 10 – 15% of exports.

Chapter 4.1. *Silva ad pasturam porcorum: forest pasturing of pigs in royal and Church properties in early medieval Europe* (p. 253-295) was written by Pavol Hudáček. It is based not only on written information, but also on archaeology. It considers the rearing of pigs in Western Europe, especially on royal and Church estates. The rich Western European written sources give us a good idea of the rearing, especially of animals pastured in forests, about their number and value. Pigs were pastured in forests, mainly on acorns and beech nuts and especially in autumn. These pigs were mainly intended for meat. Fees were paid for pasturing pigs in royal forests. Serfs also owned considerable numbers of pigs, cattle and sheep. Economic animals were kept in buildings in winter, so hay was produced in summer. The author looks in detail at the records of the rearing and feeding of pigs in forests found in monastery polyptychs.

Chapter 4.2. has the title: *Rearing and use of domestic animals in the Middle Ages* (p. 296-301). Its author Ján Lukačka is concerned with beef cattle in the Kingdom of Hungary and especially in Slovakia. Bulls were harnessed or fattened. Innumerable herds of bulls were pastured on the Great Hungarian Plain and driven to the west. They were driven through south-western Slovakia, crossing the Váh at Šintava, then the Malé Karpaty mountains and passing through Uherský Brod to reach Hustopeče. Moravian merchants waited here to deliver them to Germany or Italy. Heavy horses began to do more work in agriculture only in the 13th and 14th centuries. Horses for riding emphasized the social position of their owners. Medieval farmers also produced pigs, sheep, goats and poultry.

The fifth thematic field *Hated and persecuted animals* has two chapters. In the introduction to them (p. 302-304) D. Dvořáková informs us about negative perceptions of animals. Christians saw the raven as a symbol of sinners, heretics and Jews. Although medieval people took a negative view of the raven, bear, wild boar and wolf, they also appeared in heraldry. Medieval people believed in the mythical dragon and werewolf.

Chapter 5.1. *Demonic and feared, humiliated and ridiculed. The wolf in the Middle ages* (p. 305-319) written by Tomáš Borovský, captures the changes in perception of the wolf from early Christianity to the end of the Middle Ages. In various types of written source, pictures and sculpture, the wolf was fierce, cunning, ruthless, insatiable and blood-thirsty. In the contrast between the wolf and the lamb, the wolf embodied the devil and the lamb the Saviour. Medieval encyclopaedists gave animals human characteristics and values. The animals were seen in allegorical and symbolic ways. The expansion of human settlements leading to the origin of cities reduced the area of forests and so the number of wolves, which people persecuted and killed. Albert the Great, who studied Aristotle's work, gave great attention to wolves. He placed among them legendary creatures that originated by combination of wolf, bull and horse and lived in Persia. Vincent of Beauvais, Bartholomaeus Anglicus and Thomas of Cantimpré also devoted attention to wolves. Nivardus composed an extensive poetic work: *Ysengrimus*, in which the wolf Ysengrim and other animals behaved like people. *Ysengrimus* is continued by the *Roman de Renart*: the story of the cunning fox Renart, which takes advantage of the stupidity of Ysengrim the wolf and other animals. About 1460 the Czech author Pavel Židek described the wolf as a *fierce and voracious animal*. The wolf also found a place in books of dreams and in religious literature. They frequently ridiculed and disparaged it.

Chapter 5.2. *The nice werewolf* (p. 320-336) is again by Peter Bystrický. People saw human characteristics in wolves and also gave themselves wolf names. Slavonic, Germanic, Greek and Celtic wolf names are known. The Hittite name Lupakku, Hungarian Farkas, Turkish Kurt and Hebrew Z'ev also mean wolf. Warrior bands such as the Nordic *berserker*, Irish *fian/diberg*, Iranian *mairjo* and Indian *rudrijas* were like wolf packs. The outcast from society, outlaw or man disinherited for his crimes was a wolf to other people. In various parts of Europe stories circulated about men who changed into wolves and attacked people and cattle. We have these stories already recorded from the 12th century. The author gives a detailed consideration of the various stories about people changing into wolves or other animals.

The sixth thematic field *The animal as a royal gift* has three chapters. In the introductory essay (p. 337-341) D. Dvořáková writes about the gifts exchanged at diplomatic meetings. Since the gift was a symbol, giving was a form of symbolic communication. Animals were also popular gifts. Horses and dogs were valued gifts, worthy of a king, but so were birds of prey, most frequently falcons, hunted cattle, elks and bison. On very rare occasions, exotic animals – camels, giraffes, rhinoceros and elephants were given.

Chapter 6.1. has the title *The Plzeň camel. The fate of a camel in the middle of the Hussite Wars and the question of the grant of arms by the Emperor Sigismund to Plzeň* (p. 342-370). The

author Petr Elbel seeks an answer to the question of how a camel came to Bohemia in the middle of the Hussite Wars and became a feature of the Plzeň town shield. The camel on the Plzeň shield has two humps. The author starts by summarizing the natural science and geographical information about camels whether they have one hump or two. Then he considers the occurrence of camels and other exotic animals in the medieval West, which they sometimes reached by trade or as gifts from Moslem rulers. The Plzeň camel came from the Tatar Khanate of the Golden Horde, from which two-humped camels came to Lithuania and Poland. Either the King of Poland gave the camel to the Orphans (Sirotci – a Hussite military unit), or it was stolen by a German knight fighting against them on the side of King Vladislav Jagiello of Poland. The author considers the possibility that the Orphans acquired it as their share of the loot. In the end he cautiously inclines to the view that Vladislav Jagiello gave the camel to the Orphans, perhaps in Sieradz, where he met Ján Čapek of Sán and other Hussite commanders, or that he sent the camel to Ján Čapek from Kraków. The Orphans took it to Plzeň. In 1433 the defenders of Plzeň defeated the besieging Orphans and captured the camel, which they very much appreciated. Soon after the end of the siege, Plzeň gave the camel to Nuremberg to express gratitude for support during the siege. Sigismund put the camel on the Plzeň shield, or the people of Plzeň did it themselves and connected this improvement with the Emperor only later. Sigismund may have approved this improvement to the Plzeň shield without an official document. The third possibility is the most probable.

In chapter 6.2. *An unfortunate gift from a fortunate king* (p. 371-379) Michaela Antonín Malaníková considers a drawing of a rhinoceros by Albrecht Dürer from 1515. This rhinoceros belonged to King Manuel I the Fortunate of Portugal. He received it from his Viceroy in India Alfonso de Albuquerque, who was given it by the Sultan Muzaffar II ruler of the Indian city of Diu. The King of Portugal wanted to please Pope Leo X, so in December 1515 he sent the rhinoceros from Lisbon to Rome. King Francis I of France and Queen Claudia admired it in Marseilles. On the next stage of the journey the ship with the rhinoceros sank in a storm. The dead rhinoceros was washed up on the seashore. King Manuel had its skin stuffed with straw and sent to the Pope. The Pope also had an elephant named Hanno, received from the King of Portugal in 1514.

Chapter 6.3. *An elephant at Bratislava Castle in 1552* (p. 380-389) was written by Michal Bada. It mentions a parliament held in Bratislava in 1552 at which the widow of John Zápoľský handed over the Hungarian crown jewels to King Ferdinand I. The participants in the great celebrations included the Indian elephant Soliman, which the heir to the throne of Hungary Archduke Maximilian had received on a visit to Lisbon from King John III of Portugal. The elephant came to Vienna on 7 March and on 10 March it was presented in celebrations at Bratislava Castle. Then it returned to Vienna, where it died on 18 December 1553. Archduke Maximilian had it stuffed.

The seventh thematic field: *Hunting and fishing* has four chapters. In the introductory essay (p. 390-392) Daniela Dvořáková refers to mentions of hunting in the Kingdom of Hungary. These mentions are frequent but they do not describe the course of a hunt in detail. An exception is a letter from the Italian Ludovico de Bagno, who accompanied his lord as well as other Italians on a hunt for bears near Eger and a hunt with falcons near the town gates of Eger in February 1518. All classes in medieval society could participate in fishing. In summer 1414 Sigismund of Luxembourg King of Hungary went fishing in Narbonne. In winter 1414 the burgers of Friedberg invited him to go fishing in a lake. In 1412 Sigismund invited his guests to fish for beluga in the river Váh apparently close to its confluence with the Danube. According to the report of Eberhard Windecke, they caught 26 beluga and five thousand sturgeons.

Chapter 7.1. *Catches, gifts and deer in the stable. The social and cultural background of hunting in the County of Zvolen* (p. 393-408) was written by Pavol Maliniak. He deals with medieval hunting in the territory of the County of Zvolen. He points out that nobody protected animals at the times they were most vulnerable. Restrictions on hunting were intended only to protect ani-

mals for the needs of the lords and not to protect nature and fauna as such. The anonymous *Gesta Hungarorum* mentions that Duke Borša from the House of Arpád pursued a deer along the river Hron to the top of a hill, where he killed it and had a castle built. Deer also guided warriors and rulers to new territories before suddenly disappearing. On 26 November 1353 King Louis I participated in a bear hunt in the County of Zvolen. In 1256 King Belo IV rewarded 8 guardians of the Zvolen game park. One of them was named *Holata*. In the Czech Lands *holoti* were dog handlers. A letter sent from Bratislava on 3 June 1429 by the castellan of Vígľaš Martin of Cejkov to his deputy castellan Peter of Cerovo speaks of preparations for hunting in the Vígľaš lordship. Animals and fish could be given and transported to distant markets. In 1464, the royal foresters at Môťová are mentioned. They were responsible for taking animals to the royal court. Burgers ate meat from hunting only rarely, but fish frequently. This is shown by data in the accounts of the Zvolen town book. Furs from martens, squirrels and other animals were inherited and given as presents. About 1563, John Dernschwam, a former factorius for the Thurzos and Fuggers, wrote that the administrator of the Banská Bystrica copper company told the burgers of Banská Bystrica that they should establish a garden and keep deer and four foxes in it. The establishment of this garden happened at the end of the 15th century. The green room in the Thurzo house in Banská Bystrica is decorated with wall paintings of rabbits and tame dancing bears. The nobility established a game park where deer and other animals were kept.

Chapter 7.2. *Hunting and the protection of animals in Bohemian and Moravian law* (p. 409-431) was written by Jana Janišová and Dalibor Janiš. The right to hunt was part of the royal prerogative in most Western European countries in the Middle Ages. Numerous princes and then royal foresters (*hájníci*) and game wardens took care of the royal forests. The game wardens were hierarchically organized. They collected tolls for safe travel through royal forests with goods on the way to markets and other fees for use of the royal forests. In the time of the Přemyslid princes, administration of the royal forests was concentrated in courts and in the 13th century also in royal castles. In the early Middle Ages, the right to hunt derived from royal ownership of the forests. The authors consider evidence of forest and hunting rights and about game wardens up to the beginning of the 15th century, the legal regulation of hunting according to Bohemian legislation from the 15th to early 17th centuries, the legal regulation of hunting according to Moravian legislation from the 16th to early 17th centuries and protection of animals in Bohemian and Moravian legislation.

In chapter 7.3. *On the art of hunting with birds of prey* (p. 432-446), Žofia Lysá devotes her attention to hunting with birds of prey, especially falconry. She writes about instruction books on catching and training birds of prey and hunting with them. The most important work *De arte venandi cum avibus* was written by the Emperor Frederick II (1194–1250). A work on falconry *De institutione ac venatu falcorum libri duo. Carmen didacticum* by Juraj Pray was published at Trnava in 1749. The chief falconer to King Louis I of Hungary (1342–1382) was Ladislav Hungarus, who wrote a work on taming falcons. This work is lost, but some parts of it were included in the work *Aucupatorium herodiorum* written about 1430–1450 by Eberhard Hicfelt. The author also takes an interest in lesser written evidence, modest archaeological finds and numismatic depictions.

In chapter 7.4. *Fish and the Lent tradition* (p. 447-460) Miriam Hlavačková examines the history of Lent. We learn what people gave up or kept during Lent. Fish became a permitted Lent food, so monasteries provided themselves with it. The author writes about the production or hunting of fish, the different species of fish, their preservation, sale and preparation in the kitchen.

The eighth thematic field *Animals in towns* has three chapters. In the introduction (p. 461-465) D. Dvořáková concerns herself with the coexistence of people and animals in medieval towns. The towns paid dog catchers to get rid of wandering dogs. Economic animals produced dung, which attracted insects, parasites and rodents. Dung and mud had to be removed. The Bratislava municipal

accounts (Kammerrechnungen) from 1434, 1440 and other years are an extraordinarily rich source on animals in the town. They tell us most about horses.

Chapter 8.1. *Animals in a medieval town, the example of Bratislava* (p. 466-489) is a result of thorough study of more than five thousand medieval documents and books of wills in the Bratislava city archives by the author Juraj Šedivý. Apart from real estate, Bratislava burgers also bequeathed animals to their heirs. Animals are mentioned in documents as subjects of legal proceedings 91 times. Among them, horses appear 73 times, cattle 15 times, sheep once and dogs once. The book of wills contains 32 wills that mention animals, in 12 cases horses, cattle in 13, pigs in 6 and sheep in one. The author informs us about individual cases in more detail. People from the surroundings settled in the town and supplied it with food and animals. We have information about horses in Bratislava, about theft and disputes about horses. Burgers owned horses and wagons. The king sometimes asked the people of Bratislava for transport services. Two routes through the Bratislava area were used to drive cattle from Hungary to Austria. The town had to solve cases of theft of cattle. Sheep, goats and pigs also lived in medieval Bratislava. They were less valuable so they are rarely mentioned in wills and other documents. Dogs and cats were typical for a medieval town. Poultry could be found in almost every Bratislava courtyard. Rodents and insects troubled the people of Bratislava. Wolves, foxes, beavers, otters, deer, wild boar and water fowl lived in the surroundings of Bratislava.

Chapter 8.2. *Theft of animals according to the criminal cases recorded in the Bratislava court book from 1435–1519* (p. 490-496) was written by Martin Štefánik. He informs us about criminality in the medieval town, which also involved animals. We learn about the judicial penalties recorded in the *Aechtbuch*. This book includes 49 court cases covering 238 different offences. Twenty nine offences are theft of animals, including 23 involving horses, 5 of cattle and 1 of poultry. In 1391 King Sigismund authorized the people of Bratislava to sell horses to foreigners at markets held twice a year in the town. However, in 1502 the king cancelled this authorization. The author informs us in more detail about the offences connected with animals. The offences mentioned in the *Aechtbuch* are reviewed in three tables.

In chapter 8.3. *Animal symbolism in the material culture of the town: house signs, coats of arms and seals* (p. 497-509) Kateřina Jišová considers animals in the symbols of Prague burgers. Lions, bears, dogs, horses, goats, cocks, deer antlers and many other animals, some of them exotic appear on the coats of arms, house signs and seals of Prague burgers. The decoration of the chapel in the Old Town Hall includes 22 shields from the 14th century, some of them bearing heraldic figures of animals. The Old Town Bridge Tower also bears sculptures of animals. House signs often also became the family name of burger families. Mentions of animals in wills include horses, cattle, sheep, hens, goats and pigs. Prague burgers kept them in the countryside.

The conclusion (p. 510) calls for further research and study of the history of the co-existence of humans and animals, so that we will know how medieval people perceived animals and what role they had in everyday life.

The collective monograph: *People and the animal world in the Middle Ages* originated in the Institute of History of the Slovak Academy of Sciences. It is a pioneering work about the relationships between people and animals in history, which may interest the wider educated public, as well as domestic and foreign experts.

Ján Steinhübel

BYSTRICKÝ, Peter. *PES V MYTOLÓGII, NÁBOŽENSTVE A FOLKLÓRE STAROVEKU A STREDOVEKU. (THE DOG IN THE MYTHOLOGY, RELIGION AND FOLKLORE OF ANTIQUITY AND THE MIDDLE AGES.)*. Bratislava : Published by the Institute of History of the SAS and Veda, vydavateľstve Slovenskej akadémie vied, 2015, 416 pages. ISBN 9788022414777.

Peter Bystrický, a scientific researcher at the Institute of History of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, has divided his book into an introduction, 11 chapters and a conclusion, which is followed by a list of sources and literature, list of illustrations, index and brief foreign language summary.

Introduction (p. 9-11). The author informs us about his intension to trace the relationship between man and dog in history and its cultural impact. He takes an interest in how people perceived the dog or how the dog penetrated into human culture. He distinguishes cultural fields in which the similarities and differences in human – dog relations can be noticed.

Greece (p. 12-104). The chapter on the dog in ancient Greece is the largest in the book. The author appeals to numerous mentions of dogs in the works by Greek philosophers and other authors, depictions on wall paintings, ceramics, coins, sculptures and so on.

The Greeks liked their dogs, which guarded their herds and houses or were their companions. The rich and the aristocracy bred dogs for hunting, joy and admiration. The Greek historian Xenophon (c. 430 – 354 BC) wrote a book on hunting with dogs. Shorter mentions of dogs were written by the historian Arrianos and the poet Oppianus from Cilicia. Around the turn of the eras, Grattius wrote a book on hunting with dogs in verse. Nemesianus of Carthage wrote a poem about dogs in the 3rd century. Odysseus' dog Argos appears in Homer's works. Aristotle wrote in detail about the life of dogs in his "History of animals". He devoted the most attention to Laconian dogs. Molosser dogs, bred as sheepdogs, hunters, army dogs and guard dogs, came from Molossoi in Epirus. Maltese dogs were small, hairy and sociable.

Dogs in Aesop's fables were greedy, insatiable, irritating, cowardly, selfish, ungrateful, bad-tempered and stupid. Diogenes of Sinope (412–323 BC) received the nickname "kyon", which means dog, because he lived like a dog and had impudent, daring but witty views, speeches and answers. His supporters were called "kynikos", which means "dog-like".

The author devotes great attention to the dogs in Greek mythology. The most important was Kerberos, which had three heads. It prevented the shades of the dead going out of the underworld into the world of the living. Kerberos' older brother was the two-headed dog Ortos. Skylla was half woman and half dog with six heads and twelve legs. She lived in a cave in rocks by the Strait of Messina, where she and the monster Charybdis threatened sailors. Dogs were companions of gods and goddesses. They also accompanied the goddess of hunting, wild animals and the wilderness Artemis. The horned Pan was god of the forest, wilderness, pastures, hunting, herds and shepherds. He originated in Arcadia, but spread to the whole Peloponese and other Greek regions. He gave Artemis six dogs and seven Arcadian bitches.

Artemis' brother Apollo did not have dogs but he had a wolf and other animals. He was lord of the Delphic oracle. There was a statue of a wolf in the temple at Delphi. Two of Apollo's sons had the wolf names Lykoros and Lykomedes. Apollo's son Miletos was born on Crete and suckled by wolves. Another of Apollo's sons Kydon is depicted with dogs. Another son of Apollo was Linos, who was killed by shepherds' dogs. Sirius, with which summer heat was associated, was the dog star. The god Asklepios could heal and turn away illness and especially plague. He discovered many medicines and medical procedures. He had a snake wound around a stick and sometimes also a dog. Hekaté was a night goddess of light, the Moon, hunting, spells, prophecy and herbal medicine. She protected homes, crossroads, children and childbirth. She was associated with the Moon,

crossroads and magic. Black dogs from the underworld accompanied her. Hekaté received a bitch as a sacrifice. Before going to war, young Spartans sacrificed puppies to the god Enyalios. Artemis changed the young Aktaíon into a deer, which was torn to pieces and devoured by his own dogs. Aktaíon had 50 dogs, each with a name. In his book on hunting, Xenophon recommended giving dogs short names and gave an extensive list of them. The Roman author Columella recommended giving dogs names with no more than two syllables. Artemis gave Prokris, wife of Kephalos King of Phokis, a dog called Lailaps that no other animal could escape. According to another story, Prokris received Lailaps from King Minos of Crete. A golden dog (*kyón chryseos*) had to guard the place in Crete where Zeus was born. The Thessalian hunter Kyanippos married the beautiful Leukoné, who was torn apart by his dogs. The ancient Greeks also placed dogs in the sky. The giant hunter Orion was a son of Poseidon. In the sky he had the dog star Sirius. The star that comes before the dog star Sirius had the name Prokyon (= before the dog). The time when heat, drought and disease prevail was the *caniculares*, which means dog days. Aktaíon's father Aristaios was a hunter and shepherd, who made discoveries in the fields of hunting, cultivation and pastoralism, including bee-keeping, collection of honey, care for cattle, pressing of olives and making of cheese, which he shared with people. Artemis taught the art of hunting with dogs to swift-footed Atalanta, who participated in the famous hunt of the Kalydón boar, in which many hunting dogs died. The harpies were terrible "dogs of Zeus". The daughters of the goddess Nyx (= night) Ceres were "fast dogs of the god Hades". The three winged monsters Erinyes were goddesses of revenge. Mormo, Mormolyka, Empusa and Lamia were female spirits or monsters of the underworld. The wife of King Priam of Troy was Hecuba, who was changed into a bitch by the gods after the fall of Troy.

The dog-heads lived on the steppes to the east of the Massagetai. They were *hemikynés*, which means half-dogs. During the campaigns of Alexander the Great, the Greeks heard stories of dog-heads (*kynokephaloí*), which lived in India in high and inaccessible mountains. Dog-faces (*kynoprosopoi*, *kynamolgíoi*) lived in Africa. They were baboons.

Rome (p. 105-141). The Romans liked dogs even more than the Greeks. They built graves and set up epitaphs for dead dogs. Roman gravestones bear depictions of dogs and inscriptions commemorating dogs. Dogs also appear on Roman coins. Romans, for example Grattius and Nemesianus, also wrote books on hunting with dogs. In Roman works on agriculture, we learn about the selection, care and rearing of dogs. Pliny the Elder devoted attention to domestic animals starting with dogs in his work *Naturalis historia*.

In Roman mythology, the dog was associated with Silvanus, who protected forests, pastures, fields, herds and boundaries. *Lares* were the spirits of ancient heroes. Like the *manes* and *penates* they were remnants of the cult of ancestors. Like dogs, the *lares* frightened away thieves and guarded in both day and night.

The Roman wolf festival Lupercalia began with the sacrifice of two goats and a dog. Then the luperci priests ran around the city and whipped people with strips of leather. Later this was done especially to women and children for purification, health, fertility and prosperity.

In the Sicilian city of Adranum, close to Etna, a temple of Hephaistos where they bred sacred molosser dogs, stood in a grove. Hephaistos had merged with the Sicul god Adranus. Coins show the connection of Adranum with dogs.

The agricultural Robigalia festival happened on 25 April. At a ceremony in the grove of the goddess Robigo, they sacrificed a bitch or puppy for the return of mould (*robigo*).

The Romans also sacrificed puppies to the goddess Mana Genita, who helped in childbirth.

The Celts (p. 142-159). Celtic dogs guarded cattle and crops, hunted and probably also served in wars. The Celts in Britain bred two outstanding breeds. Hunting (*vertragus*), a pasture and guard breed and a small tracking dog (*agasseus*). The most important dog in the Irish stories was Bran. In the story of the *Feast in Conan's house*, the hero Finn (Fion) Mac Cumhaill had dogs called Bran

and Sceolang. Their mother Uirne (Tuirreann) was enchanted on the back. She returned to human form but her children did not. The word “con” – dog came into Celtic names such as Connor, Conán and Conaire. The hero of Irish myths Cu Chulain also had a dog name. The god of agriculture, forests and beer Sucellus also had a dog.

The dog was associated with dying, death and the underworld. The sagas written by the Irish and Welsh centuries after they became Christians also mention underworld dogs. The Welsh story of Pwyll Prince of Dyfed includes the *cwn Annwn*, which means white dogs. The Welsh dog *Cwyllgi* was the embodiment of sinners or demons. *Cú Sídh* was an Irish black dog. The Scottish dog *Cú Síth* was as big and strong as a bull and was a messenger of death.

Caesar mentioned that the Celts most venerated a god he identified with the Roman Mercury. Figures of dogs and amulets made from dog bones were found on the sites of his temples and in the source of the Seine (Sequana). The Celtic healer gods merged with Apollo or Mars. The Celts built sanctuaries at medicinal springs. The connection of dogs with healing is also recorded in the Irish legal text *Críth Gablach*.

The Germanic peoples (p. 160-173). Germanic mythology also included dogs. They were Garm, Fenri and Fenri's sons Hati and Sköll. *Völuspá* repeats three times that when Ragnarök (the twilight of the gods) comes, Garm (garml = dog) will howl in front of the cave of Gnipa and Fenri (= wolf) will break his bonds. Snorri Sturluson (1179–1241) also describes Ragnarök. It will begin with the wolf Sköll (treacherous) swallowing the Sun and the wolf Hati (hateful) swallowing the Moon.

The reports of medieval chroniclers, archaeological finds and German folklore indicate a connection of dogs with death also among the continental Germanic peoples. The Lady Holda mentioned in North Germany for the first time in the 15th century had dogs, as did Perchta in South Germany, Austria and Slovenia. She may originally have been Mother Earth called Hlodana.

King Olaf Trygvason of Norway (995–1000) mentioned by Snorri Sturluson in the *Heimskringla*, was a zealous spreader of Christianity. An Irish shepherd gave him the dog Vige, which Olaf loved. The King of Norway and Saint Olaf II Haraldson (995–1030) had hunting dogs and falcons. The laws of King Rothari of the Lombards (636–652) mention dogs as do the Burgundian and Frankish laws. Dogs were buried in the graves of Germanic people from the period 500–1100. Thietmar of Merseburg mentions a ceremony at Lejre in Denmark, where pagans met once every 9 years and sacrificed dogs and other animals. Adam of Bremen described a similar ceremony at Uppsala in Sweden.

A saga told by the Lombard historian Paul the Deacon (c. 720–799), and the *Cosmographia Aethica Istrica* (8th century) mentions dog-heads. The dog Hungar (Hundgar = Little Dog) is mentioned in the Anglo-Saxon poem *Widsith*. Saxo Grammaticus in *History of the Danes* and the Poetic Edda mention King Hunding, who killed Helgi from the Wulfing family. The *Ynglinga Saga* mentions Odin's men, who were as furious as dogs and wolves, bit into shields, had the strength of bears or bulls and were not injured by fire or iron. They fought without armour. They were *berserker* and *ulfhednar*. The Longobard sagas and Tacitus mention wild warriors named *Hari*.

Some dogs became kings. According to Snorri, King Eystein of the Uplands fought a war against the Kingdom of Trondheim and conquered its parts Eyna and Sparbyggja. His dog Saur became king in Trondheim, which Eystein conquered. According to the chronicle of Lejre, King Athiel of Sweden sent a dog named Rachi to rule the Danes.

Egypt (p. 174-223). The Egyptians depicted dogs on reliefs, wall paintings, ceramics, knife handles, metal plaquettes, on papyrus and in the form of figures made from ivory, stone and other materials. We have information that Pharaoh Amenhotep III (1388–1351 BC) loved hunting with dogs.

We know 90 Egyptian dog names. Egyptian texts added a pictogram of a dog as a determinative (which is not pronounced) to the name of a dog to make it clear that the name belongs to a dog. The Egyptians mummified venerated dogs after their death, especially in the Ptolemaic period. When King Kambýses II of Persia (530–520 BC) killed the sacred bull of Hapi, embodiment of the god Ptah at Memphis, nobody approached him only dogs.

The Egyptian god Anup (Greek Anubis) had a black jackal's head. He had healing powers, invented mummification, accompanied the soul to the underworld, participated in the ceremony of weighing the heart and opening the mouth, when the dead person was awakened and began a new life in the underworld. As Nebtadžeser (= Lord of the Holy Land) he defended the dead, the graves and cemeteries. The centre of Anup's cult was in the city of Kasa (Greek Kynopolis = Dog's City). It was the capital of the Upper Egyptian nome of Anpu. His symbol was a lying jackal. Anup's wife, the goddess Anput also had the form of a jackal. She was worshipped in the nome of Anpu. Sutech partly resembled a jackal. He was depicted with the black head of the hybrid animal *ša*. The god Chentejimentaju had the form of a lying black jackal. Another jackal god was Vepuaet. The god Duamutef also had a black jackal's head. The god Serapis, whose cult was introduced by Ptolemaios I (323–284 BC), connected Egypt with Greece. Hermanubis also had the head of a dog, although not always. In the Ptolemaic period, Anup merged with the Greek god Hermes (the Roman Mercury). The Greeks originally linked Hermes with Thovt. The god Anup or Hermanubis, identified with the Greek Hermes and Roman Mercury was overlaid by St. Christopher, the patron of travellers, pilgrims, ferrymen, sailors, soldiers and other people on the road. He took over the symbol and roles of this pagan god. Therefore he had a dog's head in Orthodox iconography.

Eset, the Greek Isis, was the most worshipped goddess in Egypt. She was connected with Sirius, originally the goddess Sopdet (Sothis in Greek). Many cultures in the northern hemisphere including East Asia and America, identified Sirius with the dog, wolf, coyote or fox. The Greeks already called Sirius the dog even before Homer, and the Romans called it *Canicula* meaning the Little Dog. The *Kalab Šamaš* (Dog of the Sun) was worshipped. The name *Kalbu* (Sumerian *mul. ur.gi*) designated the constellation of Hercules, which resembled a sitting dog. The Phoenicians called the star Sirius *HaNabeah*, which means the “Barker”. The Arabs called it *al-Kalb al ak-bar*, (= Great Dog). They also used the name *al-Šira* taken over from the Greeks. The Chinese called Sirius the Heavenly Wolf, and the Alaskan Inuit knew it as the Moon Wolf. Various Native American tribes also regarded it as a dog or coyote.

Mesopotamia (p. 224-246). From Mesopotamia we have depictions of sturdy, heavy dogs similar to the mastiff, and suitable for guard work and hunting. They preserved proverbs, sayings and comparisons about dogs in Sumerian and in Akkadian. The Sumerian symbol for dog *ur* and *ur-gi* represented the Akkadian word *kalbu(m)*, for example, *Kalbi-Sin*, *Kalbi-Šamaš*, *Kalbi-Marduk*. *Kalibum* (*Ga-li-bu-um*) seventh king in the first dynasty of Kish also had a dog name.

Some Mesopotamian gods had dogs. The Sumerian goddess Gula (Great) had the name Ninkarak in Babylon. She was responsible for healing, drink and food. She was depicted with a large dog. Marduk's animal was the snake *Mušchuššu*, but he was sometimes depicted with four dogs. They were *Ukkumu* (Holder), *Sukkulu* (devourer), *Ikšuda* (Catcher) and *Iltebu* (Pursuer). The gods Enlil, Enki, Damkin, Ningublu, Nindinugga and Ninkilim also had dogs. Lamaštu (Sumerian Dimme) was a female demon, who killed new-born babies. She was depicted with a dog or pig. A black dog indicated her presence.

Asia Minor (p. 247-257). The Hittites had dogs for guard work, hunting and looking after herds. Puppies, young dogs and figures of dogs as well as other animals were used in purification ceremonies. The dog was one of the main animals for sacrifices in Caria and Lydia. In Sardes they killed puppies and prepared ritual food from them. The Armenians believed that the invisible artalez had the form of dogs and could heal wounded warriors by licking wounds, or could even

raise them from the dead. *Siaw* (Black) was a dog of death and *Spitak* (White) was a dog of life. The centre of their cult was Tushpa (Van). We also have information about dogs (*klbt*) from Ugarit, mainly about hunting dogs.

Judaism (p. 258-285). Two dog graves from about 3500 BC found by archaeologists in Gilat and a large cemetery for dogs from the 5th century BC near Ashkelon testify to the ritual importance of dogs in the Levant. Since the Ashkelon cemetery was near a temple, the dogs were sacred and connected with the local healing cult of Rešep (Hebrew Rešef). Rešep was the Phoenician god of war, plague and healing. His name meant a blaze or threat, a metaphor for plague. In the Cypriot city of Kition, a temple was dedicated to Aštarte and Rešep Mikal. The temple was inhabited by dogs that were intended to help against fire, plague and illness. The Assyro-Babylonian parallel for Rešep was Nergal.

The dog (*kelev*) is mentioned 32 times in the Old Testament. The Old Testament Jews distinguished two types of dog: the ordinary dog, which helped look after herds and did guard work, was larger. The smaller country (*kufari*) dog resembled a jackal. Dogs were not allowed into homes, but only in the courtyard. Two Old Testament people had the name *Kaleb*. Jefon's (Hesron's) son *Kaleb* was one of the twelve spies sent by Moses to investigate Canaan.

The mentions of dogs in the Old Testament are mostly negative. There were many wandering dogs in the towns and countryside. Dogs threatened people with rabies. The Jewish religious and intellectual elite regarded dogs as half-wild, repulsive, dirty and with nasty habits. We also find rejection of dogs in later proverbs and sayings, Jewish folklore, superstitions about dogs and in the Talmud. The instruction for pulling a mandrake out of the ground is also an example of this attitude. A person who pulled the mandrake out of the ground killed it. Therefore a dog should do this work because it would not be harmed.

In the 14th century BC the minor rulers in Syria and Canaan were subject to Egypt. In correspondence with Pharaoh, found by archaeologists at Amarna, they humbly refer to themselves as dogs.

In the apocryphal Book of Tobit, a dog accompanies the Archangel Raphael, patron of doctors, healers and pharmacists.

Christianity (p. 286-308). For Christians, pagans were dogs, who would not get into the Kingdom of God. Thus dog became a term of abuse. But Christians could not do without dogs. Especially hunting dogs were popular in the Middle Ages. Instruction books on hunting, advice on the breeding of dogs and instructions on how to transfer illness from person to dog were written. Sometimes, monks and nuns also had dogs. Collections called bestiaries were written for a combination of entertainment and instruction. They comprise short texts about real and fictional animals drawing on Classical, Egyptian, Indian and Jewish sources.

A dog was an attribute of various saints. Saint Roch of Montpellier (14th century) lived in a forest. A dog licked his plague sores and brought him food from Gotard's table. St. Guinefort was a dog, which also healed after his death.

People believed that a dog could see ghosts, gods, angels and demons and warn against them, foresee and announce the death of relations, friends or the condemned, as well as epidemics and other disasters. A black dog was a form of the devil, a companion of witches and wizards. The devil in the form of a black dog allegedly helped Pope Silvester II and the scholar Albert the Great, who were suspected of witchcraft. It also accompanied the alchemist Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa and Johann Georg Faust. The black dog appeared in many places in England, especially on the east coast and islands. People feared spectral and ghost dogs.

Islam (p. 309-333). Moslems disliked dogs, avoided them and did not take care of them. Dog, in Arabic *Kalb* became a term of abuse for Moslems. The Mamluk Sultan Al-Nasir Muhammad

(1285–1341) had many hunting dogs. The Mogul Jalal ud-din Muhammad Akbar (1542–1605) was a great lover of dogs.

The dog is mentioned only three times in the Koran. Only the later collections of Muhammad's statements, views and actions called hadiths regard the dog as unclean so that a vessel licked by a dog needed to be washed several times. A dog that came close to a believer devalued his prayer. Islam took over the old superstition about the black dog that is actually the devil. We find in the hadiths not only scorn and appeals to kill dogs, but also examples of mercy towards them. Moslems had guard dogs, hunting dogs and dogs that assisted herdsmen.

The Persian author Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn al Marzuban wrote a collection of stories and poems *Book on the superiority of dogs over many of those who wear clothes*. He mentions good and bad characteristics of dogs. He contrasts the dog's faithfulness and sincere expressions of affection with human falsity and hypocrisy of people. The Arab story about Majnun and Layla praises the dog.

Persia and India (p. 334-346). Before Islam, the Persians regarded the dog as the highest creature after man. Therefore, people who treated dogs badly were threatened with severe penalties. The whole of chapter 13 and part of chapter 15 of the Persian text *Vendidad (Videvdad)*, which is part of the Avesta, is devoted to dogs. Breeding of Indian dogs was very widespread in Persia.

The dog is unclean for Hindus. Saramá, who accompanied the god of storms and rain Indra, had the nickname "bitch of the gods". She was the mother of all dogs. The god of thunder and hunting Rudra, known as the "lord of dogs", also had a dog or wolf. One of the forms of Śiva was Bhaurava, the god connected with death Bhairava. A dog or wolf also accompanied him. Dogs can enter his temples. Other Hindu deities also had their dogs. Dogs were one of the means of healing. Rudra was another of Śiva's forms. He was not only a god of storms, thunder, rain and hunting, but also a "doctor of doctors". He was accompanied by a dog with a wide mouth. Some Indian stories emphasize the great loyalty of the dog. King Yudhishthira encountered such loyalty from a dog when he was seeking final salvation. Another Indian story tells how the hunter Ugravira killed his faithful dog by mistake as a result of hastiness.

Conclusion (p. 347-351). Many nations associated the dog with death and the underworld. The Finns had the underworld dog Manalan-Rakki. The Lapps had Rutu's dogs, spirits of death. The Greenland Inuit buried dogs with the dead. The Eskimos placed a dog's head on a child's grave. The Mari and Mordvin of the Volga region gave the dead sticks, so that they could resist the canine ghosts. The Komi-Permyaks believed that after death the soul would first meet a dog. The Chuvash believed that the soul would whip the black dog and so get to the underworld. At a funeral feast they fed dogs because the dead came on the tip of their muzzles. After death, the Irkutsk Tofalar had to cross an abyss on a thin rope and then go through a village inhabited by canine souls. Dead Tuvvin people had to feed black dogs, which guarded the entrance to the underworld. Dogs also guarded the world of the dead among the Selkups and a dog guided the souls of the Amur Nanay and Selkup peoples. The Sakhalin Oroks believed that a dog protects the hunter on the way to the next world. The Nivkhs by the Sea of Okhotsk, Chukci of Chukotka, Koryaks of Kamchatka, Yukaghir, Ainu, Manchurians, Alaskan Athabaskan and Yupik peoples also had dogs in the after-life or underworld. Native Americans had similar beliefs. The Tlingits of Canada had a heaven for dogs. The North American Shawnee and Menominee had to cross a river bridge after death guarded by a huge dog, lord of all the earthly dogs and wolves. Many other indigenous tribes from North, Central and South America had similar myths, which are mentioned by the author.

The connection of the dog, wolf, jackal or coyote with birth, death and the underworld had a great and similar role in the religious ideas of many nations. The author of the book considers the cause of this universal position of the dog in human mythology. He wants to know where this agreement and similarity comes from. There may be two answers given by research up to now.

People in different parts of the world had similar experiences with dogs and their wild relations, so they thought about them in similar ways. This similar thinking led to the same or similar ideas. The alternative is that these ideas arose before humanity divided into separate cultural regions and perhaps even language families, so they could have a common beginning. Apart from this, the author considers it probable that Indo-European mythology of the earliest times had two dogs, one white or golden and the other black. The white dog had to lead people to the light and the black dog to the underworld. The dog stands on the boundary between animals and people, between nature and civilization. Therefore, the dog also guarded the mythical boundary between the world of the living and the world of the dead.

Bibliography (p. 352-400). The list of sources and literature is very rich and almost all the cited works are in foreign languages.

List of illustrations (p. 401-404). The author has placed 40 illustrations in the book. The list gives their chronological order, size and other information as well as the place where the original is found. The authors and sources from which illustrations come are precisely cited.

The index (p. 405-414) includes the names of people, animals, gods and mythical figures mentioned in the book.

Summary (p. 415-416). The book ends with a brief summary in English.

Peter Bystrický has collected, studied and mastered a large source base and a respectable quantity of expert literature. He has taken an interest not only in written sources, but also in artistic and sculptural works, depictions on coins and archaeological research. We have only some smaller comments. We find Ugarit, situated in northern Syria, in the chapter on "Asia Minor" (p. 255-257). The author could have created a chapter with the title "Levant" or "Syria and Palestine" and placed Ugarit there together with the archaeological finds from Gilat and Ashkelon (p. 258-260), the Canaanite and Phoenician cult of Rešep (p. 259-260) and dogs in the correspondence of the minor Canaanite and Syrian rulers with the Egyptian Pharaohs Amenhotep III and Amenhotep IV (p. 279-281), which he has placed in the chapter on "Judaism", although they are not connected with Judaism. Statements from the Talmud (p. 276-278) do not automatically relate to ancient Israel. The mythical ideas about dogs from Eastern Europe, Siberia and America (p. 347-350) do not belong in the conclusion but should be in a separate chapter. The conclusion should be evaluative and generalizing.

Peter Bystrický has put into his book related information from various ends of the Earth, and presented the co-existence of people and dogs over a long time period of several millennia as an important cultural phenomenon.

Ján Steinhübel

HLAVAČKOVÁ, Miriam. *JURAJ ZO SCHÖNBERGU. Bratislavský prepoš v službach cisára a kráľa. (GEORGE OF SCHÖNBERG. Provost of Bratislava in the service of Emperor and King)*. Bratislava : HÚ SAV, 2015, 296 pages. ISBN 9788022414739.

Miriam Hlavačková has established herself as a leading expert in research into late medieval cultural history. Her research organically connects Church history, the history of learning and the history of everyday life. Her previous monograph on the Bratislava Chapter already indicated her potential to present the destinies of important medieval personalities in the wider Central European context. In it, she already took an interest in George of Schönberg, who was closely connected with

Bratislava for several decades as provost of an important ecclesiastical institution – the Bratislava Chapter. The position of Bratislava on the frontier with the Austrian Lands and especially its closeness to Vienna gave George of Schönberg quick access to important and accurate information. Since he had theological and legal training, he knew how to orient himself in complex times. Although he was not of aristocratic origin, he became an honoured diplomat in the service of the Habsburg Emperor Frederick III and surprisingly also of King Matthias Corvinus of Hungary, although relations between these two monarchs were strained in some periods. It is possible to say that he gradually became an excellent mediator, who could make peace even in very complex and difficult matters. For example, he mediated the return of the Crown of St. Stephen, which the Emperor Frederick was holding and so blocking the coronation of Matthias Corvinus.

Miriam Hlavačková has divided her monograph into 13 chapters. In the first, she attempts to approach Schönberg's youth although no relevant information on it has survived. However, it is certain that thanks to his relation John Paul von Maiers licentiate of canon law and chancellor in the Austrian chancellery, the 15 – 16 year old George could have begun to study at Vienna University in 1446. The author analyses the methods of study at a medieval university. His interest in the study of law also suggests that he studied in Rome although concrete evidence has not survived. It is interesting that Schönberg did not pursue quick ordination into the high clergy. He even asked the Pope to delay his ordination because he was occupied providing services to secular rulers.

Thanks to close contacts with the King of Hungary Ladislav V the Posthumous, Schönberg became provost of the Bratislava Chapter at the relatively young age of about 25. This made him a prelate in the Church. In the second chapter, the author gives basic information on the origin and significance of this old collegiate foundation. She deals with its structure and functioning as well as with Provost George's close contacts with the representatives of the town.

In the third chapter, the author acquaints the reader with the diplomatic activities of Provost Schönberg in the service of the Roman Curia. Popes Calixtus III and Pius II were striving to organize a coalition of Christian countries with the aim of pushing the Ottoman Empire out of Europe. These diplomatic activities of Provost George of Schönberg did not achieve anything concrete. Rome showed its appreciation of George's activities by granting him the title apostolic protonotarius, which he used until his death.

In the fourth chapter, the author traces the dramatic circumstances associated with the coming of King Ladislav V to Prague in 1457, and the organizing of a delegation to France to ask for the hand in marriage of Magdalena daughter of King Charles VII of France for Ladislav, and to bring the bride to Bohemia. The ambassadors empowered to conclude the marriage treaty included representatives of all the countries ruled by Ladislav. The delegation also included the Provost of Bratislava George of Schönberg. We learn about the circumstances of the sudden death of Ladislav V, his funeral, the departure of the ambassadors from Paris on the last day of 1457 and their return journey, about the internment of Matthias Corvinus in Prague and his election as King of Hungary, about the succession disputes after the death of Ladislav V, and about the conclusion of a peace treaty between Matthias Corvinus and Frederick III, ratified at Wiener Neustadt and Sopron on 17–19 July 1463.

The fifth chapter presents Provost George of Schönberg as a close adviser and member of the Austrian Chancellery of the Emperor Frederick III, but it was not the only one. There was also the so-called "Roman" chancellery, which dealt with the affairs of the Holy Roman Empire. George was ever more frequently entrusted with various diplomatic and political matters by the Emperor, who gave the leading positions in both chancelleries to educated Church dignitaries, who lectured in the Faculty of Canon Law of Vienna University or served as judges in the chamber court. Provost Schönberg experienced dramatic moments during the siege of the Hofburg in Vienna, where the Emperor was in residence. Provost George joined the defenders of the Hofburg,

although clergymen were not allowed to use weapons. However, George avoided this prohibition by putting his provost's habit over his armour. As a loyal supporter of the Emperor Frederick III, George was imprisoned and tortured by the Habsburg Duke Albrecht VI. The burgers of Vienna had to compensate him for this.

In the following sixth chapter, the author presents Provost George of Schönberg as the organizer of the reconstruction of the chancel of St. Martin's Minster (today's Cathedral). The short chancel of the original church had to be demolished and rebuilt in the elaborate Late Gothic style. George succeeded in carrying out this project. An important act of King Matthias Corvinus of Hungary was his request to Pope Paul II in 1465 that a university be established in the Kingdom of Hungary. Although George of Schönberg was not initially a member of the closest group of supporters, he very promptly joined in the organizational work connected with establishing the Istropolitana University, and he worked in it from the beginning of its teaching activity in 1467. He entirely naturally became the vice chancellor of the new university. However, he did not give up his links with the Austrian court. He remained an adviser to the Emperor, and in the end, the King of Hungary also profited from this. The author also devoted attention to his journeys to Rome. She found in the Vatican Secret Archive a request from Provost George in 1466 for permission to wear pontifical insignia – mitre, crosier and ring when celebrating Mass or taking part in processions in St. Martin's Minster, as well as a request for the granting of indulgences for the Chapel of St. Mary and the Holy Trinity in St. Martin's Minster in Bratislava in the diocese of Esztergom, which he founded and endowed himself.

The seventh chapter traces the activities of the Bratislava provost as vice chancellor of the Istropolitana University in connection with the establishment and successful functioning of this new educational institution.

The eighth chapter presents George Peltel of Schönberg as a humanist and bibliophile, tracing the fate of his library and the latest discoveries connected with it.

In the following ninth chapter, the author uncovers the background to the war between Hungary and Bohemia. She comments on the results of the diplomatic journeys of Provost George undertaken on behalf of King Matthias of Hungary to the courts of German princes with the aim of securing their support in a great alliance against Bohemia. She also deals with George's role in organizing an assembly of imperial princes at Landshut in November 1468 and the beginning of their discussions in March of the following year.

Chapter nine brings the reader an account of the talks between Matthias Corvinus and George of Poděbrady in Olomouc, as well as a further demanding task for George of Schönberg, namely securing the smooth course of talks between Matthias Corvinus and Frederick III in Vienna.

The tenth chapter traces the struggle of Matthias Corvinus for the Czech crown, which overlapped with a succession dispute about the Duchy of Głogów, where events in the period 1476–1482 representing a mixture of inheritance, feudal and marital problems, brought no satisfaction for any of the participants.

Matthias Corvinus entrusted the negotiations to George of Schönberg. George was a diplomat with two masters in this period, but this was not unusual in the 15th century, when able clergymen served two or more masters at the same time as advisers or spokesmen. This became problematic if a military conflict broke out between the masters, and the adviser had to decide which side to support. This also happened to George of Schönberg, when Matthias Corvinus declared war on the Emperor Frederick III on 12 June 1477. George became a mediator between the two sides as is presented in chapter 11.

Provost George gave up his post as provost in Wetzlar. His strength was apparently declining and he gave priority to Bratislava and the Istropolitana University. Provost George certainly had difficulty putting up with the intrigues and complaints against him from half his canons in the

Bratislava Chapter. A court in Buda described half the members of the chapter as guilty of intrigues and falsification. At the same time, it is interesting that all the complainers came from the territory of the Kingdom of Hungary. These problems may have shortened the life of the provost. His last mission was a journey to Switzerland at the end of 1485, but the planned talks ended only after his death in May 1487.

The last chapter is named with a quotation from the gravestone of George of Schönberg in the Chapel of St. Anne in St. Martin's Minster in Bratislava: "*Behold, I was once a famous Church dignitary...*" It is a sort of postscript or consideration of death and its perception in the Middle Ages, but especially an indication of historical attention to the grave of this important man of his time.

Miriam Hlavačková's monograph on the Provost of Bratislava and Papal Protonotarius George of Schönberg deserves attention from the expert historical public. She presents an important personality from the Late Middle Ages in a cultivated and expert way. Thanks to study visits to Vienna and Rome, she has substantially deepened our knowledge of the Church dignitary, diplomat, lawyer, professor and vice chancellor of the Istropolitana University George of Schönberg from neighbouring Lower Austria, who certainly felt at home in Bratislava.

Ján Lukačka

NEW VOLUMES IN THE SERIES OF COMPREHENSIVE WORKS ON SLOVAKIA IN THE 20TH CENTURY

FERENČUHOVÁ, Bohumila – ZEMKO, Milan (eds.). *V MEDZIVOJNOVOM ČESKOSLOVENSKU 1918 – 1939. (IN INTER-WAR CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1918–1939).*

Bratislava : Veda, Vydavateľstvo Slovenskej akadémie vied, 2012, 543 strán.

ISBN 9788022411998;

HRADSKÁ, Katarína – KAMENEC, Ivan (eds.). *SLOVENSKÁ REPUBLIKA 1939 – 1945.*

(THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC OF 1939–1945). Bratislava : Veda, Vydavateľstvo Slovenskej akadémie vied, 2015, 477 strán. ISBN 9788022413510.

In the period 2012–2015 the third and fourth volumes were published in the History Institute's ambitious long-term project to produce a series on Slovakia in the 20th century. The project aims to map all the key aspects of the most recent history of Slovakia in the form of a synthesis of the most recent findings. The third volume is concerned with the extraordinarily important epoch of the inter-war Czechoslovak state and the place of Slovakia within it. From the chronological point of view, the work is defined on one side by the circumstances of the origin of Czechoslovakia in October 1918, and on the other by its forcible break up in March 1939. As the authors of this work already note, its content is based mainly on the results of historical research after 1989. A multitude of ideologically unburdened works have appeared since 1989 concerned with the most varied problems of inter-war Czechoslovakia or Czecho-Slovakia after the end of November 1938. The authors chose the chronological approach for the basic structuring of the individual chapters, but also accepted the thematic point of view. The object of their interest is not only the political development of Slovakia in this period, but also a wide range of problems from different spheres of Slovak life. These are covered by independent chapters on changes in Slovak society, the develop-

ment of education and culture, or the economy in the relevant period. Apart from this, the themes are placed in their wider context and analysed against the background of the dramatic international-political development in the inter-war period. Independent chapters are also devoted to these aspects, which is understandable in relation to the fact that the growing tension on the international scene also determined the position of Czechoslovakia and had a fatal impact on its existence at the end of the 1930s. However, it is a pity that the authors did not devote a little more space to the development of specific positions and initiatives in the military and security field. In this context it would be necessary to give more details of how the position of the territory of Slovakia changed in the second half of the 1930s in the military – strategic conception of the construction and supposed use of the Czechoslovak army in the event of a threat to the integrity of the Czechoslovak Republic. A comprehensive strategic plan for the defence of the republic was adopted in 1934. It changed the military significance of Slovakia. Modification of this strategic plan required great financial expense for the building of armaments factories in Slovakia, continuous fortifications along almost all the frontiers of Czechoslovakia and so on.

The military-political aspects are often only briefly outlined in the work, for example, in the case of problems concerning the battles for Slovakia. Only minimal attention is devoted to the battles of the Czechoslovak army with the Hungarian Soviet Republic or to the origin and existence of the Slovak Soviet Republic. Events are also inaccurately interpreted, when the authors state that the Hungarian army retreated under pressure from Czechoslovak units (p. 58). The sharp reaction of the Entente, which sent threats from the negotiating table of the Paris peace conference to the Hungarian communist government, that there would be armed intervention if it did not withdraw its forces is not emphasized here. The work also gives only minimal attention to the actions of the Czechoslovak Army Corps in Russia. It was the largest component of the Czechoslovak army abroad and its foreign travels were completed only at the end of 1920.

Apart from these small shortcomings, the whole work is conceptually balanced in spite of its relatively wide group of authors. Where the question of the direction of Slovak history is concerned, development is not evaluated on the basis of simplified nationalist criteria, according to which the inter-war period was only a continuation of the emancipation struggle of the Slovaks leading to the declaration of their own state. Czecho – Slovak relations are not perceived from the position of hegemon – oppressed, but in the whole breadth of their complexity, as is shown by the space the work devotes to internal political questions and conflicts, changes of political development in a widely structured political spectrum in conditions of a democratic regime. In this context, the authors also evaluate the actual existence of Czechoslovakia, emphasizing its democratic character, a contribution from the point of view of formation of the Slovak nation. On the other hand, the authors do not idealize the situation in inter-war Czechoslovakia. They devote great attention to its inadequacies, which determined the relations between the two state-forming nations, and to the efforts to overcome these problems.

The fourth volume connects with its predecessor from the conceptual point of view, but, on the other hand, this is not always clear as a result of the equally wide range of authors for Slovak conditions. Especially when we consider that the history of the Slovak Republic of 1939–1945 considered in this volume is still one of the most discussed and controversial themes in Slovak historiography. It is immediately necessary to point here to the rather unsatisfactory title of the work *The Slovak Republic of 1939–1945*, which more or less fulfils a marketing role, since it appears to push to the margin of interest a further range of relevant problems concerning the existence of the Czechoslovak struggle in exile and the participation of Slovaks in it, as well as the position of the Slovaks in the territory given to Hungary by the Vienna Arbitration. However, these questions are considered in the work, specifically in the eighth and ninth chapters.

When conceiving the work, its compilers logically chose a similar approach to the previous volumes in the series. From the chronological point of view, the work is framed by the chapter on the origin of the Slovak state and the second chapter analysing the German occupation regime in the final phase of the existence of the Slovak Republic. The other chapters are divided thematically with independent attention devoted to foreign policy, the political system, internal political development, Slovak society including a section on the so-called solution of the Jewish question, the economy, and the military problem, which has its own chapter in contrast to the previous volume. Independent attention is also logically devoted to resistance activity, and as already mentioned to the life of the Slovaks in the territories added to Hungary. This thematic approach is logical and gives clarity to the work. On the other hand, in relation to the fact that individual chapters are chronologically limited only by the end of the Slovak state in 1945, the authors have not avoided the repetition of the same information in some places, especially in the final chapter about the occupation regime in Slovakia. Apart from this, repetition of the same information can also be traced in other places in relation to the thematic division. As an example, it is possible to mention chapters III and IV, concerned with the related problems of the political system and regime of the Slovak Republic. The relatedness of sub-chapter III/5 and IV/3 is problematic, since both are concerned with the role of Hlinka's Slovak People's Party as the state-party, which is already contained in their titles. The inclusion of the first chapter *Origin of the Slovak state* in this volume is also problematic from this point of view because a chapter with practically the same name concludes the previous volume. From the point of view of proportional balance between quantity and quality of the information provided in the synthesis, it is clear that in some places the authors more or less directly used their already published scientific works. Since the quality of their adaptation to the published texts is not always appropriate, the results are larger or smaller disproportions in the conceptions of individual chapters. This means inadequacies in the selection of relevant information. However, it is necessary to bear in mind the fact that the work is intended for the wider range of readers. In relation to the prescribed extent of the work, less important facts were unintentionally given priority in some cases at the expense of those important for understanding the relevant problem.

It is possible to give the example of the second chapter on the foreign policy of Slovakia. The disproportionality in working out the relevant questions in the foreign policy of Slovakia is already clear from the structure of the individual sub-chapters. In the reviewer's opinion, the author already devoted too much attention in the introductory parts to the building up of a Slovak foreign service and the process of diplomatic recognition of Slovakia. On the basis of this he even states the "*foreign policy situation of the Slovak Republic was essentially good*" (p. 46), while the satellite status of Slovakia in relation to Nazi Germany as legalized in the form of a treaty of protection, is covered in detail only in the fifth sub-chapter on relations between Slovakia and Germany. On the other hand, on p. 49 the author states in conflict with reality that the Slovak government signed the treaty of protection only under the threat of Hungarian attack, which he connects with the so-called little war. German pressure resulting from its position of hegemony in Central Europe is not mentioned at all. In connection with the Hungarian – Slovak armed conflict, the author illogically states that without German intervention there would have been war. In connection with the analysis of the treaty of protection, the author devotes hardly any attention to its application in practice in the form of dragging Slovakia into the war against Poland, and not even in the sub-chapter on Slovak – Polish relations. The actual sub-chapter on German – Slovak relations has less than four pages. For comparison, the author devotes approximately the same space to analysing the formal process of diplomatic recognition of the Slovak Republic, while the sub-chapter on relations between Slovakia and the USSR is about a third longer. In the sub-chapter on the "*foreign policy of the Slovak state in the final phase of its existence*", the author gives a page of detailed comments on

various declarations, considerations and conceptions from diplomats of the Slovak foreign service related to the worsening foreign policy position of the Slovak Republic, but there is no mention of the activity of the minister of national defence General F. Čatloš and the memorandum he sent to Moscow in August 1944. This document represents the only realized attempt by a representative of the Slovak government to detach Slovakia from Germany and go over to the side of the Allies as the Eastern Front approached. Fortunately, this information does appear in other chapters. The reader also learns nothing about the attempts of the Slovak government to withdraw Slovak military units from the fronts of the Second World War in the years 1943–1944. These questions are not covered even in the separate chapter on the army. The initiative of the government in this field was part of its foreign policy effort to minimize its engagement in the war on the side of Germany at a time when defeat was becoming ever more inevitable.

Another example of the disproportionate approach in the selection of published information is the sub-chapter on the Hungarian – Slovak armed conflict in the chapter on the armed forces. Its extent in terms of pages is comparable to the size of the sub-chapter on the participation of the Slovak army on the fronts of the Second World War, which undoubtedly deserve several times more space, both from the chronological and thematic points of view.

It is also possible to comment on the lack of unity in the use of expert terminology in connection with an effort to more closely classify the Ľudák dictatorship. Some authors of texts describe the regime of the Slovak Republic as no more than “autoritatívny”, a word not usually applied to regimes in Slovak, while others use the term “totalitarian”. At the same time, the lack of clarity around the typological assignment of the political system and regime in this work also indirectly uncovers the still persisting disputes associated with the effort to theoretically define it. However, it is also to some degree a result of lack of interest in study of the theoretical foundations of the researched phenomenon and their application in the form of the theory of totalitarianism, which can be used as an instrument of historical science in the analysis of political regimes. Apart from this, the term “autoritatívny” already appears problematic. In recent works it has been understood more or less as a search for a way out of an internal crisis of democracy, as a sort of third way between democracy and dictatorship, where a lesser degree of violence is also acceptable. However, the problem lies in how such an “autoritatívny” regime was understood by its creators at the time and not only in Slovakia. For democratic regimes, it became a sort of symbol of a system that falsifies and misuses “authority”, and this meaning became established. The word “authority” in this term acquired a pejorative meaning. The difference of meaning is only slight, but it is more accurate to use the term “autoritársky” (authoritarian) rather than “autoritatívny” in this context. Various foreign theorists of democracy or political scientists have already observed the need to distinguish between these terms.

In spite of these comments, both works represent an important contribution to the presentation of the latest findings of Slovak historiography. They fulfil the basic aim of the whole series on 20th century history, namely making these findings accessible to the wider reading public in an attractive, freer style. It is especially necessary to appreciate the integrated conceptual approach by the teams of authors, their effort to interpret Slovak history in its whole breadth and dynamism with regard to foreign policy development in this especially dramatic and ground-breaking period of the 20th century.

Igor Baka


DANIELA DVOŘÁKOVÁ

BARBARA VON CILLI

Die Schwarze Königin

(1392 – 1451)

*Die Lebensgeschichte einer ungarischen,
römisch-deutschen und böhmischen Königin*



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